DNS Tool

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Generated 10 Mar 2026, 14:11 UTC
Duration 1.3s
Version v26.35.35
Integrity f1909c3ea527a4e6b027da531fb64f9838bd43c1c4ad93ac2844f5b08238081c76f00273e97f4144dd2d5b296e4a80af5cfd524b1836e9f5971f849969d60eb7

TLP:AMBER

Limited disclosure — recipients may share within their organization only

Subject Domain

example.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

example.com

10 Mar 2026, 14:11 UTC · 1.3s ·v26.35.35 · SHA-3-512: f190✱✱✱✱ Verify

Executive Methodology

Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain

Footprint

DNS Security & Trust Posture

Risk Level: Low Risk

4 protocols configured, 5 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades

1 recommendation

Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)

MODERATE 67/100

Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.

Accuracy 63% Currency 71/100 Maturity verified

Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers

Intelligence Currency

Data Currency: Adequate 71/100

ICuAE Details

Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale

DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type	Observed TTL	Typical TTL	Severity	Context
NS	`21570s`	`1 day (86400s)`	medium	NS TTL is below typical — observed 21570s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT	`270s`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	TXT TTL is below typical — observed 270s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX	`9s`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	MX TTL is below typical — observed 9s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA	`444s`	`1 hour (3600s)`	medium	SOA TTL is below typical — observed 444s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. Provider Note: Cloudflare manages SOA timers automatically. Free/Pro/Business plans cannot modify SOA values. Observed TTL (444s) is set by Cloudflare, not the zone administrator. See RFC 1912 §2.2 for recommended SOA timer values.
A	`5 minutes (300s)`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	A TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
AAAA	`5 minutes (300s)`	`1 hour (3600s)`	high	AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.

Big Picture Questions

How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.

Tune TTL for example.com

Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Cloudflare — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.

Primary NS elliott.ns.cloudflare.com

Serial 2397268091

Admin dns.cloudflare.com

Provider Cloudflare

Timer	Value	RFC 1912 Range
Refresh	`10000s`	1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry	`2400s`	Fraction of Refresh
Expire	`604800s`	1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)	`1800s`	300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)

Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s). Cloudflare's anycast architecture reduces the practical risk, but this value departs from the RFC recommendation.

RFC 1912 §2.2

Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

SOA Expire below RFC 1912 recommendation RFC 1912 §2.2

Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.

Below RFC recommendation

Proxied record TTLs fixed at 300s RFC 2181 §5.2

Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.

Technically compliant, but overrides administrator intent

Non-standard SOA serial format RFC 1912 §2.2

RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.

Compliant with RFC 1035, deviates from RFC 1912 convention

Negative cache TTL delays new records RFC 2308 §5

Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.

RFC-compliant, but causes real-world automation failures

Historical RFC 2181 §5.2 violation: TTL mismatch in CNAME RRsets RFC 2181 §5.2

In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.

Was a documented RFC violation — appears resolved

This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.

Email Spoofing

Protected

Brand Impersonation

Not Setup

DNS Tampering

Protected

Certificate Control

Open

Recommended

Add DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) for visibility into email authentication

Configured

SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM (not applicable — no-mail domain), DNSSEC

Not Configured

MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, CAA

Priority Action Achievable posture: Secure

Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.

Field	Value
Type	`CAA`
Host	`example.com` (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value	`0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`

RFC 8659

Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE

RESERVED-Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

Where domain was purchased

Email Service Provider

No Mail Domain

No-Mail Domain — Fully Hardened

Web Hosting

Unknown

Where website is hosted

DNS Hosting OBSERVED

Cloudflare

Where DNS records are edited

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No null MX indicates no-mail domain

No-Mail Domain — Fully Hardened 3/3 controls

This domain declares it does not send or receive email and has all three RFC-recommended controls in place: Null MX (RFC 7505), SPF -all (RFC 7208), and DMARC reject (RFC 7489).

DMARC reject (RFC 7489) Null MX (RFC 7505) SPF -all (RFC 7208)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes

Success -all

Valid SPF (no mail allowed) - domain declares it sends no email

v=spf1 -all

RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.

RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy

Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=s;aspf=s

Alignment: SPF strict DKIM strict sp=reject

No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse

No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports

RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.

DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.

Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable

Weak Keys

Found 81 DKIM selector(s) but some keys are revoked

Key revoked (p= empty)

amazonses._domainkey Amazon SES

v=DKIM1; p=

barracuda._domainkey Barracuda

v=DKIM1; p=

brevo._domainkey Brevo (Sendinblue)

v=DKIM1; p=

cisco._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

cm._domainkey Campaign Monitor

v=DKIM1; p=

ctct1._domainkey Constant Contact

v=DKIM1; p=

ctct2._domainkey Constant Contact

v=DKIM1; p=

customerio._domainkey Customer.io

v=DKIM1; p=

default._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

dk._domainkey ActiveCampaign

v=DKIM1; p=

dkim._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

dkim1._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

dkim2._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

dkim3._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

drip._domainkey Drip

v=DKIM1; p=

em._domainkey SendGrid

v=DKIM1; p=

email._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

everlytickey1._domainkey Everlytic

v=DKIM1; p=

everlytickey2._domainkey Everlytic

v=DKIM1; p=

fm1._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

fm2._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

fm3._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

freshdesk._domainkey Freshdesk

v=DKIM1; p=

google._domainkey Google Workspace

v=DKIM1; p=

google2048._domainkey Google Workspace

v=DKIM1; p=

hornet._domainkey Hornetsecurity

v=DKIM1; p=

hs1._domainkey HubSpot

v=DKIM1; p=

hs2._domainkey HubSpot

v=DKIM1; p=

hubspot._domainkey HubSpot

v=DKIM1; p=

intercom._domainkey Intercom

v=DKIM1; p=

k1._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

k2._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

k3._domainkey MailChimp

v=DKIM1; p=

key1._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

key2._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

klaviyo._domainkey Klaviyo

v=DKIM1; p=

mail._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

mailchimp._domainkey MailChimp

v=DKIM1; p=

mailer._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

mailgun._domainkey Mailgun

v=DKIM1; p=

mailjet._domainkey Mailjet

v=DKIM1; p=

mandrill._domainkey MailChimp (Mandrill)

v=DKIM1; p=

mandrill2._domainkey MailChimp (Mandrill)

v=DKIM1; p=

mc._domainkey MailChimp

v=DKIM1; p=

mimecast._domainkey Mimecast

v=DKIM1; p=

ml._domainkey MailerLite

v=DKIM1; p=

mta._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

mta1._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

mta2._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

mx._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

postmark._domainkey Postmark

v=DKIM1; p=

proofpoint._domainkey Proofpoint

v=DKIM1; p=

protonmail._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

protonmail2._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

protonmail3._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

s1._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

s2._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

s3._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

salesforce._domainkey Salesforce

v=DKIM1; p=

selector1._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

selector2._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

selector3._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

sendgrid._domainkey SendGrid

v=DKIM1; p=

sendgrid2._domainkey SendGrid

v=DKIM1; p=

sendinblue._domainkey Brevo (Sendinblue)

v=DKIM1; p=

sf1._domainkey Salesforce

v=DKIM1; p=

sf2._domainkey Salesforce

v=DKIM1; p=

sig1._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

sig2._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

smtp._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

smtpapi._domainkey SendGrid

v=DKIM1; p=

sparkpost._domainkey SparkPost

v=DKIM1; p=

sq._domainkey Square Online

v=DKIM1; p=

square._domainkey Square Online

v=DKIM1; p=

squareup._domainkey Square Online

v=DKIM1; p=

turbo-smtp._domainkey

v=DKIM1; p=

zendesk1._domainkey Zendesk

v=DKIM1; p=

zendesk2._domainkey Zendesk

v=DKIM1; p=

zmail._domainkey Zoho Mail

v=DKIM1; p=

zoho._domainkey Zoho Mail

v=DKIM1; p=

zohomail._domainkey Zoho Mail

v=DKIM1; p=

RFC Stance: RFC 6376 (Internet Standard) defines the DKIM mechanism. DKIM selectors are not publicly enumerable — absence in a scan does not prove absence of signing.

Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented

Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting

Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No valid MX hosts — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).

This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No significant AI surface findings

llms.txt llmstxt.org

Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No

No llms.txt found

No llms-full.txt found

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives

No robots.txt found

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured

No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.

Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No

No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No

No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.

Sources scanned (1)

https://example.com/

What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on hera.ns.cloudflare.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check	Result	Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR)	Denied	Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion	Disabled	Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity	Hidden	No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping	Protected	Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: hera.ns.cloudflare.com, elliott.ns.cloudflare.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:

Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key Tag	DS Algorithm	DNSKEY Key Tag	DNSKEY Algorithm
2371	13	2371	13

Glue Record Completeness Complete

Nameserver	In-Bailiwick	IPv4 Glue	IPv6 Glue	Status
`elliott.ns.cloudflare.com`	No	N/A	N/A	OK
`hera.ns.cloudflare.com`	No	N/A	N/A	OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

elliott.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.397268091e+09

hera.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.397268091e+09

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for example.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver	IPv4	IPv6	ASN / Operator	UDP	TCP	AA	SOA Serial
`hera.ns.cloudflare.com`	108.162.192.162 173.245.58.162 172.64.32.162	2803:f800:50::6ca2:c0a2 2a06:98c1:50::ac40:20a2 2606:4700:50::adf5:3aa2	AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc.				2397268091
`elliott.ns.cloudflare.com`	108.162.195.228 172.64.35.228 162.159.44.228	2606:4700:58::a29f:2ce4 2a06:98c1:50::ac40:23e4 2803:f800:50::6ca2:c3e4	AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc.				2397268091

Unique ASNs

Unique Operators

Unique /24 Prefixes

Diversity Score

Fair

1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:

CDS/CDNSKEY automation present but only single KSK — pre-publish second KSK before rollover

DNSKEY Inventory 4 Keys

Role	Key Tag	Algorithm	Key Size
ZSK	36315	ECDSA P-256/SHA-256	256 bits
ZSK	9776	ECDSA P-256/SHA-256	256 bits
ZSK	34505	ECDSA P-256/SHA-256	256 bits
KSK	2371	ECDSA P-256/SHA-256	256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence NSEC

NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.

Rollover Readiness Partial

Multiple KSKs:

CDS Published:

CDNSKEY Published:

Automation: full

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No MX records found

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry

TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders

Live Probe Supplementary

Skipped — No MX records found for this domain

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASN	Name	Country
`AS13335`	Cloudflare, Inc.	US

IPv4 Mappings:

104.18.26.120 → AS13335 (104.18.16.0/20)

104.18.27.120 → AS13335 (104.18.16.0/20)

IPv6 Mappings:

2606:4700::6812:1b78 → AS13335 (2606:4700::/44)

2606:4700::6812:1a78 → AS13335 (2606:4700::/44)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 — MUST implement, recommended default (RFC 8624 §3.1)

All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.

AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures

DS Record (at registrar):

2371 13 2 C988EC423E3880EB8DD8A46FE06CA230EE23F35B578D64E78B29C3E1C83D245A

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: elliott.ns.cloudflare.com hera.ns.cloudflare.com

Managed DNS

All 2 nameservers hosted by Cloudflare. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.

DNS provider(s): Cloudflare

Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS

HTTPS records found

Priority	Target	ALPN	ECH	Raw
1	`.`	h2	No	`example.com. 124 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h2" ipv4hint="104.18.26.120,104.18.27.120" ipv6hint="2606:4700::6812:1a78,2606:4700::6812:1b78"`

CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS CDNSKEY

Full RFC 8078 automated DNSSEC key rollover signaling detected (CDS + CDNSKEY)

Key Tag	Algorithm	Digest Type	Digest
`2371`	ECDSAP256SHA256	2

CDNSKEY Records:

Flags	Protocol	Algorithm	Public Key
`257`	3	ECDSAP256SHA256

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

104.18.26.120

104.18.27.120

Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700::6812:1b78

2606:4700::6812:1a78

IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

0 .

Null MX RFC 7505

Domain explicitly does not accept email

SRVServices

No SRV records

No service-specific routing configured

Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: Null MX (no mail) Services: None

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 1 subdomains discovered

How did we find these?

CT logs unavailable 1 current 0 expired Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence

Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.

Subdomain	Source	Status	Provider / CNAME	Certificates	First Seen	Issuer(s)
`www.example.com`	CT Log	Current	—	4	2025-12-02T00:00:00	Sectigo Limited

Export Recon (CSV)

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.

DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)

Authoritative Records (Source of truth)

A Synchronized 2 / 2 records

104.18.26.120

104.18.27.120

104.18.26.120

AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records

2606:4700::6812:1b78

2606:4700::6812:1a78

2606:4700::6812:1b78

CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records

No records

DMARC _dmarc.example.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=s;aspf=s

MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

0 .

NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records

elliott.ns.cloudflare.com.

hera.ns.cloudflare.com.

SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records

elliott.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2397268091 10000 2400 604800 1800

TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 2 / 2 records

_k2n1y4vw3qtb4skdx9e7dxt97qrmmq9

v=spf1 -all

DNS History Timeline BETA

Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

f1909c3ea527a4e6b027da531fb64f9838bd43c1c4ad93ac2844f5b08238081c76f00273e97f4144dd2d5b296e4a80af5cfd524b1836e9f5971f849969d60eb7

Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 10 Mar 2026, 14:11 UTC.

Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)

cat dns-intelligence-example.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-example.com.json

Python 3 (cross-platform)

python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-example.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"

sha3sum (coreutils 9+)

sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-example.com.json

Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/7071/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for example.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer example.com A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer example.com AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer example.com MX

Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer example.com NS

Query TXT records RFC 1035

dig +noall +answer example.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208

dig +short example.com TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy RFC 7489

dig +short _dmarc.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'amazonses' RFC 6376

dig +short amazonses._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'barracuda' RFC 6376

dig +short barracuda._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'brevo' RFC 6376

dig +short brevo._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'cisco' RFC 6376

dig +short cisco._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' RFC 6376

dig +short cm._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'ctct1' RFC 6376

dig +short ctct1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'ctct2' RFC 6376

dig +short ctct2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'customerio' RFC 6376

dig +short customerio._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376

dig +short default._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'dk' RFC 6376

dig +short dk._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' RFC 6376

dig +short dkim._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim1' RFC 6376

dig +short dkim1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim2' RFC 6376

dig +short dkim2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim3' RFC 6376

dig +short dkim3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'drip' RFC 6376

dig +short drip._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'em' RFC 6376

dig +short em._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'email' RFC 6376

dig +short email._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'everlytickey1' RFC 6376

dig +short everlytickey1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'everlytickey2' RFC 6376

dig +short everlytickey2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'fm1' RFC 6376

dig +short fm1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'fm2' RFC 6376

dig +short fm2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'fm3' RFC 6376

dig +short fm3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'freshdesk' RFC 6376

dig +short freshdesk._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376

dig +short google._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'google2048' RFC 6376

dig +short google2048._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'hornet' RFC 6376

dig +short hornet._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'hs1' RFC 6376

dig +short hs1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'hs2' RFC 6376

dig +short hs2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'hubspot' RFC 6376

dig +short hubspot._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'intercom' RFC 6376

dig +short intercom._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' RFC 6376

dig +short k1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' RFC 6376

dig +short k2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' RFC 6376

dig +short k3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'key1' RFC 6376

dig +short key1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'key2' RFC 6376

dig +short key2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'klaviyo' RFC 6376

dig +short klaviyo._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mail' RFC 6376

dig +short mail._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mailchimp' RFC 6376

dig +short mailchimp._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mailer' RFC 6376

dig +short mailer._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mailgun' RFC 6376

dig +short mailgun._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mailjet' RFC 6376

dig +short mailjet._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill' RFC 6376

dig +short mandrill._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill2' RFC 6376

dig +short mandrill2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mc' RFC 6376

dig +short mc._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mimecast' RFC 6376

dig +short mimecast._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'ml' RFC 6376

dig +short ml._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mta' RFC 6376

dig +short mta._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mta1' RFC 6376

dig +short mta1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mta2' RFC 6376

dig +short mta2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mx' RFC 6376

dig +short mx._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'postmark' RFC 6376

dig +short postmark._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'proofpoint' RFC 6376

dig +short proofpoint._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail' RFC 6376

dig +short protonmail._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail2' RFC 6376

dig +short protonmail2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail3' RFC 6376

dig +short protonmail3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376

dig +short s1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376

dig +short s2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 's3' RFC 6376

dig +short s3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'salesforce' RFC 6376

dig +short salesforce._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376

dig +short selector1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376

dig +short selector2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector3' RFC 6376

dig +short selector3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sendgrid' RFC 6376

dig +short sendgrid._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sendgrid2' RFC 6376

dig +short sendgrid2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sendinblue' RFC 6376

dig +short sendinblue._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sf1' RFC 6376

dig +short sf1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sf2' RFC 6376

dig +short sf2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sig1' RFC 6376

dig +short sig1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sig2' RFC 6376

dig +short sig2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'smtp' RFC 6376

dig +short smtp._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'smtpapi' RFC 6376

dig +short smtpapi._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sparkpost' RFC 6376

dig +short sparkpost._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sq' RFC 6376

dig +short sq._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'square' RFC 6376

dig +short square._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'squareup' RFC 6376

dig +short squareup._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'turbo-smtp' RFC 6376

dig +short turbo-smtp._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' RFC 6376

dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' RFC 6376

dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zmail' RFC 6376

dig +short zmail._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zoho' RFC 6376

dig +short zoho._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zohomail' RFC 6376

dig +short zohomail._domainkey.example.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +noall +answer example.com DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035

dig +noall +answer example.com DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035

dig +dnssec +cd example.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA

Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461

dig +short _mta-sts.example.com TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461

curl -sL https://mta-sts.example.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460

dig +short _smtp._tls.example.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft

dig +short default._bimi.example.com TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659

dig +noall +answer example.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460

dig +noall +answer example.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344

dig +noall +answer example.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/example.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.example.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt RFC 9116

curl -sL https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://example.com/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://example.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.18.26.120 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 120.26.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

ASN lookup for 104.18.27.120 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 120.27.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.

Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated

How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.

SPF

Verified 4843 runs

DKIM

Verified 4662 runs

DMARC

Verified 4827 runs

DANE/TLSA

Verified 4646 runs

DNSSEC

Verified 4824 runs

BIMI

Verified 4661 runs

MTA-STS

Verified 4664 runs

TLS-RPT

Verified 4666 runs

CAA

Verified 4658 runs

Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer example.com A

Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer example.com AAAA

Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer example.com MX

Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer example.com NS

Query TXT records (RFC 1035)

dig +noall +answer example.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208)

dig +short example.com TXT | grep -i spf

Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489)

dig +short _dmarc.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'amazonses' (RFC 6376)

dig +short amazonses._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'barracuda' (RFC 6376)

dig +short barracuda._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'brevo' (RFC 6376)

dig +short brevo._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'cisco' (RFC 6376)

dig +short cisco._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' (RFC 6376)

dig +short cm._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'ctct1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short ctct1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'ctct2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short ctct2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'customerio' (RFC 6376)

dig +short customerio._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376)

dig +short default._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'dk' (RFC 6376)

dig +short dk._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' (RFC 6376)

dig +short dkim._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short dkim1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short dkim2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim3' (RFC 6376)

dig +short dkim3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'drip' (RFC 6376)

dig +short drip._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'em' (RFC 6376)

dig +short em._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'email' (RFC 6376)

dig +short email._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'everlytickey1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short everlytickey1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'everlytickey2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short everlytickey2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'fm1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short fm1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'fm2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short fm2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'fm3' (RFC 6376)

dig +short fm3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'freshdesk' (RFC 6376)

dig +short freshdesk._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376)

dig +short google._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'google2048' (RFC 6376)

dig +short google2048._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'hornet' (RFC 6376)

dig +short hornet._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'hs1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short hs1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'hs2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short hs2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'hubspot' (RFC 6376)

dig +short hubspot._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'intercom' (RFC 6376)

dig +short intercom._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short k1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short k2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' (RFC 6376)

dig +short k3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'key1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short key1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'key2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short key2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'klaviyo' (RFC 6376)

dig +short klaviyo._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mail' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mail._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mailchimp' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mailchimp._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mailer' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mailer._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mailgun' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mailgun._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mailjet' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mailjet._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mandrill._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mandrill2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mc' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mc._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mimecast' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mimecast._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'ml' (RFC 6376)

dig +short ml._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mta' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mta._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mta1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mta1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mta2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mta2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'mx' (RFC 6376)

dig +short mx._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'postmark' (RFC 6376)

dig +short postmark._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'proofpoint' (RFC 6376)

dig +short proofpoint._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail' (RFC 6376)

dig +short protonmail._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short protonmail2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail3' (RFC 6376)

dig +short protonmail3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short s1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short s2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 's3' (RFC 6376)

dig +short s3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'salesforce' (RFC 6376)

dig +short salesforce._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short selector1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short selector2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'selector3' (RFC 6376)

dig +short selector3._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sendgrid' (RFC 6376)

dig +short sendgrid._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sendgrid2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short sendgrid2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sendinblue' (RFC 6376)

dig +short sendinblue._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sf1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short sf1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sf2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short sf2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sig1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short sig1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sig2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short sig2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'smtp' (RFC 6376)

dig +short smtp._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'smtpapi' (RFC 6376)

dig +short smtpapi._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sparkpost' (RFC 6376)

dig +short sparkpost._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'sq' (RFC 6376)

dig +short sq._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'square' (RFC 6376)

dig +short square._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'squareup' (RFC 6376)

dig +short squareup._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'turbo-smtp' (RFC 6376)

dig +short turbo-smtp._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' (RFC 6376)

dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' (RFC 6376)

dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zmail' (RFC 6376)

dig +short zmail._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zoho' (RFC 6376)

dig +short zoho._domainkey.example.com TXT

Check DKIM key for selector 'zohomail' (RFC 6376)

dig +short zohomail._domainkey.example.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +noall +answer example.com DNSKEY

Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035)

dig +noall +answer example.com DS

Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035)

dig +dnssec +cd example.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672)

dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA

Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461)

dig +short _mta-sts.example.com TXT

Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461)

curl -sL https://mta-sts.example.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460)

dig +short _smtp._tls.example.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft)

dig +short default._bimi.example.com TXT

Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659)

dig +noall +answer example.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460)

dig +noall +answer example.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344)

dig +noall +answer example.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083)

curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/example.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962)

curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.example.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20

Check security.txt (RFC 9116)

curl -sL https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt

curl -sI https://example.com/llms.txt | head -5

Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules

curl -s https://example.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.18.26.120 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 120.26.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

ASN lookup for 104.18.27.120 (Team Cymru)

dig +short 120.27.18.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No null MX indicates no-mail domain

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

llms.txt llmstxt.org

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

DNS Server Security Hardened

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Policy Assessment Primary

Telemetry

Live Probe Supplementary

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 1 subdomains discovered

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

Rules of Engagement

What You May Do

What You May Not Do

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

Intelligence Dissemination

Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No null MX indicates no-mail domain

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

llms.txt llmstxt.org

AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft

Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft

AI Recommendation Poisoning

Hidden Prompt Artifacts

Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

DNS Server Security Hardened

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Policy Assessment Primary

Telemetry

Live Probe Supplementary

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 1 subdomains discovered

DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison

DNS History Timeline BETA

Intelligence Sources

Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

Download & Verify Intelligence SHA-3-512

Reproduce the Evidence Transparency Source-Verifiable

Appendix: Verification Commands

RFC Reference