Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
| Parameter | Current | Suggested | Severity | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| timeout_seconds | 5s |
8s |
low | Average scan duration is 33.2s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures. RFC 8767 |
Change your DMARC policy from p=none to p=quarantine (then p=reject). Review your DMARC aggregate reports first to ensure legitimate senders pass authentication.
DANE/TLSA records are published but DNSSEC is not enabled. DANE requires DNSSEC to work — without it, TLSA records cannot be authenticated and are ignored by validating resolvers (RFC 7672 §2.2). Enable DNSSEC first.
Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.red.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.
DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) cryptographically signs DNS responses, preventing attackers from forging DNS answers. Contact your DNS hosting provider to enable DNSSEC signing.
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Partially
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent
SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 8/10 lookups
spf2.0/pra) from a Microsoft experiment circa 2006 that was never standardized. RFC 7208 §A explicitly deprecates it. No modern mail receiver processes this record. It is safe to delete.
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent
DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent
Found DKIM records for 2 selector(s)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent
No MTA-STS record found
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent
No TLS-RPT record found
DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1
All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized
| External Domain | Authorization | Auth Record |
|---|---|---|
forwardemail.net |
Authorized |
v=DMARC1;
|
DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
DANE configured — TLSA records found for all 2 MX hosts
| MX Host | Usage | Selector | Match | Certificate Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|
mx1.forwardemail.net |
3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) | Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) | SHA-256 | 5e81da1af16df20b13e667ad6d9c2b65b95bfcd95150caffe7116c1707b4dd2c |
mx2.forwardemail.net |
3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) | Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) | SHA-256 | 5e81da1af16df20b13e667ad6d9c2b65b95bfcd95150caffe7116c1707b4dd2c |
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning
No BIMI record found
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Success IODEF
CAA configured - only Let's Encrypt, Amazon, DigiCert, Sectigo can issue certificates
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced
Transport security inferred from 1 DNS signal(s)
- DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct
ASN / Network Success
Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)
| ASN | Name | Country |
|---|---|---|
AS16509 |
US |
3.169.71.5 → AS16509 (3.169.68.0/22)3.169.71.75 → AS16509 (3.169.68.0/22)3.169.71.84 → AS16509 (3.169.68.0/22)3.169.71.8 → AS16509 (3.169.68.0/22)Edge / CDN Success AWS
Domain is behind AWS edge network
SaaS TXT Footprint Success 7 services
7 SaaS service(s) detected via TXT record verification
Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.
| Service | Verification Record |
|---|---|
| Microsoft 365 | MS=ms90467680 |
| Apple | apple-domain-verification=lrease1jj5yhKu1A |
| Google Workspace | google-site-verification=rfoESIAfF6youN2T4_L_jsIdPbKG_k8abtuxZF2Eyv8 |
| Dropbox | dropbox-domain-verification=9i3l1qna33qy |
facebook-domain-verification=i6l6p5krhuto4im0f98mvx3pbjfhvi |
|
| Atlassian | atlassian-domain-verification=fecVuukmD7HYkotOSHJeZj7bwwPi2KkUXN61uckFqkF4es9woz... |
| 1Password | 1password-site-verification=FL35IRPJAZA45EMAHJE3DM2P34 |
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?
DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Consistent Unsigned
DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned
NS Delegation Verified
4 nameserver(s) configured
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?
AIPv4 Address
AAAAIPv6 Address
MXMail Servers
SRVServices
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 39 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?| Subdomain | Source | Status | Provider / CNAME | Certificates | First Seen | Issuer(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 2 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 30 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 6 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 5 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 26 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 76 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 12 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 12 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 1 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 6 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 24 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 8 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 18 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 16 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 85 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 46 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 18 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 5 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 1 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 5 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 88 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 60 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 36 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 12 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 8 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 8 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 10 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 30 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 4 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 105 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 6 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 28 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 4 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 2 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 1 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 10 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 6 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 64 | — | — |
|
CT Log | Expired | — | 32 | — | — |
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
3.169.71.5
18.160.143.112
3.169.71.75
18.160.143.124
3.169.71.84
18.160.143.20
3.169.71.8
18.160.143.52
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 iodef "mailto:iodef@red.com"
0 iodef "mailto:iodef@red.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "www.digicert.com"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "www.digicert.com"
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-68b7843f04d9df0d350c2996@forwardemail.net
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-68b7843f04d9df0d350c2996@forwardemail.net
10 mx2.forwardemail.net.
10 mx1.forwardemail.net.
10 mx1.forwardemail.net.
10 mx2.forwardemail.net.
ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk.
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org.
ns-738.awsdns-28.net.
ns-1827.awsdns-36.co.uk.
ns-193.awsdns-24.com.
ns-193.awsdns-24.com.
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org.
ns-738.awsdns-28.net.
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
ns-1449.awsdns-53.org. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDDIyp3V1j2XAo4c9eEIaNpO/W31jONArkhj3L7ttWF8BqCFfLfkB/QYWTIUvItbj3ZiVA5ODPW4/w7Rax7EW15uvs1y/oLT+kyKhTx8DGBWXCpaDOUfjOoSzb+Z/CsaBWBU2vd69lG/76O+I1xFW+6eQ24/fpr3k5mSrtVCrn2awIDAQAB
MS=ms90467680
apple-domain-verification=lrease1jj5yhKu1A
google-site-verification=rfoESIAfF6youN2T4_L_jsIdPbKG_k8abtuxZF2Eyv8
google-site-verification=wWF7PHkVbQ_Rxb2kv8-dUHz8-AwzLEEV33V9cCNr_hM
fub7Jg8wns9rH4Byn/ymd3bVcq7z9ufxhBkZWZjgJNDTRUiRYT8uM/QAvHZJMbLpHys5LwcZxFkbqWySIFHd9A==
klaviyo-site-verification=SHA5cE
google-site-verification=V4yoSBiET77_9lNFGziBaIrPkhAGJdTjnJ70bmaMH28
google-site-verification=URKywT9Orj6_nk93ayvDWupzAH39Xci8dOxAsAuJgI0
dropbox-domain-verification=9i3l1qna33qy
v=spf1 mx include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mail.zendesk.com a:outboundips.netsuite.com include:rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:eu.rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:ap.rp.oracleemaildelivery.com include:sendgrid.net ip4:70.183.25.226 ip4:70.183.25.233 ip4:12.215.166.253 ip4:46.61.187.62 ip4:216.194.106.13 ip4:149.20.194.55 ip4:148.62.51.171 ip4:23.21.109.197 ip4:23.21.109.212 ip4:147.160.167.14 ip4:147.160.167.15 ip4:52.49.235.189 ip4:52.49.201.246 ~all
facebook-domain-verification=i6l6p5krhuto4im0f98mvx3pbjfhvi
atlassian-domain-verification=fecVuukmD7HYkotOSHJeZj7bwwPi2KkUXN61uckFqkF4es9wozestIp1cmelFdUo
mdq267gx87p93v5k76fcg7s86xh7j1kg
v=spf2.0/pra a mx include:radicaepost.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:mailsenders.netsuite.com include:sent-via.netsuite.com ~all
_m42h676p7k4b3h9fqw5ogb6m3empi48
1password-site-verification=FL35IRPJAZA45EMAHJE3DM2P34
forward-email-site-verification=IFdNp6eOx3
traction-guest=0ca160cd-40d1-4986-8f39-6e435152eec5
DNS History Timeline BETA
When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?
Confirm Your Email Configuration
This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.
DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY
All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.
Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.
Intelligence Sources
This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), SecurityTrails (DNS history), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below
This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.
59de34c07bd0165cc0b5c316daf9d0b8fc9e6cd2fb701336f2bf048ae38c117584756e49766eec6bf3c4d8b6f8d0145fb4299bb83b6b9916514cfc12ecda87b6
Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.
After downloading, verify with any of these commands:
Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).
cat dns-intelligence-red.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-red.com.jsonpython3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-red.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-red.com.json.sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/782/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).
Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for red.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer red.com Adig +noall +answer red.com AAAAdig +noall +answer red.com MXdig +noall +answer red.com NSdig +noall +answer red.com TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short red.com TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.red.com TXTdig +short mail._domainkey.red.com TXTdig +short selector2._domainkey.red.com TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer red.com DNSKEYdig +noall +answer red.com DSdig +dnssec +cd red.com A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.forwardemail.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.forwardemail.net TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx2.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx2.forwardemail.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.red.com TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.red.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.red.com TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.red.com TXTdig +noall +answer red.com CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer red.com HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer red.com CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/red.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx2.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx2.forwardemail.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.red.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://red.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://red.com/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://red.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 5.71.169.3.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 75.71.169.3.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Appendix: Verification Commands
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer red.com Adig +noall +answer red.com AAAAdig +noall +answer red.com MXdig +noall +answer red.com NSdig +noall +answer red.com TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short red.com TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.red.com TXTdig +short mail._domainkey.red.com TXTdig +short selector2._domainkey.red.com TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer red.com DNSKEYdig +noall +answer red.com DSdig +dnssec +cd red.com A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx2.forwardemail.net TLSAdig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.forwardemail.net TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx2.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx2.forwardemail.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.red.com TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.red.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.red.com TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.red.com TXTdig +noall +answer red.com CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer red.com HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer red.com CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/red.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx2.forwardemail.net:25 -servername mx2.forwardemail.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.red.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://red.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://red.com/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://red.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 5.71.169.3.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 75.71.169.3.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT