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Executive's DNS Intelligence Brief

Board-level domain security assessment — blauw.com

13 Feb 2026, 08:23 UTC · 34.1s · SHA-3-512: f58b✱✱✱✱ Verify
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk
4 protocols configured, 3 not configured
1 action required 1 recommendation
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Set Up
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
What Requires Attention
Critical DMARC enforcement partial — only 40% of mail subject to policy
Recommended No DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) configured — unable to monitor authentication results
The BIG Questions
Can this domain be impersonated by email? Not Assessed
Can DNS itself be tampered with? Not Assessed
Can this brand be convincingly faked? Not Assessed
Is mail transport encryption enforced? Not Assessed
Is certificate issuance controlled? Not Assessed
Domain Overview
Registrar Realtime Register B.V.
Email Provider Microsoft 365
Web Hosting Cloudflare (CDN)
DNS Hosting Unknown

Technical Findings

Email Authentication
SPF (Sender Policy) Configured
DMARC (Policy) Partial Policy: quarantine
DKIM (Signatures) Configured
Mail Posture Email: Enforced
Mail Transport Security
MTA-STS Partial
DANE / TLSA Hosted Provider DANE not available — Barracuda does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure
TLS-RPT (Reporting) Not Configured
Mail Transport Not Enforced Policy-assessed
DNS Security
DNSSEC Signed & Validated
DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
NS Delegation Healthy
Brand & Certificate Controls
BIMI (Brand Logo) Not Configured
CAA (Certificate) Open Any certificate authority may issue certificates
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable: Low Risk
Medium Add DMARC aggregate reporting

Add a rua= tag to your DMARC record to receive aggregate reports about authentication results. Without reporting, you cannot see who is sending email as your domain or whether legitimate mail is failing authentication.

_dmarc.blauw.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@blauw.com"
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.blauw.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.blauw.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
Low Upgrade DMARC to reject policy

Your DMARC policy is quarantine — spoofed messages are flagged. Upgrading to p=reject blocks them entirely. Review aggregate reports to confirm legitimate senders are aligned.

_dmarc.blauw.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@blauw.com"
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com). CAA is advisory — CAs must check it before issuing, but absence means any CA can issue.

blauw.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.blauw.com TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@blauw.com"
Appendix — Additional Resources

Full technical details including raw DNS records, DKIM public keys, IP/ASN mappings, resolver consensus evidence, and verification commands are available in the Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report.

View Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been tampered with? Verify below

Tamper-evident fingerprint binding this analysis to its data, domain, timestamp, and tool version.

f58b1c06e38595ad47c20352784c30cbbeb8ff50ee1ee03c28481339438506ca468d838cb4c10c0e60f6f2b4487ac85dc9d6fad3916436d3ef50780f84585651
12 RFCs evaluated · DNS state at 13 Feb 2026, 08:23 UTC