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Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

microsoft.com
14 Feb 2026, 17:14 UTC · 19.0s ·v26.14.17 · SHA-3-512: 249a✱✱✱✱ Verify
Recon ModeRecon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
6 protocols configured, 3 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Enterprise
Certificate Control
Configured
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA
Not Configured
BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
MarkMonitor Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Microsoft 365
Where email is hosted (MX)
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Azure DNS Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 5/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 5/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf-a.microsoft.com include:_spf-b.microsoft.com include:_spf-c.microsoft.com include:_spf-ssg-a.msft.net include:_spf1-meo.microsoft.com -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)

selector2._domainkey Microsoft 365
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCPkb8bu8RGWeJGk3hJrouZXIdZ+HTp/azRp8IUOHp5wKvPUAi/54PwuLscUjRk4Rh3hjIkMpKRfJJXPxWbrT7eMLric7f/S0h+qF4aqIiQqHFCDAYfMnN6V3Wbke2U5EGm0H/cAUYkaf2AtuHJ/rdY/EXaldAm00PgT9QQMez66QIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 7 days (604800 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: *.mail.protection.outlook.com

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)


Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS — the best available option for Microsoft 365. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, MTA-STS is the strongest transport security this domain can deploy. MTA-STS enforces TLS via HTTPS-based policy, protecting against downgrade attacks (RFC 8461).

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).


Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? No

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - specific CAs authorized

0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Yes RFC 9116

security.txt properly configured

Contact

https://msrc.microsoft.com/report/vulnerability/new

Expires

2026-09-23 Valid

Encryption

https://msrc.microsoft.com/.well-known/csaf/openpgp/998D7EC1A516E3D17FF90480EF148D3CDE714E0D.asc

Policy

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/bounty/
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/cvd
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/bounty-safe-harbor
en Canonical URL Acknowledgments

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Opportunistic

Transport security inferred from 3 DNS signal(s)

Direct SMTP probe unavailable (port 25 blocked). Transport security inferred from DNS policy records and provider capabilities.
Transport Security Signals:
  • MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures
  • Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates
SMTP port 25 may be blocked by hosting provider — this is common for cloud platforms
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS8075 US
IPv4 Mappings:
13.107.246.38AS8075 (13.104.0.0/14)
13.107.213.38AS8075 (13.104.0.0/14)
IPv6 Mappings:
2620:1ec:46::51AS8075 (2620:1ec::/36)
2620:1ec:bdf::51AS8075 (2620:1ec::/36)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS verification records detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.


Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1-39.azure-dns.com ns2-39.azure-dns.net ns3-39.azure-dns.org ns4-39.azure-dns.info
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (4 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [1password-site-verification=35ZTURTFFFDC5BW7GFQKRJ77QM MS=ms79629062 _zx2p8gpzv720db2aqmozy4jhwk2nl43 d365mktkey=3uc1cf82cpv750lzk70v9bvf2 d365mktkey=6358r1b7e13hox60tl1uagv14 docusign=d5a3737c-c23c-4bd0-9095-d2ff621f2840 fg2t0gov9424p2tdcuo94goe9j linear-domain-verification=iuq6saifcnbe t7sebee51jrj7vm932k531hipa]
A: Google returned different results: [13.107.213.38 13.107.246.38]
A: OpenDNS returned different results: [13.107.213.35 13.107.246.35]
A: Quad9 returned different results: [13.107.213.66 13.107.246.66]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

13.107.246.38
13.107.213.38
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2620:1ec:46::51
2620:1ec:bdf::51
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 1 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.
_sip._tls: 100 1 443 sipdir.online.lync.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 2 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable
How did we find these?

Passive discovery using Certificate Transparency Logs — publicly auditable records of every TLS certificate ever issued. Certificate Transparency lookup failed

Δ Changes Detected: A Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Propagating 2 / 2 records
13.107.246.38
13.107.246.51
13.107.213.38
13.107.213.51
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2620:1ec:46::51
2620:1ec:bdf::51
2620:1ec:bdf::51
2620:1ec:46::51
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
DMARC _dmarc.microsoft.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1
MTA-STS _mta-sts.microsoft.com RFC 8461 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;
v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns2-39.azure-dns.net.
ns1-39.azure-dns.com.
ns3-39.azure-dns.org.
ns2-39.azure-dns.net.
ns1-39.azure-dns.com.
ns3-39.azure-dns.org.
ns4-39.azure-dns.info.
ns4-39.azure-dns.info.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns1-39.azure-dns.com. azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com. 1 3600 300 2419200 300
ns1-39.azure-dns.com. azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com. 1 3600 300 2419200 300
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.microsoft.com RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report
TXT RFC 7208 §4 51 / 0 records
google-site-verification=uFg3wr5PWsK8lV029RoXXBBUW0_E6qf1WEWVHhetkOY
hcp-domain-verification=3ce174a8b9fba88909633ab13eb1d81ce0123454745d66e500052ed84b7248a1
workplace-domain-verification=lK0QDLk73xymCYMKUXNpfKAT8TY5Mx
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=AqXeTHJ/1FCYeuvJ8dc1B+X3uHaa7m2W0s31vzL4opnrJlSaBdtbWTY8Ti5WiZnu9Q==
MS=ms79629062
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A8qndBCDJGtFF2+3v/IPIMmM0SaVcrJBoSue7rKob6sUeK7QGeFuWkrtvze3AiqUDA==
d365mktkey=8fEQahTresJms7tZGxGFr94T1zDz36oCbUt1LJc99mox
facebook-domain-verification=fwzwhbbzwmg5fzgotc2go51olc3566
d365mktkey=3uc1cf82cpv750lzk70v9bvf2
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=As/XxnDWZFxFwHvRZj+HbG5/ImtAeabLkiOWu1h7wCJQFAR216E9HoYQ5Hy6o7StoQ==
google-site-verification=pjPOauSPcrfXOZS9jnPPa5axowcHGCDAl1_86dCqFpk
google-site-verification=M--CVfn_YwsV-2FGbCp_HFaEj23BmT0cTF4l8hXgpvM
fg2t0gov9424p2tdcuo94goe9j
hubspot-developer-verification=OTQ5NGIwYWEtODNmZi00YWE1LTkyNmQtNDhjMDMxY2JjNDAx
google-site-verification=uhh5_jbxpcQgnb-A7gDIjlrr5Ef34lA2t2_BAveYpnk
d365mktkey=SxDf1EZxLvMwx6eEZUxzjFFgHoapF8DvtWEUjwq7ZTwx
ms-domain-verification=561512fc-b4ba-4ac7-a946-e464c8f49f1b
google-site-verification=mEAmcTy1e8jIB9W6ENPk2GDg9hjuNytQQRGlK0hPm0c
d365mktkey=QDa792dLCZhvaAOOCe2Hz6WTzmTssOp1snABhxWibhMx
v=spf1 include:_spf-a.microsoft.com include:_spf-b.microsoft.com include:_spf-c.microsoft.com include:_spf-ssg-a.msft.net include:_spf1-meo.microsoft.com -all
liveramp-site-verification=kxcV8fDH_FUNUZQEcAO6lwgim47f_hNLgMP4VG0PF_Q
zoom-domain-verification=ZOOM_verify_e97a3d385acb4c47b9b924609a280524
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=AoHTKEi2W8L2P8cf9CoDicIxYiuttTkwtIeFOqYCewBGoRZiiF+9/92saUkIDERGAA==
sitecore-domain-verification=1d46cb5467624e33a408d14324874088
ms-domain-verification=65f91178-9dfb-41cd-929d-08d1a38ed607
ms-domain-verification=1c4e4677-e58f-4117-8d61-e5b2810388c2
d365mktkey=PNcDqkW71x8VOUhcE96aGM4l5PYX1gnlRl6ieXUl5eMx
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=Asc8WWov6gsmCCzn4CSrwRuJIh5SqvaitKz/LlTW+SD54lLC52wzcnWhlTI416p2vw==
docusign=d5a3737c-c23c-4bd0-9095-d2ff621f2840
ms-domain-verification=478640ad-6524-43d5-86c4-a914804b9e93
d365mktkey=6358r1b7e13hox60tl1uagv14
_zx2p8gpzv720db2aqmozy4jhwk2nl43
google-site-verification=GfDnTUdATPsK1230J0mXbfsYw-3A9BVMVaKSd4DcKgI
ms-domain-verification=d6545068-89f7-4432-b947-0b137e8a9fe3
d365mktkey=JlXV17lfZjyvWxNje1qiP390ACSKzTxo5mGqZ3V2BmYx
d365mktkey=wbU64GRacxVEQxwcLSQnx0zisXLYzgUbfvsufIqO9ZUx
d365mktkey=heYmJ57sWrwMjCgIG1xRwTREJrQokUIDtBcNfGuxoWQx
mixpanel-domain-verify=5803bc4c-5bb6-4ce1-8076-753800097373
atlassian-domain-verification=xvoaqRfxSg3PnlVnR4xCSOlKyw1Aln0MMxRiKXnwWroFG7vI76TUC8xYb03MwMXv
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=An4mJIFLRys9h1EvjX18SJs5p1uEF5MHcs2JJLYPrI48C5Qt9FpaZEM0sQTV4JvNYw==
t7sebee51jrj7vm932k531hipa
d365mktkey=Fu49WtSTeClkHtK7S14227RIVpGwwGrzEsO6RVs1I2Ax
d365mktkey=3l6dste9txazu0Qd2zu4135PUB4E35txLxyzJxjkPbsx
d365mktkey=j2qHWq9BHdaa3ZXZH8x64daJZxEWsFa0dxDeilxDoYYx
linear-domain-verification=iuq6saifcnbe
ms-domain-verification=25524f4b-1476-489c-a086-30f4c5016ecc
airtable-verification=79a09e4a8013ff5737798ffb4ea88eee
1password-site-verification=35ZTURTFFFDC5BW7GFQKRJ77QM
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A/Mf6IKdZzcHfBvpiVz9rkdPTIcCP5IbRDdEkeP3PgXEXF3mNjorahOwaYlMINBF5A==
d365mktkey=ZGFU0tlXPekPusNHPo5QQQWpVf0gic0xpuKroNy3NQEx
anthropic-domain-verification-phksss=GZrrKDUR4klRLFCvxyOvqcNGE
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

249a2bff9b4aa1bf5d9121c819afb5f41356089266795d4868b65ee79ad33fb63da078030abd50274df793680e34244aef9b2715b39afd54080a42d81690d7a5
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 14 Feb 2026, 17:14 UTC.

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)
cat dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform)
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+)
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/847/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for microsoft.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208
dig +short microsoft.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489
dig +short _dmarc.microsoft.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376
dig +short selector2._domainkey.microsoft.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +noall +answer microsoft.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +cd microsoft.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461
dig +short _mta-sts.microsoft.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461
curl -sL https://mta-sts.microsoft.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460
dig +short _smtp._tls.microsoft.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft
dig +short default._bimi.microsoft.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/microsoft.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.microsoft.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116
curl -sL https://microsoft.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt
curl -sI https://microsoft.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules
curl -s https://microsoft.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 13.107.246.38 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 38.246.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 13.107.213.38 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 38.213.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4930 runs
DKIM
Verified 4748 runs
DMARC
Verified 4913 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4732 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4911 runs
BIMI
Verified 4747 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4750 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4752 runs
CAA
Verified 4744 runs
Maturity: Development Verified Consistent Gold Gold Master
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

microsoft.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.