DNS Tool

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Generated 18 Mar 2026, 07:20 UTC
Duration 20.1s
Version v26.37.28
Integrity 5526ea38220a5b5cef4f9f440e688da5d5ae079a9b52a3b67a5d5b702b5188d8e19d2a7539c9f62c261e4366aa66a925a03c79d1824eff1417f32783ccd9bb41

TLP:AMBER

Limited disclosure — recipients may share within their organization only

Subject Domain

nlnetlabs.nl

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

nlnetlabs.nl

18 Mar 2026, 07:20 UTC · 20.1s ·v26.37.28 · SHA-3-512: 5526✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Cross-Referenced

Executive Topology

Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain

Footprint 1 SaaS Service

DNS Security & Trust Posture

Risk Level: Medium Risk

5 protocols configured, 4 not configured Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled Why we go beyond letter grades

1 recommendation 1 monitoring

Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.

Accuracy 61% Currency 68/100 Maturity verified

Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers

Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale

ICuAE Details

DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type	Observed TTL	Typical TTL	Severity	Context
NS	`90s`	`1 day (86400s)`	high	NS TTL is below typical — observed 90s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A	`137s`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	A TTL is below typical — observed 137s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT	`137s`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	TXT TTL is below typical — observed 137s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA	`216s`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	SOA TTL is below typical — observed 216s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA	`205s`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 205s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX	`155s`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	MX TTL is below typical — observed 155s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.

Tune TTL for nlnetlabs.nl

Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.

Primary NS ns.nlnetlabs.nl

Serial 2026031600

Admin hostmaster.nlnetlabs.nl

Provider Unknown

Timer	Value	RFC 1912 Range
Refresh	`28800s`	1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry	`7200s`	Fraction of Refresh
Expire	`604800s`	1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)	`240s`	300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)

Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).

RFC 1912 §2.2

Email Spoofing

Partial

Brand Impersonation

Not Setup

DNS Tampering

Protected

Certificate Control

Open

Recommended

Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject'

Monitoring

DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended

Configured

SPF, DMARC (with warnings), DKIM, DANE, DNSSEC

Not Configured

MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA

Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Low Risk

High Upgrade DMARC from p=none

Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.

A quarantine or reject policy instructs receivers to take action on failing mail.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_dmarc.nlnetlabs.nl` (DMARC policy record)
Value	`v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@nlnetlabs.nl`

RFC 7489 §6.3

Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.

Field	Value
Type	`CAA`
Host	`nlnetlabs.nl` (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value	`0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`

RFC 8659

Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

Your domain has DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest email transport security available. TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_smtp._tls.nlnetlabs.nl` (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Value	`v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@nlnetlabs.nl`

RFC 8460

Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

Field	Value
Type	`TXT`
Host	`_mta-sts.nlnetlabs.nl` (MTA-STS policy record)
Value	`v=STSv1; id=nlnetlabs.nl`

RFC 8461

Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records

Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE

Prolocation B.V. (Registrant: Benno Overeinder)

Where domain was purchased

Email Service Provider INFERRED

Self-hosted

Moderately Protected

Web Hosting

Unknown

Where website is hosted

DNS Hosting

Unknown

Where DNS records are edited

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes

Success ~all 3/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 3/10 lookups

v=spf1 +a include:_spf.google.com include:mailbox.org ip4:185.49.140.0/22 ip6:2a04:b900::/29 ~all

RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.

RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain has DMARC p=none (monitoring only). Enforcing quarantine or reject is recommended to gain real protection.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only

Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; psd=n; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@nlnetlabs.nl

Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes

No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports

Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled

RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.

DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified

Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 2 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

SPF authorizes Google Workspace servers, but MX records point to self-hosted infrastructure. The Google Workspace SPF include likely supports ancillary services (e.g., calendar invitations, shared documents) rather than primary mailbox hosting.

DKIM key in test mode (t=y per RFC 6376 §3.6.1) — verifiers should treat failures as unsigned, remove t=y for production

default._domainkey Self-hosted (inferred) 2048-bit Adequate

v=DKIM1; g=*; k=rsa; t=y;p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDOBxkIlNsk1fVhUO8fZs6qJV6/ZFEsltVIuTHDUn1dQXOSqo04SCOXiuRgsFzxKKAOqZKksjEdxzcGI7UIakfyzHEeoAeeJCrIQoY3NcTOm6Z4ak5X24X8dPIi2075YwFAHiwELthtgwtrvUpWr6U0KBmEeXtyQ4nk++HR2asJIQIDAQAB

google._domainkey Google Workspace 2048-bit Adequate

v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAhfvuanQm2kCz1VQ9gSR4yfap9BonWGMMo56dnGVCfySlaNVqMumJTferAsSn5HnlciPA6LJ46i28kX75jY9P1K9BBA4vwBrlhg9nS+LjgdbKiynnyq92ARWYsVUrdzmdQNgu3K4OjzFHEQXLsCpRSrPs4X/UiaUufabV/EMRD7xp5GhE6arl3inx7B65gOifzMg241EQM6bliIlt6Q8wTanhA8kbzBvJ5MT/9rryGX9X7msJ+v9xYEybiPZyGwnhnI6LMewcHzxtK4LFoYTrb0NOSK+tueth4Vhdz1TBbFwIT9IykxL6+75MqrQKSFzXAwg432yHkpian+8Z/4jAkQIDAQAB

RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).

Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented

Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting

Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes

RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 3/3 MX

DANE configured — TLSA records found for all 3 MX hosts

MX Host	Usage	Selector	Match	Certificate Data
`mxext1.mailbox.org`	3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate)	Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo)	SHA-256	`4758af6f02dfb5dc8795fa402e77a8a0486af5e85d2ca60c294476aadc40b220`
`mxext1.mailbox.org`	3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate)	Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo)	SHA-256	`e41cc7633029afdba53744d7e5fc31ef507e592de9dfb33557bf3b9a79239446`
`mxext1.mailbox.org`	3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate)	Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo)	SHA-256	`996ad31d65e03f038b8ec950f6f26611529da03e3a283e4400cba2edd04b8a88`
`mxext3.mailbox.org`	3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate)	Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo)	SHA-256	`e41cc7633029afdba53744d7e5fc31ef507e592de9dfb33557bf3b9a79239446`
`mxext3.mailbox.org`	3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate)	Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo)	SHA-256	`4758af6f02dfb5dc8795fa402e77a8a0486af5e85d2ca60c294476aadc40b220`
`mxext3.mailbox.org`	3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate)	Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo)	SHA-256	`996ad31d65e03f038b8ec950f6f26611529da03e3a283e4400cba2edd04b8a88`
`mxext2.mailbox.org`	3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate)	Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo)	SHA-256	`996ad31d65e03f038b8ec950f6f26611529da03e3a283e4400cba2edd04b8a88`
`mxext2.mailbox.org`	3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate)	Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo)	SHA-256	`e41cc7633029afdba53744d7e5fc31ef507e592de9dfb33557bf3b9a79239446`
`mxext2.mailbox.org`	3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate)	Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo)	SHA-256	`4758af6f02dfb5dc8795fa402e77a8a0486af5e85d2ca60c294476aadc40b220`

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).

This domain uses DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest cryptographic transport security. DANE binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, creating a verifiable chain of trust from root to mail server (RFC 7672 §1.3). MTA-STS could complement this for senders that don't validate DNSSEC, but DANE alone provides the highest level of protection available.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Yes RFC 9116

security.txt properly configured

Contact

https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/security-report/

Expires

                                        2032-11-30
                                        
                                            Valid

Policy

https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/security-report/

PGP Signed Canonical URL

Source: https://nlnetlabs.nl/.well-known/security.txt

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org

Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No

No llms.txt found

No llms-full.txt found

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked

No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured

No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.

Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No

No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No

No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected

Evidence Log (1 item)

Type	Detail	Severity	Confidence
`robots_txt_no_ai_blocks`	robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives	low	Observed

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.

Sources scanned (6)

https://nlnetlabs.nl/
https://nlnetlabs.nl/theme/js/jquery-3.2.1.min.js
https://nlnetlabs.nl/theme/js/bootstrap.min.js
https://nlnetlabs.nl/static/js/analytics.js
https://nlnetlabs.nl/theme/js/slick.min.js
https://nlnetlabs.nl/static/js/customer_carousel.js

What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns.nlnetlabs.nl — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check	Result	Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR)	Denied	Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion	Disabled	Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity	Hidden	No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping	Protected	Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns.nlnetlabs.nl, ns5.sidn.nl, anyns.pch.net

Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:

In-bailiwick NS ns.nlnetlabs.nl has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key Tag	DS Algorithm	DNSKEY Key Tag	DNSKEY Algorithm
50602	8	50602	8

Glue Record Completeness Incomplete

Nameserver	In-Bailiwick	IPv4 Glue	IPv6 Glue	Status
`anyns.pch.net`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`ns.nlnetlabs.nl`				Missing
`ns5.sidn.nl`	No	N/A	N/A	OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 240s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

anyns.pch.net: 2.0260316e+09

ns.nlnetlabs.nl: 2.0260316e+09

ns5.sidn.nl: 2.0260316e+09

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 3 nameserver(s) for nlnetlabs.nl — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver	IPv4	IPv6	ASN / Operator	SOA Serial
`anyns.pch.net`	204.61.216.4	2001:500:14:6004:ad::1	AS42	2026031600
`ns.nlnetlabs.nl`	185.49.140.60	2a04:b900::8:0:0:60	AS8587	2026031600
`ns5.sidn.nl`	147.75.205.55	2604:1380:4601:5c00::d	AS15830 54825	2026031600

Unique ASNs

Unique Operators

Unique /24 Prefixes

Diversity Score

Good

3 ASNs, 3 /24 prefixes across 3 nameservers

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:

Single KSK with no CDS/CDNSKEY automation — manual rollover required

DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys

Role	Key Tag	Algorithm	Key Size
ZSK	42393	RSA/SHA-256	1056 bits
KSK	50602	RSA/SHA-256	2088 bits

RRSIG Signatures 1 Signature

Type	Key Tag	Expiry	Status
A	42393	2026-04-13T01:50:02Z	Active

Denial of Existence NSEC

NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.

Rollover Readiness Not_ready

Multiple KSKs:

CDS Published:

CDNSKEY Published:

Automation: none

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification

All 3 server(s) verified: encrypted transport confirmed via direct SMTP probe and DNS policy

Policy Assessment Primary

DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC (RFC 7672)

Telemetry

TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders

Live Probe Supplementary

MX Host	TLS Version	Cipher	Certificate
`mxext2.mailbox.org`	TLSv1.3	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	Valid Expires: 2026-06-10 (84 days) Issuer: DigiCert Inc
`mxext1.mailbox.org`	TLSv1.3	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	Valid Expires: 2026-06-10 (84 days) Issuer: DigiCert Inc
`mxext3.mailbox.org`	TLSv1.3	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	Valid Expires: 2026-06-10 (84 days) Issuer: DigiCert Inc

Multi-Vantage Probe Results

Unanimous: TLS verified 2 probes, 1 responded

US-East (Boston) observed

All servers support TLS

France - EU skipped

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

ASN	Name	Country
`AS24940`	Hetzner Online GmbH	DE

IPv4 Mappings:

128.140.76.106 → AS24940 (128.140.0.0/17)

IPv6 Mappings:

2a01:4f8:c0c:cdfa::1 → AS24940 (2a01:4f8::/32)

Edge / CDN

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Intelligence Dissemination

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Yes RFC 9116

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

llms.txt llmstxt.org

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Evidence Log (1 item)

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

DNS Server Security Hardened

Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification

Policy Assessment Primary

Telemetry

Live Probe Supplementary

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct