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Email Security Scope: SPF: No Local Record DMARC: Inherited from franklinroadacademy.com MX Records Present
This subdomain has no locally configured email security records. DMARC protection is inherited from the organizational domain (franklinroadacademy.com) per RFC 7489 §6.6.3. Since this subdomain has MX records, consider publishing subdomain-specific SPF and DMARC records for explicit protection. Analyzing franklinroadacademy.com shows the organizational domain’s full email security posture.
DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 8 Mar 2026, 03:32 UTC
Duration 35.5s
Version v26.35.17
Integrity 250e6e7e296e68e47ae8427fe88d49ae0134768b7099d8e475d8c99ba468072053edcc49769e9676f96b3cf41fa218a229a5434f45321aed3d33db6acfd3af20
Subject Domain
www.franklinroadacademy.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

www.franklinroadacademy.com
8 Mar 2026, 03:32 UTC · 35.5s ·v26.35.17 · SHA-3-512: 250e✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Critical Risk
3 protocols configured, 6 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 action required 2 recommendations 1 monitoring
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 61/100
Some DNS data may be stale or incomplete, limiting confidence. Resolver agreement and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 61% Currency 61/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Data currency is degraded — some records may be stale, incomplete, or inconsistent with authoritative sources
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 61/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Adequate Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions
Enterprise Traffic Engineering Detected DNS-based Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB)

This domain uses short TTLs across 5 record types (A record at 60s), consistent with DNS-based traffic management (GSLB). Enterprises operating large anycast networks intentionally use short TTLs to enable rapid failover, geographic steering, and load distribution. This is a deliberate infrastructure choice, not a misconfiguration. RFC 1035 §3.2.1 permits any TTL value the zone administrator selects. The findings below reflect deviation from typical values for reference, not necessarily actionable recommendations for this class of infrastructure.

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from typical values. For domains using DNS-based traffic management, short TTLs are expected and intentional.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
MX 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
CNAME 1 minute (60s) 5 minutes (300s) medium CNAME TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 5 minutes (300s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 300 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 1 minute (60s) 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
CAA 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high CAA TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 1 minute (60s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 1 minute (60s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • This domain runs short TTLs across multiple record types. Does it operate a global anycast network where DNS-based traffic steering justifies the query volume?
  • Are the short TTLs enabling active failover, geographic routing, or load distribution — or are they leftover from a migration that was never reverted?
  • Enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure (sub-5ms authoritative response times, globally distributed nameservers) absorbs short-TTL query volume. Would your authoritative DNS handle the same load?
Tune TTL for www.franklinroadacademy.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 11 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 50.8s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Vulnerable
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Action Required
No SPF and no DMARC — domain is completely unprotected against email spoofing. Both protocols are RFC-recommended (not mandatory), but their absence leaves the domain open to impersonation (CVE-2024-7208, CVE-2024-49040)
Recommended
Publish an SPF record to authorize legitimate mail senders, Publish a DMARC record starting with p=none and rua reporting
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
DKIM (inferred via Unknown), DNSSEC, CAA
Not Configured
SPF, DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Moderate Risk
Critical Publish DMARC Record

Add a DMARC record to protect your domain against email spoofing and receive authentication reports.

DMARC tells receivers how to handle mail that fails SPF/DKIM checks.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.www.franklinroadacademy.com (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@www.franklinroadacademy.com
RFC 7489 §6.3
Critical Publish SPF Record

Add an SPF record to authorize mail servers for this domain.

SPF tells receiving servers which IPs may send mail for your domain.
TypeTXT
Hostwww.franklinroadacademy.com (root of domain)
Valuev=spf1 ~all
RFC 7208
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.www.franklinroadacademy.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@www.franklinroadacademy.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.www.franklinroadacademy.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=www.franklinroadacademy.com
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Network Solutions, LLC
Registrar for franklinroadacademy.com
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Unprotected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes no SPF or DMARC protection

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? No
Warning

No SPF record found

RFC Stance: RFC 7208 defines the SPF mechanism for domains that choose to publish sender authorization. The standard does not mandate SPF publication — it is a voluntary security control.
Operational Security: We flag its absence because any server on the internet can send email claiming to be this domain. Attackers send from a domain — they do not need the domain to have email infrastructure.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? No policy published
Warning Inherited

No DMARC record found

RFC Stance: RFC 7489 is classified as Informational (not Standards Track). DMARC is a widely adopted industry practice but is not an IETF-mandated standard.
Operational Security: Without DMARC, receiving mail servers have no policy for handling SPF/DKIM failures. Spoofed messages may be delivered to recipients.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Not Discoverable

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 2 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Yes No DMARC policy (RFC 7489) — attackers can send email appearing to be from this domain with no sender-authentication barrier

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only ssl.com, cansignhttpexchanges=yes, Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, Sectigo, godaddy.com can issue certificates

Authorized CAs: ssl.com cansignhttpexchanges=yes Let's Encrypt DigiCert Sectigo godaddy.com
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
clients.finalsitecdn.com.
0 issue "godaddy.com"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116

security.txt found but missing required fields

Contact

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.3)

Expires

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
Source: https://www.franklinroadacademy.com/.well-known/security.txt
Missing required Contact field (RFC 9116 §2.5.3)
Missing required Expires field (RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? Yes

AI governance signals observed

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? Yes
llms.txt found — domain provides structured context for LLMs
llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context)
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (3 items)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
llms_txt_found llms.txt file found providing structured LLM context info Observed
llms_full_txt_found llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) info Observed
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (4)
  • https://www.franklinroadacademy.com/
  • https://www.franklinroadacademy.com/assets/in_layout_head2-140fb2f4466c1714368a71c05ec4f1cdece232db08c102ac428e80515160abc6.js
  • https://www.franklinroadacademy.com/assets/application-b2aea0fb23d7dedf494a85140efe407d0803835155b16375592a734cf2513a0e.js
  • https://www.franklinroadacademy.com/uploaded/themes/default_25/main.js?1763413745
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com, clients.finalsitecdn.com

Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from child zone
  • Could not retrieve SOA serial from any nameserver

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
clients.finalsitecdn.com No N/A N/A OK
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Parent TTL: 60s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

Nameserver Fleet Matrix 1 Issue

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for www.franklinroadacademy.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Findings:
  • Reachability probes skipped — all 2 resolved nameservers failed both UDP and TCP, indicating the scanning environment's network restricts outbound DNS on port 53
Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com clients.finalsitecdn.com.
104.17.164.123
104.17.165.123
104.17.163.123
104.17.166.123
104.17.162.123 		clients.finalsitecdn.com.
2606:4700::6811:a57b
2606:4700::6811:a67b
2606:4700::6811:a47b
2606:4700::6811:a37b
2606:4700::6811:a27b 		N/A
clients.finalsitecdn.com 104.17.166.123
104.17.162.123
104.17.163.123
104.17.165.123
104.17.164.123 		2606:4700::6811:a47b
2606:4700::6811:a57b
2606:4700::6811:a67b
2606:4700::6811:a27b
2606:4700::6811:a37b 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		N/A
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No transport encryption policy detected — mail delivery relies on opportunistic TLS

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 14 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com. → AS ()
clients.finalsitecdn.com. → AS ()
104.17.163.123 → AS13335 (104.17.160.0/20)
104.17.162.123 → AS13335 (104.17.160.0/20)
104.17.165.123 → AS13335 (104.17.160.0/20)
104.17.166.123 → AS13335 (104.17.160.0/20)
104.17.164.123 → AS ()
IPv6 Mappings:
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com. → AS ()
clients.finalsitecdn.com. → AS ()
2606:4700::6811:a67b → AS ()
2606:4700::6811:a27b → AS ()
2606:4700::6811:a47b → AS ()
2606:4700::6811:a57b → AS ()
2606:4700::6811:a37b → AS ()

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed

DNSSEC configured (DNSKEY + DS records present) but AD flag not set — resolver did not confirm chain of trust validation (RFC 4035 §3.2.3). This may indicate a broken chain or a non-validating resolver path.

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Not Set - Records exist but resolver didn't confirm validation
DS Record (at registrar):
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
clients.finalsitecdn.com.

NS Delegation Check Failed Mismatch

NS delegation mismatch - child and parent zone have different NS records

NS records at domain differ from parent zone delegation. May indicate recent DNS migration still propagating.
Nameservers: clients.finalsitecdn.com franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS HTTP/3

HTTPS records found, HTTP/3 supported

PriorityTargetALPNECHRaw
1 . h3, h2 No clients.finalsitecdn.com. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h3,h2" ipv4hint="104.17.162.123,104.17.163.123,104.17.164.123,104.17.165.123,104.17.166.123" ipv6hint="2606:4700::6811:a27b,2606:4700::6811:a37b,2606:4700::6811:a47b,2606:4700::6811:a57b,2606:4700::6811:a67b"
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
clients.finalsitecdn.com.
104.17.163.123
104.17.162.123
104.17.165.123
104.17.166.123
104.17.164.123
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
clients.finalsitecdn.com.
2606:4700::6811:a67b
2606:4700::6811:a27b
2606:4700::6811:a47b
2606:4700::6811:a57b
2606:4700::6811:a37b
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
clients.finalsitecdn.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (7 IPv4, 7 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? None found
How did we find these?

No subdomains found via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS probing, or CNAME chain traversal for this domain. No TLS certificates have been issued and no common service names resolve for subdomains of www.franklinroadacademy.com.

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 7 / 0 records
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
—
clients.finalsitecdn.com.
—
104.17.163.123
—
104.17.162.123
—
104.17.165.123
—
104.17.166.123
—
104.17.164.123
—
AAAA 7 / 0 records
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
—
clients.finalsitecdn.com.
—
2606:4700::6811:a67b
—
2606:4700::6811:a27b
—
2606:4700::6811:a47b
—
2606:4700::6811:a57b
—
2606:4700::6811:a37b
—
CAA RFC 8659 §4 8 / 0 records
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
—
clients.finalsitecdn.com.
—
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
—
0 issue "ssl.com"
—
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
—
0 issue "godaddy.com"
—
0 issue "comodoca.com"
—
0 issue "digicert.com"
—
CNAME 1 / 0 records
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
—
MX RFC 5321 2 / 0 records
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
—
clients.finalsitecdn.com.
—
NS RFC 1035 2 / 0 records
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
—
clients.finalsitecdn.com.
—
SOA RFC 1035 2 / 0 records
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
—
clients.finalsitecdn.com.
—
TXT RFC 7208 §4 2 / 0 records
franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com.
—
clients.finalsitecdn.com.
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
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DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

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Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

250e6e7e296e68e47ae8427fe88d49ae0134768b7099d8e475d8c99ba468072053edcc49769e9676f96b3cf41fa218a229a5434f45321aed3d33db6acfd3af20
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 8 Mar 2026, 03:32 UTC.
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-proof, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it cannot be altered, deleted, or disputed. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a legally defensible chain of evidence for domain security state.

View Archived Snapshot
Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20260308033209/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/6538/view/E
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-www.franklinroadacademy.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-www.franklinroadacademy.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-www.franklinroadacademy.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-www.franklinroadacademy.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/6538/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for www.franklinroadacademy.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd www.franklinroadacademy.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.www.franklinroadacademy.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/www.franklinroadacademy.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.www.franklinroadacademy.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://www.franklinroadacademy.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://www.franklinroadacademy.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://www.franklinroadacademy.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com. (Team Cymru) 
dig +short .com.finalsite.franklinroadacademycom.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for clients.finalsitecdn.com. (Team Cymru) 
dig +short .com.finalsitecdn.clients.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4846 runs
DKIM
Verified 4665 runs
DMARC
Verified 4830 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4649 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4827 runs
BIMI
Verified 4664 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4667 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4669 runs
CAA
Verified 4661 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd www.franklinroadacademy.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.www.franklinroadacademy.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.www.franklinroadacademy.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer www.franklinroadacademy.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/www.franklinroadacademy.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.www.franklinroadacademy.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://www.franklinroadacademy.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://www.franklinroadacademy.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://www.franklinroadacademy.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for franklinroadacademycom.finalsite.com. (Team Cymru) 
dig +short .com.finalsite.franklinroadacademycom.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for clients.finalsitecdn.com. (Team Cymru) 
dig +short .com.finalsitecdn.clients.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

www.franklinroadacademy.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.