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Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

evilhacker.com
12 Feb 2026, 23:10 UTC · 2.0s ·v26.12.28 · SHA-3-512: d2f9✱✱✱✱ Verify
Recon ModeRecon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Critical Risk
6 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Email Spoofing
Vulnerable
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Action Required
No SPF record, No DMARC record
Recommended
DKIM not discoverable via common selectors — may be configured with custom or rotating selectors (RFC 6376 §3.6.2.1)
Monitoring
DKIM (inconclusive)
Not Configured
SPF, DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA, DNSSEC
Priority Actions 7 total Achievable posture: Medium Risk
Critical Publish SPF record

SPF (Sender Policy Framework) tells receiving mail servers which IP addresses are authorized to send email for your domain. Without SPF, any server can claim to send as your domain.

evilhacker.com TXT "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"
Critical Publish DMARC policy

DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance) tells receivers how to handle messages that fail SPF/DKIM checks. Without DMARC, failed authentication checks are ignored. Start with p=none and rua reporting to monitor, then escalate to p=quarantine and p=reject.

_dmarc.evilhacker.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@evilhacker.com"
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.evilhacker.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.evilhacker.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
Low Verify DKIM configuration

DKIM selectors were not discoverable via common selector names. This does not confirm DKIM is absent — your provider may use custom or rotating selectors that cannot be enumerated through DNS (RFC 6376 §3.6.2.1). Check your email provider's DKIM settings to confirm signing is enabled.

selector1._domainkey.evilhacker.com TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public_key>"
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com). CAA is advisory — CAs must check it before issuing, but absence means any CA can issue.

evilhacker.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.evilhacker.com TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@evilhacker.com"
Low Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) cryptographically signs DNS responses, preventing attackers from forging DNS answers. Contact your DNS hosting provider to enable DNSSEC signing.

Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Tucows Domains Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider OBSERVED
Unknown
Email: Ambiguous
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes
Email: Ambiguous
No email authentication detected. It is unclear whether this domain sends email.
If this domain should not send email, add these DNS records:
Null MX — Publish a null MX record: 0 . (RFC 7505)
SPF -all — Publish SPF with -all to reject all senders. (RFC 7208)
DMARC reject — Publish DMARC with p=reject to discard unauthenticated mail. (RFC 7489)
Verdict: No email authentication — this domain can be impersonated by anyone.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? No
Warning

No SPF record found

RFC 7208 Deviation: This SPF record deviates from RFC 7208 requirements.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
Publish SPF record:
evilhacker.com TXT "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? No policy published
Warning

No DMARC record found

Publish DMARC policy:
_dmarc.evilhacker.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@evilhacker.com"
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Not Discoverable

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found


DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No MX records available — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).


Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: No brand protection configured. Any CA can issue certificates and no brand logo verification in place.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates


Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

No MX records found

Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS55293 US
IPv4 Mappings:
216.137.187.21AS55293 (216.137.186.0/23)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No TXT records found

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.


Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.hover.com ns2.hover.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

216.137.187.21
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

No MX records
Domain cannot receive email

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: Not configured Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? None found
How did we find these?

No subdomains found via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS probing, or CNAME chain traversal for this domain. No TLS certificates have been issued and no common service names resolve for subdomains of evilhacker.com.

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
216.137.187.21
216.137.187.21
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
ns2.hover.com.
ns1.hover.com.
ns1.hover.com.
ns2.hover.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns1.hover.com. dnsmaster.hover.com. 1724454820 1800 900 604800 300
ns1.hover.com. dnsmaster.hover.com. 1724454820 1800 900 604800 300
TXT RFC 7208 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), SecurityTrails (DNS history), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

d2f9a508ad466a1ac2fde4b18a108cee5ef5160ea4064def6ff5cdf42d5d4e9eaf2bbda6cf13a704db33f1cbbe0170c61489302f7acc2b6791b3a6cc3ab81007
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 12 Feb 2026, 23:10 UTC.

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)
cat dns-intelligence-evilhacker.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-evilhacker.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform)
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-evilhacker.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+)
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-evilhacker.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/697/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for evilhacker.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer evilhacker.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer evilhacker.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer evilhacker.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer evilhacker.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer evilhacker.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208
dig +short evilhacker.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489
dig +short _dmarc.evilhacker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376
dig +short default._domainkey.evilhacker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376
dig +short google._domainkey.evilhacker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376
dig +short selector1._domainkey.evilhacker.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376
dig +short selector2._domainkey.evilhacker.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +noall +answer evilhacker.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035
dig +noall +answer evilhacker.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +cd evilhacker.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461
dig +short _mta-sts.evilhacker.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461
curl -sL https://mta-sts.evilhacker.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460
dig +short _smtp._tls.evilhacker.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft
dig +short default._bimi.evilhacker.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659
dig +noall +answer evilhacker.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460
dig +noall +answer evilhacker.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344
dig +noall +answer evilhacker.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/evilhacker.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.evilhacker.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116
curl -sL https://evilhacker.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt
curl -sI https://evilhacker.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules
curl -s https://evilhacker.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 216.137.187.21 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 21.187.137.216.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4853 runs
DKIM
Verified 4672 runs
DMARC
Verified 4837 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4656 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4834 runs
BIMI
Verified 4671 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4674 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4676 runs
CAA
Verified 4668 runs
Maturity: Development Verified Consistent Gold Gold Master
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

evilhacker.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.