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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 10 Mar 2026, 14:11 UTC
Duration 18.0s
Version v26.35.35
Integrity bb8710062040d9a4f580bb7a80d89a05c19cb349eb873112b148f7ad3f9716acfbfe03e7d6cf3e543f24c6d132572e0227c08db8b31a21843002cc8357952cfa
Subject Domain
it-help.tech

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

it-help.tech
10 Mar 2026, 14:11 UTC · 18.0s ·v26.35.35 · SHA-3-512: bb87✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Google Workspace 3 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
8 protocols configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 67/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 56% Currency 80/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 80/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
AAAA 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: AWS Route 53 alias records have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds when pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3). This is an AWS-specific extension, not part of DNS RFCs. To set a custom TTL, use a standard A/AAAA record or CNAME instead of an alias — but note this loses automatic IP tracking.
A 28s 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 28s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 21585s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 21585s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for it-help.tech
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: AWS Route 53 — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ns-529.awsdns-02.net
Serial 1
Admin awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com
Provider AWS Route 53
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh7200s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry900sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)86400s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.

Independent RFC compliance assessment for AWS Route 53. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

Alias record TTLs fixed at 60s RFC 1035 §3.2.1

AWS Route 53 alias records pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3, API Gateway) have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds that cannot be modified. Route 53 alias records are an AWS-specific extension — not part of standard DNS RFCs. They solve the CNAME-at-apex problem (RFC prohibits CNAME at zone apex) by appearing as A/AAAA records to resolvers. The 60-second TTL ensures fast failover but removes administrator TTL control.

Proprietary extension — not covered by DNS RFCs
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Basic
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Amazon Registrar, Inc.
Registrar for it-help.tech
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Google Workspace
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Amazon Route 53
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_u.it-help.tech._spf.smart.ondmarc.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:dc1e127b@inbox.ondmarc.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=3600
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=reject
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

DKIM key management delegated — _domainkey.it-help.tech NS records point to Red Sift OnDMARC (ns-dkim.ondmarc.com). DKIM selectors are dynamically managed and may include keys for services beyond what static scanning discovers.
google._domainkey Google Workspace 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEApb3onIiQsLq6/SLBfl88zt4CsCwp56n2M3GgAENKfVPV3s68+d6gQduuQAO2VL1VaAJU3XAh9gravPqZqev6Lt/qrGKYXUUcXRQ9zE3+YcJIMNGyP9xaId43TZ3szC6Q2DNxqfOFNdnZfRv6plKSGRlzfWK4QaPxr66GRGKRvfaDGtZS6E8PhACYXgjshexZB76T9iUM4MC3WteUl1NTr1nUsJeY6RdJhxGr9NKi00qHJO8MHmA73d6dYDaf+eBE4BX90ZgbghKvA+CYws9WXVAwK4IUB3zj8a6Qh398tvhIEwivkwD7x65rZsMl32iHIdkp+alfQV4tFlc2wIm+hQIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=1741123722267
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 14 days (1209600 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: smtp.google.com

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:dc1e127b@inbox.ondmarc.com;

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
inbox.ondmarc.com Authorized v=DMARC1;
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Google Workspace

Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)

Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS — the best available option for Google Workspace. Since Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE, MTA-STS is the strongest transport security this domain can deploy. MTA-STS enforces TLS via HTTPS-based policy, protecting against downgrade attacks (RFC 8461).

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? No DMARC reject policy enforced (RFC 7489 §6.3), BIMI brand verification active (BIMI Spec), and certificate issuance restricted by CAA (RFC 8659 §4) — all three brand-faking vectors addressed

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success No VMC SVG

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Yes

BIMI configured - logo validated (VMC recommended for Gmail)

BIMI works without VMC! VMC (Verified Mark Certificate) requires a registered trademark. Small businesses can use BIMI with just a logo - it shows in Apple Mail and some providers. Gmail requires VMC.
v=BIMI1;l=https://dnstool.it-help.tech/bimi-logo.svg
BIMI Logo
Logo validated (SVG) View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success IODEF

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only Amazon, Let's Encrypt can issue certificates (wildcard issuance: Let's Encrypt per RFC 8659 §4.3)

Authorized CAs: Amazon Let's Encrypt
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 iodef "mailto:hello@it-help.tech"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Yes RFC 9116

security.txt properly configured

Contact

mailto:security@it-help.tech
https://www.it-help.tech/security-policy

Expires

2027-02-14 Valid

Policy

https://www.it-help.tech/security-policy
en Canonical URL Acknowledgments
Source: https://it-help.tech/.well-known/security.txt
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? Yes

AI governance signals observed

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? Yes
llms.txt found — domain provides structured context for LLMs
llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context)
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (3 items)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
llms_txt_found llms.txt file found providing structured LLM context info Observed
llms_full_txt_found llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) info Observed
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (1)
  • https://it-help.tech/
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk, ns-1117.awsdns-11.org, ns-4.awsdns-00.com, ns-529.awsdns-02.net

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key TagDS AlgorithmDNSKEY Key TagDNSKEY Algorithm
12492 13 12492 13

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns-1117.awsdns-11.org No N/A N/A OK
ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk No N/A N/A OK
ns-4.awsdns-00.com No N/A N/A OK
ns-529.awsdns-02.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns-1117.awsdns-11.org: 1
ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk: 1
ns-4.awsdns-00.com: 1
ns-529.awsdns-02.net: 1
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for it-help.tech — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk 205.251.198.67 2600:9000:5306:4300::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-1117.awsdns-11.org 205.251.196.93 2600:9000:5304:5d00::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-4.awsdns-00.com 205.251.192.4 2600:9000:5300:400::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-529.awsdns-02.net 205.251.194.17 2600:9000:5302:1100::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • Single KSK with no CDS/CDNSKEY automation — manual rollover required

DNSKEY Inventory 3 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 27212 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
ZSK 10768 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
KSK 12492 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence none

No NSEC or NSEC3 records detected.

Rollover Readiness Not_ready

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: none
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (3 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport (RFC 8461)
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
  • Google Workspace enforces TLS 1.2+ with valid certificates on all inbound/outbound mail
Telemetry
TLS-RPT configured — domain receives reports about TLS delivery failures from sending mail servers (RFC 8460)
Reporting to: mailto:dc1e127b@inbox.ondmarc.com
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 12 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
143.204.204.129 → AS16509 (143.204.204.0/24)
143.204.204.109 → AS16509 (143.204.204.0/24)
143.204.204.72 → AS16509 (143.204.204.0/24)
143.204.204.52 → AS16509 (143.204.204.0/24)
IPv6 Mappings:
2600:9000:2058:ac00:13:842a:58c0:93a1 → AS16509 (2600:9000:2058::/48)
2600:9000:2058:c400:13:842a:58c0:93a1 → AS16509 (2600:9000:2058::/48)
2600:9000:2058:4c00:13:842a:58c0:93a1 → AS16509 (2600:9000:2058::/48)
2600:9000:2058:da00:13:842a:58c0:93a1 → AS16509 (2600:9000:2058::/48)
2600:9000:2058:5200:13:842a:58c0:93a1 → AS16509 (2600:9000:2058::/48)
2600:9000:2058:6400:13:842a:58c0:93a1 → AS16509 (2600:9000:2058::/48)
2600:9000:2058:be00:13:842a:58c0:93a1 → AS16509 (2600:9000:2058::/48)
2600:9000:2058:2000:13:842a:58c0:93a1 → AS16509 (2600:9000:2058::/48)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 3 services

3 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google Workspace google-site-verification=FaC0aC3UvT7d88w-4Vg0lNH2WdCV4FQOmbf0_p25Nkc
Apple apple-domain-verification=0Fr6C3CKU6a7VuF2KwsdLQpksMIPUrsSk8T6W-i5P3E
Facebook / Meta facebook-domain-verification=76rq4jzu9l70hfw98qkma7lgsougsg
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 — MUST implement, recommended default (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
12492 13 2 3F0538D5BA61D8D90ECBFBBF7B5B40508D00A794649CE949EA77FC8862E5531A

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns-1117.awsdns-11.org ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk ns-4.awsdns-00.com ns-529.awsdns-02.net
Managed DNS
All 4 nameservers hosted by Amazon Route 53. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Amazon Route 53
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (2 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [75fb54a0-061c-11f0-a839-09712ee48904 facebook-domain-verification=76rq4jzu9l70hfw98qkma7lgsougsg google-site-verification=BnjqY2BGRiD4dDcPTYt235UM40y0QR3p_DX-OfVfXVg google-site-verification=FaC0aC3UvT7d88w-4Vg0lNH2WdCV4FQOmbf0_p25Nkc openai-domain-verification=dv-u60z0qkvBe135qAUQSKYKNDU v=spf1 include:_u.it-help.tech._spf.smart.ondmarc.com ~all]
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [3.162.38.13 3.162.38.30 3.162.38.47 3.162.38.68]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

143.204.204.129
143.204.204.109
143.204.204.72
143.204.204.52
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2600:9000:2058:ac00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:c400:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:4c00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:da00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:5200:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:6400:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:be00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:2000:13:842a:58c0:93a1
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

1 smtp.google.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Google Workspace

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (4 IPv4, 8 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 3 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 3 current 0 expired 1 CNAME Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
schedule.it-help.tech DNS Current — — — —
server.it-help.tech DNS Current — — — —
www.it-help.tech DNS Current d316lglduxncrn.cloudfront.net — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: AAAA Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 4 / 4 records
143.204.204.129
143.204.204.72
143.204.204.109
143.204.204.109
143.204.204.72
143.204.204.129
143.204.204.52
143.204.204.52
AAAA Propagating 8 / 8 records
2600:9000:2058:ac00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:4600:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:c400:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:5600:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:4c00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:1000:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:da00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:1800:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:5200:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:4400:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:6400:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:6a00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:be00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:aa00:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:2000:13:842a:58c0:93a1
2600:9000:2058:b400:13:842a:58c0:93a1
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 iodef "mailto:hello@it-help.tech"
0 iodef "mailto:hello@it-help.tech"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
DMARC _dmarc.it-help.tech RFC 7489 §6.3 1 / 0 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:dc1e127b@inbox.ondmarc.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=3600
—
MTA-STS _mta-sts.it-help.tech RFC 8461 §3 1 / 0 records
v=STSv1; id=1741123722267
—
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
1 smtp.google.com.
1 smtp.google.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns-1117.awsdns-11.org.
ns-1117.awsdns-11.org.
ns-529.awsdns-02.net.
ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk.
ns-1603.awsdns-08.co.uk.
ns-4.awsdns-00.com.
ns-4.awsdns-00.com.
ns-529.awsdns-02.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns-529.awsdns-02.net. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
ns-529.awsdns-02.net. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.it-help.tech RFC 8460 §3 1 / 0 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:dc1e127b@inbox.ondmarc.com;
—
TXT RFC 7208 §4 8 / 0 records
v=spf1 include:_u.it-help.tech._spf.smart.ondmarc.com ~all
—
google-site-verification=FaC0aC3UvT7d88w-4Vg0lNH2WdCV4FQOmbf0_p25Nkc
—
google-site-verification=qRV0IpeTmVGGCbCgy1bB4vsJpUXVSw1sXLSfPC01vgs
—
75fb54a0-061c-11f0-a839-09712ee48904
—
apple-domain-verification=0Fr6C3CKU6a7VuF2KwsdLQpksMIPUrsSk8T6W-i5P3E
—
facebook-domain-verification=76rq4jzu9l70hfw98qkma7lgsougsg
—
google-site-verification=BnjqY2BGRiD4dDcPTYt235UM40y0QR3p_DX-OfVfXVg
—
openai-domain-verification=dv-u60z0qkvBe135qAUQSKYKNDU
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

bb8710062040d9a4f580bb7a80d89a05c19cb349eb873112b148f7ad3f9716acfbfe03e7d6cf3e543f24c6d132572e0227c08db8b31a21843002cc8357952cfa
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 10 Mar 2026, 14:11 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-it-help.tech.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-it-help.tech.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-it-help.tech.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-it-help.tech.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/7070/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for it-help.tech. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short it-help.tech TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.it-help.tech TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.it-help.tech TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer it-help.tech DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd it-help.tech A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for smtp.google.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.smtp.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (smtp.google.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.it-help.tech TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.it-help.tech/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.it-help.tech TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.it-help.tech TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/it-help.tech' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (smtp.google.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.it-help.tech&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://it-help.tech/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://it-help.tech/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://it-help.tech/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 143.204.204.129 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 129.204.204.143.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 143.204.204.109 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 109.204.204.143.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4843 runs
DKIM
Verified 4662 runs
DMARC
Verified 4827 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4646 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4824 runs
BIMI
Verified 4661 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4664 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4666 runs
CAA
Verified 4658 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short it-help.tech TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.it-help.tech TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.it-help.tech TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer it-help.tech DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd it-help.tech A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for smtp.google.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.smtp.google.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (smtp.google.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.it-help.tech TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.it-help.tech/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.it-help.tech TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.it-help.tech TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer it-help.tech CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/it-help.tech' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (smtp.google.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.google.com:25 -servername smtp.google.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.it-help.tech&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://it-help.tech/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://it-help.tech/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://it-help.tech/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 143.204.204.129 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 129.204.204.143.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 143.204.204.109 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 109.204.204.143.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

it-help.tech

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.