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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 12 Feb 2026, 21:06 UTC
Duration 17.8s
Version v26.12.28
Integrity 09201d2c9a583570ad69ea3e20b1e31f0712a7c595cc7e0acc945a1ccfe3ab46bab0bfa09c4f310d109130203abcd8b599d88d05c40dcfec2c114920b4d9c114
Subject Domain
freebsd.org

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

freebsd.org
12 Feb 2026, 21:06 UTC · 17.8s ·v26.12.28 · SHA-3-512: 0920✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 2 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk Monitoring
5 protocols configured, 2 not configured DMARC is in monitoring mode (p=none) with advanced security controls (DNSSEC/DANE/MTA-STS) deployed — this indicates sophisticated security management with deliberate monitoring Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 1 monitoring
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 30.5s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Recommended
No DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) configured — unable to monitor authentication results
Monitoring
DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none)
Configured
SPF (~all), DKIM, DANE, CAA, DNSSEC
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Escalate DMARC from monitoring to enforcement

Change your DMARC policy from p=none to p=quarantine (then p=reject). Review your DMARC aggregate reports first to ensure legitimate senders pass authentication.

_dmarc.freebsd.org TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@freebsd.org"
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.freebsd.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.freebsd.org TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
RFC 8461 §3
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

Your domain has DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest email transport security available. TLS-RPT adds operational visibility by reporting when sending servers fail DANE validation or encounter STARTTLS issues delivering to your MX hosts. It does not add security — it monitors the security you already have.

_smtp._tls.freebsd.org TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@freebsd.org"
RFC 8460 §3
Registrar (WHOIS) OBSERVED LIVE
Gandi SAS
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider OBSERVED
Unknown
Email: Monitoring
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Partially
Verdict: Partial email authentication configured — some spoofed messages may be delivered. DMARC is in monitoring mode (p=none).

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success 1/10 lookups

SPF valid, 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 redirect=_spf.freebsd.org
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only
Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1; p=none
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. DMARC is in monitoring mode (p=none) with advanced security controls (DNSSEC/DANE/MTA-STS) deployed — this indicates sophisticated security management with deliberate monitoring
Escalate DMARC from monitoring to enforcement:
_dmarc.freebsd.org TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@freebsd.org"
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)

dkim._domainkey
v=DKIM1; k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAy46C+GD7Y5L4nk7hCMeOJfHf4EA8P/j9UoQRAQx9TQ2+xCCGNhZIoqfn8aQl+q0rSntr1X1dKKNjzJxxa9UX8cubpX4vAIPSvM8xXZ03wbVXoTSJ/YpRwMABLHAKR5OE2X4jLK/O6AXKrMMKj8EcPQofgWwnsub6I/PjXpPrXGbrMLpCh0umE2ViF3RV5qX9bz5el3tt/rQfV+rtahzo5V6xeXwLjJxNY5tKRb3fHheijrprzBFkczFwOCAjORh6zwPKfvpJtbe2Fch9MOMaPS4Hr/jJ1jyweFJWUtQOLxesWl6H+y71sK+Fs91op9pG1ThHaDLEV6K1i1W9YISkmwIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 1/2 MX

DANE partially configured — TLSA records on 1/2 MX hosts

MX Host Usage Selector Match Certificate Data
mx1.freebsd.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 0a7e2f469913ea64ca98af1f31bbbcaf51920d8df90d2972a9dc02bf7c37f404
Missing DANE for: mx66.freebsd.org
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest cryptographic transport security. DANE binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, creating a verifiable chain of trust from root to mail server (RFC 7672 §1.3). MTA-STS could complement this for senders that don't validate DNSSEC, but DANE alone provides the highest level of protection available.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: Certificate issuance restricted via CAA. BIMI not configured for brand logo protection.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only Sectigo, Let's Encrypt can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: Sectigo Let's Encrypt
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

Transport security inferred from 1 DNS signal(s)

Direct SMTP probe unavailable (port 25 blocked). Transport security inferred from DNS policy records and provider capabilities.
Transport Security Signals:
  • DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC
SMTP port 25 may be blocked by hosting provider — this is common for cloud platforms
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS11403 US
IPv4 Mappings:
96.47.72.84 → AS11403 (96.47.64.0/20)
IPv6 Mappings:
2610:1c1:1:606c::50:15 → AS11403 (2610:1c1::/32)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 2 services

2 SaaS service(s) detected via TXT record verification

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google Workspace google-site-verification=REWF41fx56YWyINtE9RTibL63H3ZBtek1Dl6oX0TJww
Microsoft 365 MS=ms11588187
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 1.1.1.1 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (1.1.1.1) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
33175 8 2 BCFE5919C2E253EFD990C2E3BC88A45BEA9F4474821D193B2D7272A6951B01AF

NS Delegation Verified

5 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.freebsd.org ns2.freebsd.org ns3.he.net ns4.he.net ns5.he.net
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

96.47.72.84
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2610:1c1:1:606c::50:15
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

30 mx66.freebsd.org.
10 mx1.freebsd.org.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable
How did we find these?

Passive discovery using Certificate Transparency Logs — publicly auditable records of every TLS certificate ever issued. CT log returned HTTP 503

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
96.47.72.84
96.47.72.84
AAAA Synchronized 1 / 1 records
2610:1c1:1:606c::50:15
2610:1c1:1:606c::50:15
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
DMARC _dmarc.freebsd.org RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=none
v=DMARC1; p=none
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
30 mx66.freebsd.org.
10 mx1.freebsd.org.
10 mx1.freebsd.org.
30 mx66.freebsd.org.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
ns4.he.net.
ns3.he.net.
ns1.freebsd.org.
ns4.he.net.
ns3.he.net.
ns5.he.net.
ns5.he.net.
ns1.freebsd.org.
ns2.freebsd.org.
ns2.freebsd.org.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns0.freebsd.org. hostmaster.freebsd.org. 2026021220 3600 900 1209600 3600
ns0.freebsd.org. hostmaster.freebsd.org. 2026021220 3600 900 1209600 3600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
hns-claim:aakkrbzh6oyntnuoh5inq26wzg5iceg43ti726v4aaaaaaaapkk3hln5b5mvy7fny4mh6iaapmwg3wrcc5tw6bbk2dzaeaaaacnun75s
MS=ms11588187
v=spf1 redirect=_spf.freebsd.org
v=spf1 redirect=_spf.freebsd.org
google-site-verification=REWF41fx56YWyINtE9RTibL63H3ZBtek1Dl6oX0TJww
google-site-verification=REWF41fx56YWyINtE9RTibL63H3ZBtek1Dl6oX0TJww
MS=ms11588187
hns-claim:aakkrbzh6oyntnuoh5inq26wzg5iceg43ti726v4aaaaaaaapkk3hln5b5mvy7fny4mh6iaapmwg3wrcc5tw6bbk2dzaeaaaacnun75s
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), SecurityTrails (DNS history), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

09201d2c9a583570ad69ea3e20b1e31f0712a7c595cc7e0acc945a1ccfe3ab46bab0bfa09c4f310d109130203abcd8b599d88d05c40dcfec2c114920b4d9c114
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 12 Feb 2026, 21:06 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-freebsd.org.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-freebsd.org.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-freebsd.org.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-freebsd.org.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/689/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for freebsd.org. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short freebsd.org TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.freebsd.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' RFC 6376 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.freebsd.org TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer freebsd.org DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd freebsd.org A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx66.freebsd.org RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx66.freebsd.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx1.freebsd.org RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.freebsd.org TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx66.freebsd.org) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx66.freebsd.org:25 -servername mx66.freebsd.org 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.freebsd.org TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.freebsd.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.freebsd.org TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.freebsd.org TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/freebsd.org' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx66.freebsd.org) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx66.freebsd.org:25 -servername mx66.freebsd.org </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.freebsd.org&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://freebsd.org/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://freebsd.org/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://freebsd.org/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 96.47.72.84 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 84.72.47.96.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4874 runs
DKIM
Verified 4692 runs
DMARC
Verified 4857 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4676 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4855 runs
BIMI
Verified 4691 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4694 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4696 runs
CAA
Verified 4688 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short freebsd.org TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.freebsd.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.freebsd.org TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer freebsd.org DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd freebsd.org A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx66.freebsd.org (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx66.freebsd.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx1.freebsd.org (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx1.freebsd.org TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx66.freebsd.org) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx66.freebsd.org:25 -servername mx66.freebsd.org 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.freebsd.org TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.freebsd.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.freebsd.org TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.freebsd.org TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer freebsd.org CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/freebsd.org' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx66.freebsd.org) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx66.freebsd.org:25 -servername mx66.freebsd.org </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.freebsd.org&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://freebsd.org/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://freebsd.org/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://freebsd.org/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 96.47.72.84 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 84.72.47.96.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

freebsd.org

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.