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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 14 Feb 2026, 05:58 UTC
Version v26.12.28
Integrity 900a53dfda64b621be54eaec9d354fb1056aca9ac72d4d03511fe489c399ca130685e6124ada02971428703c5bba24642ed579456d31af53e28d03cbc7f541ae
Subject Domain
amazon.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

amazon.com
14 Feb 2026, 05:58 UTC ·v26.12.28 · SHA-3-512: 900a✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 9 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
4 protocols configured, 4 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
2 recommendations
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Protected
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
DKIM found for third-party senders only — enable DKIM for primary mail platform (Amazon SES) for full alignment, DMARC external reporting to dmarc.amazon.com is not authorized (RFC 7489 §7.1)
Configured
SPF (-all), DMARC (quarantine), DKIM (third-party), BIMI
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA, DNSSEC
Priority Actions 6 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
Medium Enable DKIM for Amazon SES

DKIM is only configured for third-party services, not your primary mail platform (Amazon SES). Enable DKIM signing in Amazon SES settings to cover all outbound mail. Note: large organizations may already have DKIM configured with custom or rotating selectors not discoverable through standard checks — try re-scanning with a custom DKIM selector, or verify in your Amazon SES admin console.

<unique_token>.dkim.amazonses._domainkey.amazon.com TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public_key>"
RFC 6376 §3.6
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.amazon.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.amazon.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
RFC 8461 §3
Low Upgrade DMARC to reject policy

Your DMARC policy is quarantine — spoofed messages are flagged. Upgrading to p=reject blocks them entirely. Review aggregate reports to confirm legitimate senders are aligned.

_dmarc.amazon.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@amazon.com"
RFC 7489 §6.3
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com). CAA is advisory — CAs must check it before issuing, but absence means any CA can issue.

amazon.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659 §4
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.amazon.com TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@amazon.com"
RFC 8460 §3
Low Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) cryptographically signs DNS responses, preventing attackers from forging DNS answers. Contact your DNS hosting provider to enable DNSSEC signing.

RFC 4033 §2
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
MarkMonitor Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider OBSERVED
Unknown
Email: Enabled
Web Hosting OBSERVED
AWS
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Mostly No
Verdict: DMARC policy is quarantine — spoofed messages will be flagged as spam by receiving servers. DKIM verified for third-party senders; primary provider (Amazon SES) DKIM not observed.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 3/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 3/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:spf1.amazon.com include:spf2.amazon.com include:amazonses.com -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC enforcement is partial (quarantine). -all may preempt DKIM/DMARC evaluation at some receivers. Consider p=reject for full enforcement; ~all is more DMARC-compatible.
Legacy Record — Safe to Delete This is a Sender ID record (spf2.0/pra) from a Microsoft experiment circa 2006 that was never standardized. RFC 7208 §A explicitly deprecates it. No modern mail receiver processes this record. It is safe to delete.
spf2.0/pra include:spf1.amazon.com include:spf2.amazon.com include:amazonses.com -all

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Quarantined, not rejected
Success p=quarantine

DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection

v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;rua=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com;ruf=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these
Upgrade DMARC to reject policy:
_dmarc.amazon.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@amazon.com"
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Weak Keys

Found 2 DKIM selector(s) but some keys are revoked

DKIM verified for Zendesk only — no DKIM found for primary mail platform (Amazon SES). The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks. Try re-scanning with a custom DKIM selector if you know yours.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
Key revoked (p= empty)
Key revoked (p= empty)
zendesk1._domainkey Zendesk
v=DKIM1; p=
zendesk2._domainkey Zendesk
v=DKIM1; p=
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing
Warning

1 of 1 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
dmarc.amazon.com Unauthorized —
External domain dmarc.amazon.com has not authorized amazon.com to send DMARC reports (missing amazon.com._report._dmarc.dmarc.amazon.com TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 1 MX host)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: BIMI brand logo configured. CAA not configured — any CA can issue certificates.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success VMC SVG

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Yes

BIMI with VMC certificate (from Verified CA)

VMC certificate accessible (from Verified CA) - logo displays in Gmail, Apple Mail, and all major providers.
v=BIMI1;l=https://d3frv9g52qce38.cloudfront.net/amazondefault/order_1424920778_logo.svg;a=https://d3frv9g52qce38.cloudfront.net/amazondefault/amazon_web_services_inc_2026.pem
BIMI Logo
Logo validated (SVG) View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

Port 25 not reachable from this host

MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Certificate
amazon-smtp.amazon.com N/A N/A N/A
SMTP port 25 may be blocked by hosting provider — this is common for cloud platforms
Summary: 0/1 reachable, 0 STARTTLS, 0 valid certs
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 2 unique ASN(s) across 3 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS16509 US
AS14618 US
IPv4 Mappings:
98.87.170.71 → AS16509 (98.80.0.0/12)
98.87.170.74 → AS16509 (98.80.0.0/12)
98.82.161.185 → AS14618 (98.80.0.0/13)

Edge / CDN Success AWS

Domain is behind AWS edge network

Behind CDN Origin Hidden
ASN 16509 belongs to AWS (cloud infrastructure)

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 9 services

9 SaaS service(s) detected via TXT record verification

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Microsoft 365 MS=4B600B22799EB2CAC0D8FF0A3A3CAECA5EE2BF3A
Stripe stripe-verification=65883709F0B36AB2B73FFC870338AE9F817315DDBB1CAB28910F074F4A8D...
Apple apple-domain-verification=dVkKZnu17XS0EN2X
Facebook facebook-domain-verification=d9u57u52gylohx845ogo1axzpywpmq
Canva canva-site-verification=WhUvTbfe6tUQWmIXnQifGA
Zoom ZOOM_verify_ARI4AiKALCcjulAUZNwR8S
Google Workspace google-site-verification=14WGW2MdNMxchG8PlinF7LgqqE0OwwHqOq0HKhb7rDQ
Cisco cisco-ci-domain-verification=1b256bd11daa486ba2fa405d2d5de70f75feb6757dd8993ca8d...
Atlassian atlassian-domain-verification=ZT4AapXgobCpXIWoNcd7gtMjZyOUdr4EDFMnFUWrqqqgdaQVbD...
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

8 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.amzndns.co.uk ns1.amzndns.com ns1.amzndns.net ns1.amzndns.org ns2.amzndns.co.uk ns2.amzndns.com ns2.amzndns.net ns2.amzndns.org
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [00DcX000002xu6h=1TBcX00000000Xt MS=4B600B22799EB2CAC0D8FF0A3A3CAECA5EE2BF3A TS1760027 ZOOM_verify_6OUC1znUonKMCoyMMGyFfX ZOOM_verify_ARI4AiKALCcjulAUZNwR8S apple-domain-verification=4wbNaeWvAH0pU1yi apple-domain-verification=dVkKZnu17XS0EN2X brevo-code:9be7f7c39958d253a31de6593fa831bc canva-site-verification=Hksh9WEUPWP13_SEU1mPMA]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

98.87.170.71
98.87.170.74
98.82.161.185
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

5 amazon-smtp.amazon.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (3 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable
How did we find these?

Passive discovery using Certificate Transparency Logs — publicly auditable records of every TLS certificate ever issued. Certificate Transparency lookup failed

Δ Changes Detected: TXT Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 3 / 3 records
98.87.170.71
98.87.170.74
98.87.170.74
98.82.161.185
98.82.161.185
98.87.170.71
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.amazon.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;rua=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com;ruf=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;rua=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com;ruf=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
5 amazon-smtp.amazon.com.
5 amazon-smtp.amazon.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 8 / 8 records
ns2.amzndns.net.
ns1.amzndns.co.uk.
ns2.amzndns.com.
ns1.amzndns.com.
ns2.amzndns.org.
ns1.amzndns.net.
ns2.amzndns.co.uk.
ns1.amzndns.org.
ns1.amzndns.co.uk.
ns2.amzndns.co.uk.
ns1.amzndns.org.
ns2.amzndns.com.
ns1.amzndns.com.
ns2.amzndns.net.
ns1.amzndns.net.
ns2.amzndns.org.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
dns-external-master.amazon.com. hostmaster.amazon.com. 2010197765 180 60 604800 900
dns-external-master.amazon.com. hostmaster.amazon.com. 2010197765 180 60 604800 900
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Propagating 57 / 8 records
MS=4B600B22799EB2CAC0D8FF0A3A3CAECA5EE2BF3A
00DcX000002xu6h=1TBcX00000000Xt
sending_domain949422=99a7b44052aefc4dec2abf56189160824664d2fdac00ca962f4455be62b51d56
MS=4B600B22799EB2CAC0D8FF0A3A3CAECA5EE2BF3A
liveramp-site-verification=jZJKgMEQ_1mdjMhKj02iqNACZ-NJHRWhCEQdQ_OuCMo
TS1760027
box-domain-verification=ffea95cd0e0d61c302198367155b07e74fd534fa1d867662dc9bf9969b6f535d
ZOOM_verify_6OUC1znUonKMCoyMMGyFfX
pendo-domain-verification=ecbe1a51-954d-4202-ab86-d15e04b96769
ZOOM_verify_ARI4AiKALCcjulAUZNwR8S
stripe-verification=65883709F0B36AB2B73FFC870338AE9F817315DDBB1CAB28910F074F4A8DE1EC
apple-domain-verification=4wbNaeWvAH0pU1yi
stripe-verification=a27edc0da55836ea6bb7eac592bf2ca8e246eb652608d54493119df7df005afc
apple-domain-verification=_j3fIZD8uuYetbG64YKTEpz-8mwyvYrLRqM5CoVZVTk
stripe-verification=B0AD8DC1918B8A717E5B6A29C2E04594A9872AB05F8DA24CB762BBA0A0487BC6
apple-domain-verification=dVkKZnu17XS0EN2X
v=spf1 include:spf1.amazon.com include:spf2.amazon.com include:amazonses.com -all
—
apple-domain-verification=dVkKZnu17XS0EN2X
—
00DcX000002xu6h=1TBcX00000000Xt
—
sending_domain1014172=003846595520e80ec84e8cc47c07e3a71afb855fc743bb92cdec93f88c7a4029
—
facebook-domain-verification=d9u57u52gylohx845ogo1axzpywpmq
—
uber-domain-verification=7a35217f-6956-41a0-be5c-a28ea2646964
—
apple-domain-verification=_j3fIZD8uuYetbG64YKTEpz-8mwyvYrLRqM5CoVZVTk
—
sending_domain949422=43d714838567583460e7720e6049505edb8e25c1ef4321419d41bc5255db7ba5
—
docker-verification=1779f74e-699a-4d8b-acdc-ce242d73559f
—
stripe-verification=C7ABA7B41F5AC26E3C397015A34CD46ACD2130DC8DAAFA7F59AAEFEDBC3FA517
—
canva-site-verification=WhUvTbfe6tUQWmIXnQifGA
—
stripe-verification=35A865E5A20C09CD0288F87ACA29DE73FF8A704D21F7310A5AAFF4CB63062E81
—
sending_domain229492=7cde83fbc5246557c64d9d9ba79f0d11f7ba9eb6127f60451a9aa6f8dead4381
—
stripe-verification=26EFABF97D624D7F4F3C062366A04C4B1399841F23F275DD81E58D00A981979C
—
stripe-verification=1D421397AAEC571CCBD9F25DDC90F00EDEBC3E74F4047270EC9A13B784579E34
—
stripe-verification=a5c01aa4d732f4b93154d67983d77982ef1a2db73fecfd4bcd64e224d3ab4075
—
ZOOM_verify_ARI4AiKALCcjulAUZNwR8S
—
uber-domain-verification=0ddb4c64-175c-4e7a-8a7a-f552034222e8
—
google-site-verification=14WGW2MdNMxchG8PlinF7LgqqE0OwwHqOq0HKhb7rDQ
—
sending_domain608861=d33a88e8540c33a1217138cf8a25879734bd35673bb7cfbd639f95c550b33ec4
—
canva-site-verification=Hksh9WEUPWP13_SEU1mPMA
—
spf2.0/pra include:spf1.amazon.com include:spf2.amazon.com include:amazonses.com -all
—
uber-domain-verification=01e9f567-7b84-45dd-9326-53992a028b40
—
google-site-verification=D0RwRb_QApkpApKTFaFlRwbm_yrkey0uokKw0wQUIdk
—
stripe-verification=6a5d107aa37465eac2101bb1c725b02072689a4fa7bd38b455970baac4979a17
—
ZOOM_verify_6OUC1znUonKMCoyMMGyFfX
—
sending_domain197572=555e96ed2e576ced81c89f7001740cb72f9c66aeb136d0d05734aad625766bc1
—
brevo-code:9be7f7c39958d253a31de6593fa831bc
—
google-site-verification=G_-mXb0ZYjjGkQVGjpOOB2deSOaVdxVj4i4vozJTREs
—
apple-domain-verification=4wbNaeWvAH0pU1yi
—
sending_domain1003771=199bc63a54ace5d8d5c5d08286af86d7049b4afacb5ef7decd6b22cf9e8d5efb
—
stripe-verification=76924B623B7105057C67D4F5EAE19F65EE8BD92635581BCACA2CCACA4D38FE1B
—
cisco-ci-domain-verification=1b256bd11daa486ba2fa405d2d5de70f75feb6757dd8993ca8de685a7dfea1df
—
lucidlink-verification=QG752KJ3CMZAZTZ3ERMX1AXMCG
—
sending_domain608861=81b0d52095dae60d604e7cbea5e58e1d842f7d950d6673a43feae339b664ca31
—
uber-domain-verification=5f5cc242-4dbe-4871-b726-bbbe085ff053
—
stripe-verification=79C640ED20153B836A623F16A3DCF65E2072948FB80C42D19300514DADF94EC5
—
autodesk-domain-verification=dmryiygGOGBJFJFVo5Bl
—
dell-technologies-domain-verification=amazon.com_2dc4b285-482d-4948-bf92-16e698f2cab9_1738858526
—
neat-pulse-domain-verification-QgvLWLN=f37f2998-0bb3-493b-a3aa-c4ff8f3dce08
—
TS1760027
—
stripe-verification=8E217BE0FF12B50596BD78EEA3F81E62C6C7A2AC78FBD46DAD95B7D21BA2F8BF
—
sending_domain229492=341509a116ea4311fcb2e489303bf09a139b10ce9b90e5029d2677055cb4dc89
—
sending_domain1003771=f1303d8ee3b86e39db2703b11feb83e1e8b712a9ffc64c3d56505192e5b3bf4f
—
google-site-verification=NV91qEfNgqDZOPzwlhXE-KtDUfCBSNgAsdxaFebyh80
—
wrike-verification=MzI3NzM2ODo2NDk5MjE4NjQ2MWJmOTEwMGMxM2MzNzJmNWJlY2U5ZDU4MmVlNzQ2NWU4MTY5OWJjMjlmYjQ4Mjc5M2JiMzky
—
pardot326621=b26a7b44d7c73d119ef9dfd1a24d93c77d583ac50ba4ecedd899a9134734403b
—
stripe-verification=45f746e3b195198f419af3f685fdf217532ce552b4b47070b3caefe325559a67
—
atlassian-domain-verification=ZT4AapXgobCpXIWoNcd7gtMjZyOUdr4EDFMnFUWrqqqgdaQVbDvoGpRaIwj/tgPH
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), SecurityTrails (DNS history), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

900a53dfda64b621be54eaec9d354fb1056aca9ac72d4d03511fe489c399ca130685e6124ada02971428703c5bba24642ed579456d31af53e28d03cbc7f541ae
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 14 Feb 2026, 05:58 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-amazon.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-amazon.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-amazon.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-amazon.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/813/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for amazon.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short amazon.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.amazon.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.amazon.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.amazon.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer amazon.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd amazon.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for amazon-smtp.amazon.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.amazon-smtp.amazon.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (amazon-smtp.amazon.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect amazon-smtp.amazon.com:25 -servername amazon-smtp.amazon.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.amazon.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.amazon.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.amazon.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.amazon.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/amazon.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (amazon-smtp.amazon.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect amazon-smtp.amazon.com:25 -servername amazon-smtp.amazon.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.amazon.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://amazon.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://amazon.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://amazon.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 98.87.170.71 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 71.170.87.98.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 98.87.170.74 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 74.170.87.98.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4895 runs
DKIM
Verified 4713 runs
DMARC
Verified 4878 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4697 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4876 runs
BIMI
Verified 4712 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4715 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4717 runs
CAA
Verified 4709 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short amazon.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.amazon.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.amazon.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.amazon.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer amazon.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd amazon.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for amazon-smtp.amazon.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.amazon-smtp.amazon.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (amazon-smtp.amazon.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect amazon-smtp.amazon.com:25 -servername amazon-smtp.amazon.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.amazon.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.amazon.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.amazon.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.amazon.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer amazon.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/amazon.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (amazon-smtp.amazon.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect amazon-smtp.amazon.com:25 -servername amazon-smtp.amazon.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.amazon.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://amazon.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://amazon.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://amazon.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 98.87.170.71 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 71.170.87.98.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 98.87.170.74 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 74.170.87.98.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

amazon.com

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DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.