DNS Tool

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Generated 15 Feb 2026, 00:08 UTC
Duration 22.3s
Version v26.14.23
Integrity c45e44ae9806c5d9b2124a08668f997f9b48f1362a7b1fcde9fcb5fbf438278f927b8932685c908e1fb34d13d46a0b8eef01780cac234814d21708deb739f419

TLP:AMBER

Limited disclosure — recipients may share within their organization only

Subject Domain

usa.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

usa.gov

15 Feb 2026, 00:08 UTC · 22.3s ·v26.14.23 · SHA-3-512: c45e✱✱✱✱ Verify

Executive Methodology

Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain

Footprint

DNS Security & Trust Posture

Risk Level: Low Risk

4 protocols configured, 5 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades

1 monitoring

Email Spoofing

Protected

Brand Impersonation

Not Setup

DNS Tampering

Protected

Certificate Control

Open

Monitoring

DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector

Configured

SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM (inferred via Amazon SES), DNSSEC

Not Configured

MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, CAA

Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Secure

Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`default._bimi.usa.gov` (BIMI default record)
Value	`v=BIMI1; l=https://usa.gov/brand/logo.svg`

RFC 9495

Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.

Field	Value
Type	`CAA`
Host	`usa.gov` (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value	`0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`

RFC 8659

Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_smtp._tls.usa.gov` (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Value	`v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@usa.gov`

RFC 8460

Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_mta-sts.usa.gov` (MTA-STS policy record)
Value	`v=STSv1; id=usa.gov`

RFC 8461

Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE

get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)

Where domain was purchased

Email Service Provider

Unknown

Strongly Protected

Web Hosting

Unknown

Where website is hosted

DNS Hosting

Unknown

Where DNS records are edited

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes

Success ~all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:amazonses.com include:532040.spf10.hubspotemail.net ~all

RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.

RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy

Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=86400; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@gsa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov; ruf=mailto:dmarcfailures@gsa.gov

Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed

No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing

Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these

RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.

DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Provider-managed

Provider Verified

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

Amazon SES detected as primary mail platform — DKIM signing is managed by the provider. The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.

Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.

Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented

Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting

Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized

Success

All 2 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain	Authorization	Auth Record
`gsa.gov`	Authorized	`v=DMARC1`
`dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov`	Authorized	`v=DMARC1`

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No MX records available — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).

This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? No

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org

Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No

No llms.txt found

No llms-full.txt found

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked

No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured

No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.

Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No

No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No

No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected

Evidence Log (1 item)

Type	Detail	Severity	Confidence
`robots_txt_no_ai_blocks`	robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives	low	Observed

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

No MX records found

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

ASN	Name	Country
`AS14618`		US

IPv4 Mappings:

23.22.13.113 → AS14618 (23.22.0.0/15)

IPv6 Mappings:

2600:1f18:f88:4313:6df7:f986:f915:78d6 → AS14618 (2600:1f18::/35)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS verification records detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.

AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures

DS Record (at registrar):

62996 8 2 9F496F09690F4923E2B4D9336A3A0886CAC24DAEB44153E13F50543B9BA77977

445 8 2 5517C2B10E0CE87584293327971302E9781169313111D9D6C9C4064AEB4865BA

4292 8 2 9C1D52E67A297D47056BE8647CEC0DEDDAF6757817AEC22A4A26D4FB9300AB53

NS Delegation Verified

5 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: dns.gsa.gov dns2.gsa.gov dns3.gsa.gov dns4.gsa.gov dns5.gsa.gov

Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

23.22.13.113

Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2600:1f18:f88:4313:6df7:f986:f915:78d6

IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

No MX records

Domain cannot receive email

SRVServices

No SRV records

No service-specific routing configured

Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: Not configured Services: None

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 156 subdomains discovered

How did we find these?

Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).

Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup

1555 certificates analyzed 1 current 155 expired 1 CNAME Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence

Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.

Wildcard certificate detected: *.usa.gov Expired 0 cert

No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).

DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.

Subdomain	Source	Status	Provider / CNAME	Certificates	First Seen	Issuer(s)
`1.usa.gov`	CT Log	Current	`1.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov.`	42	2020-08-29T20:31:06	Let's Encrypt
`52weeks4women.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	13	2018-04-23T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`admin-survey.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	49	2017-03-01T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust, COMODO CA Limited
`advocacysba.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	59	2018-05-29T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`alpha.my.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	1	2015-12-17T00:00:00	COMODO CA Limited
`analytics.usa.gov`	CT Log	Current	`analytics.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov.`	39	2020-08-05T10:31:08	Let's Encrypt, COMODO CA Limited
`answers.usa.gov`	CT Log	Current	`answers.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov.`	145	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt
`api-business.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	1	2017-10-20T19:12:28	Let's Encrypt
`api.usa.gov`	CT Log	Current	`api-usa-gov.domains.api.data.gov.`	101	2020-08-09T06:33:00	Let's Encrypt, GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust
`apps.usa.gov`	CT Log	Current	`apps.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov.`	175	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt, GeoTrust Inc.
`armyengineerhistory.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	13	2018-04-23T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`asis.demo1.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	1	2016-12-28T23:10:00	Let's Encrypt
`asis.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	42	2020-07-28T15:25:12	Let's Encrypt
`atlfeb.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	15	2018-04-19T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`aws.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	18	2016-11-11T17:09:00	Let's Encrypt
`beta.business.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	20	2017-03-01T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc.
`beta.gobierno.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	25	2017-08-28T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc.
`beta.usa.gov`	CT Log	Current	`beta.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov.`	25	2017-08-28T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc.
`blm.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	61	2018-05-29T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`blmca.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	33	2018-01-05T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`blog.usa.gov`	CT Log	Current	`blog.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov.`	73	2019-10-03T00:00:00	"CloudFlare, GeoTrust Inc.
`buscador.usa.gov`	CT Log	Current	`buscador.sites.infr.search.usa.gov.`	76	2020-08-20T19:37:00	Let's Encrypt
`business.usa.gov`	CT Log	Current	`business.usa.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov.`	91	2020-03-06T16:15:28	Let's Encrypt, GeoTrust Inc., COMODO CA Limited, The USERTRUST Network, "GeoTrust
`civilrights.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	13	2018-04-23T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`commissiononcare.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	33	2018-01-05T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`communitysolutions.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	34	2018-01-05T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`components.standards.usa.gov`	CT Log	Current	—	29	2020-02-03T15:27:29	Let's Encrypt
`connect.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	35	2019-09-17T00:00:00	"CloudFlare, Let's Encrypt
`crazyhat.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	13	2018-04-23T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`crowdsourcing-toolkit.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	33	2018-01-05T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`demo.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	2	2019-12-02T18:11:14	Let's Encrypt
`demo1.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	34	2020-01-21T23:51:25	Let's Encrypt
`demo1.staging.infr.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	34	2020-01-21T23:51:25	Let's Encrypt
`demo2.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	38	2020-01-24T23:04:29	Let's Encrypt
`demo2.staging.infr.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	40	2020-01-24T23:04:29	Let's Encrypt
`demo3.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	35	2020-01-21T23:14:18	Let's Encrypt
`demo3.staging.infr.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	36	2020-01-21T23:14:18	Let's Encrypt
`demo4.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	18	2019-01-18T23:28:18	Let's Encrypt
`demo4.staging.infr.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	18	2019-01-18T23:28:18	Let's Encrypt
`demo5.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	2	2017-10-20T02:34:56	Let's Encrypt
`demo5.staging.infr.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	2	2017-10-20T02:34:56	Let's Encrypt
`dev-business.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	16	2016-08-27T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc.
`dgdev.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	12	2018-05-22T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`dotgov.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	13	2018-04-23T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`epa-notice.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	46	2020-08-11T19:31:05	Let's Encrypt
`fcsm.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	33	2018-01-05T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`fedstats.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	33	2018-01-05T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`feedback-staging.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	35	2020-08-12T23:31:13	Let's Encrypt
`feedback.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	146	2020-08-12T22:31:29	Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc, GeoTrust Inc., "GoDaddy.com
`financialprotection.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	16	2017-03-01T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc.
`fmi.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	15	2018-04-19T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`fsgb.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	12	2018-05-22T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`gobierno.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	139	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt, GeoTrust Inc., "GoDaddy.com
`govt-urls.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	15	2019-05-10T13:51:50	Let's Encrypt
`gsa-ecas.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	6	2020-08-31T15:57:39	Let's Encrypt
`i14y.demo1.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	1	2016-12-28T23:10:00	Let's Encrypt
`i14y.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	35	2020-07-28T15:25:12	Let's Encrypt
`i14y.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	42	2020-07-28T15:25:12	Let's Encrypt
`iciwarm.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	33	2018-01-05T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`images.usa.gov`	DNS	Current	`285be84fb617dbd13607-633e79af86eef6fa3040b8a64f85b956.r50.cf2.rackcdn.com`	—	—	—
`innovationfellows.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	35	2015-04-27T19:48:23	GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust, Cybertrust Inc, COMODO CA Limited
`isdc.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	33	2018-01-05T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`kibana.demo1.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	34	2020-01-21T23:51:25	Let's Encrypt
`kibana.demo2.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	38	2020-01-24T23:04:29	Let's Encrypt
`kibana.demo3.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	35	2020-01-21T23:14:18	Let's Encrypt
`kibana.demo4.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	18	2019-01-18T23:28:18	Let's Encrypt
`kibana.demo5.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	2	2017-10-20T02:34:56	Let's Encrypt
`kibana.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	67	2020-03-04T13:48:45	Let's Encrypt
`kibana5.demo1.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	23	2020-01-21T23:51:25	Let's Encrypt
`kibana5.demo2.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	27	2020-01-24T23:04:29	Let's Encrypt
`kibana5.demo3.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	26	2020-01-21T23:14:18	Let's Encrypt
`kibana5.demo4.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	11	2019-01-18T23:28:18	Let's Encrypt
`kibana5.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	27	2020-03-18T19:59:26	Let's Encrypt
`kibana6.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	2	2020-03-18T19:59:26	Let's Encrypt
`kids.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	90	2020-03-09T17:49:00	Let's Encrypt, GeoTrust Inc., COMODO CA Limited, The USERTRUST Network, "GeoTrust
`labs.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	38	2020-08-12T15:31:05	Let's Encrypt
`lets-encrypt.infr.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	23	2020-05-04T03:14:53	Let's Encrypt
`m.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	144	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt
`mip.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	12	2018-05-22T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`msct.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	15	2018-04-19T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`my.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	162	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt, "GoDaddy.com
`newtech4fedlib.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	15	2018-04-20T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`nihseniorhealth.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	15	2018-04-20T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`notice.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	162	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt
`notifications.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	162	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt
`nsta.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	12	2018-05-22T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`opahit.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	15	2018-04-20T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`open-staging.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	37	2020-08-12T22:31:34	Let's Encrypt
`open.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	37	2020-08-12T22:31:03	Let's Encrypt
`participation.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	127	2020-08-12T22:31:55	Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc, GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust
`pca.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	12	2018-05-22T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`pianc.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	15	2018-04-20T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`presidentialtransition.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	64	2017-10-17T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc.
`promotions.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	161	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt
`proxylb.us-east-1.infr.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	101	2020-08-20T19:37:00	Let's Encrypt
`proxylb.us-west-2.infr.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	5	2016-04-01T19:36:00	Let's Encrypt
`publications.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	143	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt
`rcfl.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	15	2018-04-19T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`registry.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	162	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt
`resque.demo1.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	32	2020-01-21T23:51:25	Let's Encrypt
`resque.demo2.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	34	2020-01-24T23:04:29	Let's Encrypt
`resque.demo3.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	33	2020-01-21T23:14:18	Let's Encrypt
`resque.demo4.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	16	2019-01-18T23:28:18	Let's Encrypt
`resque.demo5.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	2	2017-10-20T02:34:56	Let's Encrypt
`resque.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	73	2020-08-20T19:37:00	Let's Encrypt
`rtv.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	60	2015-10-16T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc.
`sbalearning.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	12	2018-05-22T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`search-prerelease1.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	9	2017-10-03T15:49:45	Let's Encrypt
`search-prerelease2.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	10	2017-10-03T15:55:41	Let's Encrypt
`search-prerelease3.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	7	2017-10-03T15:59:45	Let's Encrypt
`search-prerelease4.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	5	2017-04-28T16:28:00	Let's Encrypt
`search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	128	2020-08-20T19:37:00	Let's Encrypt, COMODO CA Limited, The USERTRUST Network, GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust
`searchstats.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	25	2017-03-01T15:16:00	Let's Encrypt
`sffeb.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	17	2018-04-19T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	130	2018-05-29T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc, "GoDaddy.com, Symantec Corporation, GeoTrust Inc., Verizon Enterprise Solutions
`stage-beta.gobierno.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	18	2017-03-01T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc.
`stage-beta.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	18	2017-03-01T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc.
`stage-business.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	40	2017-10-17T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc.
`staging-vote.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	9	2017-03-01T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc.
`staging.apps.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	45	2017-03-01T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust
`staging.my.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	1	2015-12-17T00:00:00	COMODO CA Limited
`staging.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	45	2017-03-01T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust
`standards.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	32	2020-02-03T15:27:29	Let's Encrypt
`stats.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	40	2019-10-14T13:41:40	Let's Encrypt
`stratblog.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	17	2018-04-19T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`survey.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	54	2017-08-28T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust, COMODO CA Limited
`tell-us.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	154	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt
`tellus.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	165	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt
`tematres.demo1.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	19	2019-07-09T23:30:37	Let's Encrypt
`tematres.demo2.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	23	2019-07-09T23:50:46	Let's Encrypt
`tematres.demo3.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	22	2019-07-09T23:34:59	Let's Encrypt
`tematres.demo4.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	13	2019-01-18T23:28:18	Let's Encrypt
`tematres.demo5.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	1	2017-10-20T02:34:56	Let's Encrypt
`test.gsa-ecas.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	196	2020-08-10T22:08:59	Let's Encrypt
`test.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	5	2012-11-02T00:00:00	COMODO CA Limited
`twa800.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	67	2018-04-20T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc, GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust
`usaceecopcx.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	15	2018-04-19T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`uspto-dev-blog.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	12	2018-05-22T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`uswds.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	15	2018-04-19T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`vote.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	169	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt, GeoTrust Inc.
`wellness.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	17	2018-04-20T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`whldp.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	12	2018-05-22T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`womenbizinfo.sites.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	17	2018-04-20T00:00:00	DigiCert Inc
`www.alpha.my.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	1	2015-12-17T00:00:00	COMODO CA Limited
`www.analytics.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	2	2015-12-29T00:00:00	COMODO CA Limited
`www.business.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	54	2017-08-28T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust, COMODO CA Limited
`www.epa-notice.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	9	2016-12-26T11:38:00	Let's Encrypt
`www.feedback.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	205	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt, GeoTrust Inc., "GoDaddy.com
`www.gobierno.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	142	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt
`www.kids.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	54	2017-08-28T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust, COMODO CA Limited
`www.my.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	171	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt, GeoTrust Inc., "GeoTrust
`www.promotions.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	161	2020-09-15T17:52:33	Let's Encrypt
`www.search.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	78	2020-08-20T19:37:00	Let's Encrypt
`www.staging.my.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	1	2015-12-17T00:00:00	COMODO CA Limited
`www.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	132	2015-10-16T00:00:00	GeoTrust Inc., COMODO CA Limited, The USERTRUST Network, "GeoTrust
`www.vote.usa.gov`	CT Log	Expired	—	6	2020-02-03T15:27:29	Let's Encrypt

Export Recon (CSV)

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.

DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)

Authoritative Records (Source of truth)

A Synchronized 1 / 1 records

23.22.13.113

AAAA Synchronized 1 / 1 records

2600:1f18:f88:4313:6df7:f986:f915:78d6

CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records

No records

DMARC _dmarc.usa.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=86400; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@gsa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov; ruf=mailto:dmarcfailures@gsa.gov

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=86400; rua=mailto:dmarcreports@gsa.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov; ruf=mailto:dmarcfailures@gsa.gov

MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records

No records

NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 5 / 5 records

dns3.gsa.gov.

dns5.gsa.gov.

dns2.gsa.gov.

dns.gsa.gov.

dns4.gsa.gov.

dns5.gsa.gov.

dns2.gsa.gov.

dns4.gsa.gov.

dns3.gsa.gov.

SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

dns.gsa.gov. hostmaster.gsa.gov. 789057670 3600 180 1209600 3600

TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 4 / 4 records

v=spf1 include:amazonses.com include:532040.spf10.hubspotemail.net ~all

amazonses:X5JKkKWosJlNPD8iJfPvNksuvQJzup3fDYEJtve9l20=

MS=ms45746088

amazonses:X5JKkKWosJlNPD8iJfPvNksuvQJzup3fDYEJtve9l20=

d1rt4thgsoin5q.cloudfront.net

v=spf1 include:amazonses.com include:532040.spf10.hubspotemail.net ~all

DNS History Timeline BETA

Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

c45e44ae9806c5d9b2124a08668f997f9b48f1362a7b1fcde9fcb5fbf438278f927b8932685c908e1fb34d13d46a0b8eef01780cac234814d21708deb739f419

Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 15 Feb 2026, 00:08 UTC.

Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)

cat dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json

Python 3 (cross-platform)

python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"

sha3sum (coreutils 9+)

sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-usa.gov.json

Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/883/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for usa.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer usa.gov A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer usa.gov AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer usa.gov MX

Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer usa.gov NS

Query TXT records RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer usa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208

dig +short usa.gov TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy RFC 7489

dig +short _dmarc.usa.gov TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376

dig +short default._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376

dig +short google._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376

dig +short selector1._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376

dig +short selector2._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +noall +answer usa.gov DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035

dig +noall +answer usa.gov DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +cd usa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA

Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461

dig +short _mta-sts.usa.gov TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461

curl -sL https://mta-sts.usa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460

dig +short _smtp._tls.usa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft

dig +short default._bimi.usa.gov TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659

dig +noall +answer usa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460

dig +noall +answer usa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344

dig +noall +answer usa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/usa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.usa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt RFC 9116

curl -sL https://usa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://usa.gov/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://usa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.22.13.113 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 113.13.22.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.

Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated

How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.

SPF

Verified 4877 runs

DKIM

Verified 4695 runs

DMARC

Verified 4860 runs

DANE/TLSA

Verified 4679 runs

DNSSEC

Verified 4858 runs

BIMI

Verified 4694 runs

MTA-STS

Verified 4697 runs

TLS-RPT

Verified 4699 runs

CAA

Verified 4691 runs

Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer usa.gov A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer usa.gov AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer usa.gov MX

Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer usa.gov NS

Query TXT records (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer usa.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208)

dig +short usa.gov TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489)

dig +short _dmarc.usa.gov TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376)

dig +short default._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376)

dig +short google._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short selector1._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short selector2._domainkey.usa.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +noall +answer usa.gov DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035)

dig +noall +answer usa.gov DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +cd usa.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672)

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA

Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461)

dig +short _mta-sts.usa.gov TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461)

curl -sL https://mta-sts.usa.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460)

dig +short _smtp._tls.usa.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft)

dig +short default._bimi.usa.gov TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659)

dig +noall +answer usa.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460)

dig +noall +answer usa.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344)

dig +noall +answer usa.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083)

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/usa.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962)

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.usa.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt (RFC 9116)

curl -sL https://usa.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://usa.gov/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://usa.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.22.13.113 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 113.13.22.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? No

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

llms.txt llmstxt.org

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Evidence Log (1 item)

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 156 subdomains discovered

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Intelligence Dissemination

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? No

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

llms.txt llmstxt.org

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Evidence Log (1 item)

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 156 subdomains discovered

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

RFC Reference