Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
TLP:AMBER
Limited disclosure — recipients may share within their organization only
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
apple.com
Footprint
8 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level:
Low Risk
5 protocols configured, 4 not configured
Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC deployment phase — quarantine fully enforced with reporting, consider upgrading to reject
Why we go beyond letter grades
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE
67/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 60%
Currency 74/100
Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency:
Adequate
74/100
Currentness Excellent
TTL Compliance Excellent
Completeness Degraded
Source Credibility Excellent
TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 474s |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | A TTL is below typical — observed 474s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| AAAA | 241s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 241s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| CAA | 234s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | CAA TTL is below typical — observed 234s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| NS | 5594s |
1 day (86400s) |
high | NS TTL is below typical — observed 5594s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| TXT | 1738s |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | TXT TTL is below typical — observed 1738s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| SOA | 6 hours (21600s) |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | SOA TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. |
Big Picture Questions
- How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
- Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
- Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
- Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Primary NS
ns-ext-prod.jackfruit.apple.com
Serial
2026030901
Admin
dnscontact.apple.com
Provider
Unknown
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 300s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 300s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 3628800s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 300s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
Refresh: SOA Refresh is 5 minutes (300s), below the RFC 1912 recommended minimum of 1,200 seconds.
Suggested Scanner Configuration
High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
| Parameter | Current | Suggested | Severity | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| timeout_seconds | 5s |
8s |
low | Average scan duration is 34.4s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures. RFC 8767 |
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Protected
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Configured
Recommended
Upgrade DMARC policy from quarantine to reject (p=reject) for maximum spoofing protection
Monitoring
External domain rua.agari.com has not authorized apple.com to send DMARC reports (missing apple.com._report._dmarc.rua.agari.com TXT record), External domain ruf.agari.com has not authorized apple.com to send DMARC reports (missing apple.com._report._dmarc.ruf.agari.com TXT record)
Configured
SPF, DMARC (quarantine, 100%), DKIM, BIMI, CAA
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, DANE, DNSSEC
Priority Actions
4 total
Achievable posture: Secure
Medium
Enable DNSSEC
DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.
Medium
Upgrade DMARC to Reject
Your DMARC policy is set to quarantine. Upgrade to p=reject for maximum protection — reject instructs receivers to discard spoofed mail entirely rather than quarantining it.
A reject policy provides the strongest protection against domain spoofing.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _dmarc.apple.com (update existing DMARC record) |
| Value | v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@apple.com |
Low
Add TLS-RPT Reporting
TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.
TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _smtp._tls.apple.com (SMTP TLS reporting record) |
| Value | v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@apple.com |
Low
Deploy MTA-STS
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.
MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _mta-sts.apple.com (MTA-STS policy record) |
| Value | v=STSv1; id=apple.com |
Registrar (RDAP)
OBSERVED
LIVE
Nom-iq Ltd. dba COM LAUDE
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified
Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf?
Yes
Success
~all
2/10 lookups
SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups
v=spf1 include:_spf.apple.com include:_spf-txn.apple.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs:
CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing),
CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation),
CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard.
Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made.
This domain uses ~all + DMARC quarantine — good protection. Moving to p=reject would achieve the strongest stance.
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified
Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined?
Quarantined, not rejected