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Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

reisswellness.com Medium Risk
22 Aug 2026, 22:02 UTC · 60.7s ·v26.51.0-135-g7ada422b6 · SHA-3-512: 2e7c✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived ·Cross-Referenced
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
Inconclusive
Brand Impersonation
Inconclusive
DNS Tampering
Could Not Verify
Certificate Control
Inconclusive
Monitoring
Inconclusive
DANE
Unavailable on Provider
TRACE L0 · Email Spoofing — Inconclusive L1 · 01 · Email Security · SPF/DMARC L3 · Reproduce commands
Monitoring
MTA-STS could not be verified — the DNS lookup did not complete; re-run before concluding it is absent, TLS-RPT could not be verified — the DNS lookup did not complete; re-run before concluding it is absent, BIMI could not be verified — the DNS lookup did not complete; re-run before concluding it is absent, DNSSEC could not be verified — DNSKEY/DS lookup did not complete; re-run before concluding the zone is unsigned (RFC 4035), CAA could not be verified — the DNS lookup did not complete; re-run before concluding it is absent
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Configured
SPF, DKIM
Priority Action Achievable posture: Hardened
Medium Add DMARC Aggregate Reporting

Add a rua= tag to receive aggregate DMARC reports. Without reporting, you cannot monitor authentication failures.

Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Launchpad.com Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Google Workspace
Could Not Verify
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Inconclusive
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Could not verify a DNS lookup did not complete — re-run before concluding

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:google.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Inconclusive
DMARC Could Not Be Verified. The _dmarc TXT lookup did not complete (transient resolver failure — SERVFAIL/timeout). Per RFC 7489 §6.6.3, a DNS temporary error is a TempError — never an absence of policy. This result is inconclusive, not a finding that DMARC is absent. Re-run before drawing a conclusion.
Inconclusive

DMARC could not be verified — the DNS lookup did not complete (transient SERVFAIL/timeout). This is not a finding that DMARC is absent; re-run before drawing a conclusion.

RFC 7489 — Result Indeterminate: The _dmarc TXT lookup did not complete (transient resolver failure). Per RFC 7489 §6.6.3, a DNS temporary error is a TempError — never an absence of policy. We cannot assert this domain lacks DMARC. This is an inconclusive measurement. Re-run before concluding.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

default._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAwDBqpw0Zq7mIFs+w9PxKQi6eUJEhgBxnaiMDg8XW87TnGv7I3ktmdP+NqHbL5m3pE3IT5Bv4WVkXh6X8X2UYm6NVXTfHIoAZTlN6t+LtZn/mglRHl0fVu/NK925T90b8XJvnsN9sUboGOHposQ1KEbMWyXpR/oGskQnltOD3moe6ZvOFo2rMUE1MrdNvxaUb0ka9aBAsJvOuM16KLICCTahD/BK98SmJzb3twhGFzh5Wf1Yty8j/Zr850OZWQfsnaOv4omP2FAL2peyRTIwT0gZD03W3LasbeoIyGHXMRv6Xre1p0KPyG5KsXJa39QoTask+MmLyTi91LvwCbrUxoQIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Inconclusive
Inconclusive

MTA-STS could not be verified: the DNS lookup did not complete (transient SERVFAIL/timeout/network error). This is not evidence that MTA-STS is absent — re-run before concluding it is unconfigured.

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Inconclusive
Inconclusive

TLS-RPT could not be verified: the DNS lookup did not complete (transient SERVFAIL/timeout/network error). This is not evidence that TLS-RPT is absent — re-run before concluding it is unconfigured.

02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC & NS Could Not Verify

DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Google Workspace

Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).


Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
MTA-STS could not be verified. The MTA-STS DNS lookup did not complete (transient resolver failure), so its presence is inconclusive. Per RFC 8461 §3.1, absence can only be asserted from an authoritative answer — this is not a finding that MTA-STS is absent. DANE was likewise not detected on this domain. Re-run once resolution is stable to confirm transport policy.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Inconclusive

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Inconclusive

CAA could not be verified: the DNS lookup did not complete (transient SERVFAIL/timeout/network error). This is not evidence that CAA is absent — re-run before concluding it is unconfigured.

Delegation Consistency 3 Issues

Delegation consistency: 3 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DNSKEY records missing at child — DS records at parent have no matching keys
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from either parent or child
  • Could not retrieve SOA serial from any nameserver

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

Unmatched DS records (no corresponding DNSKEY):
Key Tag: 31140, Algorithm: 13
Key Tag: 31140, Algorithm: 13

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent


Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Unknown DNSSEC could not be confirmed — re-run to verify. This is not evidence the zone is unsigned (RFC 4035).

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Could Not Verify

DNSSEC could not be verified — DNSKEY/DS lookups did not complete (transient resolver failure). This is not evidence that DNSSEC is absent (RFC 4035).

DNSKEY/DS lookups did not complete (transient resolver failure). Per RFC 4035, signing status cannot be asserted from a failed lookup — this result is inconclusive, not a finding that DNSSEC is absent. Re-run the scan to confirm.

NS Delegation Check Failed Mismatch

Could not retrieve NS records

NS records at domain differ from parent zone delegation. May indicate recent DNS migration still propagating.
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Unknown Mail transport security could not be verified — the MTA-STS DNS lookup did not complete; a TLS-RPT record alone does not enforce TLS, so this is not evidence enforcement is absent. Re-run before concluding transport encryption is unenforced

All 1 server(s) verified: encrypted transport confirmed via direct SMTP probe and DNS policy

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Google Workspace enforces TLS 1.2+ with valid certificates on all inbound/outbound mail
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Key Exchange Certificate
smtp.google.com TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 N/A Valid
Expires: 2026-10-28 (66 days)
Issuer: Google Trust Services
Multi-Vantage Probe Results
Unanimous: TLS verified 3 probes, 1 responded
EU (Paris) observed
All servers support TLS
6.117492347s
US-East (Virginia) skipped
APAC (Singapore) skipped
What Is Measured: Our probe’s TLS 1.3 handshake offers the hybrid post-quantum group X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 combined with ML-KEM-768). The Key Exchange column reports the group each mail server actually negotiated — direct, observed evidence of its post-quantum readiness toward a hybrid-capable client.
Quantum-Safe Hybrid: The session key agreement combines classical X25519 with ML-KEM-768, standardized in FIPS 203 (final, August 2024). This protects the key exchange against “harvest now, decrypt later” collection by a future quantum adversary.
Classical: The server completed the handshake without selecting the offered hybrid group. This is not a deviation — no RFC currently requires post-quantum key exchange. The X25519MLKEM768 group is defined in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem (Standards Track draft, not yet an RFC); the hybrid approach is described in draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (IESG-approved Informational). Servers supporting only other hybrid groups also read as Classical here.
Transition Outlook: NIST’s draft transition guidance (NIST IR 8547) projects quantum-vulnerable algorithms being deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid key exchange requires TLS 1.3. This finding is informational and does not affect this domain’s grade.
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Inconclusive

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC policy is not set to reject (RFC 7489 §6.3) — partial protection only

BIMI BIMI Spec Gold Inconclusive

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Inconclusive

BIMI could not be verified: the DNS lookup did not complete (transient SERVFAIL/timeout/network error). This is not evidence that BIMI is absent — re-run before concluding it is unconfigured.

05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

Could not fetch security.txt

Fetch error: Connection failed
A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.


AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No significant AI surface findings

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives
No robots.txt found
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Not Checked

No nameservers found — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Not tested
Open Recursion Disabled Not tested
Nameserver Identity Hidden Not tested
Cache Snooping Protected Not tested
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Info

No IP addresses to look up

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service

Detected 1 SaaS verification record

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google google-site-verification=Gauq80vz5S1HzR7NoxwgjuEAz4FTyt3jEavwrW_-QHw
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

No A records
Domain may use AAAA (IPv6) only or CNAME

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

1 smtp.google.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Google Workspace

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: No direct IP Mail: 1 server Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 4 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
CT logs unavailable 4 current 0 expired 4 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
cpanel.reisswellness.com DNS Current reisswellness.com
ftp.reisswellness.com DNS Current reisswellness.com
webmail.reisswellness.com DNS Current reisswellness.com
www.reisswellness.com DNS Current wp.wpenginepowered.com
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
06 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
Some DNS data may be stale or incomplete, limiting confidence. Resolver agreement and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 92% Currency 53/100 Maturity gold
Limiting factor: Data currency is degraded — some records may be stale, incomplete, or inconsistent with authoritative sources
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Adequate Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Stale TTL Relevance Good
ICuAE Details
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for reisswellness.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns1.dnsbycomodo.net
Serial 2026082201
Admin admin.dns.com
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10800s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry864000sFraction of Refresh
Expire7200s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)7200s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 2 hours (7200s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 2 hours (7200s).
Expire vs Refresh+Retry: If Expire is not greater than Refresh + Retry, secondary nameservers may stop serving the zone before they've had a chance to retry the primary.
Suggested Scanner Configuration Medium Confidence
Based on 9 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
resolver_set 5 resolvers, 0% agreement Add additional resolvers or replace low-agreement ones high Resolver agreement rate is 0.0%, below the 70% threshold. Low agreement indicates potential DNS propagation issues or resolver-specific caching behavior. Adding diverse resolvers improves measurement confidence.
NIST SP 800-53 SI-7
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 63.5s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 1 / 0 records
1 smtp.google.com.
NS RFC 1035 2 / 0 records
ns1.dnsbycomodo.net.
ns2.dnsbycomodo.net.
SOA RFC 1035 1 / 0 records
ns1.dnsbycomodo.net. admin.dns.com. 2026082201 10800 864000 7200 7200
TXT RFC 7208 §4 2 / 0 records
google-site-verification=Gauq80vz5S1HzR7NoxwgjuEAz4FTyt3jEavwrW_-QHw
v=spf1 include:google.com ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

2e7c4b6f11c6094037ae542e623b4b586ded696a87f759aa4eb85c98249c3354900c5729bb4a13e90f32bc1682a4310ae666de28fefa7f3e6a47878a96464863
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 22 Aug 2026, 22:02 UTC.
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-evident, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it provides an independently verifiable record of the analysis at this point in time. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a verifiable chain of evidence for domain security state.

Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20260822220223/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/18471/view/E

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)
cat dns-intelligence-reisswellness.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-reisswellness.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform)
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-reisswellness.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+)
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-reisswellness.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/18471/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for reisswellness.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer reisswellness.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer reisswellness.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer reisswellness.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer reisswellness.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer reisswellness.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208
dig +short reisswellness.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489
dig +short _dmarc.reisswellness.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376
dig +short default._domainkey.reisswellness.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +noall +answer reisswellness.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035
dig +noall +answer reisswellness.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +cd reisswellness.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for smtp.google.com RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.smtp.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (smtp.google.com) RFC 6698
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461
dig +short _mta-sts.reisswellness.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461
curl -sL https://mta-sts.reisswellness.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460
dig +short _smtp._tls.reisswellness.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft
dig +short default._bimi.reisswellness.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659
dig +noall +answer reisswellness.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460
dig +noall +answer reisswellness.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344
dig +noall +answer reisswellness.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/reisswellness.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (smtp.google.com) RFC 3207
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.reisswellness.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116
curl -sL https://reisswellness.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt
curl -sI https://reisswellness.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules
curl -s https://reisswellness.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine gold · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Gold 15673 runs
DKIM
Gold 15463 runs
DMARC
Gold 15654 runs
DANE/TLSA
Gold 15445 runs
DNSSEC
Gold 15632 runs
BIMI
Gold 15460 runs
MTA-STS
Gold 15481 runs
TLS-RPT
Gold 15496 runs
CAA
Gold 15493 runs
Maturity: Development Verified Consistent Gold Gold Master

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Running Real-Time Scan Telemetry

Most scans complete in less than one minute. Some may take longer.

Markers represent known resolver locations. Anycast routing selects the nearest node — exact routing is internal to each provider.

Pipeline nodes reflect live data as each analysis phase completes.

Telemetry Log 0 polls