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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 9 Mar 2026, 09:46 UTC
Duration 60.0s
Version v26.35.32
Integrity 1c039fc2cd535a77c6e42301ce2af2b5e52ffc3da49c006120285d2f9a50b11d00eb0dceccab4cb521fc708fb2499cb36f3487b88dde272b75839f2db2ee1ceb
Subject Domain
weather.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

weather.gov
9 Mar 2026, 09:46 UTC · 60.0s ·v26.35.32 · SHA-3-512: 1c03✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: High Risk
3 protocols configured, 6 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 3 monitoring
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 66/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 65% Currency 68/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 68/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 20s 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 20s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 20s 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 20s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 6 hours (21600s) 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 relevance guidance.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for weather.gov
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS dns02.woc.noaa.gov
Serial 1560867956
Admin hostmaster.noaa.gov
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh1800s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry10800sFraction of Refresh
Expire3600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)604800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 1 hour (3600s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 1 hour (3600s).
RFC 1912 §2.2
Expire vs Refresh+Retry: If Expire is not greater than Refresh + Retry, secondary nameservers may stop serving the zone before they've had a chance to retry the primary.
RFC 1912 §2.2
Minimum (Negative Cache TTL): SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 7 days (604800s). High values cause NXDOMAIN responses to be cached for extended periods, delaying visibility of newly created records.
RFC 2308 §5
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Publish an SPF record to authorize legitimate mail senders
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector, External domain doc.gov has not authorized weather.gov to send DMARC reports (missing weather.gov._report._dmarc.doc.gov TXT record), External domain dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov has not authorized weather.gov to send DMARC reports (missing weather.gov._report._dmarc.dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov TXT record)
Configured
DMARC (reject), DKIM (inferred via Unknown), DNSSEC
Not Configured
SPF, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, CAA
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Lock Down SPF for No-Mail Domain

This domain has no MX records and appears to be a website-only domain. Publishing a strict SPF record explicitly declares that no servers are authorized to send email, preventing attackers from spoofing your domain.

Explicitly declares no servers are authorized to send email from this domain.
TypeTXT
Hostweather.gov
Valuev=spf1 -all
RFC 7208
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostweather.gov (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Limited Protection
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Akamai
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Partially DMARC present but no SPF

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? No
Warning

No SPF record found

RFC Stance: RFC 7208 defines the SPF mechanism for domains that choose to publish sender authorization. The standard does not mandate SPF publication — it is a voluntary security control.
Operational Security: We flag its absence because any server on the internet can send email claiming to be this domain. Attackers send from a domain — they do not need the domain to have email infrastructure.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@doc.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Not Discoverable

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing
Warning

2 of 2 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
doc.gov Unauthorized —
dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov Unauthorized —
External domain doc.gov has not authorized weather.gov to send DMARC reports (missing weather.gov._report._dmarc.doc.gov TXT record)
External domain dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov has not authorized weather.gov to send DMARC reports (missing weather.gov._report._dmarc.dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No MX records available — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No significant AI surface findings

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives
No robots.txt found
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on a1-97.akam.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: a1-97.akam.net, a6-65.akam.net, a26-64.akam.net, a7-66.akam.net, a11-66.akam.net, a18-67.akam.net

Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • DNSKEY records missing at child — DS records at parent have no matching keys
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Misaligned

Unmatched DS records (no corresponding DNSKEY):
Key Tag: 36065, Algorithm: 8

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
a1-97.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a11-66.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a18-67.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a26-64.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a6-65.akam.net No N/A N/A OK
a7-66.akam.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

a1-97.akam.net: 1.560867956e+09
a11-66.akam.net: 1.560867956e+09
a18-67.akam.net: 1.560867956e+09
a26-64.akam.net: 1.560867956e+09
a6-65.akam.net: 1.560867956e+09
a7-66.akam.net: 1.560867956e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 6 nameserver(s) for weather.gov — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
a7-66.akam.net 23.61.199.66 2600:1406:32::42 AS21342 1560867956
a6-65.akam.net 23.211.133.65 2600:1401:1::41 AS21342 1560867956
a1-97.akam.net 193.108.91.97 2600:1401:2::61 AS21342 1560867956
a11-66.akam.net 84.53.139.66 2600:1480:1::42 AS21342 1560867956
a18-67.akam.net 95.101.36.67 2600:1480:4800::43 AS21342 1560867956
a26-64.akam.net 23.74.25.64 2600:1480:b800::40 AS21342 1560867956
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No MX records found

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — No MX records found for this domain
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
23.47.72.6 → AS ()
23.47.72.14 → AS ()
IPv6 Mappings:
2600:1407:7400:5d::17d5:ba2a → AS ()
2600:1407:7400:5d::17d5:ba24 → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed RSA/SHA-256 Adequate

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: RSA/SHA-256 — MUST implement, widely deployed (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
36065 8 2 CEA2F8F95C815CEB7362F7F36DD276EC5B02015FF35BAF689C06C96C72E79767

NS Delegation Verified

6 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: a1-97.akam.net a11-66.akam.net a18-67.akam.net a26-64.akam.net a6-65.akam.net a7-66.akam.net
Managed DNS
All 6 nameservers hosted by Akamai. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Akamai
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (3 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
A: Cloudflare returned different results: [23.45.46.229 23.45.46.237]
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [2.16.6.20 2.16.6.35]
A: Quad9 returned different results: [23.192.220.15 23.192.220.19]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

23.47.72.6
23.47.72.14
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2600:1407:7400:5d::17d5:ba2a
2600:1407:7400:5d::17d5:ba24
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

No MX records
Domain cannot receive email

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: Not configured Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 33 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
22 unique certificates 33 current 0 expired Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Wildcard certificate detected: *.weather.gov Active 2 certs 2 CAs: GoDaddy.com, Inc., Amazon
No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).
DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.
Certificate Authority Diversity (4 CAs observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
Let's Encrypt 18 2026-01-04 2026-03-05 Active
Amazon 2 2025-06-09 2026-01-05 Active
GoDaddy.com, Inc. 1 2025-11-22 2025-11-22 Active
DigiCert Inc 1 2025-04-12 2025-04-12 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
airquality-x.weather.gov CT Log Current d3axvzmzwji33f.cloudfront.net 2 2026-01-05T00:00:00 Amazon
airquality.weather.gov CT Log Current d3axvzmzwji33f.cloudfront.net 2 2026-01-05T00:00:00 Amazon
alerts-v2.weather.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-04-12T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
alerts.weather.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-04-12T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
api.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
beta.weather.gov CT Log Current beta.weather.gov.external-domains-production.cloud.gov 4 2026-03-05T21:21:19 Let's Encrypt
digital-x.weather.gov CT Log Current d1tvdy3x9hzixd.cloudfront.net 2 2026-01-05T00:00:00 Amazon
digital.weather.gov CT Log Current d1tvdy3x9hzixd.cloudfront.net 2 2026-01-05T00:00:00 Amazon
forecast.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
ftp.ocean.weather.gov
80/tcp Citrix NetScaler https redirect 443/tcp Apache httpd
CT Log Current ftp.opc.ncep.noaa.gov 16 2026-02-20T19:41:52 Let's Encrypt
graphical-x.weather.gov CT Log Current d2l83rcyfep53k.cloudfront.net 2 2026-01-05T00:00:00 Amazon
graphical.weather.gov CT Log Current d2l83rcyfep53k.cloudfront.net 2 2026-01-05T00:00:00 Amazon
marine.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
ocean.weather.gov
80/tcp Citrix NetScaler https redirect 443/tcp Apache httpd
CT Log Current ocean.weather.gov.akadns.net 16 2026-02-20T19:41:52 Let's Encrypt
preview-alerts.weather.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-04-12T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
preview-api.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
preview-forecast.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
preview-idp.weather.gov
80/tcp AkamaiGHost 443/tcp AkamaiGHost
CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
preview-marine.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
preview-ra4-gifs.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
preview-radar.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
preview-spot.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
preview.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
products.weather.gov DNS Current — 2 2025-06-09 GoDaddy.com, Inc., Amazon
ra4-gifs-idp.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
ra4-gifs.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
radar.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
secure.training.weather.gov CT Log Current master-www-sectraining.woc.noaa.gov 2 2026-02-02T11:08:20 Let's Encrypt
spot.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
training.weather.gov CT Log Current d2x2rknc6vjr3.cloudfront.net 10 2026-02-19T04:08:39 Let's Encrypt
vpn.weather.gov DNS Current — 2 2025-06-09 GoDaddy.com, Inc., Amazon
water.weather.gov CT Log Current — 1 2025-04-12T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
www.weather.gov CT Log Current sancert.weather.gov.edgekey.net 5 2026-01-06T18:58:59 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
23.47.72.6
23.47.72.14
23.47.72.14
23.47.72.6
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2600:1407:7400:5d::17d5:ba2a
2600:1407:7400:5d::17d5:ba2a
2600:1407:7400:5d::17d5:ba24
2600:1407:7400:5d::17d5:ba24
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.weather.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@doc.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@doc.gov,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 6 / 6 records
a11-66.akam.net.
a1-97.akam.net.
a6-65.akam.net.
a26-64.akam.net.
a26-64.akam.net.
a7-66.akam.net.
a18-67.akam.net.
a11-66.akam.net.
a1-97.akam.net.
a18-67.akam.net.
a7-66.akam.net.
a6-65.akam.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
dns02.woc.noaa.gov. hostmaster.noaa.gov. 1560867956 1800 10800 3600 604800
dns02.woc.noaa.gov. hostmaster.noaa.gov. 1560867956 1800 10800 3600 604800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
linkedin-site-verification=47065543-a2e5-4262-a95f-8da091a09ff0
linkedin-site-verification=47065543-a2e5-4262-a95f-8da091a09ff0
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

1c039fc2cd535a77c6e42301ce2af2b5e52ffc3da49c006120285d2f9a50b11d00eb0dceccab4cb521fc708fb2499cb36f3487b88dde272b75839f2db2ee1ceb
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 9 Mar 2026, 09:46 UTC.
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-proof, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it cannot be altered, deleted, or disputed. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a legally defensible chain of evidence for domain security state.

View Archived Snapshot
Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20260309094622/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/6809/view/E
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-weather.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-weather.gov.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-weather.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-weather.gov.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/6809/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for weather.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short weather.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.weather.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.weather.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.weather.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.weather.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.weather.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer weather.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd weather.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.weather.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.weather.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.weather.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.weather.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/weather.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.weather.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://weather.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://weather.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://weather.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.47.72.6 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 6.72.47.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 23.47.72.14 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 14.72.47.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4867 runs
DKIM
Verified 4686 runs
DMARC
Verified 4851 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4670 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4848 runs
BIMI
Verified 4685 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4688 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4690 runs
CAA
Verified 4682 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short weather.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.weather.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.weather.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.weather.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.weather.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.weather.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer weather.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd weather.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.weather.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.weather.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.weather.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.weather.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer weather.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/weather.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.weather.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://weather.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://weather.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://weather.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.47.72.6 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 6.72.47.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 23.47.72.14 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 14.72.47.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

weather.gov

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.