DNS Tool

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Generated 13 Feb 2026, 21:25 UTC
Duration 20.0s
Version v26.12.28
Integrity 0f04fc97d446c7c36d89037aacc67db965e1f3525363f8a3b397e2d6336175ab4b02191e6cfb9486fc2f8f7a92da98764e7a821cde95533df59ac0031992d1ef

TLP:AMBER

Limited disclosure — recipients may share within their organization only

Subject Domain

microsoft.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

microsoft.com

13 Feb 2026, 21:25 UTC · 20.0s ·v26.12.28 · SHA-3-512: 0f04✱✱✱✱ Verify

Executive Methodology

Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain

Footprint Microsoft 365 8 SaaS Services

DNS Security & Trust Posture

Risk Level: Low Risk

6 protocols configured, 1 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades

Email Spoofing

Protected

Brand Impersonation

Not Setup

DNS Tampering

Enterprise

Certificate Control

Configured

SPF (-all), DMARC (reject), DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA

Not Configured

DNSSEC

Priority Actions Achievable posture: Secure

Low Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) cryptographically signs DNS responses, preventing attackers from forging DNS answers. Contact your DNS hosting provider to enable DNSSEC signing.

RFC 4033 §2

Low Configure BIMI brand logo

Publish a BIMI DNS record pointing to your brand logo (SVG Tiny PS format). For full support in Gmail, you will also need a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC).

default._bimi.microsoft.com TXT "v=BIMI1; l=https://microsoft.com/logo.svg"

BIMI Spec

Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE

MarkMonitor Inc.

Where domain was purchased

Email Service Provider OBSERVED

Microsoft 365

Email: Enforced

Web Hosting INFERRED

Microsoft Azure (CDN)

Where website is hosted

DNS Hosting OBSERVED

Azure DNS Enterprise

Where DNS records are edited

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No

Verdict: DMARC policy is reject — spoofed messages will be blocked by receiving servers. DKIM keys verified with strong cryptography.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes

Success -all 5/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 5/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf-a.microsoft.com include:_spf-b.microsoft.com include:_spf-c.microsoft.com include:_spf-ssg-a.msft.net include:_spf1-meo.microsoft.com -all

RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked

RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.

RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy

Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1

Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed

No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing

Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these

RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.

DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified

Found

Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)

selector2._domainkey Microsoft 365

v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCPkb8bu8RGWeJGk3hJrouZXIdZ+HTp/azRp8IUOHp5wKvPUAi/54PwuLscUjRk4Rh3hjIkMpKRfJJXPxWbrT7eMLric7f/S0h+qF4aqIiQqHFCDAYfMnN6V3Wbke2U5EGm0H/cAUYkaf2AtuHJ/rdY/EXaldAm00PgT9QQMez66QIDAQAB;

RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).

Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced

Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;

Policy Details:

Mode: enforce
Max Age: 7 days (604800 seconds)
MX Patterns: *.mail.protection.outlook.com

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured

Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)

RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).

This domain uses MTA-STS — the best available option for Microsoft 365. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, MTA-STS is the strongest transport security this domain can deploy. MTA-STS enforces TLS via HTTPS-based policy, protecting against downgrade attacks (RFC 8461).

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?

Verdict: Certificate issuance restricted via CAA. BIMI not configured for brand logo protection.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - specific CAs authorized

0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"

Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

Transport security inferred from 3 DNS signal(s)

Direct SMTP probe unavailable (port 25 blocked). Transport security inferred from DNS policy records and provider capabilities.

Transport Security Signals:

MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport
TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures
Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates

SMTP port 25 may be blocked by hosting provider — this is common for cloud platforms

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASN	Name	Country
`AS8075`		US

IPv4 Mappings:

13.107.213.51 → AS8075 (13.104.0.0/14)

13.107.246.51 → AS8075 (13.104.0.0/14)

IPv6 Mappings:

2620:1ec:46::51 → AS8075 (2620:1ec::/36)

2620:1ec:bdf::51 → AS8075 (2620:1ec::/36)

Edge / CDN Success Microsoft Azure

Domain is behind Microsoft Azure edge network

Behind CDN Origin Hidden

ASN 8075 belongs to Microsoft Azure (cloud infrastructure)

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 8 services

8 SaaS service(s) detected via TXT record verification

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Service	Verification Record
Google Workspace	`google-site-verification=pjPOauSPcrfXOZS9jnPPa5axowcHGCDAl1_86dCqFpk`
Microsoft 365	`MS=ms79629062`
Hubspot	`hubspot-developer-verification=OTQ5NGIwYWEtODNmZi00YWE1LTkyNmQtNDhjMDMxY2JjNDAx`
1Password	`1password-site-verification=35ZTURTFFFDC5BW7GFQKRJ77QM`
Workplace	`workplace-domain-verification=lK0QDLk73xymCYMKUXNpfKAT8TY5Mx`
Facebook	`facebook-domain-verification=fwzwhbbzwmg5fzgotc2go51olc3566`
DocuSign	`docusign=d5a3737c-c23c-4bd0-9095-d2ff621f2840`
Atlassian	`atlassian-domain-verification=xvoaqRfxSg3PnlVnR4xCSOlKyw1Aln0MMxRiKXnwWroFG7vI76...`

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1-39.azure-dns.com ns2-39.azure-dns.net ns3-39.azure-dns.org ns4-39.azure-dns.info

Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (3 differences found)

Resolver Differences:

TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [1password-site-verification=35ZTURTFFFDC5BW7GFQKRJ77QM MS=ms79629062 _zx2p8gpzv720db2aqmozy4jhwk2nl43 d365mktkey=3uc1cf82cpv750lzk70v9bvf2 d365mktkey=6358r1b7e13hox60tl1uagv14 docusign=d5a3737c-c23c-4bd0-9095-d2ff621f2840 fg2t0gov9424p2tdcuo94goe9j linear-domain-verification=iuq6saifcnbe t7sebee51jrj7vm932k531hipa]

A: OpenDNS returned different results: [13.107.213.38 13.107.246.38]

A: Quad9 returned different results: [13.107.213.66 13.107.246.66]

This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

13.107.213.51

13.107.246.51

Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2620:1ec:46::51

2620:1ec:bdf::51

IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.

Priority + mail server for email delivery

Microsoft 365

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 1 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.

_sip._tls: 100 1 443 sipdir.online.lync.com.

SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints

Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 2 endpoints

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable

How did we find these?

Passive discovery using Certificate Transparency Logs — publicly auditable records of every TLS certificate ever issued. Failed to parse CT response

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.

DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)

Authoritative Records (Source of truth)

A Synchronized 2 / 2 records

13.107.213.51

13.107.246.51

AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records

2620:1ec:46::51

2620:1ec:bdf::51

2620:1ec:46::51

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"

DMARC _dmarc.microsoft.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1

MTA-STS _mta-sts.microsoft.com RFC 8461 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;

MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.

NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records

ns1-39.azure-dns.com.

ns4-39.azure-dns.info.

ns2-39.azure-dns.net.

ns3-39.azure-dns.org.

ns4-39.azure-dns.info.

SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

ns1-39.azure-dns.com. azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com. 1 3600 300 2419200 300

TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.microsoft.com RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report

TXT RFC 7208 §4 51 / 0 records

ms-domain-verification=1c4e4677-e58f-4117-8d61-e5b2810388c2

—

airtable-verification=79a09e4a8013ff5737798ffb4ea88eee

—

v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A8qndBCDJGtFF2+3v/IPIMmM0SaVcrJBoSue7rKob6sUeK7QGeFuWkrtvze3AiqUDA==

—

d365mktkey=3l6dste9txazu0Qd2zu4135PUB4E35txLxyzJxjkPbsx

—

d365mktkey=8fEQahTresJms7tZGxGFr94T1zDz36oCbUt1LJc99mox

—

d365mktkey=SxDf1EZxLvMwx6eEZUxzjFFgHoapF8DvtWEUjwq7ZTwx

—

d365mktkey=PNcDqkW71x8VOUhcE96aGM4l5PYX1gnlRl6ieXUl5eMx

—

v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A/Mf6IKdZzcHfBvpiVz9rkdPTIcCP5IbRDdEkeP3PgXEXF3mNjorahOwaYlMINBF5A==

—

t7sebee51jrj7vm932k531hipa

—

google-site-verification=pjPOauSPcrfXOZS9jnPPa5axowcHGCDAl1_86dCqFpk

—

d365mktkey=Fu49WtSTeClkHtK7S14227RIVpGwwGrzEsO6RVs1I2Ax

—

MS=ms79629062

—

google-site-verification=uFg3wr5PWsK8lV029RoXXBBUW0_E6qf1WEWVHhetkOY

—

sitecore-domain-verification=1d46cb5467624e33a408d14324874088

—

anthropic-domain-verification-phksss=GZrrKDUR4klRLFCvxyOvqcNGE

—

hubspot-developer-verification=OTQ5NGIwYWEtODNmZi00YWE1LTkyNmQtNDhjMDMxY2JjNDAx

—

google-site-verification=uhh5_jbxpcQgnb-A7gDIjlrr5Ef34lA2t2_BAveYpnk

—

1password-site-verification=35ZTURTFFFDC5BW7GFQKRJ77QM

—

ms-domain-verification=25524f4b-1476-489c-a086-30f4c5016ecc

—

v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=AoHTKEi2W8L2P8cf9CoDicIxYiuttTkwtIeFOqYCewBGoRZiiF+9/92saUkIDERGAA==

—

google-site-verification=mEAmcTy1e8jIB9W6ENPk2GDg9hjuNytQQRGlK0hPm0c

—

ms-domain-verification=d6545068-89f7-4432-b947-0b137e8a9fe3

—

d365mktkey=ZGFU0tlXPekPusNHPo5QQQWpVf0gic0xpuKroNy3NQEx

—

zoom-domain-verification=ZOOM_verify_e97a3d385acb4c47b9b924609a280524

—

d365mktkey=QDa792dLCZhvaAOOCe2Hz6WTzmTssOp1snABhxWibhMx

—

d365mktkey=j2qHWq9BHdaa3ZXZH8x64daJZxEWsFa0dxDeilxDoYYx

—

v=spf1 include:_spf-a.microsoft.com include:_spf-b.microsoft.com include:_spf-c.microsoft.com include:_spf-ssg-a.msft.net include:_spf1-meo.microsoft.com -all

—

d365mktkey=3uc1cf82cpv750lzk70v9bvf2

—

workplace-domain-verification=lK0QDLk73xymCYMKUXNpfKAT8TY5Mx

—

d365mktkey=6358r1b7e13hox60tl1uagv14

—

liveramp-site-verification=kxcV8fDH_FUNUZQEcAO6lwgim47f_hNLgMP4VG0PF_Q

—

ms-domain-verification=561512fc-b4ba-4ac7-a946-e464c8f49f1b

—

facebook-domain-verification=fwzwhbbzwmg5fzgotc2go51olc3566

—

d365mktkey=heYmJ57sWrwMjCgIG1xRwTREJrQokUIDtBcNfGuxoWQx

—

v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=AqXeTHJ/1FCYeuvJ8dc1B+X3uHaa7m2W0s31vzL4opnrJlSaBdtbWTY8Ti5WiZnu9Q==

—

linear-domain-verification=iuq6saifcnbe

—

v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=Asc8WWov6gsmCCzn4CSrwRuJIh5SqvaitKz/LlTW+SD54lLC52wzcnWhlTI416p2vw==

—

d365mktkey=wbU64GRacxVEQxwcLSQnx0zisXLYzgUbfvsufIqO9ZUx

—

google-site-verification=GfDnTUdATPsK1230J0mXbfsYw-3A9BVMVaKSd4DcKgI

—

d365mktkey=JlXV17lfZjyvWxNje1qiP390ACSKzTxo5mGqZ3V2BmYx

—

docusign=d5a3737c-c23c-4bd0-9095-d2ff621f2840

—

atlassian-domain-verification=xvoaqRfxSg3PnlVnR4xCSOlKyw1Aln0MMxRiKXnwWroFG7vI76TUC8xYb03MwMXv

—

hcp-domain-verification=3ce174a8b9fba88909633ab13eb1d81ce0123454745d66e500052ed84b7248a1

—

v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=An4mJIFLRys9h1EvjX18SJs5p1uEF5MHcs2JJLYPrI48C5Qt9FpaZEM0sQTV4JvNYw==

—

ms-domain-verification=65f91178-9dfb-41cd-929d-08d1a38ed607

—

v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=As/XxnDWZFxFwHvRZj+HbG5/ImtAeabLkiOWu1h7wCJQFAR216E9HoYQ5Hy6o7StoQ==

—

fg2t0gov9424p2tdcuo94goe9j

—

google-site-verification=M--CVfn_YwsV-2FGbCp_HFaEj23BmT0cTF4l8hXgpvM

—

_zx2p8gpzv720db2aqmozy4jhwk2nl43

—

ms-domain-verification=478640ad-6524-43d5-86c4-a914804b9e93

—

mixpanel-domain-verify=5803bc4c-5bb6-4ce1-8076-753800097373

—

DNS History Timeline BETA

Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), SecurityTrails (DNS history), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

0f04fc97d446c7c36d89037aacc67db965e1f3525363f8a3b397e2d6336175ab4b02191e6cfb9486fc2f8f7a92da98764e7a821cde95533df59ac0031992d1ef

Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 13 Feb 2026, 21:25 UTC.

Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)

cat dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json

Python 3 (cross-platform)

python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"

sha3sum (coreutils 9+)

sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json

Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/740/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for microsoft.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com MX

Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com NS

Query TXT records RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208

dig +short microsoft.com TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy RFC 7489

dig +short _dmarc.microsoft.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376

dig +short selector2._domainkey.microsoft.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +noall +answer microsoft.com DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +cd microsoft.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA

Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates

Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461

dig +short _mta-sts.microsoft.com TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461

curl -sL https://mta-sts.microsoft.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460

dig +short _smtp._tls.microsoft.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft

dig +short default._bimi.microsoft.com TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/microsoft.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.microsoft.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt RFC 9116

curl -sL https://microsoft.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://microsoft.com/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://microsoft.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 13.107.213.51 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 51.213.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

ASN lookup for 13.107.246.51 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 51.246.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.

Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated

How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.

SPF

Verified 4901 runs

DKIM

Verified 4719 runs

DMARC

Verified 4884 runs

DANE/TLSA

Verified 4703 runs

DNSSEC

Verified 4882 runs

BIMI

Verified 4718 runs

MTA-STS

Verified 4721 runs

TLS-RPT

Verified 4723 runs

CAA

Verified 4715 runs

Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com MX

Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com NS

Query TXT records (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208)

dig +short microsoft.com TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489)

dig +short _dmarc.microsoft.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short selector2._domainkey.microsoft.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +noall +answer microsoft.com DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035)

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +cd microsoft.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com (RFC 7672)

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA

Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 6698)

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates

Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461)

dig +short _mta-sts.microsoft.com TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461)

curl -sL https://mta-sts.microsoft.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460)

dig +short _smtp._tls.microsoft.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft)

dig +short default._bimi.microsoft.com TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659)

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460)

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344)

dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083)

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/microsoft.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 3207)

openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962)

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.microsoft.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt (RFC 9116)

curl -sL https://microsoft.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://microsoft.com/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://microsoft.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 13.107.213.51 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 51.213.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

ASN lookup for 13.107.246.51 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 51.246.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Intelligence Dissemination

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

RFC Reference