Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NS | 21570s |
1 day (86400s) |
medium | NS TTL is below typical — observed 21570s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| AAAA | 5 minutes (300s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high |
AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
|
| A | 5 minutes (300s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high |
A TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
|
| MX | 1 minute (60s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | MX TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| TXT | 5 minutes (300s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
- Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
- Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
- Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
jill.ns.cloudflare.com
2398064274
dns.cloudflare.com
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 10000s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 2400s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 604800s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 1800s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.
Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.
Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.
RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.
Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.
In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.
Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _dmarc.ietf.org (DMARC policy record) |
| Value | v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@ietf.org |
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | CAA |
| Host | ietf.org (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider) |
| Value | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
Your domain has DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest email transport security available. TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _smtp._tls.ietf.org (SMTP TLS reporting record) |
| Value | v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@ietf.org |
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _mta-sts.ietf.org (MTA-STS policy record) |
| Value | v=STSv1; id=ietf.org |
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified
SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified
DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified
DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified
No MTA-STS record found
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified
No TLS-RPT record found
DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1
All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized
| External Domain | Authorization | Auth Record |
|---|---|---|
vali.email |
Authorized |
v=DMARC1;
|
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
DANE configured — TLSA records found for all 1 MX host
| MX Host | Usage | Selector | Match | Certificate Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|
mail2.ietf.org |
3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) | Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) | SHA-256 | fe9ac5cf25473ced8ce069b5c5794fcfe23cbecc1c51ba477cac72ffa2c1e045 |
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial
BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success No VMC SVG
BIMI configured - logo validated (VMC recommended for Gmail)
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning
No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116
No security.txt found
/.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities.
See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No
No AI governance measures detected
llms.txt llmstxt.org
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it.
Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Evidence Log (1 item)
| Type | Detail | Severity | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks |
robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives | low | Observed |
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No
No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.
Sources scanned (2)
- https://ietf.org/
- https://ietf.org/static/dist/main.e2d621c55276.js
What type of scan is this?
This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.
Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.
Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.
DNS Server Security Hardened
No DNS server misconfigurations found on jill.ns.cloudflare.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.
| Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | Denied | Zone transfer denied (correct configuration) |
| Open Recursion | Disabled | Recursion disabled (correct configuration) |
| Nameserver Identity | Hidden | No nameserver identity information disclosed |
| Cache Snooping | Protected | Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration) |
Tested nameservers: jill.ns.cloudflare.com, ken.ns.cloudflare.com
Delegation Consistency 1 Issue
Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.
- Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned
| DS Key Tag | DS Algorithm | DNSKEY Key Tag | DNSKEY Algorithm |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2371 | 13 | 2371 | 13 |
Glue Record Completeness Complete
| Nameserver | In-Bailiwick | IPv4 Glue | IPv6 Glue | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
jill.ns.cloudflare.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
ken.ns.cloudflare.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
NS TTL Comparison Drift
SOA Serial Consistency Consistent
jill.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.398064274e+09ken.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.398064274e+09Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy
Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for ietf.org — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.
| Nameserver | IPv4 | IPv6 | ASN / Operator | UDP | TCP | AA | SOA Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ken.ns.cloudflare.com |
172.64.33.127 173.245.59.127 108.162.193.127 |
2606:4700:58::adf5:3b7f 2a06:98c1:50::ac40:217f 2803:f800:50::6ca2:c17f |
AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. |
2398064274 | |||
jill.ns.cloudflare.com |
173.245.58.122 108.162.192.122 172.64.32.122 |
2606:4700:50::adf5:3a7a 2a06:98c1:50::ac40:207a 2803:f800:50::6ca2:c07a |
AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. |
2398064274 |
1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity
DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue
DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.
- CDS/CDNSKEY automation present but only single KSK — pre-publish second KSK before rollover
DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys
| Role | Key Tag | Algorithm | Key Size |
|---|---|---|---|
| ZSK | 34505 | ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 | 256 bits |
| KSK | 2371 | ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 | 256 bits |
RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures
No RRSIG records found.
Denial of Existence NSEC
NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.
Rollover Readiness Partial
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification
0/1 servers support STARTTLS (direct probe)
Policy Assessment Primary
- DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC (RFC 7672)
Telemetry
Live Probe Supplementary
| MX Host | STARTTLS | TLS Version | Cipher | Certificate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
mail2.ietf.org |
N/A | N/A |
Invalid
STARTTLS not supported |
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct
ASN / Network Success
Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)
| ASN | Name | Country |
|---|---|---|
AS13335 |
Cloudflare, Inc. | US |
104.16.45.99 → AS13335 (104.16.32.0/20)104.16.44.99 → AS13335 (104.16.32.0/20)2606:4700::6810:2d63 → AS13335 (2606:4700::/44)2606:4700::6810:2c63 → AS13335 (2606:4700::/44)Edge / CDN Success
Domain appears to use direct origin hosting
SaaS TXT Footprint Success
No SaaS services detected
Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern
DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
NS Delegation Verified
2 nameserver(s) configured
HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS HTTP/3
HTTPS records found, HTTP/3 supported
| Priority | Target | ALPN | ECH | Raw |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | . |
h3, h2 | No | ietf.org. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h3,h2" ipv4hint="104.16.44.99,104.16.45.99" ipv6hint="2606:4700::6810:2c63,2606:4700::6810:2d63" |
CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS CDNSKEY
Full RFC 8078 automated DNSSEC key rollover signaling detected (CDS + CDNSKEY)
| Key Tag | Algorithm | Digest Type | Digest |
|---|---|---|---|
2371 |
ECDSAP256SHA256 | 2 | |
| Flags | Protocol | Algorithm | Public Key |
|---|---|---|---|
257 |
3 | ECDSAP256SHA256 | |
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?
AIPv4 Address
AAAAIPv6 Address
MXMail Servers
SRVServices
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 93 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?| Subdomain | Source | Status | Provider / CNAME | Certificates | First Seen | Issuer(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
account.ietf.org
|
DNS | Current | — | 10 | 2025-12-18 | Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services |
alertmanager.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-17T10:43:55 | Let's Encrypt |
analytics.ietf.org
|
DNS | Current | — | 10 | 2025-12-18 | Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services |
auth-01-cn.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 2 | 2026-03-06T19:50:28 | Let's Encrypt |
auth-02-cn.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 2 | 2026-03-06T19:50:28 | Let's Encrypt |
auth-cn.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 2 | 2026-03-06T19:50:28 | Let's Encrypt |
auth.ietf.org
|
DNS | Current | — | 10 | 2025-12-18 | Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services |
bibxml.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-02-11T01:41:21 | Google Trust Services |
dashboard.ietf.org
|
DNS | Current | — | 10 | 2025-12-18 | Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services |
dashboard.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
dashboard-new.noc.ietf.org
|
4 | 2026-02-10T20:18:52 | Let's Encrypt |
dev-legacy.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 16 | 2026-02-09T18:29:42 | Let's Encrypt |
dev.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-01-26T22:12:40 | Let's Encrypt |
dev.ssh.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-02-07T14:16:41 | Let's Encrypt |
dev2.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-02-01T00:58:02 | Let's Encrypt |
docker.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-17T10:43:55 | Let's Encrypt |
docker.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-02-17T10:44:07 | Let's Encrypt |
draftforge.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-02-26T08:02:00 | Google Trust Services |
drone.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-17T10:43:55 | Let's Encrypt |
dt.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-02-14T10:14:06 | Google Trust Services |
files.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
docker.meeting.ietf.org
|
4 | 2026-02-17T10:43:55 | Let's Encrypt |
forgejo.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-02-17T10:44:07 | Let's Encrypt |
ftp.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-08T15:50:34 | Let's Encrypt |
get.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 5 | 2026-02-10T17:57:25 | Google Trust Services |
get.staging.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-02-19T18:39:42 | Google Trust Services |
git.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-02-17T10:44:07 | Let's Encrypt |
gogs.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-01-01T01:43:34 | Let's Encrypt |
grafana.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
docker.noc.ietf.org
|
8 | 2026-02-17T10:44:07 | Let's Encrypt |
hacknet.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 2 | 2026-01-21T00:11:15 | Let's Encrypt |
hedgedoc.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-02-17T10:44:07 | Let's Encrypt |
iabdev.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 1 | 2025-09-13T00:00:00 | Amazon |
iaoc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 3 | 2026-01-12T10:50:25 | Google Trust Services |
idnits.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 3 | 2026-01-24T20:39:48 | Google Trust Services |
ietf-125-radius.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 2 | 2026-03-06T19:50:28 | Let's Encrypt |
imap.ietf.org
|
DNS | Current | — | 10 | 2025-12-18 | Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services |
influxdb.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-02-17T10:44:07 | Let's Encrypt |
jabber.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 5 | 2026-02-11T04:56:37 | Google Trust Services |
k8s.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-01-11T18:14:02 | Let's Encrypt |
keycloak.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
docker.noc.ietf.org
|
8 | 2026-02-17T10:44:07 | Let's Encrypt |
keyclone.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-17T10:43:55 | Let's Encrypt |
mail2.ietf.org
|
DNS | Current | — | 10 | 2025-12-18 | Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services |
meetecho-interims.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
ws.conf.meetecho.com
|
1 | 2025-09-06T00:00:00 | Amazon |
meetecho-meetings.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 2 | 2026-02-05T10:09:15 | Let's Encrypt |
meetecho-or.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
or.conf.meetecho.com
|
2 | 2025-05-27T00:00:00 | Amazon |
meetecho-player.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 5 | 2026-02-10T15:48:01 | Google Trust Services |
meetecho-sin.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 2 | 2025-12-26T00:00:00 | Amazon |
meetecho.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
wws.conf.meetecho.com
|
2 | 2025-09-06T00:00:00 | Amazon |
meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-03-01T02:57:35 | Let's Encrypt |
mon.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-03-01T02:57:35 | Let's Encrypt |
monitoring.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
noc.ietf.org
|
6 | 2026-03-01T02:57:35 | Let's Encrypt |
netbox.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
docker.noc.ietf.org
|
8 | 2026-02-17T10:44:07 | Let's Encrypt |
nms.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-28T23:37:38 | Let's Encrypt |
noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-03-01T02:57:35 | Let's Encrypt |
notes-media.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 3 | 2026-01-12T13:22:10 | Google Trust Services |
ops.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-01-12T16:29:50 | Let's Encrypt |
pbs.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-03-02T14:11:16 | Let's Encrypt |
private.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 10 | 2026-02-18T11:00:12 | Let's Encrypt |
privatewikis.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-01-12T19:40:28 | Google Trust Services |
prod.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 16 | 2026-02-16T19:11:36 | Let's Encrypt |
prod.ssh.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-02-07T14:16:41 | Let's Encrypt |
proto.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-02-23T16:46:00 | Let's Encrypt |
proxy-cn.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 2 | 2026-02-11T19:51:39 | Let's Encrypt |
proxy.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 9 | 2026-02-11T15:00:27 | Google Trust Services |
pulse.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-14T17:36:02 | Let's Encrypt |
pushgateway.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
docker.noc.ietf.org
|
8 | 2026-02-17T10:44:07 | Let's Encrypt |
pvm0.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-17T16:43:38 | Let's Encrypt |
pvm1.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-17T16:33:38 | Let's Encrypt |
pvm2.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-17T16:23:36 | Let's Encrypt |
relay01.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 2 | 2026-02-19T21:03:58 | Let's Encrypt |
rt5.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
rt5-ietf-org.hostedrt.com
|
2 | 2026-02-02T12:38:31 | Let's Encrypt |
rundeck.noc.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 2 | 2025-12-11T03:16:03 | Let's Encrypt |
sandbox.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 13 | 2026-02-12T17:39:15 | Google Trust Services, Let's Encrypt |
services-1.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-17T16:43:36 | Let's Encrypt |
services-2.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-17T16:22:35 | Let's Encrypt |
snmp-exporter.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
docker.meeting.ietf.org
|
4 | 2026-02-17T10:43:55 | Let's Encrypt |
ssh.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-02-07T14:16:41 | Let's Encrypt |
staff.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 9 | 2026-02-13T13:30:46 | Google Trust Services |
staging.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-01-22T11:57:01 | Let's Encrypt |
staging.ssh.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 8 | 2026-02-07T14:16:41 | Let's Encrypt |
static.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-02-13T02:46:57 | Google Trust Services |
status.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current |
cname.instatus.com
|
4 | 2026-02-13T03:13:38 | Let's Encrypt |
store.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 2 | 2026-01-12T19:54:47 | Let's Encrypt |
tools-common.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 3 | 2026-01-12T11:28:31 | Google Trust Services |
tools.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 13 | 2026-02-11T19:56:30 | Google Trust Services, Let's Encrypt |
trac.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-02-15T01:30:18 | Google Trust Services |
trac.tools.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-02-12T20:28:55 | Google Trust Services |
vault.ietf.org
|
DNS | Current | — | 10 | 2025-12-18 | Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services |
wiki.ietf.org
|
DNS | Current | — | 10 | 2025-12-18 | Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services |
www.ietf.org
|
DNS | Current | — | 10 | 2025-12-18 | Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services |
www1.ietf.org
|
DNS | Current | — | 10 | 2025-12-18 | Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services |
www6.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-02-11T19:56:42 | Google Trust Services |
wwwdev.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 1 | 2025-09-13T00:00:00 | Amazon |
xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 6 | 2026-02-11T02:12:40 | Google Trust Services |
ztp.meeting.ietf.org
|
CT Log | Current | — | 4 | 2026-02-17T12:14:34 | Let's Encrypt |
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
104.16.45.99
104.16.44.99
104.16.44.99
104.16.45.99
2606:4700::6810:2d63
2606:4700::6810:2d63
2606:4700::6810:2c63
2606:4700::6810:2c63
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email,mailto:dmarc-report@ietf.org
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email,mailto:dmarc-report@ietf.org
0 mail2.ietf.org.
0 mail2.ietf.org.
jill.ns.cloudflare.com.
jill.ns.cloudflare.com.
ken.ns.cloudflare.com.
ken.ns.cloudflare.com.
jill.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2398064274 10000 2400 604800 1800
jill.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2398064274 10000 2400 604800 1800
v=spf1 ip4:166.84.6.31 ip4:166.84.7.238 ip6:2602:f977:800:f7f6::/64 include:_spf.google.com include:spf.hostedrt.com ~all
ca3-5567e36d3f9947308ac2892e009840cc
vs58md9pf8hu6knlglfda9lk6g
v=spf1 ip4:166.84.6.31 ip4:166.84.7.238 ip6:2602:f977:800:f7f6::/64 include:_spf.google.com include:spf.hostedrt.com ~all
ca3-5567e36d3f9947308ac2892e009840cc
vs58md9pf8hu6knlglfda9lk6g
DNS History Timeline BETA
When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?
Confirm Your Email Configuration
This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.
DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY
All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.
Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.
Intelligence Sources
This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below
This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.
3b488191d53102b51409ac0de0a6c16d2c3511b88e62218e38e338180fc47b2d96350a2a25152f655a9159345dbcb4d381f550b7d4b1878defaedac355ebc026
Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.
After downloading, verify with any of these commands:
Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).
cat dns-intelligence-ietf.org.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-ietf.org.jsonpython3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-ietf.org.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-ietf.org.json.sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/7055/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).
Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for ietf.org. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer ietf.org Adig +noall +answer ietf.org AAAAdig +noall +answer ietf.org MXdig +noall +answer ietf.org NSdig +noall +answer ietf.org TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short ietf.org TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.ietf.org TXTdig +short default._domainkey.ietf.org TXTdig +short google._domainkey.ietf.org TXTdig +short selector1._domainkey.ietf.org TXTdig +short selector2._domainkey.ietf.org TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer ietf.org DNSKEYdig +noall +answer ietf.org DSdig +dnssec +cd ietf.org A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail2.ietf.org TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail2.ietf.org:25 -servername mail2.ietf.org 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.ietf.org TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.ietf.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.ietf.org TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.ietf.org TXTdig +noall +answer ietf.org CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer ietf.org HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer ietf.org CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/ietf.org' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail2.ietf.org:25 -servername mail2.ietf.org </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.ietf.org&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://ietf.org/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://ietf.org/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://ietf.org/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 99.45.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 99.44.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Appendix: Verification Commands
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer ietf.org Adig +noall +answer ietf.org AAAAdig +noall +answer ietf.org MXdig +noall +answer ietf.org NSdig +noall +answer ietf.org TXTEmail Authentication
dig +short ietf.org TXT | grep -i spfdig +short _dmarc.ietf.org TXTdig +short default._domainkey.ietf.org TXTdig +short google._domainkey.ietf.org TXTdig +short selector1._domainkey.ietf.org TXTdig +short selector2._domainkey.ietf.org TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer ietf.org DNSKEYdig +noall +answer ietf.org DSdig +dnssec +cd ietf.org A @1.1.1.1Transport Security
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail2.ietf.org TLSAopenssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail2.ietf.org:25 -servername mail2.ietf.org 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -datesdig +short _mta-sts.ietf.org TXTcurl -sL https://mta-sts.ietf.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txtdig +short _smtp._tls.ietf.org TXTBrand & Trust
dig +short default._bimi.ietf.org TXTdig +noall +answer ietf.org CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer ietf.org HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer ietf.org CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/ietf.org' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50Transport Security
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail2.ietf.org:25 -servername mail2.ietf.org </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5Infrastructure Intelligence
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.ietf.org&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20curl -sL https://ietf.org/.well-known/security.txt | head -20AI Surface
curl -sI https://ietf.org/llms.txt | head -5curl -s https://ietf.org/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'Infrastructure Intelligence
dig +short 99.45.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXTdig +short 99.44.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT