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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 11 Feb 2026, 22:34 UTC
Duration 27.4s
Version v26.12.17
Integrity e57ac2c355a67ce0dbffdb11e43824d7e9762688b57edbf4cf06799220fe4273e6fbba644cb0f66653ab4133807b2f6b39780a34b43ad2076f9e73eb70ea64d5
Subject Domain
ietf.org

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

ietf.org
11 Feb 2026, 22:34 UTC · 27.4s ·v26.12.17 · SHA-3-512: e57a✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk Monitoring
5 protocols configured, 3 not configured DMARC is in monitoring mode (p=none) with aggregate reporting active — this appears to be a deliberate deployment phase before enforcement Why we go beyond letter grades
1 monitoring
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Basic
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Monitoring
DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none)
Configured
SPF (~all), DKIM (provider-verified), BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Escalate DMARC from monitoring to enforcement

Change your DMARC policy from p=none to p=quarantine (then p=reject). Review your DMARC aggregate reports first to ensure legitimate senders pass authentication.

_dmarc.ietf.org TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@ietf.org"
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Deploy MTA-STS policy

Publish an MTA-STS DNS record and host a policy file at https://mta-sts.ietf.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. This tells senders to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.

_mta-sts.ietf.org TXT "v=STSv1; id=20240101"
RFC 8461 §3
Low Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com). CAA is advisory — CAs must check it before issuing, but absence means any CA can issue.

ietf.org CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659 §4
Low Configure TLS-RPT reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain. Helps diagnose MTA-STS and STARTTLS issues.

_smtp._tls.ietf.org TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@ietf.org"
RFC 8460 §3
Registrar (WHOIS) LIVE
Cloudflare, Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Google Workspace
Email: Monitoring
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Cloudflare Enterprise
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Partially
Verdict: Partial email authentication configured — some spoofed messages may be delivered. DMARC is in monitoring mode (p=none).

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 ip4:166.84.6.31 ip4:166.84.7.238 ip6:2602:f977:800:f7f6::/64 include:_spf.google.com include:spf.hostedrt.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain has DMARC p=none (monitoring only). Enforcing quarantine or reject is recommended to gain real protection.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only
Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email,mailto:dmarc-report@ietf.org
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. DMARC is in monitoring mode (p=none) with aggregate reporting active — this appears to be a deliberate deployment phase before enforcement
Escalate DMARC from monitoring to enforcement:
_dmarc.ietf.org TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@ietf.org"
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Provider-managed
Provider Verified

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

Google Workspace detected as primary mail platform — DKIM signing is managed by the provider. The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 1/1 MX

DANE configured — TLSA records found for all 1 MX host

MX Host Usage Selector Match Certificate Data
mail2.ietf.org 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 d39b310da9dfcb60d705f94f2aea8234fb5b039653c3f0d47a33bc746d28dcae
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest cryptographic transport security. DANE binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, creating a verifiable chain of trust from root to mail server (RFC 7672 §1.3). MTA-STS could complement this for senders that don't validate DNSSEC, but DANE alone provides the highest level of protection available.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: BIMI brand logo configured. CAA not configured — any CA can issue certificates.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success No VMC SVG

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Yes

BIMI configured - logo validated (VMC recommended for Gmail)

BIMI works without VMC! VMC (Verified Mark Certificate) requires a registered trademark. Small businesses can use BIMI with just a logo - it shows in Apple Mail and some providers. Gmail requires VMC.
v=BIMI1;l=https://static.ietf.org/logos/ietf-bimi.svg
BIMI Logo
Logo validated (SVG) View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Not Enforced

Transport security inferred from 1 DNS signal(s)

Direct SMTP probe unavailable (port 25 blocked). Transport security inferred from DNS policy records and provider capabilities.
Transport Security Signals:
  • DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC
SMTP port 25 may be blocked by hosting provider — this is common for cloud platforms
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
2371 13 2 B1AE88AFF068DDEC3F7FF662F47D6599C74134425C67106E6C203942D6227EA4

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: jill.ns.cloudflare.com ken.ns.cloudflare.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

104.16.44.99
104.16.45.99
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2606:4700::6810:2c63
2606:4700::6810:2d63
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

0 mail2.ietf.org.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Google Workspace

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (2 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? Unavailable
How did we find these?

Passive discovery using Certificate Transparency Logs — publicly auditable records of every TLS certificate ever issued. Certificate Transparency lookup failed

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 2 / 2 records
104.16.44.99
104.16.44.99
104.16.45.99
104.16.45.99
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2606:4700::6810:2c63
2606:4700::6810:2c63
2606:4700::6810:2d63
2606:4700::6810:2d63
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.ietf.org RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email,mailto:dmarc-report@ietf.org
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email,mailto:dmarc-report@ietf.org
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 mail2.ietf.org.
0 mail2.ietf.org.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
jill.ns.cloudflare.com.
jill.ns.cloudflare.com.
ken.ns.cloudflare.com.
ken.ns.cloudflare.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
jill.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2396329116 10000 2400 604800 1800
jill.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2396329116 10000 2400 604800 1800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 3 / 3 records
v=spf1 ip4:166.84.6.31 ip4:166.84.7.238 ip6:2602:f977:800:f7f6::/64 include:_spf.google.com include:spf.hostedrt.com ~all
ca3-5567e36d3f9947308ac2892e009840cc
vs58md9pf8hu6knlglfda9lk6g
v=spf1 ip4:166.84.6.31 ip4:166.84.7.238 ip6:2602:f977:800:f7f6::/64 include:_spf.google.com include:spf.hostedrt.com ~all
ca3-5567e36d3f9947308ac2892e009840cc
vs58md9pf8hu6knlglfda9lk6g
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

e57ac2c355a67ce0dbffdb11e43824d7e9762688b57edbf4cf06799220fe4273e6fbba644cb0f66653ab4133807b2f6b39780a34b43ad2076f9e73eb70ea64d5
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 11 Feb 2026, 22:34 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-ietf.org.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-ietf.org.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-ietf.org.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-ietf.org.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/607/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for ietf.org. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short ietf.org TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.ietf.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.ietf.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.ietf.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.ietf.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.ietf.org TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer ietf.org DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd ietf.org A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mail2.ietf.org RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail2.ietf.org TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mail2.ietf.org) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail2.ietf.org:25 -servername mail2.ietf.org 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.ietf.org TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.ietf.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.ietf.org TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.ietf.org TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/ietf.org' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mail2.ietf.org) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail2.ietf.org:25 -servername mail2.ietf.org </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.ietf.org&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://ietf.org/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://ietf.org/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://ietf.org/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.16.44.99 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 99.44.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.16.45.99 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 99.45.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4876 runs
DKIM
Verified 4694 runs
DMARC
Verified 4859 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4678 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4857 runs
BIMI
Verified 4693 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4696 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4698 runs
CAA
Verified 4690 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short ietf.org TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.ietf.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.ietf.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.ietf.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.ietf.org TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.ietf.org TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer ietf.org DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd ietf.org A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mail2.ietf.org (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail2.ietf.org TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mail2.ietf.org) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail2.ietf.org:25 -servername mail2.ietf.org 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.ietf.org TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.ietf.org/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.ietf.org TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.ietf.org TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer ietf.org CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/ietf.org' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mail2.ietf.org) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail2.ietf.org:25 -servername mail2.ietf.org </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.ietf.org&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://ietf.org/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://ietf.org/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://ietf.org/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 104.16.44.99 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 99.44.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 104.16.45.99 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 99.45.16.104.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

ietf.org

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.