Registry Zone Health Report
Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.
This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.
01!1 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing N/A — Registry
02@2 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC Operations DNSSEC & NS N/A — Registry
CAA RFC 8659 §4 N/A
CAA records on a TLD zone do not constrain certificate issuance for domains registered under this suffix. Per RFC 8659 §3, CAs process CAA by climbing the DNS tree from the requested FQDN — a CAA record on the TLD itself would only affect certificates for the bare TLD, not for child domains like example.me. No major TLD publishes CAA records.
Delegation Consistency 7 Issues
Delegation consistency: 7 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.
- DNSKEY records missing at child — DS records at parent have no matching keys
- In-bailiwick NS a0.nic.me has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
- In-bailiwick NS a2.nic.me has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
- In-bailiwick NS b0.nic.me has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
- In-bailiwick NS b2.nic.me has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
- In-bailiwick NS c0.nic.me has no glue records at parent — resolution may fail
- Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned
Glue Record Completeness Incomplete
| Nameserver | In-Bailiwick | IPv4 Glue | IPv6 Glue | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
a0.nic.me |
Missing | |||
a2.nic.me |
Missing | |||
b0.nic.me |
Missing | |||
b2.nic.me |
Missing | |||
c0.nic.me |
Missing |
NS TTL Comparison Drift
SOA Serial Consistency Consistent
a0.nic.me: 1.773065801e+09a2.nic.me: 1.773065801e+09b0.nic.me: 1.773065801e+09b2.nic.me: 1.773065801e+09c0.nic.me: 1.773065801e+09DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 2 Issues
DNSSEC operational notes: 2 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.
- NSEC3 uses a non-empty salt; RFC 9276 recommends empty salt for new deployments
- Single KSK with no CDS/CDNSKEY automation — manual rollover required
DNSKEY Inventory 3 Keys
| Role | Key Tag | Algorithm | Key Size |
|---|---|---|---|
| ZSK | 48861 | RSA/SHA-256 | 1056 bits |
| ZSK | 39003 | RSA/SHA-256 | 1056 bits |
| KSK | 45352 | RSA/SHA-256 | 2088 bits |
RRSIG Signatures 1 Signature
| Type | Key Tag | Expiry | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| SOA | 48861 | 2026-03-30T14:21:02Z | Active |
Denial of Existence NSEC3
Rollover Readiness Not_ready
Zone Signing & DNSSEC Methodology Is this zone cryptographically signed? YES DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified
DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Signed RSA/SHA-256 Adequate
DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)
NS Delegation Verified
5 nameserver(s) configured
03#3 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
04$4 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security N/A — Registry
05%5 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
DNS Server Security Hardened
No DNS server misconfigurations found on c0.nic.me — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.
| Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | Denied | Test inconclusive |
| Open Recursion | Disabled | Test inconclusive |
| Nameserver Identity | Hidden | Test inconclusive |
| Cache Snooping | Protected | Test inconclusive |
Tested nameservers: c0.nic.me, a0.nic.me, b0.nic.me, b2.nic.me, a2.nic.me
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy
Analyzed 5 nameserver(s) for me — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.
| Nameserver | IPv4 | IPv6 | ASN / Operator | UDP | TCP | AA | SOA Serial | Anycast Node |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
b2.nic.me |
199.249.127.1 | 2001:500:4f::1 | AS207266 | 1773065801 | N/A | |||
c0.nic.me |
199.253.61.1 | 2001:500:55::1 | AS12041 | 1773065801 | N/A | |||
b0.nic.me |
199.253.60.1 | 2001:500:54::1 | AS12041 | 1773065801 | N/A | |||
a2.nic.me |
199.249.119.1 | 2001:500:47::1 | AS207266 | 1773065801 | N/A | |||
a0.nic.me |
199.253.59.1 | 2001:500:53::1 | AS12041 | 1773065801 | N/A |
2 ASNs, 5 /24 prefixes across 5 nameservers
Subdomain Discovery Not Applicable
example.me.
06^6 Raw records & reproducibility · L2–L3 Evidence & Verification Can another engineer reproduce every material claim? Analysis Confidence Intelligence Currency What changed Raw record diff Integrity seal Reproduce
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NS | 1 hour (3600s) |
1 day (86400s) |
high | NS TTL is below typical — observed 1 hour (3600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
- Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
- Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
- Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
a0.nic.me
1773065801
hostmaster.donuts.email
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 7200s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 900s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 1209600s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 3600s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
c0.nic.me.
b2.nic.me.
b0.nic.me.
c0.nic.me.
a2.nic.me.
a0.nic.me.
a0.nic.me.
a2.nic.me.
b2.nic.me.
b0.nic.me.
a0.nic.me. hostmaster.donuts.email. 1773065801 7200 900 1209600 3600
a0.nic.me. hostmaster.donuts.email. 1773065801 7200 900 1209600 3600
DNS History Timeline BETA
When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?
DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY
All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.
Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.
Intelligence Sources
This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below
This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.
13163f6b4d9e05f2e7a1fda70faa7f56c0174ac9ed9ad1145823a05603cf83a90d359c3bb1d48df1c8f49ed8037ddba55b7b208537666443c91dc0bd444882f2
Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.
After downloading, verify with any of these commands:
Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).
cat dns-intelligence-me.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-me.jsonpython3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-me.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-me.json.sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/6856/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).
Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for me. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer me Adig +noall +answer me AAAAdig +noall +answer me MXdig +noall +answer me NSdig +noall +answer me TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer me DNSKEYdig +noall +answer me DSdig +dnssec +cd me A @1.1.1.1Brand & Trust
dig +noall +answer me CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer me HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer me CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/me' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Appendix: Verification Commands
DNS Records
dig +noall +answer me Adig +noall +answer me AAAAdig +noall +answer me MXdig +noall +answer me NSdig +noall +answer me TXTDomain Security
dig +dnssec +noall +answer me DNSKEYdig +noall +answer me DSdig +dnssec +cd me A @1.1.1.1Brand & Trust
dig +noall +answer me CAADNS Records
dig +noall +answer me HTTPSDomain Security
dig +noall +answer me CDSInfrastructure Intelligence
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/me' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50