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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 8 Mar 2026, 01:31 UTC
Duration 18.1s
Version v26.35.17
Integrity 051ed966f52923b7b23a709d3f3e25dea7b4e8b19e0ebc3e81ad76cebd5d62fdaa30ea994fdd257523f0eefba5814faa1a11fab353e28ce12838fec08c596789
Subject Domain
microsoft.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

microsoft.com
8 Mar 2026, 01:31 UTC · 18.1s ·v26.35.17 · SHA-3-512: 051e✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Microsoft 365 8 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
6 protocols configured, 2 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 71/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 60% Currency 84/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 84/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Good
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
NS 19231s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 19231s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 832s 1 hour (3600s) medium MX TTL is below typical — observed 832s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for microsoft.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns1-39.azure-dns.com
Serial 1
Admin azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh3600s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry300sFraction of Refresh
Expire2419200s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)300s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Configured
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA
Not Configured
BIMI, DNSSEC
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.microsoft.com (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://microsoft.com/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
MarkMonitor Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Microsoft 365
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Microsoft Azure DNS
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 5/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 5/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf-a.microsoft.com include:_spf-b.microsoft.com include:_spf-c.microsoft.com include:_spf-ssg-a.msft.net include:_spf1-meo.microsoft.com -all
RFC 7489: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

selector2._domainkey Microsoft 365 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCPkb8bu8RGWeJGk3hJrouZXIdZ+HTp/azRp8IUOHp5wKvPUAi/54PwuLscUjRk4Rh3hjIkMpKRfJJXPxWbrT7eMLric7f/S0h+qF4aqIiQqHFCDAYfMnN6V3Wbke2U5EGm0H/cAUYkaf2AtuHJ/rdY/EXaldAm00PgT9QQMez66QIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 7 days (604800 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: *.mail.protection.outlook.com

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS — the best available option for Microsoft 365. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, MTA-STS is the strongest transport security this domain can deploy. MTA-STS enforces TLS via HTTPS-based policy, protecting against downgrade attacks (RFC 8461).

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - specific CAs authorized

0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Yes RFC 9116

security.txt properly configured

Contact

https://msrc.microsoft.com/report/vulnerability/new

Expires

2026-09-23 Valid

Encryption

https://msrc.microsoft.com/.well-known/csaf/openpgp/998D7EC1A516E3D17FF90480EF148D3CDE714E0D.asc

Policy

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/bounty/
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/cvd
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/bounty-safe-harbor
en Canonical URL Acknowledgments
Source: https://microsoft.com/.well-known/security.txt
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (9)
  • https://microsoft.com/
  • https://microsoft.com/echo/etc.clientlibs/cascade.component.authoring/clientlibs/clientlib-reimagine-env/base.ACSHASH8cd32d1ad0be8a1a9b98c8f1eda1aae6.min.js
  • https://microsoft.com/echo/etc.clientlibs/cascade.component.authoring/clientlibs/clientlib-polyfills.ACSHASHtrue.min.js
  • https://microsoft.com/echo/etc.clientlibs/cascade.component.authoring/clientlibs/clientlib-jquery.ACSHASH75d0cb3e9ff9fee40f5ce5fd93c17fb2.min.js
  • https://microsoft.com/echo/etc.clientlibs/cascade.component.authoring/clientlibs/clientlib-jquery-cookie.ACSHASH5c75a4fa9fb3503322f8a0c9dd51512d.min.js
  • https://microsoft.com/echo/etc.clientlibs/cascade.component.authoring/dynamicclientsidelibs/handlerscripts/v1.ACSHASH6734c5d7a732130b83c7d4a6ba54dcec.min.js
  • https://microsoft.com/msonecloudapi/assets/reimaginesharedhead.js
  • https://microsoft.com/echo/etc.clientlibs/microsoft/clientlibs/exp-analytics/v1.ACSHASHbf7b336dbb370c984e1bf59b1a980d86.min.js
  • https://microsoft.com/echo/etc.clientlibs/microsoft/clientlibs/exp-cookiecomp/v1.ACSHASHa238861e6209e4e02576ddf5d1749c8b.min.js
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns2-39.azure-dns.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ns2-39.azure-dns.net, ns1-39.azure-dns.com, ns4-39.azure-dns.info, ns3-39.azure-dns.org

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns1-39.azure-dns.com No N/A N/A OK
ns2-39.azure-dns.net No N/A N/A OK
ns3-39.azure-dns.org No N/A N/A OK
ns4-39.azure-dns.info No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 172800s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns1-39.azure-dns.com: 1
ns2-39.azure-dns.net: 1
ns3-39.azure-dns.org: 1
ns4-39.azure-dns.info: 1
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for microsoft.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns2-39.azure-dns.net 150.171.16.39 2620:1ec:8ec:10::27 AS8075
Microsoft Corporation 		1
ns3-39.azure-dns.org 13.107.222.39 2a01:111:4000:10::27 AS8075
Microsoft Corporation 		1
ns4-39.azure-dns.info 13.107.206.39 2620:1ec:bda:10::27 AS8075
Microsoft Corporation 		1
ns1-39.azure-dns.com 150.171.10.39 2603:1061:0:10::27 AS8075
Microsoft Corporation 		1
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (3 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport (RFC 8461)
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
  • Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates
Telemetry
TLS-RPT configured — domain receives reports about TLS delivery failures from sending mail servers (RFC 8460)
Reporting to: https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS8075 Microsoft Corporation US
IPv4 Mappings:
13.107.226.51 → AS8075 (13.104.0.0/14)
13.107.253.51 → AS8075 (13.104.0.0/14)
IPv6 Mappings:
2620:1ec:48:1::51 → AS8075 (2620:1ec::/36)
2620:1ec:29:1::51 → AS8075 (2620:1ec::/36)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 8 services

8 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Linear linear-domain-verification=iuq6saifcnbe
1Password 1password-site-verification=35ZTURTFFFDC5BW7GFQKRJ77QM
DocuSign docusign=d5a3737c-c23c-4bd0-9095-d2ff621f2840
Facebook / Meta facebook-domain-verification=fwzwhbbzwmg5fzgotc2go51olc3566
Atlassian atlassian-domain-verification=xvoaqRfxSg3PnlVnR4xCSOlKyw1Aln0MMxRiKXnwWroFG7vI76...
Google Workspace google-site-verification=pjPOauSPcrfXOZS9jnPPa5axowcHGCDAl1_86dCqFpk
Microsoft 365 MS=ms79629062
HubSpot hubspot-developer-verification=OTQ5NGIwYWEtODNmZi00YWE1LTkyNmQtNDhjMDMxY2JjNDAx
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns1-39.azure-dns.com ns2-39.azure-dns.net ns3-39.azure-dns.org ns4-39.azure-dns.info
Managed DNS
All 4 nameservers hosted by Microsoft Azure DNS. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Microsoft Azure DNS
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (4 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [150.171.109.34]
A: OpenDNS returned different results: [150.171.109.184]
A: Google returned different results: [150.171.109.177]
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [1password-site-verification=35ZTURTFFFDC5BW7GFQKRJ77QM MS=ms79629062 _zx2p8gpzv720db2aqmozy4jhwk2nl43 d365mktkey=3uc1cf82cpv750lzk70v9bvf2 d365mktkey=6358r1b7e13hox60tl1uagv14 dobtdihqagnr18hea8uv1h1mvq docusign=d5a3737c-c23c-4bd0-9095-d2ff621f2840 fg2t0gov9424p2tdcuo94goe9j linear-domain-verification=iuq6saifcnbe t7sebee51jrj7vm932k531hipa]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

13.107.226.51
13.107.253.51
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2620:1ec:48:1::51
2620:1ec:29:1::51
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 1 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.
_sip._tls: 100 1 443 sipdir.online.lync.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 2 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 120 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 120 current 0 expired 87 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
academy.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
account.microsoft.com DNS Current account.microsoft.com.edgekey.net — — —
accounts.microsoft.com DNS Current account.microsoft.com.edgekey.net — — —
admin.microsoft.com DNS Current admin-portal.office.com — — —
alerts.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
api.microsoft.com DNS Current msdn.com — — —
apps.microsoft.com DNS Current web-store-eyfkgzgudfgwftdc.z01.azurefd.net — — —
asia.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
assets.microsoft.com DNS Current dnmpn.trafficmanager.net — — —
autodiscover.microsoft.com DNS Current autodiscover.outlook.com — — —
beta.microsoft.com DNS Current connect.microsoft.akadns.net — — —
billing.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
build.microsoft.com DNS Current global-web-build2026-prod.trafficmanager.net — — —
campaign.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
careers.microsoft.com DNS Current careers-dxeqa2fddjdtavgj.b01.azurefd.net — — —
catalog.microsoft.com DNS Current genuine.microsoft.akadns.net — — —
cdn.microsoft.com DNS Current officecdnmac.microsoft.com.edgekey.net — — —
cert.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
cloud.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
community.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
compliance.microsoft.com DNS Current protection.office.trafficmanager.net — — —
config.microsoft.com DNS Current config-microsoft.l-0007.l-msedge.net — — —
connect.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
courses.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
crl.microsoft.com DNS Current crl.www.ms.akadns.net — — —
dedicated.microsoft.com DNS Current 001-1-d.outlook-sdf.com — — —
demo.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
dev.microsoft.com DNS Current developer.microsoft.com.edgekey.net — — —
develop.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
developer.microsoft.com DNS Current developer.microsoft.akadns.net — — —
developers.microsoft.com DNS Current developer.microsoft.com.edgekey.net — — —
devices.microsoft.com DNS Current msd-global.trafficmanager.net — — —
directory.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
dns.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
doc.microsoft.com DNS Current dop-frndrendpoint-hnb3ambka5fefccx.z01.azurefd.net — — —
docs.microsoft.com DNS Current docs.microsoft.com-c.edgekey.net — — —
download.microsoft.com DNS Current dlc-shim.trafficmanager.net — — —
e.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
edge.microsoft.com DNS Current edge-microsoft-com.ax-0002.ax-msedge.net — — —
education.microsoft.com DNS Current msdn-redirection-arfxbpadcbf7ajba.z01.azurefd.net — — —
email.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
endpoint.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
es.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
eu.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
event.microsoft.com DNS Current gtm.ms-studiosmedia.com — — —
events.microsoft.com DNS Current ingress8.prd.rainfocus.com — — —
feedback.microsoft.com DNS Current feedback-microsoft-com.a-0001.a-msedge.net — — —
feeds.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
forms.microsoft.com DNS Current forms.office.com — — —
forums.microsoft.com DNS Current forums.microsoft.akadns.net — — —
ftp.microsoft.com DNS Current ftp.microsoft.akadns.net — — —
gateway.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
geo.microsoft.com DNS Current geo.genuine.ms.akadns.net — — —
github.microsoft.com DNS Current github-microsoft-htf0b3b8bfdbhffv.z01.azurefd.net — — —
go.microsoft.com DNS Current go.microsoft.com.edgekey.net — — —
help.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
hiring.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
id.microsoft.com DNS Current account.msa.akadns6.net — — —
identity.microsoft.com DNS Current prdf.aadg.msidentity.com — — —
img.microsoft.com DNS Current i.microsoft.com.edgekey.net — — —
int.microsoft.com DNS Current aisvnxtgateway-prod.azurefd.net — — —
inventory.microsoft.com DNS Current arg-dev-web.azurewebsites.net — — —
invoice.microsoft.com DNS Current invoice-ui-prod.trafficmanager.net — — —
labs.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
learn.microsoft.com DNS Current learn-public.trafficmanager.net — — —
learning.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
location.microsoft.com DNS Current location-microsoft-com.b-0005.b-msedge.net — — —
login.microsoft.com DNS Current a.privatelink.msidentity.com — — —
m.microsoft.com DNS Current origin.mobile.ms.akadns.net — — —
mail1.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
mail2.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
mail3.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
manage.microsoft.com DNS Current manage-pe.trafficmanager.net — — —
map.microsoft.com DNS Current mapmicrosoft.azurelbs.com — — —
maps.microsoft.com DNS Current mapsmicrosoft.azurelbs.com — — —
marketing.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
media.microsoft.com DNS Current ashy-meadow-0b28bcb0f.azurestaticapps.net — — —
meet.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
mobile.microsoft.com DNS Current origin.mobile.ms.akadns.net — — —
my.microsoft.com DNS Current account.microsoft.com.edgekey.net — — —
myaccount.microsoft.com DNS Current na.privatelink.msidentity.com — — —
news.microsoft.com DNS Current m3l38343je5e.wpeproxy.com — — —
notifications.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
ocsp.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
office.microsoft.com DNS Current ocsa-prod-azhueag4dtemfwe5.b01.azurefd.net — — —
orders.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
outlook.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
owa.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
partner.microsoft.com DNS Current partnerdelivery.microsoft.com.edgekey.net — — —
partners.microsoft.com DNS Current pmc.partners.microsoft.akadns.net — — —
pay.microsoft.com DNS Current mspayment-fd-prod.azurefd.net — — —
payment.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
payments.microsoft.com DNS Current mspayment-portal-prod.azurefd.net — — —
pop.microsoft.com DNS Current pie-prod-bvgxf9hvaqf0bmda.b02.azurefd.net — — —
portal.microsoft.com DNS Current admin-portal.office.com — — —
preview.microsoft.com DNS Current siweb.microsoft.akadns.net — — —
print.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
privacy.microsoft.com DNS Current privacy.microsoft.com.edgekey.net — — —
public.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
ra.microsoft.com DNS Current ra.partners.extranet.microsoft.com — — —
recruit.microsoft.com DNS Current careersite-ui.azureedge.net — — —
remote.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
rss.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
search.microsoft.com DNS Current search.microsoft.akadns.net — — —
secure.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
share.microsoft.com DNS Current share.microsoft.com.edgekey.net — — —
shop.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
signup.microsoft.com DNS Current prdsignup-ctcbframh2hnfuda.z01.azurefd.net — — —
smtp.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
staging.microsoft.com DNS Current ideas.fabric.microsoft.com — — —
store.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
stream.microsoft.com DNS Current reroute.microsoft.com — — —
support.microsoft.com DNS Current emerald-prod-asgth3agbdfbhpgz.b02.azurefd.net — — —
survey.microsoft.com DNS Current — — — —
teams.microsoft.com DNS Current teams.office.com — — —
test.microsoft.com DNS Current marketingsites-prod.microsoft.com — — —
uat.microsoft.com DNS Current uat.chrysalis.ms — — —
vendor.microsoft.com DNS Current vendorpc.partners.extranet.microsoft.com — — —
videos.microsoft.com DNS Current bblqnhta.clienthubs.vidyard.com — — —
www.microsoft.com DNS Current www.microsoft.com-c-3.edgekey.net — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: AAAA Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
13.107.226.51
13.107.253.51
13.107.253.51
13.107.226.51
AAAA Propagating 2 / 1 records
2620:1ec:48:1::51
2603:1061:14:b7::1
2620:1ec:29:1::51
—
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
DMARC _dmarc.microsoft.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1
MTA-STS _mta-sts.microsoft.com RFC 8461 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;
v=STSv1; id=20190225000000Z;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns2-39.azure-dns.net.
ns1-39.azure-dns.com.
ns1-39.azure-dns.com.
ns2-39.azure-dns.net.
ns4-39.azure-dns.info.
ns3-39.azure-dns.org.
ns3-39.azure-dns.org.
ns4-39.azure-dns.info.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns1-39.azure-dns.com. azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com. 1 3600 300 2419200 300
ns1-39.azure-dns.com. azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com. 1 3600 300 2419200 300
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.microsoft.com RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report
v=TLSRPTv1;rua=https://tlsrpt.azurewebsites.net/report
TXT RFC 7208 §4 56 / 0 records
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=As/XxnDWZFxFwHvRZj+HbG5/ImtAeabLkiOWu1h7wCJQFAR216E9HoYQ5Hy6o7StoQ==
—
d365mktkey=j2qHWq9BHdaa3ZXZH8x64daJZxEWsFa0dxDeilxDoYYx
—
linear-domain-verification=iuq6saifcnbe
—
v=spf1 include:_spf-a.microsoft.com include:_spf-b.microsoft.com include:_spf-c.microsoft.com include:_spf-ssg-a.msft.net include:_spf1-meo.microsoft.com -all
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=Al9O7vaY4u02Vzh6c6i9ie3AFUHq9j3VK9rFROTJsCx5Rh0ailSEc3/k8fyCbjrHLQ==
—
_zx2p8gpzv720db2aqmozy4jhwk2nl43
—
d365mktkey=Fu49WtSTeClkHtK7S14227RIVpGwwGrzEsO6RVs1I2Ax
—
ms-domain-verification=65f91178-9dfb-41cd-929d-08d1a38ed607
—
d365mktkey=3l6dste9txazu0Qd2zu4135PUB4E35txLxyzJxjkPbsx
—
1password-site-verification=35ZTURTFFFDC5BW7GFQKRJ77QM
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=AoHTKEi2W8L2P8cf9CoDicIxYiuttTkwtIeFOqYCewBGoRZiiF+9/92saUkIDERGAA==
—
anthropic-domain-verification-phksss=GZrrKDUR4klRLFCvxyOvqcNGE
—
liveramp-site-verification=kxcV8fDH_FUNUZQEcAO6lwgim47f_hNLgMP4VG0PF_Q
—
sitecore-domain-verification=1d46cb5467624e33a408d14324874088
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=Azw9+u4M8RoH+bxJidKAZzGDmsPkzY1N4cO7rB/uC5x1RBoNfMyBlH/ott0lpo4pOQ==
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=An4mJIFLRys9h1EvjX18SJs5p1uEF5MHcs2JJLYPrI48C5Qt9FpaZEM0sQTV4JvNYw==
—
docusign=d5a3737c-c23c-4bd0-9095-d2ff621f2840
—
d365mktkey=ZGFU0tlXPekPusNHPo5QQQWpVf0gic0xpuKroNy3NQEx
—
facebook-domain-verification=fwzwhbbzwmg5fzgotc2go51olc3566
—
ms-domain-verification=d6545068-89f7-4432-b947-0b137e8a9fe3
—
workplace-domain-verification=lK0QDLk73xymCYMKUXNpfKAT8TY5Mx
—
airtable-verification=79a09e4a8013ff5737798ffb4ea88eee
—
hcp-domain-verification=3ce174a8b9fba88909633ab13eb1d81ce0123454745d66e500052ed84b7248a1
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A/Mf6IKdZzcHfBvpiVz9rkdPTIcCP5IbRDdEkeP3PgXEXF3mNjorahOwaYlMINBF5A==
—
d365mktkey=SxDf1EZxLvMwx6eEZUxzjFFgHoapF8DvtWEUjwq7ZTwx
—
atlassian-domain-verification=xvoaqRfxSg3PnlVnR4xCSOlKyw1Aln0MMxRiKXnwWroFG7vI76TUC8xYb03MwMXv
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A8qndBCDJGtFF2+3v/IPIMmM0SaVcrJBoSue7rKob6sUeK7QGeFuWkrtvze3AiqUDA==
—
d365mktkey=heYmJ57sWrwMjCgIG1xRwTREJrQokUIDtBcNfGuxoWQx
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=Asc8WWov6gsmCCzn4CSrwRuJIh5SqvaitKz/LlTW+SD54lLC52wzcnWhlTI416p2vw==
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=Atv9t87le3AkxabGQAy75Wju8M3YATC1mPNp/3BQepwz5KS+4VwTtTq7ZSjHAPFXzw==
—
mixpanel-domain-verify=5803bc4c-5bb6-4ce1-8076-753800097373
—
d365mktkey=8fEQahTresJms7tZGxGFr94T1zDz36oCbUt1LJc99mox
—
ms-domain-verification=561512fc-b4ba-4ac7-a946-e464c8f49f1b
—
ms-domain-verification=1c4e4677-e58f-4117-8d61-e5b2810388c2
—
google-site-verification=pjPOauSPcrfXOZS9jnPPa5axowcHGCDAl1_86dCqFpk
—
google-site-verification=M--CVfn_YwsV-2FGbCp_HFaEj23BmT0cTF4l8hXgpvM
—
d365mktkey=QDa792dLCZhvaAOOCe2Hz6WTzmTssOp1snABhxWibhMx
—
fg2t0gov9424p2tdcuo94goe9j
—
d365mktkey=6358r1b7e13hox60tl1uagv14
—
v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=AqXeTHJ/1FCYeuvJ8dc1B+X3uHaa7m2W0s31vzL4opnrJlSaBdtbWTY8Ti5WiZnu9Q==
—
ms-domain-verification=478640ad-6524-43d5-86c4-a914804b9e93
—
google-site-verification=uFg3wr5PWsK8lV029RoXXBBUW0_E6qf1WEWVHhetkOY
—
google-site-verification=uhh5_jbxpcQgnb-A7gDIjlrr5Ef34lA2t2_BAveYpnk
—
dobtdihqagnr18hea8uv1h1mvq
—
zoom-domain-verification=ZOOM_verify_e97a3d385acb4c47b9b924609a280524
—
d365mktkey=wbU64GRacxVEQxwcLSQnx0zisXLYzgUbfvsufIqO9ZUx
—
d365mktkey=PNcDqkW71x8VOUhcE96aGM4l5PYX1gnlRl6ieXUl5eMx
—
t7sebee51jrj7vm932k531hipa
—
MS=ms79629062
—
atlassian-domain-verification=Sn5AwyIdVgkaRaJA/IKj7ZFMnWeCBnppa9bXGLuJvsakRHH4lYoBxS8g7GVlud9M
—
hubspot-developer-verification=OTQ5NGIwYWEtODNmZi00YWE1LTkyNmQtNDhjMDMxY2JjNDAx
—
ms-domain-verification=25524f4b-1476-489c-a086-30f4c5016ecc
—
d365mktkey=3uc1cf82cpv750lzk70v9bvf2
—
d365mktkey=JlXV17lfZjyvWxNje1qiP390ACSKzTxo5mGqZ3V2BmYx
—
google-site-verification=GfDnTUdATPsK1230J0mXbfsYw-3A9BVMVaKSd4DcKgI
—
google-site-verification=mEAmcTy1e8jIB9W6ENPk2GDg9hjuNytQQRGlK0hPm0c
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

051ed966f52923b7b23a709d3f3e25dea7b4e8b19e0ebc3e81ad76cebd5d62fdaa30ea994fdd257523f0eefba5814faa1a11fab353e28ce12838fec08c596789
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 8 Mar 2026, 01:31 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-microsoft.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/6491/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for microsoft.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short microsoft.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.microsoft.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.microsoft.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer microsoft.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd microsoft.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.microsoft.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.microsoft.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.microsoft.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.microsoft.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/microsoft.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.microsoft.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://microsoft.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://microsoft.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://microsoft.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 13.107.226.51 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 51.226.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 13.107.253.51 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 51.253.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4849 runs
DKIM
Verified 4668 runs
DMARC
Verified 4833 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4652 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4830 runs
BIMI
Verified 4667 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4670 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4672 runs
CAA
Verified 4664 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short microsoft.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.microsoft.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.microsoft.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer microsoft.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd microsoft.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.microsoft.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.microsoft.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.microsoft.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.microsoft.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer microsoft.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/microsoft.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.microsoft.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://microsoft.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://microsoft.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://microsoft.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 13.107.226.51 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 51.226.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 13.107.253.51 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 51.253.107.13.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

microsoft.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.