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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 13 Feb 2026, 08:23 UTC
Duration 34.1s
Version v26.12.28
Integrity f58b1c06e38595ad47c20352784c30cbbeb8ff50ee1ee03c28481339438506ca468d838cb4c10c0e60f6f2b4487ac85dc9d6fad3916436d3ef50780f84585651
Subject Domain
blauw.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

blauw.com
13 Feb 2026, 08:23 UTC · 34.1s ·v26.12.28 · SHA-3-512: f58b✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Barracuda 3 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk
4 protocols configured, 3 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 action required 1 recommendation
Suggested Scanner Configuration Medium Confidence
Based on 8 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 37.1s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Action Required
DMARC enforcement partial — only 40% of mail subject to policy
Recommended
No DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) configured — unable to monitor authentication results
Configured
SPF (-all), DMARC (quarantine, pct=40%), DKIM, DNSSEC
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
Medium Add DMARC aggregate reporting

Add a rua= tag to your DMARC record to receive aggregate reports about authentication results. Without reporting, you cannot see who is sending email as your domain or whether legitimate mail is failing authentication.

_dmarc.blauw.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@blauw.com"
RFC 7489 §7.1
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.blauw.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.blauw.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
RFC 8461 §3
Low Upgrade DMARC to reject policy

Your DMARC policy is quarantine — spoofed messages are flagged. Upgrading to p=reject blocks them entirely. Review aggregate reports to confirm legitimate senders are aligned.

_dmarc.blauw.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@blauw.com"
RFC 7489 §6.3
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com). CAA is advisory — CAs must check it before issuing, but absence means any CA can issue.

blauw.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659 §4
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.blauw.com TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@blauw.com"
RFC 8460 §3
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Realtime Register B.V.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider OBSERVED
Microsoft 365
Email: Enforced
Web Hosting INFERRED
Cloudflare (CDN)
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Mostly No
Verdict: DMARC policy is quarantine — spoofed messages will be flagged as spam by receiving servers. DKIM keys verified with strong cryptography.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 6/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 6/10 lookups

v=spf1 ip4:213.208.244.178/32 ip4:92.65.130.66/32 include:autotask.net include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com include:_spf.act-on.net include:_spf.atlassian.net include:spf-eu.emailsignatures365.com -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC enforcement is partial (quarantine). -all may preempt DKIM/DMARC evaluation at some receivers. Consider p=reject for full enforcement; ~all is more DMARC-compatible.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Quarantined, not rejected
Warning p=quarantine 40% enforced

DMARC quarantine but only 40% enforced - partial protection

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; ruf=mailto:DMARC-ruf@blauw.com; fo=1; pct=40;
Only 40% of mail subject to policy
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse
Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these
Add DMARC aggregate reporting:
_dmarc.blauw.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@blauw.com"
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 4 selector(s)

Mail routed through Barracuda (security gateway) — DKIM signed by Microsoft 365 (sending platform). This is a standard enterprise architecture.
s1._domainkey SendGrid
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAw1gU64wM331J2x42nJ5l0VWV9mz2yyXOQwlgqvQ5eOkANWTV43m7GSCUU9MBBKHDpm6+8o9nY+5vm506tZSqv06iEKhL3O6jjMeYBg44TrdMJ+5i0V2m9oxo7gSFBsZLKWec19eULbn2egjBTwSFRrRGpLL8QTFE7r3kIL/ILwtNQttRYbi+LUB0YZGowoPJarkeq8viT9vPy1Xvx8jl+rFM4EdqO10KEjBqkF2lrsfhec03XNooI8EnNhvD3nl++KaZm7/yHiZal05VxoLajbUDmC89iK7H/JpGOpaOqFT9YXLrkvqv9S1ehYg5UpaMMkedAxb8yP6EZAYxBEBEewIDAQAB
s2._domainkey SendGrid
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC8tvSmzHnj/KkHIVAuonmai05ZFiat3Js8GETYTxg0Pfb3773i53A56TIx89vrodwSgVPFTQFqQ1Tg/KOpQM6YlCYFWpirTqtwBBs7ty8tVV6e1qgFkucClqdsdkyg9FY/+orKQ51ee1z8RVt4XhEi7dQJQAMFJMn06/hPHR1UKQIDAQAB
selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEArjLVF+HnjksfMPJaZqONK/4/wydYINtSD11BxUVSsNm6ZAX35YRqmQHh5Sc5w5IpvoY/0fquu2EXuLX0i7fbS4PtCz6oVU1p9W/kV6M+k7e8pwfhOgSi/FYGAv7f5pvWtxdHjpNU44Q6rgtITwdULLQh9o/t36MWHTxISb+LvK7J/gTigVP5zvilZd3ECqEn+K1x5AgCQThRLM8LZ3PrfKOJhO34fybVLzcazIvXEn7nB6wMM5rLR0MBZVtv1JmfgRNwdZ1Gv5sZ+7IRQIdRAX14OSYK4Dc0va8Wz8TtRU15yDMjZlnCbhSpMe1R8lOHjskczIT8GrGqDAVVkskMYQIDAQAB;
selector2._domainkey Microsoft 365
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyOQqYtc/z3A0fPPV0JVxT1lzMIr85gLYSMinAToPyYjWF8/oyqePr/yOMv5fRlQn/qep6S1XSiwyD4p2Yxrg5CQGESzZ8YrNdtylHfvloAw7oJLMSn/EW1WGu5H8DmYDpL5sZNLFnTluooB2u5yrT8qjNGqHyeNdLuwGWUsnwR013RQHOlQEH700FY/4WC2xA2vtMv2D4WFqqvAKk+P3bO9Oulwk0fqr56+empYGd6OZQVDfishgFZ1ZHvbzg6EpoWJw9RJfBErnwH7QwylZcSN7sWck5UOcmORuWoQxP+mqDU/f5kL0pskVoJJQ7U3rsL6eCmg5Ba/zs4kTNRId0QIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Barracuda does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Barracuda

Barracuda is a security gateway with shared MX infrastructure. It does not publish per-customer TLSA records.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Barracuda does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: No brand protection configured. Any CA can issue certificates and no brand logo verification in place.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

Port 25 not reachable from this host

MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Certificate
d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com N/A N/A N/A
d301495.b.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com N/A N/A N/A
SMTP port 25 may be blocked by hosting provider — this is common for cloud platforms
Summary: 0/2 reachable, 0 STARTTLS, 0 valid certs
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS209242 US
IPv4 Mappings:
198.202.211.1 → AS209242 (198.202.211.0/24)

Edge / CDN Success Cloudflare

Domain is behind Cloudflare edge network

Behind CDN Origin Hidden
ASN 209242 belongs to Cloudflare

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 3 services

3 SaaS service(s) detected via TXT record verification

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Microsoft 365 MS=ms34400650
Google Workspace google-site-verification=ohGKGHbS0TuMQF_hDpunuM7i6MPD1jrnNlHsNzQ3GZE
Atlassian atlassian-domain-verification=TozlHTrYUqMYu4cvxOoJaT9I1zQjVsJAe7QQSUzuWtKmye7CfV...
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
65029 8 2 F9EFBD7E272BA77313E720DCCCEAE8FD43ABA6A587B099E12B9B001721B259A8

NS Delegation Verified

3 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.argewebhosting.eu ns2.argewebhosting.com ns3.argewebhosting.nl
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [44a017ee4ed3891a9ea7444854283e77 78e30145150acb90cc19fc0f49eb5c47 MS=ms34400650 google-site-verification=7RuHa9iLYQdlq6PBhLw4xsAI7MWtEjazi7C4aTzhook google-site-verification=atoxvyJBsq7Uls2fP-lozYIw8-MJDmESPtl_S-3yzoU google-site-verification=ohGKGHbS0TuMQF_hDpunuM7i6MPD1jrnNlHsNzQ3GZE lvc1j4j389guro9ob1fgtr14vu openai-domain-verification=dv-2yk37nnYcj3uNNt0SrdJIkl5]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

198.202.211.1
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

10 d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com.
20 d301495.b.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 1 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.
_imaps._tcp: 0 0 993 arg-plplcl16.argewebhosting.nl.
_sip._tls: 100 1 443 sipdir.online.lync.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: 3 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 17 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup
447 certificates analyzed current expired Source: Certificate Transparency Logs
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
CT Log Expired — 58 — —
CT Log Expired — 4 — —
CT Log Expired — 17 — —
CT Log Expired — 30 — —
CT Log Expired — 14 — —
CT Log Expired — 2 — —
CT Log Expired — 54 — —
CT Log Expired — 4 — —
CT Log Expired — 4 — —
CT Log Expired — 4 — —
CT Log Expired — 4 — —
CT Log Expired — 4 — —
CT Log Expired — 74 — —
CT Log Expired — 102 — —
CT Log Expired — 14 — —
CT Log Expired — 4 — —
CT Log Expired — 4 — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
198.202.211.1
198.202.211.1
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.blauw.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; ruf=mailto:DMARC-ruf@blauw.com; fo=1; pct=40;
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; ruf=mailto:DMARC-ruf@blauw.com; fo=1; pct=40;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
10 d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com.
10 d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com.
20 d301495.b.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com.
20 d301495.b.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
ns1.argewebhosting.eu.
ns2.argewebhosting.com.
ns2.argewebhosting.com.
ns3.argewebhosting.nl.
ns3.argewebhosting.nl.
ns1.argewebhosting.eu.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns1.argewebhosting.eu. migratie.argeweb.nl. 2026021200 10800 3600 604800 10800
ns1.argewebhosting.eu. migratie.argeweb.nl. 2026021200 10800 3600 604800 10800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 10 / 0 records
78e30145150acb90cc19fc0f49eb5c47
—
MS=ms34400650
—
google-site-verification=ohGKGHbS0TuMQF_hDpunuM7i6MPD1jrnNlHsNzQ3GZE
—
google-site-verification=7RuHa9iLYQdlq6PBhLw4xsAI7MWtEjazi7C4aTzhook
—
44a017ee4ed3891a9ea7444854283e77
—
google-site-verification=atoxvyJBsq7Uls2fP-lozYIw8-MJDmESPtl_S-3yzoU
—
openai-domain-verification=dv-2yk37nnYcj3uNNt0SrdJIkl5
—
atlassian-domain-verification=TozlHTrYUqMYu4cvxOoJaT9I1zQjVsJAe7QQSUzuWtKmye7CfVYg1a3M1nNDwKmZ
—
lvc1j4j389guro9ob1fgtr14vu
—
v=spf1 ip4:213.208.244.178/32 ip4:92.65.130.66/32 include:autotask.net include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com include:_spf.act-on.net include:_spf.atlassian.net include:spf-eu.emailsignatures365.com -all
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), SecurityTrails (DNS history), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

f58b1c06e38595ad47c20352784c30cbbeb8ff50ee1ee03c28481339438506ca468d838cb4c10c0e60f6f2b4487ac85dc9d6fad3916436d3ef50780f84585651
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 13 Feb 2026, 08:23 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-blauw.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-blauw.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-blauw.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-blauw.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/722/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for blauw.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short blauw.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.blauw.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.blauw.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376 
dig +short s2._domainkey.blauw.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.blauw.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.blauw.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer blauw.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd blauw.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for d301495.b.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.d301495.b.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com:25 -servername d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.blauw.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.blauw.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.blauw.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.blauw.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/blauw.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com:25 -servername d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.blauw.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://blauw.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://blauw.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://blauw.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 198.202.211.1 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 1.211.202.198.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4841 runs
DKIM
Verified 4660 runs
DMARC
Verified 4825 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4644 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4822 runs
BIMI
Verified 4659 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4662 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4664 runs
CAA
Verified 4656 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short blauw.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.blauw.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.blauw.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s2._domainkey.blauw.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.blauw.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.blauw.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer blauw.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd blauw.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for d301495.b.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.d301495.b.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com:25 -servername d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.blauw.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.blauw.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.blauw.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.blauw.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer blauw.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/blauw.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com:25 -servername d301495.a.ess.de.barracudanetworks.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.blauw.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://blauw.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://blauw.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://blauw.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 198.202.211.1 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 1.211.202.198.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

blauw.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.