Recon Report
reisswellness.com
Target Assessment
Target Hardness:
Unverified
2 defensive layers
5 monitoring
ANALYSIS CONFIDENCE
MODERATE
70/100
ACC:92%
CUR:53
MAT:gold
Email Spoofability Can you spoof email from this domain? Could not verify a DNS lookup did not complete — re-run before concluding
> analyzing sender authorization policy...
SPF — Sender Policy Framework
SPF is configured — sender authorization restricts spoofing
RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework
SPF allows domain owners to specify which mail servers are authorized to send email on behalf of their domain. Without SPF, any server can forge the envelope sender.
> enumerating cryptographic selectors...
DKIM — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM selectors reveal mail infrastructure
— signatures found
RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail
DKIM provides cryptographic authentication of email messages. Selector names often reveal email providers (e.g., google, selector1 = Microsoft 365).
> evaluating enforcement policy...
DMARC — Domain-based Message Authentication
DMARC could not be verified — _dmarc TXT lookup did not complete (transient SERVFAIL/timeout). Inconclusive, not a finding of absence (RFC 7489 §6.6.3). Re-run before concluding.
RFC 7489 — DMARC
DMARC ties SPF and DKIM together with a policy that tells receiving servers what to do with unauthenticated mail. p=none is monitoring only — attackers love it.
Transport Security Can you intercept email in transit? Unknown Mail transport security could not be verified — the MTA-STS DNS lookup did not complete; a TLS-RPT record alone does not enforce TLS, so this is not evidence enforcement is absent. Re-run before concluding transport encryption is unenforced
> probing certificate pinning via DNSSEC chain...
DANE / TLSA
No DANE — TLS is opportunistic and can be downgraded
MTA-STS
MTA-STS not enforced — STARTTLS stripping possible
TLS-RPT
No TLS-RPT — TLS failures go unnoticed by the domain owner
RFC 8460 — SMTP TLS Reporting
TLS-RPT enables reporting of TLS negotiation failures. Without it, STARTTLS downgrade attacks leave no trace.
Brand & Certificate Security Can you fake this brand's identity? Likely DMARC policy is not set to reject (RFC 7489 §6.3) — partial protection only
BIMI
No BIMI — no verified brand logo in email clients. Visual impersonation is easy.
CAA — Certificate Authority Authorization
No CAA — any CA on earth can issue a valid certificate for this domain. An attacker can obtain a trusted cert from the cheapest, fastest CA and stand up a convincing HTTPS phishing clone or MitM proxy.
RFC 8659 — CAA
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Without CAA, an attacker could obtain a valid cert from any CA.
DNS Infrastructure Can you poison the DNS? Unknown DNSSEC could not be confirmed — re-run to verify. This is not evidence the zone is unsigned (RFC 4035).
> validating cryptographic chain of trust...
DNSSEC
DNSSEC could not be verified — DNSKEY/DS lookups did not complete (transient). Inconclusive, not a finding of absence (RFC 4035)
RFC 4033–4035 — DNSSEC
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and response forgery. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can forge DNS answers.
NS Delegation
0 nameservers detected
— single point of failure
Attack Surface Discovery What can you find from the outside?
Subdomain Discovery (Multi-Source)
0 subdomains discovered via CT logs + DNS probing + Nmap SAN extraction
| Subdomain |
|---|
map[cert_count:— cname_target:reisswellness.com first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:cpanel.reisswellness.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:reisswellness.com first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:ftp.reisswellness.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:reisswellness.com first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:webmail.reisswellness.com source:dns] |
map[cert_count:— cname_target:wp.wpenginepowered.com first_seen:— is_current:true issuers:[] name:www.reisswellness.com source:dns] |
SaaS Services (TXT Record Discovery)
1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records
Google
Secret Exposure
No exposed secrets detected in common paths
Intelligence Metadata Can you verify this independently?
SHA-3-512 Integrity Hash
2e7c4b6f11c6094037ae542e623b4b586ded696a87f759aa4eb85c98249c3354900c5729bb4a13e90f32bc1682a4310ae666de28fefa7f3e6a47878a96464863
RFC References
12
Tool Version
v26.51.0-135-g7ada422b6
Posture Hash
b80d43b26015bd5a…