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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 9 Mar 2026, 14:40 UTC
Duration 17.2s
Version v26.35.32
Integrity 3214c1ccfdd113509744672db7b79463d05d6a011bc1d4adee971f66185a04fb9450b16f7b329760653ba02b78c2f9b43e14e67e114c4b44083e91c36fe6ffc0
Subject Domain
hegel.net

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

hegel.net
9 Mar 2026, 14:40 UTC · 17.2s ·v26.35.32 · SHA-3-512: 3214✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 1 SaaS Service
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk
5 protocols configured, 4 not configured Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 1 monitoring
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 68/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 61% Currency 76/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 76/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
SOA 6 hours (21600s) 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance.
NS 21569s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 21569s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 367s 1 hour (3600s) medium A TTL is below typical — observed 367s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 367s 1 hour (3600s) medium AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 367s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for hegel.net
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns-de.1and1-dns.de
Serial 2017022325
Admin hostmaster.kundenserver.de
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh28800s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry7200sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)300s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 38.6s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject'
Monitoring
DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended
Configured
SPF, DMARC (with warnings), DKIM, TLS-RPT, DANE
Not Configured
MTA-STS, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High DANE Requires DNSSEC

DANE/TLSA records are present but DNSSEC is not enabled. DANE cannot function without DNSSEC validation.

RFC 7672 §2.1
High Upgrade DMARC from p=none

Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.

A quarantine or reject policy instructs receivers to take action on failing mail.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.hegel.net (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@hegel.net
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hosthegel.net (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.hegel.net (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=hegel.net
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Key-Systems GmbH
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
ProtonMail
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf.protonmail.ch ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain has DMARC p=none (monitoring only). Enforcing quarantine or reject is recommended to gain real protection.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only
Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:df244b734b26.a@dmarcinput.com; ruf=mailto:df244b734b26.f@dmarcinput.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; pct=100
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 3 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

dkim._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDJudTILTG3qrzQzZzbptozaGQ03B5t5G748PkYB7u08c3VsJ4vqRt2XLAa12/fN8h4kQwFkQKYTVWmQNQFnnhzuY6pGwfyRB0BUZ6gl0x6SzHHBbznio9zzbj+8jTYFZrPwcMvheitQPVMdyLJfv5yoDvfn8+kdHCFIcI2oLKGMQIDAQAB
protonmail._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1;k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA6LNNC5gQgIHx6KcHkVg6SJSdoWvXDVDI/YKfmHPNbv95WPw2UbQPz1Gf++oWYkaVGAtndRMq1AgLBIE8xb5Guz2MNvKoTZHByn9Q1dReRoHocXrmWJRL3tFlvkjz0h8aFY4pAQNN92JkgUBvYnuM67n/B600oLkMLvSGSrtJT+s1dMu3kV+A0t49Eccn5n4wai+4tAYUrUw1jLGEaOnwsEH/WanSZIuFyHDvwRSgQcxwB4kGfbg/qp4tt+R/CAKegfZEblYR/fkGq/39uMQYA1bXdpPXrqo6b6U76bfS4GFxewgY05LuiHdrQJs9Xe9mY6AUsmdVjx6MnDSFImHvEwIDAQAB;
protonmail2._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1;k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAvI22yeFE5/e/dViz0xHJq0VhcX2KY3KarLjxVyFbQwUT4/ee7/IWCLEij9lcfz+87VZ1EG3E8eTJyKzG2BqCLA0ELX+UP2qQLoVmoEQmbQIP+jr1lDSuXapDYPT45w91sXiUbY4qWCbT01UlkyDqzHT/tcnyvyoToauONWINUlB1PpNd5nuuGuqim0rpn0Hlg/IVW9fmcaiQ9gU5UCg7vjOXNyReMU6hw5AA4b9z7JSdxsk2bollPo1nmtyxR8bxoZVpAGvD7ULUuojZ0yDzEc4Xd211Gn4Tc0dJyeHgv9z3Ffo9EvSV/uOXB9NFmPYs1rJAfOdz/CpaQlxNGhUC/wIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

MTA-STS DNS record found but policy file inaccessible

v=STSv1; id=1674429341
Policy file: HTTP 404

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:49e100b02d96.m@dmarcinput.com

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
dmarcinput.com Authorized v=DMARC1;
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 2/2 MX

DANE configured — TLSA records found for all 2 MX hosts

MX Host Usage Selector Match Certificate Data
mail.protonmail.ch 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 76bb66711da416433ca890a5b2e5a0533c6006478f7d10a4469a947acc8399e1
mail.protonmail.ch 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 6111a5698d23c89e09c36ff833c1487edc1b0c841f87c49dae8f7a09e11e979e
mailsec.protonmail.ch 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 76bb66711da416433ca890a5b2e5a0533c6006478f7d10a4469a947acc8399e1
mailsec.protonmail.ch 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 6111a5698d23c89e09c36ff833c1487edc1b0c841f87c49dae8f7a09e11e979e
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest cryptographic transport security. DANE binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, creating a verifiable chain of trust from root to mail server (RFC 7672 §1.3). MTA-STS could complement this for senders that don't validate DNSSEC, but DANE alone provides the highest level of protection available.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116

security.txt found but missing required fields

Contact

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.3)

Expires

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
Source: https://hegel.net/security.txt
Missing required Contact field (RFC 9116 §2.5.3)
Missing required Expires field (RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? Yes

AI governance signals observed

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? Yes
llms.txt found — domain provides structured context for LLMs
llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context)
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (3 items)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
llms_txt_found llms.txt file found providing structured LLM context info Observed
llms_full_txt_found llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) info Observed
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns-de.1and1-dns.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: ns-de.1and1-dns.com, ns-de.1and1-dns.org, ns-de.1and1-dns.de, ns-de.1and1-dns.biz

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns-de.1and1-dns.biz No N/A N/A OK
ns-de.1and1-dns.com No N/A N/A OK
ns-de.1and1-dns.de No N/A N/A OK
ns-de.1and1-dns.org No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 172800s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns-de.1and1-dns.biz: 2.017022325e+09
ns-de.1and1-dns.com: 2.017022325e+09
ns-de.1and1-dns.de: 2.017022325e+09
ns-de.1and1-dns.org: 2.017022325e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix 3 Issues

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for hegel.net — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Findings:
  • ns-de.1and1-dns.com: TCP unreachable on port 53
  • ns-de.1and1-dns.org: TCP unreachable on port 53
  • ns-de.1and1-dns.biz: TCP unreachable on port 53
Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns-de.1and1-dns.de 217.160.80.1 2001:8d8:fe:53:0:d9a0:5001:100 AS8560 2017022325
ns-de.1and1-dns.com 217.160.82.1 2001:8d8:fe:53:0:d9a0:5201:100 AS8560 2017022325
ns-de.1and1-dns.org 217.160.83.1 2001:8d8:fe:53:0:d9a0:5301:100 AS8560 2017022325
ns-de.1and1-dns.biz 217.160.81.1 2001:8d8:fe:53:0:d9a0:5101:100 AS8560 2017022325
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (3 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC (RFC 7672)
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
  • Proton Mail enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE support
Telemetry
TLS-RPT configured — domain receives reports about TLS delivery failures from sending mail servers (RFC 8460)
Reporting to: mailto:49e100b02d96.m@dmarcinput.com
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS8560 DE
IPv4 Mappings:
217.160.0.228 → AS8560 (217.160.0.0/16)
IPv6 Mappings:
2001:8d8:100f:f000::2cf → AS8560 (2001:8d8::/32)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service

1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google Workspace google-site-verification=l79B4iqCKP0eHmTDinh9o__D90FRnMK8RnunGnZzNv8
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns-de.1and1-dns.biz ns-de.1and1-dns.com ns-de.1and1-dns.de ns-de.1and1-dns.org
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

217.160.0.228
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2001:8d8:100f:f000::2cf
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 mail.protonmail.ch.
20 mailsec.protonmail.ch.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
ProtonMail

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 9 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 9 current 0 expired 1 CNAME Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
archive.hegel.net DNS Current — 1 2025-10-11 Sectigo Limited
es.hegel.net DNS Current — 1 2025-10-11 Sectigo Limited
ftp.hegel.net DNS Current — 1 2025-10-11 Sectigo Limited
it.hegel.net DNS Current — 1 2025-10-11 Sectigo Limited
mta-sts.hegel.net CT Log Current hegel-net.mta-sts.dmarcinput.com 4 2026-02-18T11:35:36 Let's Encrypt
selberdenken.hegel.net CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-03T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited
wiki.hegel.net DNS Current — 1 2025-10-11 Sectigo Limited
www.hegel.net DNS Current — 1 2025-10-11 Sectigo Limited
www.selberdenken.hegel.net CT Log Current — 2 2026-02-03T00:00:00 Sectigo Limited
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
217.160.0.228
217.160.0.228
AAAA Synchronized 1 / 1 records
2001:8d8:100f:f000::2cf
2001:8d8:100f:f000::2cf
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.hegel.net RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:df244b734b26.a@dmarcinput.com; ruf=mailto:df244b734b26.f@dmarcinput.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; pct=100
v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:df244b734b26.a@dmarcinput.com; ruf=mailto:df244b734b26.f@dmarcinput.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; pct=100
MTA-STS _mta-sts.hegel.net RFC 8461 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1; id=1674429341
v=STSv1; id=1674429341
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
10 mail.protonmail.ch.
20 mailsec.protonmail.ch.
20 mailsec.protonmail.ch.
10 mail.protonmail.ch.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns-de.1and1-dns.com.
ns-de.1and1-dns.de.
ns-de.1and1-dns.org.
ns-de.1and1-dns.com.
ns-de.1and1-dns.de.
ns-de.1and1-dns.biz.
ns-de.1and1-dns.biz.
ns-de.1and1-dns.org.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns-de.1and1-dns.de. hostmaster.kundenserver.de. 2017022325 28800 7200 604800 300
ns-de.1and1-dns.de. hostmaster.kundenserver.de. 2017022325 28800 7200 604800 300
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.hegel.net RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:49e100b02d96.m@dmarcinput.com
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:49e100b02d96.m@dmarcinput.com
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
sl-verification=ugxjunxqzprumxriaocchwodprnngl
google-site-verification=l79B4iqCKP0eHmTDinh9o__D90FRnMK8RnunGnZzNv8
protonmail-verification=c60a9981700f6bb58870cc301bf4f4b4bd84b547
sl-verification=ugxjunxqzprumxriaocchwodprnngl
google-site-verification=l79B4iqCKP0eHmTDinh9o__D90FRnMK8RnunGnZzNv8
v=spf1 include:_spf.protonmail.ch ~all
v=spf1 include:_spf.protonmail.ch ~all
protonmail-verification=c60a9981700f6bb58870cc301bf4f4b4bd84b547
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

3214c1ccfdd113509744672db7b79463d05d6a011bc1d4adee971f66185a04fb9450b16f7b329760653ba02b78c2f9b43e14e67e114c4b44083e91c36fe6ffc0
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 9 Mar 2026, 14:40 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-hegel.net.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-hegel.net.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-hegel.net.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-hegel.net.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/6909/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for hegel.net. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short hegel.net TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.hegel.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' RFC 6376 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.hegel.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail' RFC 6376 
dig +short protonmail._domainkey.hegel.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail2' RFC 6376 
dig +short protonmail2._domainkey.hegel.net TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer hegel.net DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd hegel.net A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mail.protonmail.ch RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail.protonmail.ch TLSA
Check TLSA record for mailsec.protonmail.ch RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mailsec.protonmail.ch TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mail.protonmail.ch) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail.protonmail.ch:25 -servername mail.protonmail.ch 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.hegel.net TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.hegel.net/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.hegel.net TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.hegel.net TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/hegel.net' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mail.protonmail.ch) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail.protonmail.ch:25 -servername mail.protonmail.ch </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.hegel.net&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://hegel.net/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://hegel.net/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://hegel.net/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 217.160.0.228 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 228.0.160.217.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short hegel.net TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.hegel.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.hegel.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short protonmail._domainkey.hegel.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short protonmail2._domainkey.hegel.net TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer hegel.net DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd hegel.net A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mail.protonmail.ch (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail.protonmail.ch TLSA
Check TLSA record for mailsec.protonmail.ch (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mailsec.protonmail.ch TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mail.protonmail.ch) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail.protonmail.ch:25 -servername mail.protonmail.ch 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.hegel.net TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.hegel.net/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.hegel.net TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.hegel.net TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer hegel.net CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/hegel.net' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mail.protonmail.ch) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail.protonmail.ch:25 -servername mail.protonmail.ch </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.hegel.net&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://hegel.net/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://hegel.net/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://hegel.net/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 217.160.0.228 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 228.0.160.217.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

hegel.net

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.