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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 2026-04-20T16:05:55Z
Duration 16.8s
Version v26.48.08
Integrity 9afc10050617dc18ea4293d26a5c2cb613250e2def836a938b3f0c6b4e1d4821ffa980c56c5a899128bfecb3fab8fccb3a454b2feab27fda8ccb1af188cbb44d
Subject Domain
wisestamp.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

wisestamp.com
2026-04-20T16:05:55Z · 16.8s ·v26.48.08 · SHA-3-512: 9afc✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Google Workspace 6 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
3 protocols configured, 5 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions
Enterprise Traffic Engineering Detected DNS-based Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB)

This domain uses short TTLs across 3 record types (A record at 48s), consistent with DNS-based traffic management (GSLB). Enterprises operating large anycast networks intentionally use short TTLs to enable rapid failover, geographic steering, and load distribution. This is a deliberate infrastructure choice, not a misconfiguration. RFC 1035 §3.2.1 permits any TTL value the zone administrator selects. The findings below reflect deviation from typical values for reference, not necessarily actionable recommendations for this class of infrastructure.

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from typical values. For domains using DNS-based traffic management, short TTLs are expected and intentional.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
MX 48s 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 48s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 48s 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 48s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 12283s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 12283s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 1788s 1 hour (3600s) medium SOA TTL is below typical — observed 1788s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: Cloudflare manages SOA timers automatically. Free/Pro/Business plans cannot modify SOA values. Observed TTL (1788s) is set by Cloudflare, not the zone administrator. See RFC 1912 §2.2 for recommended SOA timer values.
TXT 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • This domain runs short TTLs across multiple record types. Does it operate a global anycast network where DNS-based traffic steering justifies the query volume?
  • Are the short TTLs enabling active failover, geographic routing, or load distribution — or are they leftover from a migration that was never reverted?
  • Enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure (sub-5ms authoritative response times, globally distributed nameservers) absorbs short-TTL query volume. Would your authoritative DNS handle the same load?
Tune TTL for wisestamp.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Cloudflare — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS kaiser.ns.cloudflare.com
Serial 2401825046
Admin dns.cloudflare.com
Provider Cloudflare
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10000s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry2400sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)1800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s). Cloudflare's anycast architecture reduces the practical risk, but this value departs from the RFC recommendation.
RFC 1912 §2.2

Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

SOA Expire below RFC 1912 recommendation RFC 1912 §2.2

Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.

Below RFC recommendation
Proxied record TTLs fixed at 300s RFC 2181 §5.2

Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.

Technically compliant, but overrides administrator intent
Non-standard SOA serial format RFC 1912 §2.2

RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.

Compliant with RFC 1035, deviates from RFC 1912 convention
Negative cache TTL delays new records RFC 2308 §5

Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.

RFC-compliant, but causes real-world automation failures
Historical RFC 2181 §5.2 violation: TTL mismatch in CNAME RRsets RFC 2181 §5.2

In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.

Was a documented RFC violation — appears resolved
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.wisestamp.com (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://wisestamp.com/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostwisestamp.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.wisestamp.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@wisestamp.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.wisestamp.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=wisestamp.com
RFC 8461
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Google Workspace
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Cloudflare
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 5/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 5/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:customeriomail.com include:outbound.smtp.wisestamp.net include:_spf.google.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:stspg-customer.com -all
RFC 7489: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400;rua=mailto:xd1fyuq3@ag.eu.dmarcian.com;ruf=mailto:xd1fyuq3@fr.eu.dmarcian.com
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=reject
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 6 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

default._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDxd75Cr6wrlq+FJQMbFOrCQYXsrzo9onmNpJdpDhOQcsFY3a4NdOMaHg+uKE024ic1qFqiAYYKW5hNau9zef+EN7xQxFuNeOEs4kjB1My8wIjCpq4dUUILPERFL5fMrY1AbRpoozaNvSyr85M2Ec1pgdyhyg0YBrip0NEGB6ijkQIDAQAB;
google._domainkey Google Workspace 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAjd4MdvK2gNBZyJ4EYR1vk+i8XFq6BfttZRGiRiihRwixc5sCZNg6M8mSN5KqyxtyyFltLp9+PxF1oaQ9HVcUWyE4JSB01oiqzSC002Ku90LlsJxLwHugocg2rHAoR5Z9HTUY8cLaQFXqv58jCtombUdaoTcmCeh01S13GJxnifalVBhP00U7fKDcVF42GYS9OK0VmKA0EHXjmhsVV50yszBgHzgEYOUhpYSq/gTIsZj5tlqo6C7tpmBwkohKZ9h9UHVt/UGc8Ol510Vkq7kAxWXq++ALnPzOPu1cggoPSua/ZG36tNzWXLCAXEJ7SAusFSs+Xh50zppNI9V/GecnUQIDAQAB
intercom._domainkey Intercom 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC6Qu3CCcOCb2e8V+va32rNwuWe0VzwhwcUSdOfG70guW5XEvyjT4cbYRRXntW54AUKT4bNiMAq9+nKLXVMJ28E9TpeJjn4NPe0uOmjUWPY+74eM0ayezbRuTRW97BjFWS60NZdK3IFu1N2/mN19J6y39ge7HeISc1/K44W1Og9EwIDAQAB
s1._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAy7qN2KxVc2MYAbiRi5QdAPKpVkbRvWTB2/EoYTDmxNMx6zLihqxaMaA2P6slw7N9uJZxPf9btdGl1pXR9XLr78KK1rCB1BJloG/8nyAyInsO/QiT0z57h0xRhahoIrAqlmuwu4wVOPn5jlZafgsGR8xPv2bLzdePzzTEZbN2DfUpKJKa9XgORHUEX9uOCuPEtzE/rkFHDXrafsyk1rQDV0pa58n1BQ7efzuGdXlr1xhuBdSuXwaWr7bNqr7GGAGMULRzI/UhzjKYMpZn6YaFXpyBCWAiLOfGQc7KkfckGLndfVZEdipniwp/mvC4u8+CsRa6i236SRck6PkHbpuWvwIDAQAB
s2._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDfoFI8BCAzf9vVofTpF5ymOpTn/PuRU/htQTEtyDX79/nGzovPEmgnQ2uuAc0dfCAgBjUBGJxt2TWPcQ/KwE9W0InEv2xuZcNROJiwrRgQKXNk+1i2rNfPjk1K5PFC26+yRITnDBfGe03817aWHeAGrH+E7bfxPbaLyQOa8NvKBQIDAQAB
smtpapi._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDPtW5iwpXVPiH5FzJ7Nrl8USzuY9zqqzjE0D1r04xDN6qwziDnmgcFNNfMewVKN2D1O+2J9N14hRprzByFwfQW76yojh54Xu3uSbQ3JP0A7k8o8GutRF8zbFUA8n0ZH2y0cIEjMliXY4W4LwPA7m4q0ObmvSjhd63O9d8z1XkUBwIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 2 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
ag.eu.dmarcian.com Authorized v=DMARC1;
fr.eu.dmarcian.com Authorized v=DMARC1;
DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Google Workspace

Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on raquel.ns.cloudflare.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: raquel.ns.cloudflare.com, kaiser.ns.cloudflare.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
kaiser.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK
raquel.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

kaiser.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.401825046e+09
raquel.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.401825046e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for wisestamp.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
kaiser.ns.cloudflare.com 172.64.35.9
108.162.195.9
162.159.44.9 		2a06:98c1:50::ac40:2309
2606:4700:58::a29f:2c09
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c309 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2401825046
raquel.ns.cloudflare.com 108.162.194.210
172.64.34.210
162.159.38.210 		2803:f800:50::6ca2:c2d2
2606:4700:50::a29f:26d2
2a06:98c1:50::ac40:22d2 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2401825046
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

All 3 server(s) verified: encrypted transport confirmed via direct SMTP probe and DNS policy

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Google Workspace enforces TLS 1.2+ with valid certificates on all inbound/outbound mail
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Certificate
alt2.aspmx.l.google.com TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Valid
Expires: 2026-06-22 (62 days)
Issuer: Google Trust Services
alt1.aspmx.l.google.com TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Valid
Expires: 2026-06-22 (62 days)
Issuer: Google Trust Services
aspmx2.googlemail.com TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Valid
Expires: 2026-06-22 (62 days)
Issuer: Google Trust Services
Multi-Vantage Probe Results
Unanimous: TLS verified 2 probes, 1 responded
US-East (Boston) observed
All servers support TLS
France - EU skipped
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS396982 Google LLC US
IPv4 Mappings:
34.98.121.123 → AS396982 (34.96.0.0/14)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 6 services

6 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Microsoft 365 MS=ms35611526
Apple apple-domain-verification=pxlXeCEdyoGyCbhP
Atlassian atlassian-domain-verification=/9Ew/o5tGvgLN493xokuVSCtVxGhOBqBKea/A4Los4sXFifHB5...
Facebook / Meta facebook-domain-verification=796dw1dkbbc7pif7pfs0jngn8a1ojz
Google Workspace google-site-verification=4uVIpzybduWaC0Qqu7pv3nK5YUt38gyC69qg39Mxkr4
MongoDB Atlas mongodb-site-verification=mkHY0jy95rMs1XNxoDtUkE5AtSxOC1Bm
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Consistent Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: kaiser.ns.cloudflare.com raquel.ns.cloudflare.com
Managed DNS
All 2 nameservers hosted by Cloudflare. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Cloudflare
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [MS=ms35611526 MS=ms80419860 ZOOM_verify_tgB0SijcqHadhC50yNmBoq apple-domain-verification=pxlXeCEdyoGyCbhP docker-verification=8f1802f9-83d2-4f83-9cbe-ecd5c3765035 facebook-domain-verification=796dw1dkbbc7pif7pfs0jngn8a1ojz mongodb-site-verification=mkHY0jy95rMs1XNxoDtUkE5AtSxOC1Bm status-page-domain-verification=bz1x087zlf31]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

34.98.121.123
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

1 aspmx.l.google.com.
10 aspmx2.googlemail.com.
10 aspmx3.googlemail.com.
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Google Workspace

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 5 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 77 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 77 current 0 expired 10 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
accounts.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-05T09:19:23 Google Trust Services
addin.dl.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-04-01T09:52:24 Google Trust Services
api.us-central1.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-15T11:49:12 Google Trust Services
api.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-03-19T07:52:13 Google Trust Services
app.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-28T18:15:47 Google Trust Services
apps.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T15:07:49 Let's Encrypt
articles.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T15:07:49 Let's Encrypt
assets.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-03-07T14:18:36 Google Trust Services, Amazon
backoffice.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-21T15:08:04 Google Trust Services
bext.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-02-26T13:36:22 Google Trust Services
build.wisestamp.com DNS Current — 8 2026-01-28 Sectigo Limited, Google Trust Services
cdn.gifo.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 6 2026-04-11T10:22:36 Google Trust Services
cio15004.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T15:07:49 Let's Encrypt
cio2097.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T15:07:49 Let's Encrypt
csv-importer.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T21:42:57 Google Trust Services
editor.cdn.wisestamp.com CT Log Current d2tj08dp9gcdzd.cloudfront.net 4 2026-03-21T00:00:00 Amazon
email.wisestamp.com CT Log Current d3pm0lo2t0qa0.cloudfront.net 4 2026-03-16T00:00:00 Amazon
fbsig.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T15:07:49 Let's Encrypt
gapp.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-03-14T18:58:02 Google Trust Services
gapps.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-26T16:20:43 Let's Encrypt
gifo.srv.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-04-11T11:44:17 Google Trust Services
help.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-08T11:58:53 Google Trust Services
hermes.srv.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-26T16:20:50 Google Trust Services
hub.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-02-24T23:54:44 Google Trust Services
hubbrand.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-04-01T21:56:51 Google Trust Services
images.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-07T11:30:46 Google Trust Services, Amazon
images2.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-03-07T10:25:50 Google Trust Services
introapps.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-01T18:13:45 Google Trust Services
link.wisestamp.com CT Log Current d3kwv2rxoh02ir.cloudfront.net 2 2025-12-03T00:00:00 Amazon
linksbrand.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-02-19T09:56:06 Google Trust Services
lnd-assets.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-03-07T16:21:39 Google Trust Services, Amazon
lnd.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-30T09:53:57 Google Trust Services
looker.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-28T10:37:58 Google Trust Services
marketing-tools.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-25T11:04:31 Google Trust Services
mlp.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-01T23:20:19 Google Trust Services
my.wisestamp.com DNS Current wisestamp.com 8 2026-01-28 Sectigo Limited, Google Trust Services
mysig.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-09T12:22:10 Google Trust Services
news.wisestamp.com DNS Current u45519.wl.sendgrid.net 8 2026-01-28 Sectigo Limited, Google Trust Services
periph.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-04-01T01:02:40 Google Trust Services
platform.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-04-15T18:31:38 Google Trust Services
promos.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-31T14:38:58 Google Trust Services
rd.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-03-25T14:10:40 Google Trust Services
rendall.srv.wisestamp.com CT Log Current ghs.googlehosted.com 2 2026-02-18T18:21:54 Google Trust Services
rendall.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-05T03:38:01 Google Trust Services
scheduler.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-30T06:59:51 Google Trust Services
screenshots.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-15T12:31:55 Google Trust Services
sites.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-03-25T14:10:40 Google Trust Services
smtp.wisestamp.com DNS Current — 8 2026-01-28 Sectigo Limited, Google Trust Services
status.wisestamp.com CT Log Current r1k1pzwfzb8r.stspg-customer.com 4 2026-03-21T05:22:06 Let's Encrypt
support.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-02-22T07:15:45 Google Trust Services
survey.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-21T16:12:01 Let's Encrypt
surveys-api.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-03-30T03:17:05 Google Trust Services
surveys.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-25T23:28:52 Google Trust Services
templates.gapp.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-02T19:43:42 Google Trust Services
templates.gapps.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-02-24T02:35:31 Google Trust Services
tool.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-04-06T14:58:42 Let's Encrypt
tools.wisestamp.com DNS Current — 8 2026-01-28 Sectigo Limited, Google Trust Services
tracy.srv.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-11T11:39:15 Google Trust Services
trust.wisestamp.com CT Log Current elb-conveyor-74037.aptible.in 2 2026-02-20T06:52:26 Let's Encrypt
ucare.wisestamp.com CT Log Current wisestamp.ucarecdn.com 2 2026-04-09T14:42:01 Certainly
upflow-email.accounts.wisestamp.com CT Log Current eu.mailgun.org 4 2026-03-28T05:38:04 Let's Encrypt
vpay.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-04-04T20:21:50 Google Trust Services
webapp.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-03-01T05:14:00 Google Trust Services
webdisk.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-21T15:59:46 Let's Encrypt
wiki.wisestamp.com DNS Current — 8 2026-01-28 Sectigo Limited, Google Trust Services
wisesearch.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-04-02T22:47:40 Google Trust Services
www.accounts.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-05T09:19:23 Google Trust Services
www.addin.dl.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 5 2026-04-01T09:52:24 Google Trust Services
www.apps.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T15:07:49 Let's Encrypt
www.articles.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T15:07:49 Let's Encrypt
www.cio15004.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T15:07:49 Let's Encrypt
www.cio2097.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T15:07:49 Let's Encrypt
www.fbsig.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-29T15:07:49 Let's Encrypt
www.gapps.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-26T16:20:43 Let's Encrypt
www.help.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-08T11:58:53 Google Trust Services
www.tool.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 3 2026-04-06T14:58:42 Let's Encrypt
www.wisestamp.com CT Log Current — 6 2026-03-25T18:32:41 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
34.98.121.123
34.98.121.123
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.wisestamp.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400;rua=mailto:xd1fyuq3@ag.eu.dmarcian.com;ruf=mailto:xd1fyuq3@fr.eu.dmarcian.com
v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400;rua=mailto:xd1fyuq3@ag.eu.dmarcian.com;ruf=mailto:xd1fyuq3@fr.eu.dmarcian.com
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
1 aspmx.l.google.com.
1 aspmx.l.google.com.
10 aspmx2.googlemail.com.
10 aspmx2.googlemail.com.
10 aspmx3.googlemail.com.
10 aspmx3.googlemail.com.
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
kaiser.ns.cloudflare.com.
kaiser.ns.cloudflare.com.
raquel.ns.cloudflare.com.
raquel.ns.cloudflare.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
kaiser.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2401825046 10000 2400 604800 1800
kaiser.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2401825046 10000 2400 604800 1800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 15 / 0 records
MS=ms35611526
—
MS=ms80419860
—
ZOOM_verify_tgB0SijcqHadhC50yNmBoq
—
apple-domain-verification=pxlXeCEdyoGyCbhP
—
atlassian-domain-verification=/9Ew/o5tGvgLN493xokuVSCtVxGhOBqBKea/A4Los4sXFifHB5AMo9F5CaHm9ZO5
—
atlassian-domain-verification=qbAVzmvPx/kD6QjsVWtT5xPCaGbtXsEwVBo0aQwEf4oOa2QjRUF5u6eT0sVJtg94
—
docker-verification=8f1802f9-83d2-4f83-9cbe-ecd5c3765035
—
facebook-domain-verification=796dw1dkbbc7pif7pfs0jngn8a1ojz
—
google-site-verification=4uVIpzybduWaC0Qqu7pv3nK5YUt38gyC69qg39Mxkr4
—
google-site-verification=9ppAHeJwjMKuJERDhaWQtAgCZ3Neulz7GjHobCDKuCA
—
google-site-verification=OolgUj46plyqdL_xbbhEpf7Enc9DZ9iyIp3gnVHow24
—
google-site-verification=f9Haqpl9Xxm7eXv7Elc79JyAtjSsotJ1Lp1LlqRG1Bc
—
mongodb-site-verification=mkHY0jy95rMs1XNxoDtUkE5AtSxOC1Bm
—
status-page-domain-verification=bz1x087zlf31
—
v=spf1 include:customeriomail.com include:outbound.smtp.wisestamp.net include:_spf.google.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:stspg-customer.com -all
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
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DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

9afc10050617dc18ea4293d26a5c2cb613250e2def836a938b3f0c6b4e1d4821ffa980c56c5a899128bfecb3fab8fccb3a454b2feab27fda8ccb1af188cbb44d
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 2026-04-20T16:05:55Z.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-wisestamp.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-wisestamp.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-wisestamp.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-wisestamp.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/14805/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for wisestamp.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short wisestamp.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'intercom' RFC 6376 
dig +short intercom._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376 
dig +short s2._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtpapi' RFC 6376 
dig +short smtpapi._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer wisestamp.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd wisestamp.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for aspmx2.googlemail.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx2.googlemail.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for aspmx3.googlemail.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx3.googlemail.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt1.aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt1.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt2.aspmx.l.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt2.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (aspmx.l.google.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.wisestamp.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.wisestamp.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.wisestamp.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.wisestamp.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/wisestamp.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (aspmx.l.google.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.wisestamp.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://wisestamp.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://wisestamp.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://wisestamp.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 34.98.121.123 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 123.121.98.34.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Consistent · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Consistent 15107 runs
DKIM
Consistent 14884 runs
DMARC
Consistent 15088 runs
DANE/TLSA
Consistent 14866 runs
DNSSEC
Consistent 15065 runs
BIMI
Consistent 14881 runs
MTA-STS
Consistent 14902 runs
TLS-RPT
Consistent 14917 runs
CAA
Consistent 14914 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short wisestamp.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'intercom' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short intercom._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s2._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'smtpapi' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short smtpapi._domainkey.wisestamp.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer wisestamp.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd wisestamp.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for aspmx2.googlemail.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx2.googlemail.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for aspmx3.googlemail.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.aspmx3.googlemail.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt1.aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt1.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for alt2.aspmx.l.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.alt2.aspmx.l.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (aspmx.l.google.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.wisestamp.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.wisestamp.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.wisestamp.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.wisestamp.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer wisestamp.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/wisestamp.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (aspmx.l.google.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect aspmx.l.google.com:25 -servername aspmx.l.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.wisestamp.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://wisestamp.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://wisestamp.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://wisestamp.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 34.98.121.123 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 123.121.98.34.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls