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Registry Zone Health Intelligence — co.uk is a shared registry suffix.
This report focuses on zone infrastructure health: DNSSEC signing, nameserver diversity, certificate authority policy, and delegation security. Email authentication protocols (SPF, DMARC, DKIM) are not applicable to registry suffixes — they apply to domains registered under this zone.
Registry operators, ICANN, and ccTLD authorities can use this view to assess zone security posture.
DNS Tool
Registry Zone Health Report
Generated 14 Feb 2026, 05:47 UTC
Duration 2.3s
Version v26.12.28
Integrity ae14539c5800f8b329ca1c90d0c3b48a35927a828c45b3dbd4d4af9b11776c21b6a9730a03f1b3eb060e8d2020350d70687a3b94242163f633bd5466d315b33a
Subject Domain
co.uk

Registry Zone Health Report

co.uk
14 Feb 2026, 05:47 UTC · 2.3s ·v26.12.28 · SHA-3-512: ae14✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 19 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 45.8s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Registry Zone Health
DNSSEC: Success CAA: Not Set 0 Nameservers
Zone infrastructure protocols applicable to registry suffixes
Email Spoofing
Vulnerable
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Action Required
No SPF record, No DMARC record
Recommended
DKIM not discoverable via common selectors — may be configured with custom or rotating selectors (RFC 6376 §3.6.2.1)
Monitoring
DKIM (inconclusive)
Configured
DNSSEC
Not Configured
SPF, DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA
Priority Actions 7 total Achievable posture: Medium Risk
Critical Publish SPF record

SPF (Sender Policy Framework) tells receiving mail servers which IP addresses are authorized to send email for your domain. Without SPF, any server can claim to send as your domain.

co.uk TXT "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"
RFC 7208 §4
Critical Publish DMARC policy

DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance) tells receivers how to handle messages that fail SPF/DKIM checks. Without DMARC, failed authentication checks are ignored. Start with p=none and rua reporting to monitor, then escalate to p=quarantine and p=reject.

_dmarc.co.uk TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@co.uk"
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.co.uk/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.co.uk TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
RFC 8461 §3
Low Verify DKIM configuration

DKIM selectors were not discoverable via common selector names. This does not confirm DKIM is absent — your provider may use custom or rotating selectors that cannot be enumerated through DNS (RFC 6376 §3.6.2.1). Check your email provider's DKIM settings to confirm signing is enabled.

selector1._domainkey.co.uk TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public_key>"
RFC 6376 §3.6.2.1
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com). CAA is advisory — CAs must check it before issuing, but absence means any CA can issue.

co.uk CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659 §4
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.co.uk TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@co.uk"
RFC 8460 §3
Low Deploy DANE/TLSA for email transport

DNSSEC is already enabled — you can strengthen email transport security by publishing DANE TLSA records. DANE binds your mail server's TLS certificate to DNS, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks on SMTP connections.

_25._tcp.mail.co.uk TLSA 3 1 1 <certificate_hash>
RFC 7672 §3
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider OBSERVED
Unknown
Email: Ambiguous
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Zone Signing & DNSSEC Methodology Is this zone cryptographically signed?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
11810 8 2 1DF4681BDACC3E6296AC7667C42CA33CB57EFBC2005CE23064F15FBFFA286FF5

NS Delegation Verified Match

NS delegation verified - 8 nameserver(s) match parent zone

Parent zone delegation matches domain's NS records. No delegation drift detected.
Nameservers: dns1.nic.uk dns2.nic.uk dns3.nic.uk dns4.nic.uk nsa.nic.uk nsb.nic.uk nsc.nic.uk nsd.nic.uk
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records

CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS CDNSKEY

Full RFC 8078 automated DNSSEC key rollover signaling detected (CDS + CDNSKEY)

Key TagAlgorithmDigest TypeDigest
11810 RSASHA256 2
CDNSKEY Records:
FlagsProtocolAlgorithmPublic Key
257 3 RSASHA256
Subdomain Discovery Not Applicable
Certificate Transparency subdomain enumeration is not applicable for registry suffixes. For co.uk, CT logs would show registered domains under this zone rather than organizational subdomains. To analyze a specific domain's exposure, scan a registrable domain like example.co.uk.
Δ Changes Detected: SOA Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 8 / 8 records
dns3.nic.uk.
nsa.nic.uk.
nsb.nic.uk.
nsb.nic.uk.
dns1.nic.uk.
nsc.nic.uk.
dns2.nic.uk.
nsd.nic.uk.
nsa.nic.uk.
dns1.nic.uk.
nsd.nic.uk.
dns2.nic.uk.
dns4.nic.uk.
dns3.nic.uk.
nsc.nic.uk.
dns4.nic.uk.
SOA RFC 1035 Propagating 1 / 1 records
dns1.nic.uk. hostmaster.nominet.org.uk. 1771046804 900 300 2419200 10800
dns1.nic.uk. hostmaster.nominet.org.uk. 1771047975 900 300 2419200 10800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), SecurityTrails (DNS history), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

ae14539c5800f8b329ca1c90d0c3b48a35927a828c45b3dbd4d4af9b11776c21b6a9730a03f1b3eb060e8d2020350d70687a3b94242163f633bd5466d315b33a
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 14 Feb 2026, 05:47 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-co.uk.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-co.uk.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-co.uk.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-co.uk.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/769/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for co.uk. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer co.uk A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer co.uk AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer co.uk MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer co.uk NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer co.uk TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short co.uk TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.co.uk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.co.uk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.co.uk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.co.uk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.co.uk TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer co.uk DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer co.uk DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd co.uk A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.co.uk TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.co.uk/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.co.uk TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.co.uk TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer co.uk CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer co.uk HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer co.uk CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/co.uk' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.co.uk&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://co.uk/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://co.uk/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://co.uk/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4901 runs
DKIM
Verified 4719 runs
DMARC
Verified 4884 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4703 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4882 runs
BIMI
Verified 4718 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4721 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4723 runs
CAA
Verified 4715 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer co.uk A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer co.uk AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer co.uk MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer co.uk NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer co.uk TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short co.uk TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.co.uk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.co.uk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.co.uk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.co.uk TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.co.uk TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer co.uk DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer co.uk DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd co.uk A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.co.uk TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.co.uk/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.co.uk TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.co.uk TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer co.uk CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer co.uk HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer co.uk CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/co.uk' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.co.uk&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://co.uk/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://co.uk/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://co.uk/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

co.uk

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.