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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 12 Feb 2026, 17:33 UTC
Duration 27.9s
Version v26.12.28
Integrity 47c4933bc36e71e5b8c1f80d1409c2bb4cf4c50fb95a0c7fbd3b9561ceebc78e1ce5df6f8fc621cf44f77e8c9b9dc4ee477d6eb9e1a44753847767fafc042222
Subject Domain
dnsstuff.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

dnsstuff.com
12 Feb 2026, 17:33 UTC · 27.9s ·v26.12.28 · SHA-3-512: 47c4✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Microsoft 365 1 SaaS Service
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
4 protocols configured, 3 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 45.8s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
DMARC external reporting to solarwinds.com is not authorized (RFC 7489 §7.1)
Configured
SPF (-all), DMARC (reject), DKIM, DNSSEC
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.dnsstuff.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.dnsstuff.com TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
RFC 8461 §3
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com). CAA is advisory — CAs must check it before issuing, but absence means any CA can issue.

dnsstuff.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659 §4
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.dnsstuff.com TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@dnsstuff.com"
RFC 8460 §3
Low Configure BIMI brand logo

Publish a BIMI DNS record pointing to your brand logo (SVG Tiny PS format). For full support in Gmail, you will also need a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC).

default._bimi.dnsstuff.com TXT "v=BIMI1; l=https://dnsstuff.com/logo.svg"
BIMI Spec
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Key-Systems GmbH
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider OBSERVED
Microsoft 365
Email: Enforced
Web Hosting INFERRED
Microsoft Azure (CDN)
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Akamai Edge DNS Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No
Verdict: DMARC policy is reject — spoofed messages will be blocked by receiving servers. DKIM keys verified with strong cryptography.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 ip4:74.115.13.4 ip4:74.115.13.10 ip4:67.79.13.15 include:spf.protection.outlook.com a:server109-228-12-87.live-servers.net -all
RFC 7489 §10.1: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc.reports@solarwinds.com; pct=100
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 2 selector(s)

selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCMoGLwjou1m+rmWjQR5s/z92p+QpOxScsbeYDYF3Shs8ATYi/v+eA5bm1OSQWZ77vY1F62w3cl0wEtv7lHUNXDBHBmNBOyKvrCcSNxvgWoB/LqOzHQDPovGhUDsYQX6qjzgMam+/oaeP/UUvIk2qLhHRXCAv7HIUvQWrDDq1B3YwIDAQAB;
selector2._domainkey Microsoft 365
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCxeSPodFOTg1bVX3GqUDhnvA/hJyDtVRfxohtutzAfG23e6Ex9jejIk4EMSFFuL8MOsNhfqw0Q/4vzK7Kj7bySswfM/gTCnvoaPJAVrxQP2B/Nn3Vv+ktRGHV56j3HDI7xl6rYPOxcQl/W33N0zxIDplRhrE6fSLK+j74nrbfP1wIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Authorization missing
Warning

1 of 1 external reporting domains missing authorization

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
solarwinds.com Unauthorized —
External domain solarwinds.com has not authorized dnsstuff.com to send DMARC reports (missing dnsstuff.com._report._dmarc.solarwinds.com TXT record)

Third-Party Action Required

This authorization record must be created by the external reporting provider, not by you. Per RFC 7489 §7.1, the receiving domain must publish a TXT record to confirm it accepts DMARC reports from your domain.

What to do: Contact your DMARC reporting provider and ask them to publish the authorization TXT record shown above. If you use a managed DMARC service (e.g., Ondmarc, Dmarcian, Valimail), this is typically handled during onboarding — reach out to their support if the record is missing.

Impact if unresolved: Compliant receivers may silently discard aggregate or forensic reports destined for the unauthorized address, reducing your DMARC visibility.

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: No brand protection configured. Any CA can issue certificates and no brand logo verification in place.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

Transport security inferred from 1 DNS signal(s)

Direct SMTP probe unavailable (port 25 blocked). Transport security inferred from DNS policy records and provider capabilities.
Transport Security Signals:
  • Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates
SMTP port 25 may be blocked by hosting provider — this is common for cloud platforms
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS8075 US
IPv4 Mappings:
13.107.213.57 → AS8075 (13.104.0.0/14)
13.107.246.57 → AS8075 (13.104.0.0/14)
IPv6 Mappings:
2620:1ec:46::57 → AS8075 (2620:1ec::/36)
2620:1ec:bdf::57 → AS8075 (2620:1ec::/36)

Edge / CDN Success Microsoft Azure

Domain is behind Microsoft Azure edge network

Behind CDN Origin Hidden
ASN 8075 belongs to Microsoft Azure (cloud infrastructure)

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service

1 SaaS service(s) detected via TXT record verification

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google Workspace google-site-verification=dXH1nCU_LYDbzqmh2kW877feYn4KIwIpUjVtPoq22Fk
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
49238 13 2 BD4E4E1CB0ED8E441F8439F2900F43C3AFF9EFA986716C5BD318898A8AF79D58

NS Delegation Verified

6 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: a1-139.akam.net a13-66.akam.net a26-67.akam.net a28-64.akam.net a4-65.akam.net a9-66.akam.net
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (2 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
A: Google returned different results: [150.171.109.118]
A: OpenDNS returned different results: [13.107.213.36 13.107.246.36]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

13.107.213.57
13.107.246.57
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2620:1ec:46::57
2620:1ec:bdf::57
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 3 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup
275 certificates analyzed current expired Source: Certificate Transparency Logs
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
CT Log Expired — 133 — —
CT Log Expired — 106 — —
CT Log Expired — 2 — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: A AAAA Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Propagating 2 / 2 records
13.107.213.57
13.107.246.51
13.107.246.57
13.107.213.51
AAAA Propagating 2 / 2 records
2620:1ec:46::57
2620:1ec:bdf::51
2620:1ec:bdf::57
2620:1ec:46::51
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.dnsstuff.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc.reports@solarwinds.com; pct=100
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc.reports@solarwinds.com; pct=100
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
10 dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
10 dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 6 / 6 records
a26-67.akam.net.
a9-66.akam.net.
a13-66.akam.net.
a4-65.akam.net.
a4-65.akam.net.
a26-67.akam.net.
a28-64.akam.net.
a13-66.akam.net.
a9-66.akam.net.
a28-64.akam.net.
a1-139.akam.net.
a1-139.akam.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
a1-139.akam.net. hostmaster.solarwinds.com. 1550570628 900 600 86400 3600
a1-139.akam.net. hostmaster.solarwinds.com. 1550570628 900 600 86400 3600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 7 / 7 records
lrjf6w5p77s6c4mhwgw0cx2t715qsdsm
_nuyjwd76j8c2vbc9hl99iaiiiumdzef
_nuyjwd76j8c2vbc9hl99iaiiiumdzef
lrjf6w5p77s6c4mhwgw0cx2t715qsdsm
2h0j5rdwwpnnhkszz7623tg1hwhp38qn
2dmctm9jyshdtz56yk8p0w80mcr9yzvy
t61ls49w7drlb4g16yqfvl6tn7h3r2fk
v=spf1 ip4:74.115.13.4 ip4:74.115.13.10 ip4:67.79.13.15 include:spf.protection.outlook.com a:server109-228-12-87.live-servers.net -all
2dmctm9jyshdtz56yk8p0w80mcr9yzvy
google-site-verification=dXH1nCU_LYDbzqmh2kW877feYn4KIwIpUjVtPoq22Fk
v=spf1 ip4:74.115.13.4 ip4:74.115.13.10 ip4:67.79.13.15 include:spf.protection.outlook.com a:server109-228-12-87.live-servers.net -all
t61ls49w7drlb4g16yqfvl6tn7h3r2fk
google-site-verification=dXH1nCU_LYDbzqmh2kW877feYn4KIwIpUjVtPoq22Fk
2h0j5rdwwpnnhkszz7623tg1hwhp38qn
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), SecurityTrails (DNS history), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

47c4933bc36e71e5b8c1f80d1409c2bb4cf4c50fb95a0c7fbd3b9561ceebc78e1ce5df6f8fc621cf44f77e8c9b9dc4ee477d6eb9e1a44753847767fafc042222
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 12 Feb 2026, 17:33 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-dnsstuff.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-dnsstuff.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-dnsstuff.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-dnsstuff.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/668/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for dnsstuff.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short dnsstuff.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.dnsstuff.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.dnsstuff.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.dnsstuff.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer dnsstuff.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd dnsstuff.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.dnsstuff.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.dnsstuff.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.dnsstuff.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.dnsstuff.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/dnsstuff.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.dnsstuff.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://dnsstuff.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://dnsstuff.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://dnsstuff.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 13.107.213.57 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 57.213.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 13.107.246.57 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 57.246.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4874 runs
DKIM
Verified 4692 runs
DMARC
Verified 4857 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4676 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4855 runs
BIMI
Verified 4691 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4694 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4696 runs
CAA
Verified 4688 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short dnsstuff.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.dnsstuff.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.dnsstuff.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.dnsstuff.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer dnsstuff.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd dnsstuff.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.dnsstuff.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.dnsstuff.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.dnsstuff.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.dnsstuff.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer dnsstuff.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/dnsstuff.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername dnsstuff-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.dnsstuff.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://dnsstuff.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://dnsstuff.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://dnsstuff.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 13.107.213.57 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 57.213.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 13.107.246.57 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 57.246.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

dnsstuff.com

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DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.