Skip to main content

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

izvoru.ro
8 Mar 2026, 23:45 UTC · 60.0s ·v26.35.20 · SHA-3-512: d6d1✱✱✱✱ Verify
Recon ModeRecon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: High Risk
2 protocols configured, 7 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 71/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 63% Currency 79/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 79/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 9814s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 9814s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 6 hours (21600s) 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.
TXT 4 hours (14400s) 1 hour (3600s) medium TXT TTL is above typical — observed 4 hours (14400s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for izvoru.ro
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns1.universalis.ro
Serial 2026020501
Admin hostmaster.romarg.com
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh3600s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry1800sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)86400s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 32.7s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Publish a DMARC record starting with p=none and rua reporting
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DKIM
Not Configured
DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Moderate Risk
Critical Publish DMARC Record

Add a DMARC record to protect your domain against email spoofing and receive authentication reports.

DMARC tells receivers how to handle mail that fails SPF/DKIM checks.
FieldValue
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.izvoru.ro (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@izvoru.ro
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
FieldValue
TypeCAA
Hostizvoru.ro (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
FieldValue
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.izvoru.ro (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@izvoru.ro
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
FieldValue
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.izvoru.ro (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=izvoru.ro
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Limited Protection
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Likely SPF alone cannot prevent spoofing

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:relay.romarg.net -all
RFC 7489: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? No policy published
Warning

No DMARC record found

RFC Stance: RFC 7489 is classified as Informational (not Standards Track). DMARC is a widely adopted industry practice but is not an IETF-mandated standard.
Operational Security: Without DMARC, receiving mail servers have no policy for handling SPF/DKIM failures. Spoofed messages may be delivered to recipients.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

default._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA53Fe2cjBXn8RvfNf0KuIxUTZRIbR1SUYLMyLd7T87ZN21Vo1CbG/+0af1T60Yw0paV21tDWIYpYtZoQpBdqBVw/LcGCvB82u5XI9CjbMa+gGRyv+pQV410kXMKDSBZ8v36O/YmcnNBigGuzDnAjpwnHEK3vPWxaIn8qj5kPaE1W0Qk5HFqBXY7XOsk3I7M/7aDnt15Hu8l2p3kbuojtw6vLO7bEDunmu1/4g2TR5FRhOFkY/d59H2UDhDBsKqtHv9E21H/iGy2GaeNwhvMunph9em63r/4bv6riXyXdMaTNm2OoILfVX/1DLLZoxB2+US4TVKePiyOI4vvSLdr+WTQIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found


DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 3 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).


Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Yes No DMARC policy (RFC 7489) — attackers can send email appearing to be from this domain with no sender-authentication barrier

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.

AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No significant AI surface findings

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives
No robots.txt found
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns1.universalis.ro — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: ns1.universalis.ro, ns2.universalis.ro

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns1.universalis.ro No N/A N/A OK
ns2.universalis.ro No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns1.universalis.ro: 2.026020501e+09
ns2.universalis.ro: 2.026020501e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for izvoru.ro — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns1.universalis.ro 89.42.216.2 None AS205275 2026020501
ns2.universalis.ro 86.106.30.242 None AS205275 2026020501
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
2
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 2 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No transport encryption policy detected — mail delivery relies on opportunistic TLS

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 0 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

IPv4 Mappings:
89.37.212.100AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.


Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1.universalis.ro ns2.universalis.ro
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

89.37.212.100
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

10 mx01.whmpanels.com.
30 mx03.whmpanels.com.
20 mx02.whmpanels.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 3 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 3 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
1 unique certificates 3 current 0 expired 2 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Wildcard certificate detected: *.izvoru.ro Active 1 cert 1 CA: Let's Encrypt
No explicit SANs found on wildcard certificates. Subdomains covered by this wildcard won't appear individually in CT logs (RFC 6962).
DNS probing and CNAME chain traversal were used to discover additional subdomains below.
Certificate Authority Diversity (1 CA observed across CT log history)
Certificate Authority Certs First Issued Last Issued Status
Let's Encrypt 1 2026-02-05 2026-02-05 Active
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
ftp.izvoru.ro DNS Current 1 2026-02-05 Let's Encrypt
mail.izvoru.ro DNS Current izvoru.ro 1 2026-02-05 Let's Encrypt
www.izvoru.ro DNS Current izvoru.ro 1 2026-02-05 Let's Encrypt
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
89.37.212.100
89.37.212.100
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
10 mx01.whmpanels.com.
10 mx01.whmpanels.com.
30 mx03.whmpanels.com.
30 mx03.whmpanels.com.
20 mx02.whmpanels.com.
20 mx02.whmpanels.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
ns1.universalis.ro.
ns2.universalis.ro.
ns2.universalis.ro.
ns1.universalis.ro.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns1.universalis.ro. hostmaster.romarg.com. 2026020501 3600 1800 1209600 86400
ns1.universalis.ro. hostmaster.romarg.com. 2026020501 3600 1800 1209600 86400
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=spf1 include:relay.romarg.net -all
v=spf1 include:relay.romarg.net -all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

d6d1d97a80c62c1d4b25ce934a2da0cdaf8bb155d324727e6107dfd95a6f9241c0e268fdf21b88dee7f74691473825f4d3552eb1815c6219ccb56b04c5a43c0d
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 8 Mar 2026, 23:45 UTC.

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)
cat dns-intelligence-izvoru.ro.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-izvoru.ro.json
Python 3 (cross-platform)
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-izvoru.ro.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+)
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-izvoru.ro.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/6733/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for izvoru.ro. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer izvoru.ro A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer izvoru.ro AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer izvoru.ro MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer izvoru.ro NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer izvoru.ro TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208
dig +short izvoru.ro TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489
dig +short _dmarc.izvoru.ro TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376
dig +short default._domainkey.izvoru.ro TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +noall +answer izvoru.ro DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035
dig +noall +answer izvoru.ro DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +cd izvoru.ro A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx01.whmpanels.com RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx01.whmpanels.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx03.whmpanels.com RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx03.whmpanels.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx02.whmpanels.com RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx02.whmpanels.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx01.whmpanels.com) RFC 6698
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx01.whmpanels.com:25 -servername mx01.whmpanels.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461
dig +short _mta-sts.izvoru.ro TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461
curl -sL https://mta-sts.izvoru.ro/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460
dig +short _smtp._tls.izvoru.ro TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft
dig +short default._bimi.izvoru.ro TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659
dig +noall +answer izvoru.ro CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460
dig +noall +answer izvoru.ro HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344
dig +noall +answer izvoru.ro CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/izvoru.ro' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx01.whmpanels.com) RFC 3207
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx01.whmpanels.com:25 -servername mx01.whmpanels.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.izvoru.ro&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116
curl -sL https://izvoru.ro/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt
curl -sI https://izvoru.ro/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules
curl -s https://izvoru.ro/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 89.37.212.100 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 100.212.37.89.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4850 runs
DKIM
Verified 4669 runs
DMARC
Verified 4834 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4653 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4831 runs
BIMI
Verified 4668 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4671 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4673 runs
CAA
Verified 4665 runs
Maturity: Development Verified Consistent Gold Gold Master
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

izvoru.ro

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.