Skip to main content
Registry Zone Health Intelligence — com.au is a shared registry suffix.
This report focuses on zone infrastructure health: DNSSEC signing, nameserver diversity, certificate authority policy, and delegation security. Email authentication protocols (SPF, DMARC, DKIM) are not applicable to registry suffixes — they apply to domains registered under this zone.
Registry operators, ICANN, and ccTLD authorities can use this view to assess zone security posture.
DNS Tool
Registry Zone Health Report
Generated 10 Mar 2026, 14:25 UTC
Duration 18.7s
Version v26.35.35
Integrity f22f2a419fc3631efe1b7e6a955d59af5e75d48e34a1f35900a582443bb8cd6648aa3872d9ebb8715dcaa5a74f60717bb20c8000c5a9caa736fe336deb55d583
Subject Domain
com.au

Registry Zone Health Report

com.au
10 Mar 2026, 14:25 UTC · 18.7s ·v26.35.35 · SHA-3-512: f22f✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 68/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 63% Currency 73/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 73/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Stale Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 614s 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 614s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for com.au
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics)
Primary NS q.au
Serial 1773152514
Admin hostmaster.donuts.email
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh7200s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry900sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)3600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 17 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 40.9s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Registry Zone Health
DNSSEC: Success CAA: Not Set 5 Nameservers
Zone infrastructure protocols applicable to registry suffixes
Email Spoofing
Vulnerable
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Action Required
No SPF and no DMARC — domain is completely unprotected against email spoofing. Both protocols are RFC-recommended (not mandatory), but their absence leaves the domain open to impersonation (CVE-2024-7208, CVE-2024-49040)
Recommended
Publish an SPF record to authorize legitimate mail senders, Publish a DMARC record starting with p=none and rua reporting
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
DKIM (inferred via Unknown), DNSSEC
Not Configured
SPF, DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, CAA
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Add DMARC Reject for No-Mail Domain

This domain has no MX records and appears to be a website-only domain. A DMARC reject policy tells receiving mail servers to reject any email claiming to be from your domain.

Instructs receiving servers to reject all email from this domain — no legitimate mail is expected.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.com.au
Valuev=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;
RFC 7489
High Lock Down SPF for No-Mail Domain

This domain has no MX records and appears to be a website-only domain. Publishing a strict SPF record explicitly declares that no servers are authorized to send email, preventing attackers from spoofing your domain.

Explicitly declares no servers are authorized to send email from this domain.
TypeTXT
Hostcom.au
Valuev=spf1 -all
RFC 7208
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostcom.au (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
auDA Internal (9999)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Unprotected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on q.au — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: q.au, s.au, t.au, r.au, a.au

Delegation Consistency 4 Issues

Delegation consistency: 4 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DNSKEY records missing at child — DS records at parent have no matching keys
  • SOA serial 1773152624 seen on: t.au, a.au
  • SOA serial 1773152514 seen on: s.au, r.au, q.au
  • SOA serial inconsistency indicates zone data may not be fully synchronized across nameservers

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

Unmatched DS records (no corresponding DNSKEY):
Key Tag: 14185, Algorithm: 8

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
a.au No N/A N/A OK
q.au No N/A N/A OK
r.au No N/A N/A OK
s.au No N/A N/A OK
t.au No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Match

Parent TTL: 3600s Child TTL: 3600s

SOA Serial Consistency 2 Unique Serials

a.au: 1.773152624e+09
q.au: 1.773152514e+09
r.au: 1.773152514e+09
s.au: 1.773152514e+09
t.au: 1.773152624e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix 2 Issues

Analyzed 5 nameserver(s) for com.au — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Findings:
  • SOA serial 1773152624 on: a.au, t.au
  • SOA serial 1773152514 on: r.au, q.au, s.au
Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
r.au 65.22.197.1 2a01:8840:bf::1 AS12041 1773152514
a.au 58.65.254.1 2407:6e00:254::1 AS17987 38332 1773152624
t.au 65.22.199.1 2a01:8840:c1::1 AS207266 1773152624
q.au 65.22.196.1 2a01:8840:be::1 AS12041 1773152514
s.au 65.22.198.1 2a01:8840:c0::1 AS12041 1773152514
Unique ASNs
3
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
5
Diversity Score
Good

3 ASNs, 5 /24 prefixes across 5 nameservers

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 2 Issues

DNSSEC operational notes: 2 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • NSEC3 uses a non-empty salt; RFC 9276 recommends empty salt for new deployments
  • Single KSK with no CDS/CDNSKEY automation — manual rollover required

DNSKEY Inventory 3 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 429 RSA/SHA-256 1056 bits
ZSK 7683 RSA/SHA-256 1056 bits
KSK 14185 RSA/SHA-256 2088 bits

RRSIG Signatures 1 Signature

TypeKey TagExpiryStatus
DNSKEY 14185 2026-03-30T15:17:15Z Active

Denial of Existence NSEC3

Iterations: 1
Salt Length: 4 bytes
Hash Algorithm: 1 (SHA-1)

Rollover Readiness Not_ready

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: none
Zone Signing & DNSSEC Methodology Is this zone cryptographically signed? YES DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256 Adequate

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: RSA/SHA-256 — MUST implement, widely deployed (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
14185 8 2 9394BEA09F5EBD91384AA5CD0397A6B395FD2B299C7912979243CD689BA387DB

NS Delegation Verified Match

NS delegation verified - 5 nameserver(s) match parent zone

Parent zone delegation matches domain's NS records. No delegation drift detected.
Nameservers: a.au q.au r.au s.au t.au
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Subdomain Discovery Not Applicable
Certificate Transparency subdomain enumeration is not applicable for registry suffixes. For com.au, CT logs would show registered domains under this zone rather than organizational subdomains. To analyze a specific domain's exposure, scan a registrable domain like example.com.au.
Δ Changes Detected: SOA Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
q.au.
a.au.
a.au.
s.au.
s.au.
r.au.
r.au.
q.au.
t.au.
t.au.
SOA RFC 1035 Propagating 1 / 1 records
q.au. hostmaster.donuts.email. 1773152514 7200 900 1209600 3600
q.au. hostmaster.donuts.email. 1773152624 7200 900 1209600 3600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

f22f2a419fc3631efe1b7e6a955d59af5e75d48e34a1f35900a582443bb8cd6648aa3872d9ebb8715dcaa5a74f60717bb20c8000c5a9caa736fe336deb55d583
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 10 Mar 2026, 14:25 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-com.au.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-com.au.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-com.au.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-com.au.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/7102/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for com.au. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com.au A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com.au AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com.au MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com.au NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer com.au TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short com.au TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.com.au TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer com.au DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer com.au DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd com.au A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.com.au TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.com.au/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.com.au TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.com.au TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer com.au CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer com.au HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer com.au CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/com.au' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.com.au&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://com.au/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://com.au/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://com.au/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4841 runs
DKIM
Verified 4660 runs
DMARC
Verified 4825 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4644 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4822 runs
BIMI
Verified 4659 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4662 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4664 runs
CAA
Verified 4656 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short com.au TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.com.au TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.com.au TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer com.au DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer com.au DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd com.au A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.com.au TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.com.au/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.com.au TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.com.au TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer com.au CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer com.au HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer com.au CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/com.au' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.com.au&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://com.au/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://com.au/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://com.au/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

com.au

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.