Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
TLP:AMBER
Limited disclosure — recipients may share within their organization only
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
spitalul-municipal-timisoara.ro
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level:
High Risk
2 protocols configured, 7 not configured
Why we go beyond letter grades
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 63%
Currency 67/100
Maturity consistent
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent
TTL Compliance Excellent
Completeness Degraded
Source Credibility Excellent
TTL Relevance Stale
ICuAE Details
Enterprise Traffic Engineering Detected
DNS-based Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB)
This domain uses short TTLs across 4 record types (A record at 30s), consistent with DNS-based traffic management (GSLB). Enterprises operating large anycast networks intentionally use short TTLs to enable rapid failover, geographic steering, and load distribution. This is a deliberate infrastructure choice, not a misconfiguration. RFC 1035 §3.2.1 permits any TTL value the zone administrator selects. The findings below reflect deviation from typical values for reference, not necessarily actionable recommendations for this class of infrastructure.
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from typical values. For domains using DNS-based traffic management, short TTLs are expected and intentional.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NS | 30s |
1 day (86400s) |
high | NS TTL is below typical — observed 30s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| A | 30s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | A TTL is below typical — observed 30s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| TXT | 30s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | TXT TTL is below typical — observed 30s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| SOA | 30s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | SOA TTL is below typical — observed 30s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| MX | 30s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | MX TTL is below typical — observed 30s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- This domain runs short TTLs across multiple record types. Does it operate a global anycast network where DNS-based traffic steering justifies the query volume?
- Are the short TTLs enabling active failover, geographic routing, or load distribution — or are they leftover from a migration that was never reverted?
- Enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure (sub-5ms authoritative response times, globally distributed nameservers) absorbs short-TTL query volume. Would your authoritative DNS handle the same load?
Primary NS
ns1.romarg.com
Serial
2026022701
Admin
hostmaster.romarg.com
Provider
Unknown
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 3600s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 1800s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 1209600s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 86400s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Suggested Scanner Configuration
High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
| Parameter | Current | Suggested | Severity | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| timeout_seconds | 5s |
8s |
low | Average scan duration is 35.6s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures. RFC 8767 |
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Publish a DMARC record starting with p=none and rua reporting
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DKIM
Not Configured
DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions
5 total
Achievable posture: Moderate Risk
Critical
Publish DMARC Record
Add a DMARC record to protect your domain against email spoofing and receive authentication reports.
DMARC tells receivers how to handle mail that fails SPF/DKIM checks.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _dmarc.spitalul-municipal-timisoara.ro (DMARC policy record) |
| Value | v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@spitalul-municipal-timisoara.ro |
Medium
Enable DNSSEC
DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.
Low
Add CAA Records
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.
CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | CAA |
| Host | spitalul-municipal-timisoara.ro (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider) |
| Value | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
Low
Add TLS-RPT Reporting
TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.
TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _smtp._tls.spitalul-municipal-timisoara.ro (SMTP TLS reporting record) |
| Value | v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@spitalul-municipal-timisoara.ro |
Low
Deploy MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.
MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _mta-sts.spitalul-municipal-timisoara.ro (MTA-STS policy record) |
| Value | v=STSv1; id=spitalul-municipal-timisoara.ro |
Registrar (RDAP)
LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Limited Protection
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Likely SPF alone cannot prevent spoofing
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent
Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf?
Yes
Success
-all
1/10 lookups
SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups
v=spf1 include:relay.romarg.net -all
RFC 7489: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs:
CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing),
CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation),
CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC.
RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent
Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined?
No policy published
Warning
No DMARC record found
RFC Stance: RFC 7489 is classified as Informational (not Standards Track). DMARC is a widely adopted industry practice but is not an IETF-mandated standard.
Operational Security: Without DMARC, receiving mail servers have no policy for handling SPF/DKIM failures. Spoofed messages may be delivered to recipients.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.Related CVEs:
CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing),
CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)
DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent
Are outbound emails cryptographically signed?
Yes — verified
Found
2048-bit
Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)
default._domainkey
2048-bit
Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAm5AwtoNbe4Gki7OX2qigcVqHYRaYa5Jj/WoHxO/USiDm5ABqsdPJeGOvxPD0K1n6LLWKNj5E7QxW9Jc+Azb3lTHJuiPoNqKBZ8qTzpQ9ek+KNK5NvUCa8LkFf/JffdSAP46Ml03DhDZ7P7CfSOdAjopB+lefIgapl+A+ne8qQ41C6PE03+K/yEP11nSJUEnkf9+BaC1VOU4azJc/C029L2y1iA/PR+OlYTlx8uKtE7xpkeM6PPS+ka3MMcLNE/NiUkkYn9uj/hcLOw7oZJj78Z9wQIwFXrB41B4TfSoHciY8FRj7l7VATQ0/F3A9ZDdpuGiKZ1JFR5t/cr/sJ5+3iQIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities:
DKIM
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)