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Recon Report

red.com

10 Mar 2026, 03:21 UTC · 60.0s ·v26.35.34

Engineer's Re-scan New Target

Target Assessment

Target Hardness: Medium Risk

4 defensive layers | 5 attack surface gaps

1 weakness 2 monitoring

ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE MODERATE 69/100

ACC:66% CUR:73 MAT:verified

Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

> analyzing sender authorization policy...

SPF — Sender Policy Framework

SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing

RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...

DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — signatures found

RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...

DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication

DMARC p=none — monitoring only, no enforcement. Spoofing is trivial.

RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...

DANE / TLSA

No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded

MTA-STS

MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible

TLS-RPT

No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner

RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

BIMI

No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.

CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization

CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.

0 issue "amazon.com"

0 issue "www.digicert.com"

0 iodef "mailto:iodef@red.com"

0 issue "letsencrypt.org"

0 issue "sectigo.com"

RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

> validating cryptographic chain of trust...

DNSSEC

No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned

RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation

4 nameservers detected

ns-1449.awsdns-53.org ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk ns-193.awsdns-24.com ns-738.awsdns-28.net

Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?

Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)

0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction

Subdomain
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-11-21T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:2a57j78hsrstljvqlux8inqlkmoufug.rdcmetadata.red.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2026-02-28T18:56:54 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:argocd.red.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:autodiscover.outlook.com first_seen:2025-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Amazon] name:autodiscover.red.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:d25sgcrd2p0p7.cloudfront.net first_seen:2025-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Amazon] name:cms.red.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:4 cname_target:redcsc.zendesk.com first_seen:2026-02-27T23:39:31 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:csc.red.com services:[map[http_title:Did not follow redirect to https://csc.red.com/ port:80 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http] map[cert_sans_count:3 http_title:Just a moment... Requested resource was https://csc.red.com/hc/en-us port:443 product:Cloudflare http proxy protocol:tcp service:http]] source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:production-database.ca3bitgm863b.us-west-2.rds.amazonaws.com first_seen:2025-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Amazon] name:db1.red.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:d251ynbmdsa2xe.cloudfront.net first_seen:2025-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Amazon] name:docs.red.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:dzltzf5dsesf6.cloudfront.net first_seen:2025-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Amazon] name:downloads.red.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:d8qd7ihwepkly.cloudfront.net first_seen:2025-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Amazon] name:eu.red.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2026-01-19T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:firmware.red.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-07-07T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:iconises01.red.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:d1gxco57vqsng4.cloudfront.net first_seen:2025-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Amazon] name:images.red.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2026-02-01T14:22:42 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:k10.red.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-07-07T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[DigiCert Inc] name:lassises01.red.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2026-02-16T02:34:12 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:mail.red.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2025-10-19T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:netsuite.red.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:2 cname_target:webmail.red.com first_seen:2025-04-12 is_current:true issuers:[Sectigo Limited Amazon] name:owa.red.com source:dns]`
`map[cert_count:4 cname_target:redpartners.zendesk.com first_seen:2026-02-27T23:39:31 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:partners.red.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:4 first_seen:2026-02-28T18:56:53 is_current:true issuers:[Let's Encrypt] name:rancher.red.com source:ct]`
`map[cert_count:8 cname_target:capi.rdc.services first_seen:2025-11-21T00:00:00 is_current:true issuers:[Amazon] name:rdcmetadata.red.com source:ct]`

SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)

7 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Atlassian Microsoft 365 1Password Dropbox Google Workspace Apple Facebook / Meta

Secret Exposure

No exposed secrets detected in common paths

Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?

SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash

fd072e07d27384da95c105901b38b96998314175212a740477362abc36e7bbd806f3a5c4bc5a687374d161be492178eb65d372ee758c29ff1d774325165644e0

RFC References

Tool Version

v26.35.34

Posture Hash

8ecbbc39a6f18ddf…

Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do