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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 8 Mar 2026, 01:26 UTC
Duration 14.3s
Version v26.35.17
Integrity ab020f7bb2fd369495bc8bfb251e443c6ecd66448a3e0edfd8c9fcb2dcfbdc707aba6e6fb7f5f6f8aee1ed83e7879c892c5ba3486bbed974047f77f5aa2d14cf
Subject Domain
purpleflock.net

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

purpleflock.net
8 Mar 2026, 01:26 UTC · 14.3s ·v26.35.17 · SHA-3-512: ab02✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Archived
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
7 protocols configured, 2 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 68/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 57% Currency 81/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 81/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
A 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
AAAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
NS 21569s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 21569s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for purpleflock.net
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Cloudflare — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ned.ns.cloudflare.com
Serial 2398241693
Admin dns.cloudflare.com
Provider Cloudflare
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10000s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry2400sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)1800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s). Cloudflare's anycast architecture reduces the practical risk, but this value departs from the RFC recommendation.
RFC 1912 §2.2

Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

SOA Expire below RFC 1912 recommendation RFC 1912 §2.2

Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.

Below RFC recommendation
Proxied record TTLs fixed at 300s RFC 2181 §5.2

Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.

Technically compliant, but overrides administrator intent
Non-standard SOA serial format RFC 1912 §2.2

RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.

Compliant with RFC 1035, deviates from RFC 1912 convention
Negative cache TTL delays new records RFC 2308 §5

Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.

RFC-compliant, but causes real-world automation failures
Historical RFC 2181 §5.2 violation: TTL mismatch in CNAME RRsets RFC 2181 §5.2

In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.

Was a documented RFC violation — appears resolved
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM (not applicable — no-mail domain), MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, DNSSEC, CAA
Not Configured
BIMI, DANE
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
NameCheap, Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
No Mail Domain
No-Mail Domain — Fully Hardened
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Cloudflare
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No null MX indicates no-mail domain
No-Mail Domain — Fully Hardened 3/3 controls
This domain declares it does not send or receive email and has all three RFC-recommended controls in place: Null MX (RFC 7505), SPF -all (RFC 7208), and DMARC reject (RFC 7489).
DMARC reject (RFC 7489) Null MX (RFC 7505) SPF -all (RFC 7208)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all

Valid SPF (no mail allowed) - domain declares it sends no email

v=spf1 -all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; np=reject; rua=mailto:7d48d72da5fb4f42ac4aa4f4d409be16@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=reject
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

default._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyI9R4CP68EZ27oL0Owy4D8ea6oyEfjNNXk6tEoHNoi9g8LS3p7tC7X3H+aU67RNCQ59FCCD+kZ0OTNmb6/J5g4MFtQGYv3WVTN01WErk3xawxckAfP8cju/9X++1gd/t1oJNxSXa/iMhCVjpQXaJ8mVBxqrDeTYlbnJWcQ3Lgp6atoY5nDhCrb5rCFhyN9w8sNJFEy6cOUDesqo5nsMqLDNXT+FzMLSQB24drQ9hZyCPzvZ3vdYdAFd7IcH4V3UvjDmN/9Lixxf1cIe5yilSNJ1mwROOdYcXBi7qirQKXJbsX0BeDomwE9FjjsPKMGu87QGcMKngDcwJiQ69OM8jowIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=1770681707;
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 7 days (604800 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: business29.web-hosting.com

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsreport@sportcommunities.group;

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net Authorized v=DMARC1;
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No valid MX hosts — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS without DANE. MTA-STS provides transport security through HTTPS-based policy (RFC 8461), but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use. Adding DANE (RFC 7672) would provide cryptographic certificate pinning independent of certificate authorities.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning No VMC

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

BIMI configured (VMC recommended for Gmail) Logo issue: HTTP 403

v=BIMI1; l=https://purpleflock.com/bimi.svg;
BIMI Logo
HTTP 403 View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success IODEF

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only cansignhttpexchanges=yes, DigiCert, Let's Encrypt, ssl.com, Sectigo can issue certificates (wildcard issuance: ssl.com, DigiCert, cansignhttpexchanges=yes, Let's Encrypt, Sectigo per RFC 8659 §4.3)

Authorized CAs: cansignhttpexchanges=yes DigiCert Let's Encrypt ssl.com Sectigo
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 iodef "mailto:sslreport@sportcommunities.group"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Yes RFC 9116

security.txt properly configured

Contact

mailto:security@sportcommunities.group
tel:13235293208
https://sportcommunities.group/contact

Expires

2035-12-31 Valid

Policy

https://sportcommunities.group/security
en Canonical URL Acknowledgments
Source: https://purpleflock.net/.well-known/security.txt
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No significant AI surface findings

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives
No robots.txt found
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ned.ns.cloudflare.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: ned.ns.cloudflare.com, noor.ns.cloudflare.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key TagDS AlgorithmDNSKEY Key TagDNSKEY Algorithm
2371 13 2371 13

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ned.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK
noor.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ned.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.398241693e+09
noor.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.398241693e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for purpleflock.net — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
noor.ns.cloudflare.com 162.159.38.74
108.162.194.74
172.64.34.74 		2a06:98c1:50::ac40:224a
2606:4700:50::a29f:264a
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c24a 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2398241693
ned.ns.cloudflare.com 108.162.193.210
172.64.33.210
173.245.59.210 		2606:4700:58::adf5:3bd2
2a06:98c1:50::ac40:21d2
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c1d2 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2398241693
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • CDS/CDNSKEY automation present but only single KSK — pre-publish second KSK before rollover

DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 34505 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
KSK 2371 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence NSEC

NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.

Rollover Readiness Partial

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: full
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes MTA-STS enforces TLS for all inbound mail delivery

No MX records found

Policy Assessment Primary
  • MTA-STS policy in enforce mode requires encrypted transport (RFC 8461)
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
Telemetry
TLS-RPT configured — domain receives reports about TLS delivery failures from sending mail servers (RFC 8460)
Reporting to: mailto:tlsreport@sportcommunities.group
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — No MX records found for this domain
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
172.67.132.214 → AS13335 (172.67.128.0/20)
104.21.13.132 → AS13335 (104.21.0.0/19)
IPv6 Mappings:
2606:4700:3030::ac43:84d6 → AS13335 (2606:4700:3030::/48)
2606:4700:3033::6815:d84 → AS13335 (2606:4700:3033::/48)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 — MUST implement, recommended default (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
2371 13 2 C9D8655D8D0164E03A429569FAFB71449AB8CAD851F3A632F80157894FF07C7A

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ned.ns.cloudflare.com noor.ns.cloudflare.com
Managed DNS
All 2 nameservers hosted by Cloudflare. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Cloudflare
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [188.114.96.0 188.114.97.0]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS HTTP/3 ECH

HTTPS records found, HTTP/3 supported, ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) enabled

PriorityTargetALPNECHRaw
1 . h3, h2 Yes purpleflock.net. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h3,h2" ipv4hint="104.21.13.132,172.67.132.214" ech="AEX+DQBB6gAgACCzPFojevkWfoe1yYwcxEirDyso873zC7hqj3rt38gWQQAEAAEAAQASY2xvdWRmbGFyZS1lY2guY29tAAA=" ipv6hint="2606:4700:3030::ac43:84d6,2606:4700:3033::6815:d84"

CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS CDNSKEY

Full RFC 8078 automated DNSSEC key rollover signaling detected (CDS + CDNSKEY)

Key TagAlgorithmDigest TypeDigest
2371 ECDSAP256SHA256 2
CDNSKEY Records:
FlagsProtocolAlgorithmPublic Key
257 3 ECDSAP256SHA256
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

172.67.132.214
104.21.13.132
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700:3030::ac43:84d6
2606:4700:3033::6815:d84
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

0 .
Null MX RFC 7505
Domain explicitly does not accept email

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: Null MX (no mail) Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 1 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 1 current 0 expired Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
www.purpleflock.net DNS Current — 3 2025-12-22 Let's Encrypt, Google Trust Services
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
172.67.132.214
104.21.13.132
104.21.13.132
172.67.132.214
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2606:4700:3030::ac43:84d6
2606:4700:3030::ac43:84d6
2606:4700:3033::6815:d84
2606:4700:3033::6815:d84
CAA RFC 8659 §4 11 / 0 records
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
—
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
—
0 issue "ssl.com"
—
0 iodef "mailto:sslreport@sportcommunities.group"
—
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
—
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
—
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
—
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
—
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
—
0 issue "comodoca.com"
—
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
—
DMARC _dmarc.purpleflock.net RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; np=reject; rua=mailto:7d48d72da5fb4f42ac4aa4f4d409be16@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; np=reject; rua=mailto:7d48d72da5fb4f42ac4aa4f4d409be16@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net
MTA-STS _mta-sts.purpleflock.net RFC 8461 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1; id=1770681707;
v=STSv1; id=1770681707;
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 .
0 .
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
noor.ns.cloudflare.com.
ned.ns.cloudflare.com.
ned.ns.cloudflare.com.
noor.ns.cloudflare.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ned.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2398241693 10000 2400 604800 1800
ned.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2398241693 10000 2400 604800 1800
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.purpleflock.net RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsreport@sportcommunities.group;
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsreport@sportcommunities.group;
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=spf1 -all
v=spf1 -all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

ab020f7bb2fd369495bc8bfb251e443c6ecd66448a3e0edfd8c9fcb2dcfbdc707aba6e6fb7f5f6f8aee1ed83e7879c892c5ba3486bbed974047f77f5aa2d14cf
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 8 Mar 2026, 01:26 UTC.
Internet Archive — Permanent Record Wayback Machine Can this analysis be independently verified? Archived

This analysis has been automatically submitted to the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, creating a tamper-proof, third-party-hosted snapshot of the DNS security posture at analysis time. This archived copy is independent of DNS Tool — it cannot be altered, deleted, or disputed. Combined with the SHA-3-512 integrity hash, this creates a legally defensible chain of evidence for domain security state.

View Archived Snapshot
Snapshot preserved at https://web.archive.org/web/20260308012645/https://dnstool.it-help.tech/analysis/6464/view/E
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-purpleflock.net.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-purpleflock.net.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-purpleflock.net.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-purpleflock.net.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/6464/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for purpleflock.net. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short purpleflock.net TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.purpleflock.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.purpleflock.net TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer purpleflock.net DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd purpleflock.net A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.purpleflock.net TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.purpleflock.net/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.purpleflock.net TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.purpleflock.net TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/purpleflock.net' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.purpleflock.net&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://purpleflock.net/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://purpleflock.net/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://purpleflock.net/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 172.67.132.214 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 214.132.67.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.21.13.132 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 132.13.21.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4841 runs
DKIM
Verified 4660 runs
DMARC
Verified 4825 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4644 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4822 runs
BIMI
Verified 4659 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4662 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4664 runs
CAA
Verified 4656 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short purpleflock.net TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.purpleflock.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.purpleflock.net TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer purpleflock.net DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd purpleflock.net A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.purpleflock.net TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.purpleflock.net/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.purpleflock.net TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.purpleflock.net TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer purpleflock.net CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/purpleflock.net' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.purpleflock.net&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://purpleflock.net/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://purpleflock.net/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://purpleflock.net/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 172.67.132.214 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 214.132.67.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.21.13.132 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 132.13.21.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

purpleflock.net

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.