Skip to main content
DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 10 Mar 2026, 14:12 UTC
Duration 23.5s
Version v26.35.35
Integrity 8ea7690f8c48ca5c0cf1085085459a4e541b34c31828090700220d5d2b6569f80d2db864c10267d110fbcac66a0ce57f1c7ed9e0f681176ed6961d8c21ba4d25
Subject Domain
fbi.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

fbi.gov
10 Mar 2026, 14:12 UTC · 23.5s ·v26.35.35 · SHA-3-512: 8ea7✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 5 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
5 protocols configured, 4 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 monitoring
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 67/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 63% Currency 73/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 73/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions
Enterprise Traffic Engineering Detected DNS-based Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB)

This domain uses short TTLs across 3 record types (A record at 109s), consistent with DNS-based traffic management (GSLB). Enterprises operating large anycast networks intentionally use short TTLs to enable rapid failover, geographic steering, and load distribution. This is a deliberate infrastructure choice, not a misconfiguration. RFC 1035 §3.2.1 permits any TTL value the zone administrator selects. The findings below reflect deviation from typical values for reference, not necessarily actionable recommendations for this class of infrastructure.

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from typical values. For domains using DNS-based traffic management, short TTLs are expected and intentional.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 10 minutes (600s) 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 10 minutes (600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 109s 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 109s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
CAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high CAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 2 minutes (120s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 2 minutes (120s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 1423s 1 hour (3600s) medium TXT TTL is below typical — observed 1423s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 29s 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 29s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • This domain runs short TTLs across multiple record types. Does it operate a global anycast network where DNS-based traffic steering justifies the query volume?
  • Are the short TTLs enabling active failover, geographic routing, or load distribution — or are they leftover from a migration that was never reverted?
  • Enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure (sub-5ms authoritative response times, globally distributed nameservers) absorbs short-TTL query volume. Would your authoritative DNS handle the same load?
Tune TTL for fbi.gov
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Google Cloud DNS — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com
Serial 1415240977
Admin support.wildcardcorp.com
Provider Google Cloud DNS
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh600s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry1800sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)1800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Refresh: SOA Refresh is 10 minutes (600s), below the RFC 1912 recommended minimum of 1,200 seconds.
RFC 1912 §2.2
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM (inferred via Unknown), DNSSEC, CAA
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Secure
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.fbi.gov (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://fbi.gov/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.fbi.gov (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@fbi.gov
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.fbi.gov (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=fbi.gov
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Google Domains
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 +mx ip4:153.31.0.0/16 -all
RFC 7489: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@fbi.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov; ruf=mailto:dmarc-feedback@fbi.gov; pct=100
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Not Discoverable

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov Authorized v=DMARC1
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 2 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only Amazon, entrust.net, Sectigo, pki.goog, Let's Encrypt, DigiCert can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: Amazon entrust.net Sectigo pki.goog Let's Encrypt DigiCert
0 issue "entrust.net"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "pki.goog"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com, ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com, ns-cloud-e4.googledomains.com, ns-cloud-e3.googledomains.com

Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DNSKEY records missing at child — DS records at parent have no matching keys
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

Unmatched DS records (no corresponding DNSKEY):
Key Tag: 5781, Algorithm: 8
Key Tag: 5781, Algorithm: 8
Key Tag: 19010, Algorithm: 8
Key Tag: 19010, Algorithm: 8

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com No N/A N/A OK
ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com No N/A N/A OK
ns-cloud-e3.googledomains.com No N/A N/A OK
ns-cloud-e4.googledomains.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 600s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com: 1.415240977e+09
ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com: 1.415240977e+09
ns-cloud-e3.googledomains.com: 1.415240977e+09
ns-cloud-e4.googledomains.com: 1.415240977e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for fbi.gov — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com 216.239.32.110 2001:4860:4802:32::6e AS15169
Google LLC 		1415240977
ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com 216.239.34.110 2001:4860:4802:34::6e AS15169
Google LLC 		1415240977
ns-cloud-e3.googledomains.com 216.239.36.110 2001:4860:4802:36::6e AS15169
Google LLC 		1415240977
ns-cloud-e4.googledomains.com 216.239.38.110 2001:4860:4802:38::6e AS15169
Google LLC 		1415240977
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • NSEC3 uses a non-empty salt; RFC 9276 recommends empty salt for new deployments

DNSKEY Inventory 4 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 60304 RSA/SHA-256 1056 bits
ZSK 35349 RSA/SHA-256 1056 bits
KSK 5781 RSA/SHA-256 2064 bits
KSK 19010 RSA/SHA-256 2088 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence NSEC3

Iterations: 1
Salt Length: 8 bytes
Hash Algorithm: 1 (SHA-1)

Rollover Readiness Ready

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: partial
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No transport encryption policy detected — mail delivery relies on opportunistic TLS

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
104.16.149.244 → AS13335 (104.16.144.0/20)
104.16.148.244 → AS13335 (104.16.144.0/20)
IPv6 Mappings:
2606:4700::6810:95f4 → AS13335 (2606:4700::/44)
2606:4700::6810:94f4 → AS13335 (2606:4700::/44)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 5 services

5 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Amazon SES amazonses: iUbfpGEqhMPlcmJ0aykJZREltK6pWio9wOgRngnJOQE=
Apple apple-domain-verification=oOspXl6Jvnx9HzLM
Adobe adobe-idp-site-verification=101945e35b37c6efd526cf706f04bc9545a02f9cdc58dbf71867...
Microsoft 365 MS=ms39271050
Google Workspace google-site-verification=uTH4Vg-Xcc9hTqSdeThbT9UnYvuphObtVSpCEgaGr78
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256 Adequate

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: RSA/SHA-256 — MUST implement, widely deployed (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
19010 8 2 CC1E2AD6F799AB325A00D31BB6250768891CB9C57944C51AF83B441CE8DF346D
19010 8 1 A17C5611197BED9598D8124620CC67958D0AF153
5781 8 1 CE02007ED5B0EA1E820867FCF22B2FE593A7284A

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com ns-cloud-e3.googledomains.com ns-cloud-e4.googledomains.com
Enterprise DNS (Multi-Provider Redundancy)
Nameservers span 2 providers (Google Cloud DNS, Google Domains). Multi-provider DNS provides resilience against single-provider outages — an enterprise best practice for critical domains.
DNS provider(s): Google Cloud DNS Google Domains
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [625558384-8740534 MS=ms39271050 amazonses: iUbfpGEqhMPlcmJ0aykJZREltK6pWio9wOgRngnJOQE= apple-domain-verification=oOspXl6Jvnx9HzLM fastly-domain-delegation-weownfbi.gov-273985-2020-08-06 google-site-verification=6UEk-jfg1xPNjz_rQGcRFJOBGxMy1aARDZUTXgSNAqw google-site-verification=L8cauHJF4MANoTCkMbrLkAVfHBta28ctva9n1IDekTo v=spf1 +mx ip4:153.31.0.0/16 -all]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS

CDS records present for automated DS updates

Key TagAlgorithmDigest TypeDigest
19010 RSASHA256 2
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

104.16.149.244
104.16.148.244
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700::6810:95f4
2606:4700::6810:94f4
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 mx-east.fbi.gov.
20 mx-west.fbi.gov.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 1 5061 sipfed.online.gov.skypeforbusiness.us.
_sip._tls: 100 1 443 sipdir.online.gov.skypeforbusiness.us.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: 2 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 166 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 166 current 0 expired 30 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
acts-csdb-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 8 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, Entrust Limited
acts-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 8 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, Entrust Limited
admincenter.certauth.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-30T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
admincenter.fact.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2025-08-11T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc, SSL Corporation
api.fbi.gov CT Log Current api.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 3 2026-01-12T02:11:22 Google Trust Services
archives.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-24T07:40:33 Google Trust Services
artcrimes.fbi.gov CT Log Current artcrimes.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 3 2026-01-31T12:01:47 Google Trust Services
atlas.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-07-02T00:00:00 ZeroSSL
atlasbeta.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-07-02T00:00:00 ZeroSSL
autodiscover.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-02T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
autodiscover.ic.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-02T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
avalanche.dv.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current unicorn-dv-appgateway.usgovvirginia.cloudapp.usgovcloudapi.net 2 2025-10-22T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
avalanche.va.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current unicorn-ext-va-appgateway.usgovvirginia.cloudapp.usgovcloudapi.net 2 2025-10-22T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
bankrobbers.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2026-03-09T12:43:54 Google Trust Services
beta-api.fbi.gov CT Log Current beta-api.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 3 2026-01-14T23:44:07 Google Trust Services
biz.fbi.gov CT Log Current biz.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 6 2026-03-01T01:05:00 Google Trust Services
bureview.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-08-01T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
bwc.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 4 2025-08-04T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
captive-portal.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
certauth.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-30T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
cjis.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-05T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited
cms.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-25T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
codis.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 8 2025-11-04T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc, Entrust Limited
confluence.fbi.gov DNS Current confluence-dojfbi.msappproxy.us 7 2025-04-10 Amazon, Google Trust Services, ZeroSSL
connect-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited
csdb-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 7 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, SSL Corporation
cve.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 5 2026-03-08T07:37:50 Google Trust Services
delivery.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2026-03-09T06:16:55 Google Trust Services
denali.dv.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current unicorn-dv-appgateway2.usgovvirginia.cloudapp.usgovcloudapi.net 2 2025-09-29T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
denali.va.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-09-29T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
dev-azdevops.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-08-01T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
digital-briefing.fbi.gov CT Log Current digital-briefing.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 3 2026-01-13T00:43:36 Google Trust Services
efoia.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-22T22:36:46 Google Trust Services
entapps.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-10-16T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
enterprise-logging-hec-east.cjis.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 4 2025-12-05T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
enterpriseregistration.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-30T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
enterprisevettingcenter.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-04-22T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
epas.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-08-04T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
epasdev.fbi.gov CT Log Current epasdev-dojfbi.msappproxy.us 3 2025-08-04T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
epasqa.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-04T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
epassb.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-08-04T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
epassqa.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
epastest.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-08-04T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
events.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-16T11:14:23 Google Trust Services
everfox.fbi.gov CT Log Current everfox-dojfbi.msappproxy.us 2 2025-09-09T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
fact.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2025-08-11T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc, SSL Corporation
fact.fbi.gov.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-04-15T14:54:40 SSL Corporation
fbi-prod.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-06-25T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
fbibiospecs.fbi.gov CT Log Current fbibiospecs.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 6 2026-02-26T23:19:34 Google Trust Services
fbilabqsd.fbi.gov CT Log Current fbilabqsd.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 3 2026-01-11T03:00:43 Google Trust Services
fbivisit.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2026-03-10T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
fbivisitppd.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2026-03-10T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
foia.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-24T04:47:03 Google Trust Services
forms.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2026-03-09T18:45:17 Google Trust Services
frost.va.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-09-17T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
fs.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 4 2025-08-06T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
fs1.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-30T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
gitlab.fbi.gov DNS Current — 7 2025-04-10 Amazon, Google Trust Services, ZeroSSL
guest-portal.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
hqcj-ui-mdf-cp.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
hqcj-ui-mdf-cp1.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
hqcj-ui-mdf-cp2.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
hqcs.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-15T03:44:34 Google Trust Services
hqgw-ui-mdf-cp1.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-07-24T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
hqgw-ui-mdf-cp2.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-07-24T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
hqpo-ui-mdf-cp.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
hqpo-ui-mdf-cp1.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
hqpo-ui-mdf-cp2.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
hybrid.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-02T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
hybrid.ic.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-02T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
ic.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-09-02T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
icljobs-qa.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2026-02-04T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
icljobs.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 4 2026-02-04T18:20:39 Google Trust Services, DigiCert Inc
images.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-21T07:50:27 Google Trust Services
irms-dev.vc.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-11T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
jira.fbi.gov DNS Current jira-dojfbi.msappproxy.us 7 2025-04-10 Amazon, Google Trust Services, ZeroSSL
le.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2026-02-20T01:52:53 Google Trust Services
leauth-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 8 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, Entrust Limited
leb.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2026-03-07T18:21:43 Google Trust Services
leep-csdb-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 8 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, Entrust Limited
leep-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 7 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, SSL Corporation
lenz.dv.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-13T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
letechdev-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 7 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, SSL Corporation
login-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 7 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, SSL Corporation
m.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-15T07:18:58 Google Trust Services
mail-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 7 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, SSL Corporation
mail.fbi.gov CT Log Current mail.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 4 2026-01-23T11:54:45 Google Trust Services, DigiCert Inc
mdm.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
meeting-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited
mmstatic.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2026-03-09T21:28:12 Google Trust Services
mobile.fbi.gov DNS Current d8l7jfvcn8gjb.cloudfront.net 7 2025-04-10 Amazon, Google Trust Services, ZeroSSL
mpo.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
multimedia.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-24T14:39:37 Google Trust Services
myapps.dv.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-23T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
myapps.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-23T08:04:53 Google Trust Services
myapps.va.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current unicorn-ext-va-appgateway2.usgovvirginia.cloudapp.usgovcloudapi.net 2 2025-05-09T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
nationalnamecheckservice.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-05-12T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-27T16:19:20 Google Trust Services
ndex.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-05T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, Entrust Limited
ngi.cjis.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-05T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, Entrust Limited
ngic-idp.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-05T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, Entrust Limited
ngic.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-05T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, Entrust Limited
ngitest.cjis.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 4 2026-03-05T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, Entrust Limited
nibrs.fbi.gov CT Log Current nibrs.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 6 2026-03-09T07:34:24 Google Trust Services
office-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 8 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, Entrust Limited
office.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-22T18:06:30 Google Trust Services
portal-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current portal-ndcac.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 3 2026-01-13T21:27:03 Google Trust Services
portal.va.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current unicorn-ext-va-appgateway2.usgovvirginia.cloudapp.usgovcloudapi.net 2 2025-08-04T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
ppd-bureview.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-08-01T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
pulse.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2026-03-10T12:28:48 Google Trust Services
recovered.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-20T10:17:38 Google Trust Services
remarks.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-21T15:14:53 Google Trust Services
reportcorruption.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-23T21:49:30 Google Trust Services
s.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 6 2026-03-08T04:28:27 Google Trust Services
sbc.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 9 2026-02-11T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
sbc1.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 9 2026-02-11T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
sbc2.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 9 2026-02-11T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
sbc3.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 9 2026-02-11T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
sbc4.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 9 2026-02-11T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
search.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-16T22:41:26 Google Trust Services
sentinel-api.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
sentinel-gint-api.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
sentinel-gint.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
sentinel.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
services.ndex.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-20T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
sifts-dev.al.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-07T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
sos-api.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-24T12:49:02 Google Trust Services
sos.fbi.gov CT Log Current sos.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 2 2026-01-25T03:24:44 Google Trust Services
sso-azuread.va.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-09-17T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
sso-dcap.va.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-04T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
static.fbi.gov CT Log Current static.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 2 2026-01-25T12:24:40 Google Trust Services
stories.fbi.gov CT Log Current stories.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 6 2026-03-07T11:55:35 Google Trust Services
test-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current test-ndcac.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 6 2026-02-25T13:18:05 Google Trust Services
tips.cjis.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-09-10T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
tips.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-18T01:02:31 Google Trust Services
transition.fbi.gov CT Log Current transition.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 3 2026-01-14T02:55:44 Google Trust Services
tundra.va.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-09-17T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
ua3.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-08-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
ua3east.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-08-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
ua3west.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-08-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
ucr.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-26T19:53:19 Google Trust Services
uew-guest-portal.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-24T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
upload.bwc.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 10 2025-08-04T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
uploader.va.apps.dcap.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 4 2025-08-05T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
vault.fbi.gov CT Log Current vault.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 2 2026-01-24T02:45:12 Google Trust Services
vidshare.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-02-02T20:56:08 Google Trust Services
vpn-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 7 2026-03-09T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited, SSL Corporation
webmail.fbi.gov CT Log Current webmail.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 6 2026-02-17T06:04:08 Google Trust Services
wlc-rs-guest.icnw.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-24T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www.acts-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-29T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
www.csdb-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-05-16T14:08:37 SSL Corporation
www.fbi.gov CT Log Current www.fbi.gov.cdn.cloudflare.net 3 2026-01-13T17:38:52 Google Trust Services
www.leep-csdb-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-10-24T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
www.leep-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-04-02T13:59:23 SSL Corporation
www.login-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-03-11T14:22:51 SSL Corporation
www.ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 3 2026-01-14T21:51:45 Google Trust Services
www.ndex.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-20T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
www.ngi.cjis.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-05T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited
www.ngitest.cjis.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-03-05T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited
www.office-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-11-12T00:00:00 Entrust Limited
www.sentinel.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2025-08-06T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www.vpn-ndcac.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-05-16T14:03:58 SSL Corporation
www2.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 2 2026-01-21T09:44:40 Google Trust Services
xacta360.fbi.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
xacta360api.fbi.gov CT Log Current xacta360api-dojfbi.msappproxy.us 1 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
xactaio.fbi.gov CT Log Current xactaio-dojfbi.msappproxy.us 1 2025-07-31T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: TXT Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
104.16.149.244
104.16.149.244
104.16.148.244
104.16.148.244
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2606:4700::6810:95f4
2606:4700::6810:95f4
2606:4700::6810:94f4
2606:4700::6810:94f4
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 6 / 6 records
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "pki.goog"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "entrust.net"
0 issue "entrust.net"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "pki.goog"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "digicert.com"
DMARC _dmarc.fbi.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@fbi.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov; ruf=mailto:dmarc-feedback@fbi.gov; pct=100
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@fbi.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov; ruf=mailto:dmarc-feedback@fbi.gov; pct=100
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
10 mx-east.fbi.gov.
10 mx-east.fbi.gov.
20 mx-west.fbi.gov.
20 mx-west.fbi.gov.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com.
ns-cloud-e4.googledomains.com.
ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com.
ns-cloud-e2.googledomains.com.
ns-cloud-e3.googledomains.com.
ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com.
ns-cloud-e4.googledomains.com.
ns-cloud-e3.googledomains.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com. support.wildcardcorp.com. 1415240977 600 1800 1209600 1800
ns-cloud-e1.googledomains.com. support.wildcardcorp.com. 1415240977 600 1800 1209600 1800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Propagating 13 / 7 records
amazonses: iUbfpGEqhMPlcmJ0aykJZREltK6pWio9wOgRngnJOQE=
_globalsign-domain-verification=xZMJnzdDAgURaBjUZ6qbqWaaYmV5W3sfo3TF8mUxne
625558384-8740534
ublrZj1CzpSEiwtiRFKDAyiek8hRqkqaTTApxvhwai14i8JqVBOauW4cA06i39H5Lhl3HnALCM/xfTxIPEXEpA==
8OOn7pVOB40yx/xtV+rLeDEYiUCieNfF7XI2xMbcm8t8PfUvZsCwGxmvHu2DLsMUkZ6UTYUvIJ49EPi3ZL/z2w==
google-site-verification=6UEk-jfg1xPNjz_rQGcRFJOBGxMy1aARDZUTXgSNAqw
apple-domain-verification=oOspXl6Jvnx9HzLM
google-site-verification=L8cauHJF4MANoTCkMbrLkAVfHBta28ctva9n1IDekTo
_globalsign-domain-verification=xZMJnzdDAgURaBjUZ6qbqWaaYmV5W3sfo3TF8mUxne
apple-domain-verification=oOspXl6Jvnx9HzLM
adobe-idp-site-verification=101945e35b37c6efd526cf706f04bc9545a02f9cdc58dbf718678c506697d67d
v=spf1 +mx ip4:153.31.0.0/16 -all
MS=ms39271050
MS=ms39271050
google-site-verification=uTH4Vg-Xcc9hTqSdeThbT9UnYvuphObtVSpCEgaGr78
—
v=spf1 +mx ip4:153.31.0.0/16 -all
—
google-site-verification=6UEk-jfg1xPNjz_rQGcRFJOBGxMy1aARDZUTXgSNAqw
—
google-site-verification=L8cauHJF4MANoTCkMbrLkAVfHBta28ctva9n1IDekTo
—
fastly-domain-delegation-weownfbi.gov-273985-2020-08-06
—
ublrZj1CzpSEiwtiRFKDAyiek8hRqkqaTTApxvhwai14i8JqVBOauW4cA06i39H5Lhl3HnALCM/xfTxIPEXEpA==
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

8ea7690f8c48ca5c0cf1085085459a4e541b34c31828090700220d5d2b6569f80d2db864c10267d110fbcac66a0ce57f1c7ed9e0f681176ed6961d8c21ba4d25
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 10 Mar 2026, 14:12 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-fbi.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-fbi.gov.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-fbi.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-fbi.gov.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/7075/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for fbi.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short fbi.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.fbi.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.fbi.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.fbi.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.fbi.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.fbi.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer fbi.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd fbi.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx-east.fbi.gov RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-east.fbi.gov TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-west.fbi.gov RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-west.fbi.gov TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx-east.fbi.gov) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx-east.fbi.gov:25 -servername mx-east.fbi.gov 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.fbi.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.fbi.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.fbi.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.fbi.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/fbi.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx-east.fbi.gov) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx-east.fbi.gov:25 -servername mx-east.fbi.gov </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.fbi.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://fbi.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://fbi.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://fbi.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.16.149.244 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 244.149.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.16.148.244 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 244.148.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4843 runs
DKIM
Verified 4662 runs
DMARC
Verified 4827 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4646 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4824 runs
BIMI
Verified 4661 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4664 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4666 runs
CAA
Verified 4658 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short fbi.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.fbi.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.fbi.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.fbi.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.fbi.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.fbi.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer fbi.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd fbi.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx-east.fbi.gov (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-east.fbi.gov TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx-west.fbi.gov (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx-west.fbi.gov TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx-east.fbi.gov) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx-east.fbi.gov:25 -servername mx-east.fbi.gov 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.fbi.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.fbi.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.fbi.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.fbi.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer fbi.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/fbi.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx-east.fbi.gov) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx-east.fbi.gov:25 -servername mx-east.fbi.gov </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.fbi.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://fbi.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://fbi.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://fbi.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.16.149.244 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 244.149.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.16.148.244 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 244.148.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

fbi.gov

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.