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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 6 Mar 2026, 14:34 UTC
Duration 20.1s
Version v26.34.52
Integrity 79521436a84362827ddbc13914f620486b15069045bad94756839ad03140155b77384049f02b7d12cfb44650bfaed8a3feef1b5edf5282d7ecba018d9acb07dc
Subject Domain
maltejk.de

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

maltejk.de
6 Mar 2026, 14:34 UTC · 20.1s ·v26.34.52 · SHA-3-512: 7952✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 2 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
6 protocols configured, 3 not configured Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC deployment phase — quarantine fully enforced with reporting, consider upgrading to reject Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 1 monitoring
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 67/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 59% Currency 76/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 76/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
A 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
NS 21569s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 21569s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
TXT 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 6 hours (21600s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for maltejk.de
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Cloudflare — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS arya.ns.cloudflare.com
Serial 2397660806
Admin dns.cloudflare.com
Provider Cloudflare
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10000s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry2400sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)1800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s). Cloudflare's anycast architecture reduces the practical risk, but this value departs from the RFC recommendation.
RFC 1912 §2.2

Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

SOA Expire below RFC 1912 recommendation RFC 1912 §2.2

Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.

Below RFC recommendation
Proxied record TTLs fixed at 300s RFC 2181 §5.2

Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.

Technically compliant, but overrides administrator intent
Non-standard SOA serial format RFC 1912 §2.2

RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.

Compliant with RFC 1035, deviates from RFC 1912 convention
Negative cache TTL delays new records RFC 2308 §5

Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.

RFC-compliant, but causes real-world automation failures
Historical RFC 2181 §5.2 violation: TTL mismatch in CNAME RRsets RFC 2181 §5.2

In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.

Was a documented RFC violation — appears resolved
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 33.4s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Recommended
Upgrade DMARC policy from quarantine to reject (p=reject) for maximum spoofing protection
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
SPF, DMARC (quarantine, 100%), DKIM (inferred via Unknown), DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Upgrade DMARC to Reject

Your DMARC policy is set to quarantine. Upgrade to p=reject for maximum protection — reject instructs receivers to discard spoofed mail entirely rather than quarantining it.

A reject policy provides the strongest protection against domain spoofing.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.maltejk.de (update existing DMARC record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@maltejk.de
RFC 7489 §6.3
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

Your domain has DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest email transport security available. TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.maltejk.de (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@maltejk.de
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.maltejk.de (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=maltejk.de
RFC 8461
Registrar (NS INFERENCE) INFERRED LIVE
Cloudflare Registrar
Inferred from NS records
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Cloudflare
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:mailbox.org ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC quarantine — good protection. Moving to p=reject would achieve the strongest stance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Quarantined, not rejected
Success p=quarantine

DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s; pct=100; rf=iodef; ri=3600; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-aggregate@maltejk.de; ruf=mailto:dmarc-forensic@maltejk.de
Alignment: SPF strict DKIM strict sp=none
Subdomains unprotected (sp=none while p=quarantine)
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC deployment phase — quarantine fully enforced with reporting, consider upgrading to reject
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Not Discoverable

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 3/3 MX

DANE configured — TLSA records found for all 3 MX hosts

MX Host Usage Selector Match Certificate Data
mxext3.mailbox.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 e41cc7633029afdba53744d7e5fc31ef507e592de9dfb33557bf3b9a79239446
mxext3.mailbox.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 4758af6f02dfb5dc8795fa402e77a8a0486af5e85d2ca60c294476aadc40b220
mxext3.mailbox.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 996ad31d65e03f038b8ec950f6f26611529da03e3a283e4400cba2edd04b8a88
mxext1.mailbox.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 996ad31d65e03f038b8ec950f6f26611529da03e3a283e4400cba2edd04b8a88
mxext1.mailbox.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 e41cc7633029afdba53744d7e5fc31ef507e592de9dfb33557bf3b9a79239446
mxext1.mailbox.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 4758af6f02dfb5dc8795fa402e77a8a0486af5e85d2ca60c294476aadc40b220
mxext2.mailbox.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 996ad31d65e03f038b8ec950f6f26611529da03e3a283e4400cba2edd04b8a88
mxext2.mailbox.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 e41cc7633029afdba53744d7e5fc31ef507e592de9dfb33557bf3b9a79239446
mxext2.mailbox.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 4758af6f02dfb5dc8795fa402e77a8a0486af5e85d2ca60c294476aadc40b220
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest cryptographic transport security. DANE binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, creating a verifiable chain of trust from root to mail server (RFC 7672 §1.3). MTA-STS could complement this for senders that don't validate DNSSEC, but DANE alone provides the highest level of protection available.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3), and no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes; CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4) but visual brand faking remains open

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - only cansignhttpexchanges=yes, Sectigo, Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, ssl.com can issue certificates (wildcard issuance: DigiCert, cansignhttpexchanges=yes, Let's Encrypt, Sectigo, ssl.com per RFC 8659 §4.3)

Authorized CAs: cansignhttpexchanges=yes Sectigo Let's Encrypt DigiCert ssl.com
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116

security.txt found but missing required fields

Contact

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.3)

Expires

Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
Source: https://maltejk.de/.well-known/security.txt
Missing required Contact field (RFC 9116 §2.5.3)
Missing required Expires field (RFC 9116 §2.5.5)
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? Yes

AI governance signals observed

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? Yes
llms.txt found — domain provides structured context for LLMs
llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context)
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (3 items)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
llms_txt_found llms.txt file found providing structured LLM context info Observed
llms_full_txt_found llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) info Observed
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (1)
  • https://maltejk.de/
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on arya.ns.cloudflare.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: arya.ns.cloudflare.com, rick.ns.cloudflare.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key TagDS AlgorithmDNSKEY Key TagDNSKEY Algorithm
2371 13 2371 13

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
arya.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK
rick.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

arya.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.397660806e+09
rick.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.397660806e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for maltejk.de — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
rick.ns.cloudflare.com 172.64.33.139
173.245.59.139
108.162.193.139 		2a06:98c1:50::ac40:218b
2606:4700:58::adf5:3b8b
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c18b 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2397660806
arya.ns.cloudflare.com 173.245.58.70
172.64.32.70
108.162.192.70 		2803:f800:50::6ca2:c046
2606:4700:50::adf5:3a46
2a06:98c1:50::ac40:2046 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2397660806
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • CDS/CDNSKEY automation present but only single KSK — pre-publish second KSK before rollover

DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 34505 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
KSK 2371 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence NSEC

NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.

Rollover Readiness Partial

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: full
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (1 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC (RFC 7672)
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 4 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
172.67.184.245 → AS13335 (172.67.176.0/20)
104.21.19.39 → AS13335 (104.21.0.0/19)
IPv6 Mappings:
2606:4700:3036::ac43:b8f5 → AS13335 (2606:4700:3036::/48)
2606:4700:3031::6815:1327 → AS13335 (2606:4700:3031::/48)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 2 services

2 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google Workspace google-site-verification=pBCG0df_kCEs4ziyS0OCxH3cEF34AuSAPbOoukLgT8E
Microsoft 365 MS=ms24014811
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 — MUST implement, recommended default (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
2371 13 2 E8F7F875A99E9651235BAA594AD4640752D93EEA4D64519F496BEF12EAC0B2A1

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: arya.ns.cloudflare.com rick.ns.cloudflare.com
Managed DNS
All 2 nameservers hosted by Cloudflare. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Cloudflare
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records

HTTPS / SVCB Records RFC 9460 Success HTTPS HTTP/3 ECH

HTTPS records found, HTTP/3 supported, ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) enabled

PriorityTargetALPNECHRaw
1 . h3, h2 Yes maltejk.de. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h3,h2" ipv4hint="104.21.19.39,172.67.184.245" ech="AEX+DQBB1wAgACARvyZ+as39ngNe87gX4wmBQA7NBgtsqchTNMP+XWqVGwAEAAEAAQASY2xvdWRmbGFyZS1lY2guY29tAAA=" ipv6hint="2606:4700:3031::6815:1327,2606:4700:3036::ac43:b8f5"

CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS CDNSKEY

Full RFC 8078 automated DNSSEC key rollover signaling detected (CDS + CDNSKEY)

Key TagAlgorithmDigest TypeDigest
2371 ECDSAP256SHA256 2
CDNSKEY Records:
FlagsProtocolAlgorithmPublic Key
257 3 ECDSAP256SHA256
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

172.67.184.245
104.21.19.39
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700:3036::ac43:b8f5
2606:4700:3031::6815:1327
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 mxext2.mailbox.org.
10 mxext1.mailbox.org.
20 mxext3.mailbox.org.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

_autodiscover._tcp: 0 0 443 auto.mailbox.org.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 3 servers Services: 1 endpoint
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 3 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 3 current 0 expired 1 CNAME Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
cloud.maltejk.de DNS Current — 6 2025-12-25 Google Trust Services, Sectigo Limited
tempus.maltejk.de CT Log Current kaffenberger.kimai.cloud 4 2026-02-06T02:57:14 Let's Encrypt
www.maltejk.de CT Log Current — 6 2026-02-18T04:29:58 Google Trust Services
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
172.67.184.245
104.21.19.39
104.21.19.39
172.67.184.245
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2606:4700:3036::ac43:b8f5
2606:4700:3031::6815:1327
2606:4700:3031::6815:1327
2606:4700:3036::ac43:b8f5
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Synchronized 10 / 10 records
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
DMARC _dmarc.maltejk.de RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s; pct=100; rf=iodef; ri=3600; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-aggregate@maltejk.de; ruf=mailto:dmarc-forensic@maltejk.de
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s; pct=100; rf=iodef; ri=3600; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-aggregate@maltejk.de; ruf=mailto:dmarc-forensic@maltejk.de
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
10 mxext2.mailbox.org.
10 mxext1.mailbox.org.
10 mxext1.mailbox.org.
10 mxext2.mailbox.org.
20 mxext3.mailbox.org.
20 mxext3.mailbox.org.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
rick.ns.cloudflare.com.
arya.ns.cloudflare.com.
arya.ns.cloudflare.com.
rick.ns.cloudflare.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
arya.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2397660806 10000 2400 604800 1800
arya.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2397660806 10000 2400 604800 1800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
v=spf1 include:mailbox.org ~all
MS=ms24014811
google-site-verification=pBCG0df_kCEs4ziyS0OCxH3cEF34AuSAPbOoukLgT8E
google-site-verification=pBCG0df_kCEs4ziyS0OCxH3cEF34AuSAPbOoukLgT8E
MS=ms24014811
v=spf1 include:mailbox.org ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

79521436a84362827ddbc13914f620486b15069045bad94756839ad03140155b77384049f02b7d12cfb44650bfaed8a3feef1b5edf5282d7ecba018d9acb07dc
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 6 Mar 2026, 14:34 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-maltejk.de.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-maltejk.de.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-maltejk.de.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-maltejk.de.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/6105/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for maltejk.de. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short maltejk.de TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.maltejk.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.maltejk.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.maltejk.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.maltejk.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.maltejk.de TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer maltejk.de DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd maltejk.de A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mxext2.mailbox.org RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxext2.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxext1.mailbox.org RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxext1.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxext3.mailbox.org RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxext3.mailbox.org TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mxext2.mailbox.org) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxext2.mailbox.org:25 -servername mxext2.mailbox.org 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.maltejk.de TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.maltejk.de/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.maltejk.de TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.maltejk.de TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/maltejk.de' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mxext2.mailbox.org) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxext2.mailbox.org:25 -servername mxext2.mailbox.org </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.maltejk.de&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://maltejk.de/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://maltejk.de/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://maltejk.de/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 172.67.184.245 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 245.184.67.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.21.19.39 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 39.19.21.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4843 runs
DKIM
Verified 4662 runs
DMARC
Verified 4827 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4646 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4824 runs
BIMI
Verified 4661 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4664 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4666 runs
CAA
Verified 4658 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short maltejk.de TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.maltejk.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.maltejk.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.maltejk.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.maltejk.de TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.maltejk.de TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer maltejk.de DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd maltejk.de A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mxext2.mailbox.org (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxext2.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxext1.mailbox.org (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxext1.mailbox.org TLSA
Check TLSA record for mxext3.mailbox.org (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mxext3.mailbox.org TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mxext2.mailbox.org) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxext2.mailbox.org:25 -servername mxext2.mailbox.org 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.maltejk.de TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.maltejk.de/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.maltejk.de TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.maltejk.de TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer maltejk.de CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/maltejk.de' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mxext2.mailbox.org) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mxext2.mailbox.org:25 -servername mxext2.mailbox.org </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.maltejk.de&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://maltejk.de/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://maltejk.de/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://maltejk.de/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 172.67.184.245 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 245.184.67.172.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.21.19.39 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 39.19.21.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

maltejk.de

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.