Skip to main content
DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 17 Mar 2026, 19:52 UTC
Duration 41.3s
Version v26.37.23
Integrity f914e4a0b002cc228d85ad473cc4553e42da05cdfff568cba7f0c1dedf27fa633a7de2629c44f8eb483b49ecc30b82211dea7fa394a2592d0f97cd98e1a8e2b0
Subject Domain
freebsd.org

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

freebsd.org
17 Mar 2026, 19:52 UTC · 41.3s ·v26.37.23 · SHA-3-512: f914✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 2 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: High Risk
6 protocols configured, 3 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
2 recommendations 1 monitoring
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 61% Currency 86/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Good
ICuAE Details
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 1 hour (3600s) 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 1 hour (3600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for freebsd.org
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns0.freebsd.org
Serial 2026031719
Admin hostmaster.freebsd.org
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh3600s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry900sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)3600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Recommended
Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject', Enable DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) for authentication visibility
Monitoring
DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended
Configured
SPF, DMARC (with warnings), DKIM, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Upgrade DMARC from p=none

Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.

A quarantine or reject policy instructs receivers to take action on failing mail.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.freebsd.org (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@freebsd.org
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Add DMARC Aggregate Reporting

Add a rua= tag to receive aggregate DMARC reports. Without reporting, you cannot monitor authentication failures.

Aggregate reports show who is sending mail as your domain and whether it passes authentication.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.freebsd.org (add to existing DMARC record)
Valuerua=mailto:dmarc-reports@freebsd.org
RFC 7489 §7.1
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

Your domain has DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest email transport security available. TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.freebsd.org (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@freebsd.org
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.freebsd.org (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=freebsd.org
RFC 8461
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Gandi SAS
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups (via redirect: _spf.freebsd.org)

v=spf1 redirect=_spf.freebsd.org
SPF Redirect Chain RFC 7208 §6.1
This SPF record delegates policy via redirect= — the effective policy comes from the target domain.
_spf.freebsd.org
v=spf1 ip4:96.47.72.81 ip6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:2 ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain has DMARC p=none (monitoring only). Enforcing quarantine or reject is recommended to gain real protection.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only
Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1; p=none
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

dkim._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAy46C+GD7Y5L4nk7hCMeOJfHf4EA8P/j9UoQRAQx9TQ2+xCCGNhZIoqfn8aQl+q0rSntr1X1dKKNjzJxxa9UX8cubpX4vAIPSvM8xXZ03wbVXoTSJ/YpRwMABLHAKR5OE2X4jLK/O6AXKrMMKj8EcPQofgWwnsub6I/PjXpPrXGbrMLpCh0umE2ViF3RV5qX9bz5el3tt/rQfV+rtahzo5V6xeXwLjJxNY5tKRb3fHheijrprzBFkczFwOCAjORh6zwPKfvpJtbe2Fch9MOMaPS4Hr/jJ1jyweFJWUtQOLxesWl6H+y71sK+Fs91op9pG1ThHaDLEV6K1i1W9YISkmwIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 1/2 MX

DANE partially configured — TLSA records on 1/2 MX hosts

MX Host Usage Selector Match Certificate Data
mx1.freebsd.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 0a7e2f469913ea64ca98af1f31bbbcaf51920d8df90d2972a9dc02bf7c37f404
Missing DANE for: mx66.freebsd.org
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest cryptographic transport security. DANE binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, creating a verifiable chain of trust from root to mail server (RFC 7672 §1.3). MTA-STS could complement this for senders that don't validate DNSSEC, but DANE alone provides the highest level of protection available.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only Sectigo, Let's Encrypt can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: Sectigo Let's Encrypt
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (1)
  • https://freebsd.org/
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns2.freebsd.org — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns2.freebsd.org, ns3.he.net, ns1.freebsd.org, ns4.he.net, ns5.he.net

Delegation Consistency 4 Issues

Delegation consistency: 4 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DNSKEY records missing at child — DS records at parent have no matching keys
  • In-bailiwick NS ns1.freebsd.org has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • In-bailiwick NS ns2.freebsd.org has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

Unmatched DS records (no corresponding DNSKEY):
Key Tag: 33175, Algorithm: 8

Glue Record Completeness Incomplete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns1.freebsd.org Missing
ns2.freebsd.org Missing
ns3.he.net No N/A N/A OK
ns4.he.net No N/A N/A OK
ns5.he.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 3600s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns1.freebsd.org: 2.026031719e+09
ns2.freebsd.org: 2.026031719e+09
ns3.he.net: 2.026031719e+09
ns4.he.net: 2.026031719e+09
ns5.he.net: 2.026031719e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 5 nameserver(s) for freebsd.org — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns4.he.net 216.66.1.2 2001:470:400::2 AS6939
Hurricane Electric LLC 		2026031719
ns2.freebsd.org 163.237.210.233 2001:4978:10ae:aba:ca:daba:0:233 AS13331 19255 2026031719
ns5.he.net 216.66.80.18 2001:470:500::2 AS6939
Hurricane Electric LLC 		2026031719
ns3.he.net 216.218.132.2 2001:470:300::2 AS6939
Hurricane Electric LLC 		2026031719
ns1.freebsd.org 163.237.210.11 2001:4978:10ae:aba:ca:daba:0:11 AS13331 19255 2026031719
Unique ASNs
2
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score