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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 2026-04-19T23:48:58Z
Duration 60.5s
Version v26.48.08
Integrity c189a6173d5adcca1d69525eba9f75fed97e353f4d397605b81f470563d1042dfe47df9f8a8db6ab4984848499c77706253be8a9a5ae7ee74ccbde8b219120d6
Subject Domain
cirsa.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

cirsa.com
2026-04-19T23:48:58Z · 60.5s ·v26.48.08 · SHA-3-512: c189✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Microsoft 365 3 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: High Risk
2 protocols configured, 6 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
A 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: AWS Route 53 alias records have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds when pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3). This is an AWS-specific extension, not part of DNS RFCs. To set a custom TTL, use a standard A/AAAA record or CNAME instead of an alias — but note this loses automatic IP tracking.
MX 6 hours (21600s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance.
SOA 15 minutes (900s) 1 hour (3600s) medium SOA TTL is below typical — observed 15 minutes (900s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for cirsa.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: AWS Route 53 — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ns-801.awsdns-36.net
Serial 1
Admin awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com
Provider AWS Route 53
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh7200s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry900sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)86400s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.

Independent RFC compliance assessment for AWS Route 53. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

Alias record TTLs fixed at 60s RFC 1035 §3.2.1

AWS Route 53 alias records pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3, API Gateway) have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds that cannot be modified. Route 53 alias records are an AWS-specific extension — not part of standard DNS RFCs. They solve the CNAME-at-apex problem (RFC prohibits CNAME at zone apex) by appearing as A/AAAA records to resolvers. The 60-second TTL ensures fast failover but removes administrator TTL control.

Proprietary extension — not covered by DNS RFCs
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Publish a DMARC record starting with p=none and rua reporting
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DKIM
Not Configured
DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Moderate Risk
Critical Publish DMARC Record

Add a DMARC record to protect your domain against email spoofing and receive authentication reports.

DMARC tells receivers how to handle mail that fails SPF/DKIM checks.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.cirsa.com (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@cirsa.com
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostcirsa.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.cirsa.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@cirsa.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.cirsa.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=cirsa.com
RFC 8461
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Acens Technologies, S.L.U.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Microsoft 365
Limited Protection
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Amazon Route 53
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Likely SPF alone cannot prevent spoofing

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 8/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 8/10 lookups

v=spf1 ip4:82.223.77.42 ip4:195.77.234.26 ip4:195.77.234.4 ip4:195.77.234.18 ip4:199.91.137.26 ip4:3.123.206.219 ip4:3.68.129.51 ip4:35.181.156.191 ip4:13.36.253.151 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mailer.g-stock.net include:servers.mcsv.net include:spfa.alinto.net mx a:b.spf.service-now.com a:c.spf.service-now.com a:d.spf.service-now.com -all
RFC 7489: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? No policy published
Warning

No DMARC record found

RFC Stance: RFC 7489 is classified as Informational (not Standards Track). DMARC is a widely adopted industry practice but is not an IETF-mandated standard.
Operational Security: Without DMARC, receiving mail servers have no policy for handling SPF/DKIM failures. Spoofed messages may be delivered to recipients.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 2 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

k1._domainkey MailChimp 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i89sA2guU0ta4UX1Xzm06XIU6iBP41VwmPwBGRNofhBVR+e6WHUoNyIR4Bn84LVcfZE20rmDeXQblIupNWBqLXM1Q+VieI/eZu/7k9/vOkLSaQQdml4Cv8lb3PcnluMVIhQIDAQAB;
selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCqlQwliKGuOU88XiTR6NMzfJpkdT5lRJttznBLlnkWwnIAzqI/CNs3FVw48z/EK0DK6pBF8M5hDEeB1orLIaAAgnT8eGXgI89uv9mjD8x6Y/nSc49nc0DpbI9FFuRjdLrX3tXm3l8bkdf+rNA6qMFC0u+7TT5HZeWzWCWCc+0pswIDAQAB; n=1024,1455697511,1471422311
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Yes No DMARC policy (RFC 7489) — attackers can send email appearing to be from this domain with no sender-authentication barrier

BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (1)
  • https://cirsa.com/
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns-306.awsdns-38.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns-306.awsdns-38.com, ns-801.awsdns-36.net, ns-1960.awsdns-53.co.uk, ns-1438.awsdns-51.org

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns-1438.awsdns-51.org No N/A N/A OK
ns-1960.awsdns-53.co.uk No N/A N/A OK
ns-306.awsdns-38.com No N/A N/A OK
ns-801.awsdns-36.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 172800s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns-1438.awsdns-51.org: 1
ns-1960.awsdns-53.co.uk: 1
ns-306.awsdns-38.com: 1
ns-801.awsdns-36.net: 1
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for cirsa.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns-1438.awsdns-51.org 205.251.197.158 2600:9000:5305:9e00::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-1960.awsdns-53.co.uk 205.251.199.168 2600:9000:5307:a800::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-801.awsdns-36.net 205.251.195.33 2600:9000:5303:2100::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-306.awsdns-38.com 205.251.193.50 2600:9000:5301:3200::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport security inferred from 1 signal(s) — no enforcement policy active

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
3.167.183.103 → AS ()
3.167.183.129 → AS ()
3.167.183.52 → AS ()
3.167.183.7 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 3 services

3 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Microsoft 365 MS=ms65823383
Apple apple-domain-verification=wvNWTWNGXQy1k1OD
Atlassian atlassian-domain-verification=NNHF2EiGY2HWmn75SdmmnyMmFB625FgwaCbdP13F4vcpQxDUSw...
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Consistent Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns-1438.awsdns-51.org ns-1960.awsdns-53.co.uk ns-306.awsdns-38.com ns-801.awsdns-36.net
Managed DNS
All 4 nameservers hosted by Amazon Route 53. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Amazon Route 53
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (4 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [2nqhdsgg1h0hz4mxjzlk443czv9ghhxb MS539309 MS633235 MS719467 MS909050 MS=ms65823383 _3yg128lqh8ak7rf31ed9f5f1pgtx83w _5hisir1v2gmg9nk3iu2shd9l2a49k33 _78cm7p0qa7bv2uqf0yj1dmc7r1mk8ox _7lbc1y6f16p6rn75ofhzbwxkjp7oszo _ma67krxo3sntv7aq9v7gyvjaew9onsl _oxnkvklricempwf4l4f402unamifz9s _rddpi1lwz9wp12bjx2u90ychfaq8d4n]
A: Cloudflare returned different results: [13.33.252.20 13.33.252.65 13.33.252.71 13.33.252.95]
A: Quad9 returned different results: [99.84.118.114 99.84.118.124 99.84.118.5 99.84.118.62]
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [143.204.194.106 143.204.194.114 143.204.194.19 143.204.194.33]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

3.167.183.103
3.167.183.129
3.167.183.52
3.167.183.7
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

0 cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

_autodiscover._tcp: 0 5 443 autodiscover.cirsa.com.
_sipfederationtls._tcp: 0 0 5061 sip.cirsa.com.
_sip._tls: 0 0 443 access.cirsa.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (4 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 3 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 84 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
35 unique certificates 84 current 0 expired 7 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Wildcard certificate detected: *.cirsa.com Active 3 certs 1 CA:
No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).
DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.
Certificate Authority Diversity (1 CA observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
35 2025-04-22 2026-04-07 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
005056846178.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
3cxssl.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-07-10T00:00:00Z
agnus.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-05-21T00:00:00Z
api-gic-int.cirsa.com CT Log Current api-cliente-int.azure-api.net — — —
api-gic.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-03-24T00:00:00Z
apihostelerodev.cirsa.com CT Log Current apihostelerodev.azurewebsites.net 1 2026-04-07T00:00:00Z
apps.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
aru.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-15T00:00:00Z
auth.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
auth1.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
autodiscover.cirsa.com DNS Current autodiscover.outlook.com 3 2025-04-22 —
av.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
beta.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
blacklist.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
byod.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
cassrv-sql.cc.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
clienteapp.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
coljuegos.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-18T00:00:00Z
coljuegos.gli.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-19T00:00:00Z
dns1.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
dns2.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
elb-20210310.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-10-10T00:00:00Z
eusbcdyn.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-01-02T00:00:00Z
eusbcdynpre.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-01-02T00:00:00Z
ftp.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
helpdesk.cirsa.com DNS Current cirsaweb.cirsa.com 3 2025-04-22 —
identitydev.cirsa.com CT Log Current identitycirsadev.azurewebsites.net — — —
lamejorloteria.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
login.cirsa.com DNS Current app-login-prod.azurewebsites.net 3 2025-04-22 —
m.cirsa.com DNS Current cirsa.com 3 2025-04-22 —
mail.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
maillatam.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
mailrelay.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
marca.cirsa.com CT Log Current cirsa.aggylon.com 2 2026-03-11T18:33:04Z
meet.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
mydevices.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
myportalgt.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 3 2025-12-12T00:00:00Z
navidad.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-12-16T00:00:00Z
olawsapgi1.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
olawsapgp1.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
optout.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
owa.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
paula.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-15T00:00:00Z
pegasus.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
personalcommsapi-alpha.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
personalcommsapi.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
portal.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
preregistroapp.cirsa.com CT Log Current sv-cliente-preregistro-pro.azurewebsites.net — — —
preregistroappint.cirsa.com CT Log Current sv-cliente-preregistro-int.azurewebsites.net 1 2026-02-13T00:00:00Z
proxy.cirsa.com DNS Current cirsaproxy.gpcloudservice.com 3 2025-04-22 —
pruebas.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
public.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
quimera-design.cirsa.com CT Log Current zeroheight.com 1 2026-03-14T16:18:31Z
quimera-framework.cirsa.com CT Log Current zeroheight.com 1 2026-03-04T16:18:28Z
quimera.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-03-06T16:18:28Z
rhauth.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
rhauth1.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
rhauth2.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
rhauth3.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
rhauthadm01.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
rhauthspo01.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
salas.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-01-20T00:00:00Z
sbcdyn.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-05-21T00:00:00Z
sbcdynpre.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-05-21T00:00:00Z
servicios.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
sgecc.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
sip.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
slawsapgi1.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
slawsapgp1.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 3 2025-10-22T00:00:00Z
slawsappoda1.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-01-12T00:00:00Z
slawsappopa1.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-01-12T00:00:00Z
smtcirbch.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-06-30T00:00:00Z
smtcirbcn.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-06-30T00:00:00Z
sponsor.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
stp.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2026-03-12T00:00:00Z
stpdev.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
vde-int.cirsa.com CT Log Current sv-vde-webapp-pro.azurewebsites.net — — —
vpn.cirsa.com DNS Current cirsa.gpcloudservice.com 3 2025-04-22 —
webmail.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
webmaillatam.cirsa.com CT Log Current — — — —
www.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 1 2025-11-06T00:00:00Z
www.slawsapgp1.central.cirsa.com CT Log Current — 3 2025-10-22T00:00:00Z
www2.cirsa.com DNS Current — 3 2025-04-22 —
www3.cirsa.com DNS Current cirsa.com 3 2025-04-22 —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 4 / 4 records
3.167.183.103
3.167.183.7
3.167.183.129
3.167.183.129
3.167.183.52
3.167.183.103
3.167.183.7
3.167.183.52
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
0 cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns-1438.awsdns-51.org.
ns-1438.awsdns-51.org.
ns-1960.awsdns-53.co.uk.
ns-1960.awsdns-53.co.uk.
ns-306.awsdns-38.com.
ns-306.awsdns-38.com.
ns-801.awsdns-36.net.
ns-801.awsdns-36.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns-801.awsdns-36.net. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
ns-801.awsdns-36.net. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
TXT RFC 7208 §4 29 / 0 records
2nqhdsgg1h0hz4mxjzlk443czv9ghhxb
—
35F3D73F6D6EFB7D31E8917BEC0742FDBA161411B44866C59D71F1BCC661A877
—
3964DEAC968980E3DB4AFEB64CBB13EEF7A2351A84D09D991269ECC0A6C1BEFD
—
C08C09A7AECD4D8882C3BE75049D36AF6128D7C68391F7DA373E5128F0BC8D9D
—
CF422829A70965BE388A4727BD80084B062119DB5E8E6CB4CF70B0F11581F51A
—
MS539309
—
MS633235
—
MS719467
—
MS909050
—
MS=ms65823383
—
_3yg128lqh8ak7rf31ed9f5f1pgtx83w
—
_5hisir1v2gmg9nk3iu2shd9l2a49k33
—
_78cm7p0qa7bv2uqf0yj1dmc7r1mk8ox
—
_7lbc1y6f16p6rn75ofhzbwxkjp7oszo
—
_ma67krxo3sntv7aq9v7gyvjaew9onsl
—
_oxnkvklricempwf4l4f402unamifz9s
—
_rddpi1lwz9wp12bjx2u90ychfaq8d4n
—
_sm7eckq02hvswto7athgeancqxzlnod
—
_xx0qfmmopq7wfl4io6wzbr9sdevwqg8
—
apple-domain-verification=wvNWTWNGXQy1k1OD
—
atlassian-domain-verification=NNHF2EiGY2HWmn75SdmmnyMmFB625FgwaCbdP13F4vcpQxDUSwnnbUefGQk2JVUR
—
atlassian-sending-domain-verification=da8539ed-ef51-472b-985e-f1ec8b54ca86
—
d365mktkey=N3uURle7wnsrz2DVtfpYRmLTw99cdjxMGxf5hIxBOAYx
—
dtv09znbcglwnfl9sxy4b37rq7kpbj4x
—
l4bczw76n5shgr1ksjv21lqv9y1871tl
—
le/R8OmZp6unY2nRFcUxpYRnF1IHB/ecNqURlSN0f/RV3eifU+sQacVcZjAK7xT+VMFVcJzcA45xGRub6PZEvA==
—
m77507k572qhclc13p8g203w24hhcygj
—
paloaltonetworks-site-verification=368d62167e2ff61aeee9f770b76310d3fbc03b2e0b3f001c485ad5c9bef66c76
—
v=spf1 ip4:82.223.77.42 ip4:195.77.234.26 ip4:195.77.234.4 ip4:195.77.234.18 ip4:199.91.137.26 ip4:3.123.206.219 ip4:3.68.129.51 ip4:35.181.156.191 ip4:13.36.253.151 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mailer.g-stock.net include:servers.mcsv.net include:spfa.alinto.net mx a:b.spf.service-now.com a:c.spf.service-now.com a:d.spf.service-now.com -all
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

c189a6173d5adcca1d69525eba9f75fed97e353f4d397605b81f470563d1042dfe47df9f8a8db6ab4984848499c77706253be8a9a5ae7ee74ccbde8b219120d6
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 2026-04-19T23:48:58Z.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3) Cross-Reference Verification

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-cirsa.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-cirsa.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-cirsa.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-cirsa.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/14357/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for cirsa.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short cirsa.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.cirsa.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' RFC 6376 
dig +short k1._domainkey.cirsa.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.cirsa.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cirsa.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd cirsa.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.cirsa.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cirsa.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cirsa.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.cirsa.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cirsa.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cirsa.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://cirsa.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cirsa.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cirsa.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 3.167.183.103 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 103.183.167.3.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 3.167.183.129 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 129.183.167.3.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Consistent · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Consistent 15107 runs
DKIM
Consistent 14884 runs
DMARC
Consistent 15088 runs
DANE/TLSA
Consistent 14866 runs
DNSSEC
Consistent 15065 runs
BIMI
Consistent 14881 runs
MTA-STS
Consistent 14902 runs
TLS-RPT
Consistent 14917 runs
CAA
Consistent 14914 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short cirsa.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.cirsa.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k1._domainkey.cirsa.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.cirsa.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cirsa.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd cirsa.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.cirsa.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cirsa.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cirsa.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.cirsa.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer cirsa.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cirsa.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername cirsa-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cirsa.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://cirsa.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cirsa.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cirsa.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 3.167.183.103 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 103.183.167.3.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 3.167.183.129 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 129.183.167.3.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

0s

Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls