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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 2026-03-10 19:34:57 UTC
Duration 4.2s
Version v26.35.35
Integrity 099ad38e0c86a4c9092983489119b43458c696cf55fc7267d0e3142031f7efd297af3c3077514d5579cba1695416e8fa6336576c7204e0f54246efe2a2b4f2a8
Subject Domain
dns-observe.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

dns-observe.com
2026-03-10 19:34:57 UTC · 4.2s ·v26.35.35 · SHA-3-512: 099a✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
4 protocols configured, 5 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 81/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
CAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high CAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for dns-observe.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Hostinger — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ns1.dns-parking.com
Serial 2026030501
Admin dns.hostinger.com
Provider Hostinger
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10000s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry2400sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Configured
Recommended
Add DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) for visibility into email authentication
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM (not applicable — no-mail domain), CAA
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC
Priority Action Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
HOSTINGER operations, UAB
Registrar for dns-observe.com
Email Service Provider
No Mail Domain
No-Mail Domain — Fully Hardened
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No null MX indicates no-mail domain
No-Mail Domain — Fully Hardened 3/3 controls
This domain declares it does not send or receive email and has all three RFC-recommended controls in place: Null MX (RFC 7505), SPF -all (RFC 7208), and DMARC reject (RFC 7489).
DMARC reject (RFC 7489) Null MX (RFC 7505) SPF -all (RFC 7208)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all

Valid SPF (no mail allowed) - domain declares it sends no email

v=spf1 -all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;
Alignment: SPF strict DKIM strict sp=reject
No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Not Discoverable

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No valid MX hosts — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success IODEF

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - specific CAs authorized (wildcard issuance: Amazon per RFC 8659 §4.3)

0 issuewild "amazon.com"
0 iodef "mailto:hello@it-help.tech"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

Could not fetch security.txt

Fetch error: Connection failed
A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No significant AI surface findings

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives
No robots.txt found
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns2.dns-parking.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns2.dns-parking.com, ns1.dns-parking.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns1.dns-parking.com No N/A N/A OK
ns2.dns-parking.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns1.dns-parking.com: 2026030501
ns2.dns-parking.com: 2026030501
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for dns-observe.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns2.dns-parking.com 162.159.25.42 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:192a AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		0
ns1.dns-parking.com 162.159.24.201 2400:cb00:2049:1::a29f:18c9 AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		0
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
2
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 2 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No MX records found

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — No MX records found for this domain
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Info

No IP addresses to look up

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.dns-parking.com ns2.dns-parking.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

No A records
Domain may use AAAA (IPv6) only or CNAME

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

0 .
Null MX RFC 7505
Domain explicitly does not accept email

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: No direct IP Mail: Null MX (no mail) Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? None found
How did we find these?

No subdomains found via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS probing, or CNAME chain traversal for this domain. No TLS certificates have been issued and no common service names resolve for subdomains of dns-observe.com.

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
0 iodef "mailto:hello@it-help.tech"
0 iodef "mailto:hello@it-help.tech"
0 issuewild "amazon.com"
0 issuewild "amazon.com"
DMARC _dmarc.dns-observe.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 .
0 .
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
ns1.dns-parking.com.
ns2.dns-parking.com.
ns2.dns-parking.com.
ns1.dns-parking.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns1.dns-parking.com. dns.hostinger.com. 2026030501 10000 2400 604800 600
ns1.dns-parking.com. dns.hostinger.com. 2026030501 10000 2400 604800 600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=spf1 -all
v=spf1 -all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

099ad38e0c86a4c9092983489119b43458c696cf55fc7267d0e3142031f7efd297af3c3077514d5579cba1695416e8fa6336576c7204e0f54246efe2a2b4f2a8
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 2026-03-10 19:34:57 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-dns-observe.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-dns-observe.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-dns-observe.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-dns-observe.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/7186/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for dns-observe.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short dns-observe.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.dns-observe.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.dns-observe.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.dns-observe.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.dns-observe.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.dns-observe.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer dns-observe.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd dns-observe.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.dns-observe.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.dns-observe.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.dns-observe.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.dns-observe.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/dns-observe.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.dns-observe.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://dns-observe.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://dns-observe.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://dns-observe.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4844 runs
DKIM
Verified 4664 runs
DMARC
Verified 4829 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4647 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4826 runs
BIMI
Verified 4663 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4666 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4668 runs
CAA
Verified 4660 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short dns-observe.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.dns-observe.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.dns-observe.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.dns-observe.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.dns-observe.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.dns-observe.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer dns-observe.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd dns-observe.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.dns-observe.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.dns-observe.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.dns-observe.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.dns-observe.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer dns-observe.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/dns-observe.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.dns-observe.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://dns-observe.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://dns-observe.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://dns-observe.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

dns-observe.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.