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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 9 Feb 2026, 03:34 UTC
Duration 19.7s
Integrity f80d4c01b4b9f0511a05af71e48383b18ec6097846143420b7a966714dbc1c972d3f9b2e4b1c4428ed1dad68cd3ceb334674a790e2a39711243b6076392cf5ba
Subject Domain
cia.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

cia.gov
9 Feb 2026, 03:34 UTC · 19.7s · SHA-3-512: f80d✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint U.S. Government via Akamai Edge DNS
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: SECURE (Monitoring)
3 protocols configured, 4 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 monitoring
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Monitoring
DMARC quarantine (p=reject recommended for full enforcement)
Configured
DKIM (1 selector(s), 2048-bit), DNSSEC (DNS responses signed), CAA (certificate issuance restricted)
Not Configured
DANE/TLSA (certificate pinning for mail transport), MTA-STS (email TLS policy), TLS-RPT (TLS delivery reporting), BIMI (brand logo in inboxes)
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Cia.Gov
Email: Enabled
Web Hosting
Akamai Edge DNS
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Akamai Edge DNS Gov Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Mostly No
Verdict: DMARC policy is quarantine - spoofed messages will be flagged as spam. DKIM keys verified with strong cryptography.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 mx -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC enforcement is partial (quarantine). -all may preempt DKIM/DMARC evaluation at some receivers. Consider p=reject for full enforcement; ~all is more DMARC-compatible.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Quarantined, not rejected
Success p=quarantine

DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:demarcreports@uce.cia.gov; ruf=mailto:demarcfailures@uce.cia.gov; ri=86400; aspf=s; adkim=s; fo=1
Alignment: SPF strict DKIM strict sp=quarantine
Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

s1._domainkey 2048-bit
v=DKIM1; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDWKDG6o+aUX3ov7h3zsv1mjQ5oTy8kFUYXMtgRQxrk3BHfM7cEXysehX3MaOgf/1JuN1dzmbwTMG9WqY1ikhQTjWbi0qVP0LMw7QSXmkdpmGl/QXEKp5LJDNGTuE3yPtD/068WPe1wYI2Oqx/ODOkxF4LUx7tbhjBBgzXtl8/Z5QIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 2 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: Certificate issuance is controlled but brand logo (BIMI) is not configured.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success IODEF

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only DigiCert can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: DigiCert
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 iodef "mailto:caanotices@uce.cia.gov"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?
Verdict: DNS responses are authenticated from the root downward. Delegation is verified.

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated - AD flag confirmed by resolver

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
62599 8 2 E51AE54018E41619F97076A56C969D10A71B4D0050DBF1E6AB8DE2F8CF023AE5
48959 8 2 DEB2A237884DDCFD20BDFF8E8FA81F4A4B7ED069E1E4E2ED79CAE7707D1CFFFC
25534 8 2 4F6E9F886A649976127D3A4746108C2461E2D9198F1D24C869CFD9E91E2CF5B3

NS Delegation Verified

6 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: a1-22.akam.net a12-65.akam.net a13-65.akam.net a16-67.akam.net a22-66.akam.net a3-64.akam.net
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

23.64.114.72
23.64.114.71
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2600:1405:6400::17c3:519b
2600:1405:6400::17c3:5190
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 mail4.cia.gov.
10 mail3.cia.gov.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Cia.Gov

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 14 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup
109 certificates analyzed 3 current 11 expired 1 CNAME 1 provider identified Source: Certificate Transparency Logs + DNS Probing
Combines CT log certificates (RFC 6962) with DNS probing of common service names. Does not include internal-only names or uncommon subdomain prefixes.
Third-party services detected via CNAME:
Akamai (CDN)
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
www.cia.gov CT Log Current Akamai CDN 55 2006-02-08 DigiCert EV RSA CA G2, DigiCert Global G3 TLS ECC SHA384 2020 CA1, DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA
mail3.cia.gov CT Log Current — 5 2024-03-26 DigiCert EV RSA CA G2
mail4.cia.gov CT Log Current — 5 2024-03-26 DigiCert EV RSA CA G2
mail1.cia.gov CT Log Expired — 14 2016-03-31 DigiCert EV RSA CA G2, DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA, Symantec Class 3 EV SSL CA - G3
mail2.cia.gov CT Log Expired — 12 2016-04-05 DigiCert EV RSA CA G2, DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA, Symantec Class 3 EV SSL CA - G3
mivsp.cia.gov CT Log Expired — 8 2014-12-11 Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2, Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA - G4
www.mivsp.cia.gov CT Log Expired — 7 2018-08-17 Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2
cmp.cloud.cia.gov CT Log Expired — 2 2022-06-28 Amazon, Amazon RSA 2048 M02
crypt.cia.gov CT Log Expired — 2 2012-12-11 VeriSign Class 3 Extended Validation SSL SGC CA
preview-16789456.cia.gov CT Log Expired — 2 2020-12-21 R3
cloudbolt.cloud.cia.gov CT Log Expired — 1 2022-05-31 Amazon
ddss.cia.gov CT Log Expired — 1 2010-08-12 VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA - G2
ddsstest.cia.gov CT Log Expired — 1 2010-08-11 VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA - G2
res.cia.gov CT Log Expired — 1 2008-04-02 —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 2 / 0 records
23.64.114.72
—
23.64.114.71
—
AAAA 2 / 0 records
2600:1405:6400::17c3:519b
—
2600:1405:6400::17c3:5190
—
CAA RFC 8659 §4 2 / 0 records
0 issue "digicert.com"
—
0 iodef "mailto:caanotices@uce.cia.gov"
—
DMARC _dmarc.cia.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 1 / 0 records
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:demarcreports@uce.cia.gov; ruf=mailto:demarcfailures@uce.cia.gov; ri=86400; aspf=s; adkim=s; fo=1
—
MTA-STS _mta-sts.cia.gov RFC 8461 §3 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 2 / 0 records
10 mail4.cia.gov.
—
10 mail3.cia.gov.
—
NS RFC 1035 6 / 0 records
a13-65.akam.net.
—
a1-22.akam.net.
—
a3-64.akam.net.
—
a16-67.akam.net.
—
a12-65.akam.net.
—
a22-66.akam.net.
—
SOA RFC 1035 1 / 0 records
a1-22.akam.net. monrpt.cia.gov. 2015111807 7200 3600 2419200 14400
—
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.cia.gov RFC 8460 §3 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
TXT RFC 7208 §4 1 / 0 records
v=spf1 mx -all
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

f80d4c01b4b9f0511a05af71e48383b18ec6097846143420b7a966714dbc1c972d3f9b2e4b1c4428ed1dad68cd3ceb334674a790e2a39711243b6076392cf5ba
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 9 Feb 2026, 03:34 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-cia.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-cia.gov.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-cia.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-cia.gov.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/437/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for cia.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short cia.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.cia.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.cia.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cia.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd cia.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mail4.cia.gov RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail4.cia.gov TLSA
Check TLSA record for mail3.cia.gov RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail3.cia.gov TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mail4.cia.gov) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail4.cia.gov:25 -servername mail4.cia.gov 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.cia.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cia.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cia.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.cia.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cia.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mail4.cia.gov) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail4.cia.gov:25 -servername mail4.cia.gov </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cia.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://cia.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cia.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cia.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.64.114.72 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 72.114.64.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 23.64.114.71 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 71.114.64.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short cia.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.cia.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.cia.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cia.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd cia.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mail4.cia.gov (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail4.cia.gov TLSA
Check TLSA record for mail3.cia.gov (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail3.cia.gov TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mail4.cia.gov) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail4.cia.gov:25 -servername mail4.cia.gov 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.cia.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cia.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cia.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.cia.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer cia.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cia.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mail4.cia.gov) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail4.cia.gov:25 -servername mail4.cia.gov </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cia.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://cia.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cia.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cia.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.64.114.72 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 72.114.64.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 23.64.114.71 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 71.114.64.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

cia.gov

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.