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Recon Report

cia.gov
9 Feb 2026, 03:34 UTC · 19.7s
Engineer's Re-scan New Target
Target Assessment
Target Hardness: SECURE (Monitoring)
3 defensive layers | 4 attack surface gaps
1 monitoring
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain?
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework

SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.

> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure — signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail

DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).

> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC p=quarantine — authentication failures are sequestered, not rejected. Forensic telemetry is preserved (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain this posture as a deliberate monitoring strategy. See NIST SP 800-177
RFC 7489 — DMARC

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.

Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit?
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting

TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.

Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity?
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
CAA restricts certificate issuance to authorized CAs. Attacker must compromise an approved CA or exploit issuance delay windows.
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 iodef "mailto:caanotices@uce.cia.gov"
RFC 8659 — CAA

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.

DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS?
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
No DNSSEC — DNS responses can be spoofed or poisoned
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.

NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected — single point of failure
DNS Provider
U.S. Government via Akamai Edge DNS
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
Subdomain
map[cert_count:55 cname_chain:[cia.gov.edgekey.net e10004744.dsca.akamaiedge.net] cname_target:e10004744.dsca.akamaiedge.net first_seen:2006-02-08 is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[DigiCert EV RSA CA G2 DigiCert Global G3 TLS ECC SHA384 2020 CA1 DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA] last_seen:2025-08-13 name:www.cia.gov provider:Akamai provider_category:CDN]
map[cert_count:5 first_seen:2024-03-26 is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[DigiCert EV RSA CA G2] last_seen:2025-03-25 name:mail3.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:5 first_seen:2024-03-26 is_current:true is_wildcard:false issuers:[DigiCert EV RSA CA G2] last_seen:2025-03-25 name:mail4.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:14 first_seen:2016-03-31 is_current:false is_wildcard:false issuers:[DigiCert EV RSA CA G2 DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA Symantec Class 3 EV SSL CA - G3] last_seen:2024-03-25 name:mail1.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:12 first_seen:2016-04-05 is_current:false is_wildcard:false issuers:[DigiCert EV RSA CA G2 DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA Symantec Class 3 EV SSL CA - G3] last_seen:2024-03-25 name:mail2.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:8 first_seen:2014-12-11 is_current:false is_wildcard:false issuers:[Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2 Symantec Class 3 Secure Server CA - G4] last_seen:2022-08-18 name:mivsp.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:7 first_seen:2018-08-17 is_current:false is_wildcard:false issuers:[Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2] last_seen:2022-08-18 name:www.mivsp.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2022-06-28 is_current:false is_wildcard:false issuers:[Amazon Amazon RSA 2048 M02] last_seen:2023-02-22 name:cmp.cloud.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2012-12-11 is_current:false is_wildcard:false issuers:[VeriSign Class 3 Extended Validation SSL SGC CA] last_seen:2013-12-11 name:crypt.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:2 first_seen:2020-12-21 is_current:false is_wildcard:false issuers:[R3] last_seen:2020-12-21 name:preview-16789456.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2022-05-31 is_current:false is_wildcard:false issuers:[Amazon] last_seen:2022-05-31 name:cloudbolt.cloud.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2010-08-12 is_current:false is_wildcard:false issuers:[VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA - G2] last_seen:2010-08-12 name:ddss.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2010-08-11 is_current:false is_wildcard:false issuers:[VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA - G2] last_seen:2010-08-11 name:ddsstest.cia.gov]
map[cert_count:1 first_seen:2008-04-02 is_current:false is_wildcard:false issuers:[] last_seen:2008-04-02 name:res.cia.gov]
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
f80d4c01b4b9f0511a05af71e48383b18ec6097846143420b7a966714dbc1c972d3f9b2e4b1c4428ed1dad68cd3ceb334674a790e2a39711243b6076392cf5ba
RFC References
12
Verification Commands — Independently verify every finding