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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 10 Mar 2026, 03:21 UTC
Duration 60.0s
Version v26.35.34
Integrity fd072e07d27384da95c105901b38b96998314175212a740477362abc36e7bbd806f3a5c4bc5a687374d161be492178eb65d372ee758c29ff1d774325165644e0
Subject Domain
red.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

red.com
10 Mar 2026, 03:21 UTC · 60.0s ·v26.35.34 · SHA-3-512: fd07✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 7 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk
4 protocols configured, 5 not configured Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 2 monitoring
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 69/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 66% Currency 73/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 73/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 20922s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 20922s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: AWS Route 53 alias records have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds when pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3). This is an AWS-specific extension, not part of DNS RFCs. To set a custom TTL, use a standard A/AAAA record or CNAME instead of an alias — but note this loses automatic IP tracking.
MX 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 15 minutes (900s) 1 hour (3600s) medium SOA TTL is below typical — observed 15 minutes (900s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
CAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high CAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for red.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: AWS Route 53 — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ns-1449.awsdns-53.org
Serial 1
Admin awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com
Provider AWS Route 53
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh7200s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry900sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)86400s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.

Independent RFC compliance assessment for AWS Route 53. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

Alias record TTLs fixed at 60s RFC 1035 §3.2.1

AWS Route 53 alias records pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3, API Gateway) have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds that cannot be modified. Route 53 alias records are an AWS-specific extension — not part of standard DNS RFCs. They solve the CNAME-at-apex problem (RFC prohibits CNAME at zone apex) by appearing as A/AAAA records to resolvers. The 60-second TTL ensures fast failover but removes administrator TTL control.

Proprietary extension — not covered by DNS RFCs
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 31.6s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Configured
Recommended
Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject'
Monitoring
DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended, External domain forwardemail.net has not authorized red.com to send DMARC reports (missing red.com._report._dmarc.forwardemail.net TXT record)
Configured
SPF, DMARC (with warnings), DKIM, CAA
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Upgrade DMARC from p=none

Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.

A quarantine or reject policy instructs receivers to take action on failing mail.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.red.com (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@red.com
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.red.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@red.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.red.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=red.com
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
SafeNames Ltd.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Amazon Route 53
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 8/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 8/10 lookups

v=spf1 mx include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mail.zendesk.com a:outboundips.netsuite.com include:rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:eu.rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:ap.rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:sendgrid.net ip4:70.183.25.226 ip4:70.183.25.233 ip4:12.215.166.253 ip4:46.61.187.62 ip4:216.194.106.13 ip4:149.20.194.55 ip4:148.62.51.171 ip4:23.21.109.197 ip4:23.21.109.212 ip4:147.160.167.14 ip4:147.160.167.15 ip4:52.49.235.189 ip4:52.49.201.246 ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain has DMARC p=none (monitoring only). Enforcing quarantine or reject is recommended to gain real protection.
Legacy Record — Safe to Delete This is a Sender ID record (spf2.0/pra) from a Microsoft experiment circa 2006 that was never standardized. RFC 7208 §A explicitly deprecates it. No modern mail receiver processes this record. It is safe to delete.
v=spf2.0/pra a mx include:radicaepost.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mailsenders.netsuite.com include:sent-via.netsuite.com ~all

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only
Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-68b7843f04d9df0d350c2996@forwardemail.net
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 2 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

SPF authorizes Microsoft 365 servers, but MX records point to self-hosted infrastructure. The Microsoft 365 SPF include likely supports ancillary services (e.g., calendar invitations, shared documents) rather than primary mailbox hosting.
mail._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC+H3K87il6I9SQhzygQdm6Hxg9LF1KQAGz9duIk9zNYXgOg9spLftS+C6/3VfW3y1sg/6dYC8LLahyRPr0hrN3shc57Ux/hFPk5ojy7yB2kxw8PzaqaI6BA372VEo6H7uFEfenyQAyCzYMxCpPUpgEb/bZFhWjLEdIhzJ85Hk/3QIDAQAB
selector2._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDC/80iJzUEJ5QcG+eNG3Rs4R+hfERCx5T8L1m70NlNDSmIB1M6cER5aLXjkciDRRPKdSyRsMvkFVR51A7HWB6uQcB/0H4R43sg/HkHp+gY81PFrn2i8g0DBpE6L/dbxr6lroLnju4bqEX5dBk04RGan3DEBOFttTIosbv3X5b5XQIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing
Warning

1 of 1 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
forwardemail.net Unauthorized —
External domain forwardemail.net has not authorized red.com to send DMARC reports (missing red.com._report._dmarc.forwardemail.net TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 2 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success IODEF

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only Amazon, DigiCert, Let's Encrypt, Sectigo can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: Amazon DigiCert Let's Encrypt Sectigo
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "www.digicert.com"
0 iodef "mailto:iodef@red.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? Yes — 1 found

1 potential secret(s) found in publicly accessible source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

Action Required: The following secrets were observed in publicly accessible source code. These credentials should be rotated immediately and removed from public-facing code.
Severity Type Location Redacted Value Confidence
high Google API Key red.com/RedSuiteCentric/SCA-Kilimanjaro/shopping.environment.ssp?lang=en_US&c... AIza********17C8 high
Remediation: (1) Rotate all exposed credentials immediately at the provider's dashboard. (2) Remove secrets from public-facing source code. (3) Use environment variables or a secrets manager instead. (4) Review git history for previously committed secrets.
Sources scanned (5)
  • https://red.com/
  • https://red.com/RedSuiteCentric/SCA-Kilimanjaro/shopping.environment.ssp?lang=en_US&cur=null&X-SC-Touchpoint=shopping&t=1771958784353
  • https://red.com/RedSuiteCentric/SCA-Kilimanjaro/languages/shopping_en_US.js?t=1771958784353
  • https://red.com/RedSuiteCentric/SCA-Kilimanjaro/shopping-templates.js?t=1771958784353
  • https://red.com/RedSuiteCentric/SCA-Kilimanjaro/javascript/shopping.js?t=1771958784353
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns-738.awsdns-28.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: ns-738.awsdns-28.net, ns-193.awsdns-24.com, ns-1449.awsdns-53.org, ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org No N/A N/A OK
ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk No N/A N/A OK
ns-193.awsdns-24.com No N/A N/A OK
ns-738.awsdns-28.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 172800s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns-1449.awsdns-53.org: 1
ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk: 1
ns-193.awsdns-24.com: 1
ns-738.awsdns-28.net: 1
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for red.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns-193.awsdns-24.com 205.251.192.193 2600:9000:5300:c100::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-738.awsdns-28.net 205.251.194.226 2600:9000:5302:e200::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org 205.251.197.169 2600:9000:5305:a900::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk 205.251.199.35 2600:9000:5307:2300::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No transport encryption policy detected — mail delivery relies on opportunistic TLS

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
18.154.185.33 → AS ()
18.154.185.48 → AS ()
18.154.185.35 → AS ()
18.154.185.96 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 7 services

7 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Atlassian atlassian-domain-verification=fecVuukmD7HYkotOSHJeZj7bwwPi2KkUXN61uckFqkF4es9woz...
Microsoft 365 MS=ms90467680
1Password 1password-site-verification=FL35IRPJAZA45EMAHJE3DM2P34
Dropbox dropbox-domain-verification=9i3l1qna33qy
Google Workspace google-site-verification=V4yoSBiET77_9lNFGziBaIrPkhAGJdTjnJ70bmaMH28
Apple apple-domain-verification=lrease1jj5yhKu1A
Facebook / Meta facebook-domain-verification=i6l6p5krhuto4im0f98mvx3pbjfhvi
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns-1449.awsdns-53.org ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk ns-193.awsdns-24.com ns-738.awsdns-28.net
Managed DNS
All 4 nameservers hosted by Amazon Route 53. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Amazon Route 53
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (2 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [3.173.161.53 3.173.161.59 3.173.161.62 3.173.161.65]
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [1password-site-verification=FL35IRPJAZA45EMAHJE3DM2P34 MS=ms90467680 _m42h676p7k4b3h9fqw5ogb6m3empi48 apple-domain-verification=lrease1jj5yhKu1A dropbox-domain-verification=9i3l1qna33qy forward-email-site-verification=IFdNp6eOx3 klaviyo-site-verification=SHA5cE mdq267gx87p93v5k76fcg7s86xh7j1kg traction-guest=0ca160cd-40d1-4986-8f39-6e435152eec5]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

18.154.185.33
18.154.185.48
18.154.185.35
18.154.185.96
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

10 mx1.forwardemail.net.
10 mx2.forwardemail.net.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 1 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.
_sip._tls: 100 1 443 sipdir.online.lync.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (4 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: 2 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 28 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
29 unique certificates 28 current 0 expired 10 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Wildcard certificate detected: *.red.com Active 2 certs 2 CAs: Sectigo Limited, Amazon
No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).
DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.
Certificate Authority Diversity (4 CAs observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
Let's Encrypt 17 2025-12-13 2026-02-28 Active
Amazon 8 2025-02-18 2026-01-19 Active
DigiCert Inc 3 2025-04-24 2025-07-07 Active
Sectigo Limited 1 2025-11-17 2025-11-17 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
2a57j78hsrstljvqlux8inqlkmoufug.rdcmetadata.red.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-11-21T00:00:00 Amazon
argocd.red.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-28T18:56:54 Let's Encrypt
autodiscover.red.com DNS Current autodiscover.outlook.com 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
cms.red.com DNS Current d25sgcrd2p0p7.cloudfront.net 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
csc.red.com
80/tcp Cloudflare http proxy 443/tcp Cloudflare http proxy
CT Log Current redcsc.zendesk.com 4 2026-02-27T23:39:31 Let's Encrypt
db1.red.com DNS Current production-database.ca3bitgm863b.us-west-2.rds.amazonaws.com 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
docs.red.com DNS Current d251ynbmdsa2xe.cloudfront.net 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
downloads.red.com DNS Current dzltzf5dsesf6.cloudfront.net 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
eu.red.com DNS Current d8qd7ihwepkly.cloudfront.net 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
firmware.red.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-01-19T00:00:00 Amazon
iconises01.red.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-07-07T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
images.red.com DNS Current d1gxco57vqsng4.cloudfront.net 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
k10.red.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-01T14:22:42 Let's Encrypt
lassises01.red.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-07-07T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
mail.red.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-16T02:34:12 Let's Encrypt
netsuite.red.com CT Log Current — 2 2025-10-19T00:00:00 Amazon
owa.red.com DNS Current webmail.red.com 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
partners.red.com CT Log Current redpartners.zendesk.com 4 2026-02-27T23:39:31 Let's Encrypt
rancher.red.com CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-28T18:56:53 Let's Encrypt
rdcmetadata.red.com CT Log Current capi.rdc.services 8 2025-11-21T00:00:00 Amazon
snipeit.red.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-06T17:57:46 Let's Encrypt
support.red.com CT Log Current redray.zendesk.com 4 2026-02-27T23:39:31 Let's Encrypt
videos.red.com DNS Current d1hab8kmf3hm0g.cloudfront.net 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
vpn.red.com DNS Current — 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
vpn2.red.com DNS Current — 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
webmail.red.com
80/tcp Microsoft IIS httpd 443/tcp Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
DNS Current mail.office365.com 2 2025-04-12 Sectigo Limited, Amazon
www.red.com
80/tcp AkamaiGHost 443/tcp AkamaiGHost
CT Log Current www.red.com.hosting.netsuite.com 2 2026-01-29T23:35:47 Let's Encrypt
zabbix.red.com CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-06T07:23:16 Let's Encrypt
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 4 / 4 records
18.154.185.33
18.154.185.48
18.154.185.48
18.154.185.33
18.154.185.35
18.154.185.96
18.154.185.96
18.154.185.35
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
0 iodef "mailto:iodef@red.com"
0 iodef "mailto:iodef@red.com"
0 issue "www.digicert.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "www.digicert.com"
DMARC _dmarc.red.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-68b7843f04d9df0d350c2996@forwardemail.net
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-68b7843f04d9df0d350c2996@forwardemail.net
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
10 mx1.forwardemail.net.
10 mx1.forwardemail.net.
10 mx2.forwardemail.net.
10 mx2.forwardemail.net.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns-193.awsdns-24.com.
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org.
ns-738.awsdns-28.net.
ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk.
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org.
ns-193.awsdns-24.com.
ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk.
ns-738.awsdns-28.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
TXT RFC 7208 §4 19 / 0 records
_m42h676p7k4b3h9fqw5ogb6m3empi48
—
atlassian-domain-verification=fecVuukmD7HYkotOSHJeZj7bwwPi2KkUXN61uckFqkF4es9wozestIp1cmelFdUo
—
MS=ms90467680
—
fub7Jg8wns9rH4Byn/ymd3bVcq7z9ufxhBkZWZjgJNDTRUiRYT8uM/QAvHZJMbLpHys5LwcZxFkbqWySIFHd9A==
—
1password-site-verification=FL35IRPJAZA45EMAHJE3DM2P34
—
v=spf2.0/pra a mx include:radicaepost.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mailsenders.netsuite.com include:sent-via.netsuite.com ~all
—
dropbox-domain-verification=9i3l1qna33qy
—
google-site-verification=V4yoSBiET77_9lNFGziBaIrPkhAGJdTjnJ70bmaMH28
—
google-site-verification=URKywT9Orj6_nk93ayvDWupzAH39Xci8dOxAsAuJgI0
—
v=spf1 mx include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mail.zendesk.com a:outboundips.netsuite.com include:rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:eu.rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:ap.rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:sendgrid.net ip4:70.183.25.226 ip4:70.183.25.233 ip4:12.215.166.253 ip4:46.61.187.62 ip4:216.194.106.13 ip4:149.20.194.55 ip4:148.62.51.171 ip4:23.21.109.197 ip4:23.21.109.212 ip4:147.160.167.14 ip4:147.160.167.15 ip4:52.49.235.189 ip4:52.49.201.246 ~all
—
google-site-verification=wWF7PHkVbQ_Rxb2kv8-dUHz8-AwzLEEV33V9cCNr_hM
—
apple-domain-verification=lrease1jj5yhKu1A
—
google-site-verification=rfoESIAfF6youN2T4_L_jsIdPbKG_k8abtuxZF2Eyv8
—
klaviyo-site-verification=SHA5cE
—
forward-email-site-verification=IFdNp6eOx3
—
traction-guest=0ca160cd-40d1-4986-8f39-6e435152eec5
—
p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDDIyp3V1j2XAo4c9eEIaNpO/W31jONArkhj3L7ttWF8BqCFfLfkB/QYWTIUvItbj3ZiVA5ODPW4/w7Rax7EW15uvs1y/oLT+kyKhTx8DGBWXCpaDOUfjOoSzb+Z/CsaBWBU2vd69lG/76O+I1xFW+6eQ24/fpr3k5mSrtVCrn2awIDAQAB
—
mdq267gx87p93v5k76fcg7s86xh7j1kg
—
facebook-domain-verification=i6l6p5krhuto4im0f98mvx3pbjfhvi
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
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DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

fd072e07d27384da95c105901b38b96998314175212a740477362abc36e7bbd806f3a5c4bc5a687374d161be492178eb65d372ee758c29ff1d774325165644e0
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 10 Mar 2026, 03:21 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-red.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-red.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-red.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-red.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/7007/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for red.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer red.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer red.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer red.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer red.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer red.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short red.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.red.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mail' RFC 6376 
dig +short mail._domainkey.red.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.red.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer red.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer red.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd red.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx1.forwardemail.net RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.forwardemail.net TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx2.forwardemail.net RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.forwardemail.net TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx1.forwardemail.net) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx1.forwardemail.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.red.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.red.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.red.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.red.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer red.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer red.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer red.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/red.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx1.forwardemail.net) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx1.forwardemail.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.red.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://red.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://red.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://red.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 18.154.185.33 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 33.185.154.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 18.154.185.48 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 48.185.154.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer red.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer red.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer red.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer red.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer red.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short red.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.red.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mail' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mail._domainkey.red.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.red.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer red.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer red.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd red.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx1.forwardemail.net (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.forwardemail.net TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx2.forwardemail.net (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.forwardemail.net TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx1.forwardemail.net) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx1.forwardemail.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.red.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.red.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.red.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.red.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer red.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer red.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer red.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/red.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx1.forwardemail.net) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx1.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx1.forwardemail.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.red.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://red.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://red.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://red.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 18.154.185.33 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 33.185.154.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 18.154.185.48 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 48.185.154.18.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

red.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.