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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 10 Mar 2026, 15:22 UTC
Duration 18.0s
Version v26.35.35
Integrity 87e9f263d21875506867f46fc697da4ff26abc6af8ed522203936e46c17747b48d80e3b1cd966bf590376bbb8283c0ecebd16837c9515d39098f38ba9c9a87fe
Subject Domain
anva.ch

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

anva.ch
10 Mar 2026, 15:22 UTC · 18.0s ·v26.35.35 · SHA-3-512: 87e9✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
6 protocols configured, 3 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 68/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 57% Currency 82/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 82/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
TXT 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 6 hours (21600s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance.
NS 21570s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 21570s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for anva.ch
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns1.your-server.de
Serial 2026030601
Admin postmaster.your-server.de
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh86400s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry10800sFraction of Refresh
Expire3600000s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)3600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Configured
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA
Not Configured
BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.anva.ch (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://anva.ch/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 0/10 lookups

v=spf1 ip4:37.17.239.253 -all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@anva.ch
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

dkim._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1;k=rsa;t=s;s=email;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAxWSriseXGg7r3XtZnlhD6y1J+FLxgaiylNoVRCDpnVfr3j0EVCwoat8bd4mUbQlWB2dk5E+JBMGPknqgjvWDRuxFEWDArPbJQ7Yba5L5lktYDeo2YH2lAxar/rjEcULGAkt7+jwwryOQQuTxfqbeaPpme5NyKnnNtBH1GJv73v/AdC930DkLfo876zD9ILrNWBzZFAHED8oWY81yq57vEUo/4YZ+KaL0jWJ0fo1RdnqXQ66bHUBmY5LtQypcIpe4HNyyklVUysXq45ppWIlolw49J7rZOxR/dOXXSEegRJy3u6JJGoUTeFz5vI3PUpxghYrsdwKTt2KT42aqz6+JZQIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=anva.ch
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 7 days (604800 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: mail.anva.ch

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@anva.ch
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 1 MX host)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS without DANE. MTA-STS provides transport security through HTTPS-based policy (RFC 8461), but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use. Adding DANE (RFC 7672) would provide cryptographic certificate pinning independent of certificate authorities — this domain would first need to enable DNSSEC.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning No VMC

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

BIMI configured (VMC recommended for Gmail) Logo issue: Not SVG format (RFC 9495 §3.1 requires SVG Tiny PS)

v=BIMI1; l=https://anva.ch/brand/logo.svg
BIMI Logo
Not SVG format (RFC 9495 §3.1 requires SVG Tiny PS) View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only Let's Encrypt can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: Let's Encrypt
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116

security.txt found but missing required fields

Contact

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.3)

Expires

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
Source: https://anva.ch/.well-known/security.txt
Missing required Contact field (RFC 9116 §2.5.3)
Missing required Expires field (RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? Yes

AI governance signals observed

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? Yes
llms.txt found — domain provides structured context for LLMs
llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context)
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (3 items)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
llms_txt_found llms.txt file found providing structured LLM context info Observed
llms_full_txt_found llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) info Observed
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (2)
  • https://anva.ch/
  • https://anva.ch/js/main.js
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns.second-ns.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns.second-ns.com, ns1.your-server.de, ns3.second-ns.de

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns.second-ns.com No N/A N/A OK
ns1.your-server.de No N/A N/A OK
ns3.second-ns.de No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns.second-ns.com: 2.026030601e+09
ns1.your-server.de: 2.026030601e+09
ns3.second-ns.de: 2.026030601e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 3 nameserver(s) for anva.ch — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns.second-ns.com 213.239.204.242 2a01:4f8:0:a101::b:1 AS24940
Hetzner Online GmbH 		2026030601
ns1.your-server.de 213.133.100.102 2a01:4f8:0:1::5ddc:1 AS24940
Hetzner Online GmbH 		2026030601
ns3.second-ns.de 193.47.99.4 2001:67c:192c::add:b3 AS12337 2026030601
Unique ASNs
2
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
3
Diversity Score
Good

2 ASNs, 3 /24 prefixes across 3 nameservers

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery

0/1 servers support STARTTLS (direct probe)

Policy Assessment Primary
  • MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport (RFC 8461)
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
Telemetry
TLS-RPT configured — domain receives reports about TLS delivery failures from sending mail servers (RFC 8460)
Reporting to: mailto:tls-reports@anva.ch
Live Probe Supplementary
MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Certificate
mail.anva.ch N/A N/A Invalid
EHLO response timeout
Multi-Vantage Probe Results
Unanimous: No TLS 2 probes, 1 responded
France - EU observed
No TLS detected
US-East (Boston) skipped
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS13030 CH
IPv4 Mappings:
37.17.239.253 → AS13030 (37.17.232.0/21)
IPv6 Mappings:
2a02:169:3410:2:4cdf:9397:b217:af27 → AS13030 (2a02:169::/32)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

3 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns.second-ns.com ns1.your-server.de ns3.second-ns.de
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

37.17.239.253
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2a02:169:3410:2:4cdf:9397:b217:af27
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 mail.anva.ch.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

_xmpp-client._tcp: 0 5 5222 xmpp.anva.ch.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 1 endpoint
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 28 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 28 current 0 expired 3 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
13ft.anva.ch CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-01T13:07:46 Let's Encrypt
ai.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-31T06:27:33 Let's Encrypt
atuin.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-19T05:00:40 Let's Encrypt
auth.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-03T06:27:38 Let's Encrypt
autoconfig.anva.ch DNS Current mail.anva.ch — — —
autodiscover.anva.ch DNS Current mail.anva.ch — — —
book.anva.ch CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-06T12:03:33 Let's Encrypt
br.anva.ch CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-10T02:18:25 Let's Encrypt
cc.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-07T08:34:22 Let's Encrypt
cyberchef.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-02T12:27:40 Let's Encrypt
feedback.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-22T08:00:37 Let's Encrypt
firewall.anva.ch DNS Current — — — —
home.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-19T09:02:37 Let's Encrypt
immich.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-17T20:50:16 Let's Encrypt
l.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-07T07:34:22 Let's Encrypt
ldap.anva.ch
80/tcp OpenResty web app server 443/tcp openresty
CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-08T14:35:23 Let's Encrypt
mail.anva.ch CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-27T12:36:26 Let's Encrypt
media.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-07T04:34:23 Let's Encrypt
mta-sts.anva.ch CT Log Current mail.anva.ch 2 2026-02-23T18:32:02 Let's Encrypt
n8n.anva.ch CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-26T03:52:47 Let's Encrypt
netalertx.anva.ch CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-01T14:07:50 Let's Encrypt
nextcloud.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-16T08:50:12 Let's Encrypt
ntfy.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-01T22:42:42 Let's Encrypt
play.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-30T21:27:33 Let's Encrypt
search.anva.ch CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-01T05:53:29 Let's Encrypt
workout.anva.ch
80/tcp OpenResty web app server 443/tcp openresty
CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-01T17:27:33 Let's Encrypt
www.anva.ch CT Log Current — 4 2026-01-20T08:03:29 Let's Encrypt
xmpp.anva.ch CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-16T17:50:16 Let's Encrypt
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
37.17.239.253
37.17.239.253
AAAA Synchronized 1 / 1 records
2a02:169:3410:2:4cdf:9397:b217:af27
2a02:169:3410:2:4cdf:9397:b217:af27
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
DMARC _dmarc.anva.ch RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@anva.ch
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@anva.ch
MTA-STS _mta-sts.anva.ch RFC 8461 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1; id=anva.ch
v=STSv1; id=anva.ch
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
10 mail.anva.ch.
10 mail.anva.ch.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
ns.second-ns.com.
ns3.second-ns.de.
ns1.your-server.de.
ns.second-ns.com.
ns3.second-ns.de.
ns1.your-server.de.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns1.your-server.de. postmaster.your-server.de. 2026030601 86400 10800 3600000 3600
ns1.your-server.de. postmaster.your-server.de. 2026030601 86400 10800 3600000 3600
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.anva.ch RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@anva.ch
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@anva.ch
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=spf1 ip4:37.17.239.253 -all
v=spf1 ip4:37.17.239.253 -all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

87e9f263d21875506867f46fc697da4ff26abc6af8ed522203936e46c17747b48d80e3b1cd966bf590376bbb8283c0ecebd16837c9515d39098f38ba9c9a87fe
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 10 Mar 2026, 15:22 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-anva.ch.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-anva.ch.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-anva.ch.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-anva.ch.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/7151/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for anva.ch. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short anva.ch TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.anva.ch TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' RFC 6376 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.anva.ch TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer anva.ch DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd anva.ch A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mail.anva.ch RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail.anva.ch TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mail.anva.ch) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail.anva.ch:25 -servername mail.anva.ch 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.anva.ch TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.anva.ch/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.anva.ch TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.anva.ch TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/anva.ch' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mail.anva.ch) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail.anva.ch:25 -servername mail.anva.ch </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.anva.ch&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://anva.ch/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://anva.ch/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://anva.ch/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 37.17.239.253 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 253.239.17.37.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4846 runs
DKIM
Verified 4665 runs
DMARC
Verified 4830 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4649 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4827 runs
BIMI
Verified 4664 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4667 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4669 runs
CAA
Verified 4661 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short anva.ch TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.anva.ch TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.anva.ch TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer anva.ch DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd anva.ch A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mail.anva.ch (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail.anva.ch TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mail.anva.ch) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail.anva.ch:25 -servername mail.anva.ch 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.anva.ch TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.anva.ch/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.anva.ch TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.anva.ch TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer anva.ch CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/anva.ch' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mail.anva.ch) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail.anva.ch:25 -servername mail.anva.ch </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.anva.ch&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://anva.ch/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://anva.ch/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://anva.ch/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 37.17.239.253 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 253.239.17.37.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

anva.ch

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.