Skip to main content

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

sportcommunities.group
12 Feb 2026, 17:03 UTC · 24.3s ·v26.12.28 · SHA-3-512: 36b2✱✱✱✱ Verify
Recon ModeRecon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Secure
8 protocols configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Basic
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Configured
SPF (~all), DMARC (reject), DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA, DNSSEC
Priority Action Achievable posture: Secure
Low Deploy DANE/TLSA for email transport

DNSSEC is already enabled — you can strengthen email transport security by publishing DANE TLSA records. DANE binds your mail server's TLS certificate to DNS, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks on SMTP connections.

_25._tcp.mail.sportcommunities.group TLSA 3 1 1 <certificate_hash>
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider OBSERVED
Unknown
Email: Enforced
Web Hosting INFERRED
Cloudflare (CDN)
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Cloudflare Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No
Verdict: DMARC policy is reject — spoofed messages will be blocked by receiving servers. DKIM keys verified with strong cryptography.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 +mx +a +ip4:198.54.115.71 +include:spf.web-hosting.com +ip4:198.54.114.199 ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; np=reject; rua=mailto:d4c644d2db394a938b483bc28234bcc4@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=reject
Reported to Cloudflare DMARC (Cloudflare)
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found

Found DKIM records for 1 selector(s)

default._domainkey
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyLNdQNnzmVQBckkhg+ig3/aK/owrh0aeB0FcqCcWjGMIsoNCHtcwT/+mpCESDUGTyc358msZic3lpputQRlIQ7PqGeX1XBL49N7y5iA1/aFnS1K4VWmSvWJ8Umvw6ayoLZfVzQcyHMrdZtb9Ob/zTVv2LNBo09w+O4dXAF4EytJg/WQFilK6h3M469jJYOZ3vG7oJCZOtqlebLwdKFDP9MEVnQLUCqeD/i3JXv1IK3pDdSEj6NCYj/A7jNR5Bu8R17zMKQRHJvdsJU6F1AYY0K33fGn2F1n98SHWywQd4fbvZkL8LP8CYq7C8lQr+7u6ou08/kywxfZn4bFIPBFrOwIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=1770681706;
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 7 days (604800 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: sportcommunities.group

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsreport@sportcommunities.group;

Email Security Management Actively Managed

Intelligence: This domain uses dedicated email security management — indicating continuous monitoring and professional oversight, not a "set and forget" configuration. Reporting destinations reveal the operational security partner network, and we extract that intelligence directly from DNS.
Cloudflare DMARC by Cloudflare
DMARC
DMARC aggregate reports (rua)

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net Authorized v=DMARC1;

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 1 MX host)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS without DANE. MTA-STS provides transport security through HTTPS-based policy (RFC 8461), but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use. Adding DANE (RFC 7672) would provide cryptographic certificate pinning independent of certificate authorities.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).


Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: Attackers cannot easily spoof your logo or obtain fraudulent TLS certificates.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success No VMC SVG

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Yes

BIMI configured - logo validated (VMC recommended for Gmail)

BIMI works without VMC! VMC (Verified Mark Certificate) requires a registered trademark. Small businesses can use BIMI with just a logo - it shows in Apple Mail and some providers. Gmail requires VMC.
v=BIMI1; l=https://sportcommunities.group/favicon.svg;
BIMI Logo
Logo validated (SVG) View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success IODEF

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only Sectigo, Let's Encrypt, cansignhttpexchanges=yes, DigiCert, ssl.com can issue certificates (wildcard issuance: ssl.com, DigiCert, Sectigo, Let's Encrypt, cansignhttpexchanges=yes per RFC 8659 §4.3)

Authorized CAs: Sectigo Let's Encrypt cansignhttpexchanges=yes DigiCert ssl.com
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 iodef "mailto:sslreport@sportcommunities.group"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

Transport security inferred from 2 DNS signal(s)

Direct SMTP probe unavailable (port 25 blocked). Transport security inferred from DNS policy records and provider capabilities.
Transport Security Signals:
  • MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures
SMTP port 25 may be blocked by hosting provider — this is common for cloud platforms
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS13335 US
IPv4 Mappings:
104.21.84.148AS13335 (104.21.64.0/19)
172.67.194.44AS13335 (172.67.192.0/20)
IPv6 Mappings:
2606:4700:3033::ac43:c22cAS13335 (2606:4700:3033::/48)
2606:4700:3037::6815:5494AS13335 (2606:4700:3037::/48)

Edge / CDN Success Cloudflare

Domain is behind Cloudflare edge network

Behind CDN Origin Hidden
ASN 13335 belongs to Cloudflare

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS verification records detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.


Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
2371 13 2 0D6516035CA7559EB49B6D6A24FE266356969DE7861E72FC1832D27E28B8CA43

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ned.ns.cloudflare.com noor.ns.cloudflare.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS HTTP/3 ECH

HTTPS records found, HTTP/3 supported, ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) enabled

PriorityTargetALPNECHRaw
1 . h3, h2 Yes sportcommunities.group. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h3,h2" ipv4hint="104.21.84.148,172.67.194.44" ech="AEX+DQBB2AAgACA/iDqtdaG225w+GaVqBZjsdX6VlMLRHz/ZJUF794qtdwAEAAEAAQASY2xvdWRmbGFyZS1lY2guY29tAAA=" ipv6hint="2606:4700:3033::ac43:c22c,2606:4700:3037::6815:5494"

CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS CDNSKEY

Full RFC 8078 automated DNSSEC key rollover signaling detected (CDS + CDNSKEY)

Key TagAlgorithmDigest TypeDigest
2371 ECDSAP256SHA256 2
CDNSKEY Records:
FlagsProtocolAlgorithmPublic Key
257 3 ECDSAP256SHA256
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

104.21.84.148
172.67.194.44
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700:3033::ac43:c22c
2606:4700:3037::6815:5494
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 business29.web-hosting.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 1 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
61 certificates analyzed current expired Source: Certificate Transparency Logs
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
CT Log Expired 2
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
104.21.84.148
172.67.194.44
172.67.194.44
104.21.84.148
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2606:4700:3033::ac43:c22c
2606:4700:3037::6815:5494
2606:4700:3037::6815:5494
2606:4700:3033::ac43:c22c
CAA RFC 8659 §4 11 / 0 records
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 iodef "mailto:sslreport@sportcommunities.group"
0 issue "ssl.com"
DMARC _dmarc.sportcommunities.group RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; np=reject; rua=mailto:d4c644d2db394a938b483bc28234bcc4@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; np=reject; rua=mailto:d4c644d2db394a938b483bc28234bcc4@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net
MTA-STS _mta-sts.sportcommunities.group RFC 8461 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1; id=1770681706;
v=STSv1; id=1770681706;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
10 business29.web-hosting.com.
10 business29.web-hosting.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
ned.ns.cloudflare.com.
ned.ns.cloudflare.com.
noor.ns.cloudflare.com.
noor.ns.cloudflare.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ned.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2396169408 10000 2400 604800 1800
ned.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2396169408 10000 2400 604800 1800
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.sportcommunities.group RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsreport@sportcommunities.group;
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsreport@sportcommunities.group;
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=spf1 +mx +a +ip4:198.54.115.71 +include:spf.web-hosting.com +ip4:198.54.114.199 ~all
v=spf1 +mx +a +ip4:198.54.115.71 +include:spf.web-hosting.com +ip4:198.54.114.199 ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), SecurityTrails (DNS history), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

36b2213d3158b9b8cf5117f4c61a0a8dedfbdf73a785fc29cbae660be99320383c17cc6c5f20d75885ee7cd76fac07320a96b73cbf38a02dd491e784b08522b2
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 12 Feb 2026, 17:03 UTC.

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL)
cat dns-intelligence-sportcommunities.group.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-sportcommunities.group.json
Python 3 (cross-platform)
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-sportcommunities.group.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+)
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-sportcommunities.group.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/664/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for sportcommunities.group. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer sportcommunities.group A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer sportcommunities.group AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer sportcommunities.group MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer sportcommunities.group NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035
dig +noall +answer sportcommunities.group TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208
dig +short sportcommunities.group TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489
dig +short _dmarc.sportcommunities.group TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376
dig +short default._domainkey.sportcommunities.group TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +noall +answer sportcommunities.group DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035
dig +noall +answer sportcommunities.group DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035
dig +dnssec +cd sportcommunities.group A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for business29.web-hosting.com RFC 7672
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.business29.web-hosting.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (business29.web-hosting.com) RFC 6698
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect business29.web-hosting.com:25 -servername business29.web-hosting.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461
dig +short _mta-sts.sportcommunities.group TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461
curl -sL https://mta-sts.sportcommunities.group/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460
dig +short _smtp._tls.sportcommunities.group TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft
dig +short default._bimi.sportcommunities.group TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659
dig +noall +answer sportcommunities.group CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460
dig +noall +answer sportcommunities.group HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344
dig +noall +answer sportcommunities.group CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/sportcommunities.group' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (business29.web-hosting.com) RFC 3207
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect business29.web-hosting.com:25 -servername business29.web-hosting.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.sportcommunities.group&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116
curl -sL https://sportcommunities.group/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt
curl -sI https://sportcommunities.group/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules
curl -s https://sportcommunities.group/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.21.84.148 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 148.84.21.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 172.67.194.44 (Team Cymru)
dig +short 44.194.67.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4884 runs
DKIM
Verified 4702 runs
DMARC
Verified 4867 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4686 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4865 runs
BIMI
Verified 4701 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4704 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4706 runs
CAA
Verified 4698 runs
Maturity: Development Verified Consistent Gold Gold Master
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

sportcommunities.group

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.