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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 5 Mar 2026, 10:53 UTC
Duration 12.8s
Version v26.34.20
Integrity be7620979c01a1043b00629f583572cfb6adf5bd892c4c8588f14048aeefdaae3e78d9e8aff354a7d8eb65e179af2b4086e20c19ed7ed127b50e7164869cf7c0
Subject Domain
spjslatina.ro

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

spjslatina.ro
5 Mar 2026, 10:53 UTC · 12.8s ·v26.34.20 · SHA-3-512: be76✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 1 SaaS Service
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
4 protocols configured, 5 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
2 recommendations
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 66/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 63% Currency 69/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 69/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions
Enterprise Traffic Engineering Detected DNS-based Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB)

This domain uses short TTLs across 3 record types (A record at 120s), consistent with DNS-based traffic management (GSLB). Enterprises operating large anycast networks intentionally use short TTLs to enable rapid failover, geographic steering, and load distribution. This is a deliberate infrastructure choice, not a misconfiguration. RFC 1035 §3.2.1 permits any TTL value the zone administrator selects. The findings below reflect deviation from typical values for reference, not necessarily actionable recommendations for this class of infrastructure.

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from typical values. For domains using DNS-based traffic management, short TTLs are expected and intentional.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
SOA 21570s 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is above typical — observed 21570s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.
A 2 minutes (120s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 2 minutes (120s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 2 minutes (120s) 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 2 minutes (120s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 2 minutes (120s) 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 2 minutes (120s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 21571s 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 21571s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • This domain runs short TTLs across multiple record types. Does it operate a global anycast network where DNS-based traffic steering justifies the query volume?
  • Are the short TTLs enabling active failover, geographic routing, or load distribution — or are they leftover from a migration that was never reverted?
  • Enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure (sub-5ms authoritative response times, globally distributed nameservers) absorbs short-TTL query volume. Would your authoritative DNS handle the same load?
Tune TTL for spjslatina.ro
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) Note: Some DNS providers (e.g., AWS Route 53 alias records, Cloudflare proxied records) enforce fixed TTLs that cannot be modified. If a finding targets a record you cannot edit, it reflects the observed value rather than a configuration error on your part.
Primary NS ns11.globehosting.net
Serial 2026020701
Admin techteam.instra.com
Provider Unknown
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh3600s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry1800sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)86400s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 31.2s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Upgrade DMARC policy from quarantine to reject (p=reject) for maximum spoofing protection, Add DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) for visibility into email authentication
Configured
SPF, DMARC (quarantine, 100%), DKIM, TLS-RPT
Not Configured
MTA-STS, BIMI, DANE, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Add DMARC Aggregate Reporting

Add a rua= tag to receive aggregate DMARC reports. Without reporting, you cannot monitor authentication failures.

Aggregate reports show who is sending mail as your domain and whether it passes authentication.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.spjslatina.ro (add to existing DMARC record)
Valuerua=mailto:dmarc-reports@spjslatina.ro
RFC 7489 §7.1
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Medium Upgrade DMARC to Reject

Your DMARC policy is set to quarantine. Upgrade to p=reject for maximum protection — reject instructs receivers to discard spoofed mail entirely rather than quarantining it.

A reject policy provides the strongest protection against domain spoofing.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.spjslatina.ro (update existing DMARC record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@spjslatina.ro
RFC 7489 §6.3
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostspjslatina.ro (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.spjslatina.ro (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=spjslatina.ro
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
Unknown
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Unlikely SPF and DMARC quarantine policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 5/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 5/10 lookups

v=spf1 +mx +a +ip4:185.33.180.137 +include:mail.hostingww.com +include:_spf.globehosting.net +include:relay.mailchannels.net ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC quarantine — good protection. Moving to p=reject would achieve the strongest stance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Quarantined, not rejected
Success p=quarantine

DMARC policy quarantine (100%) - good protection

v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=none
Subdomains unprotected (sp=none while p=quarantine)
No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
Monitoring Posture Note: Quarantine sequesters authentication failures while preserving full DMARC forensic telemetry (RFC 7489 §7). Some organizations maintain quarantine rather than reject as a deliberate monitoring strategy — failed messages are processed and reported but sequestered from the inbox. See NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1 for enforcement tradeoffs.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Not discoverable
Weak Keys

Found 1 DKIM selector(s) with weak key(s) (1024-bit)

1024-bit key (weak, upgrade to 2048)
default._domainkey 1024-bit Weak
k=rsa; p=MHwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADawAwaAJhALjQY1adQ0/+Pz2R28RcEfwePeUlacJXd54VbYD9xIdvTzpB02vVsoY10i9/X0J5uWSFFL8Lq+apw7HZ1BIO6j15drnVlsO675t1lUXKVDnWq9hXXc8gtkO4qXT8xgph3wIDAQAB;
RFC Stance: RFC 6376 (Internet Standard) defines the DKIM mechanism. DKIM selectors are not publicly enumerable — absence in a scan does not prove absence of signing.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsrpt@spjslatina.ro;
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 1 MX host)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC quarantine flags but does not reject spoofed mail (RFC 7489 §6.3) — no BIMI or CAA (RFC 8659) reinforcement leaves brand impersonation largely unaddressed

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns12.globehosting.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: ns12.globehosting.net, ns11.globehosting.net

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns11.globehosting.net No N/A N/A OK
ns12.globehosting.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns11.globehosting.net: 2.026020701e+09
ns12.globehosting.net: 2.026020701e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for spjslatina.ro — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns11.globehosting.net 188.213.19.7 None AS3223 2026020701
ns12.globehosting.net 164.90.206.112 2a03:b0c0:2:d0::119f:b001 AS14061
DigitalOcean, LLC 		2026020701
Unique ASNs
2
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
2
Diversity Score
Good

2 ASNs, 2 /24 prefixes across 2 nameservers

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Partially TLS reporting is configured but no transport enforcement policy is active

0/1 servers support STARTTLS (direct probe)

Policy Assessment Primary
  • TLS-RPT configured — domain monitors TLS delivery failures (RFC 8460)
Telemetry
TLS-RPT configured — domain receives reports about TLS delivery failures from sending mail servers (RFC 8460)
Reporting to: mailto:tlsrpt@spjslatina.ro
Live Probe Supplementary
MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Certificate
spjslatina.ro N/A N/A Invalid
Unexpected SMTP banner
Multi-Vantage Probe Results
Unanimous: No TLS 2 probes, 2 responded
France - EU observed
No TLS detected
US-East (Boston) observed
No TLS detected
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 1 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS196763 DE
IPv4 Mappings:
185.33.180.137 → AS196763 (185.33.180.0/22)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 1 service

1 SaaS service detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google Workspace google-site-verification=oikbeJ7OfbFAT74VXrbU-UIGNdlWDN2UP-Sbj4rUe1c
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns11.globehosting.net ns12.globehosting.net
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

185.33.180.137
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

0 spjslatina.ro.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

_caldavs._tcp: 0 0 2080 spjslatina.ro.
_carddavs._tcp: 0 0 2080 spjslatina.ro.
_autodiscover._tcp: 0 0 443 cpanelemaildiscovery.cpanel.net.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 3 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 11 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 11 current 0 expired 2 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
autoconfig.spjslatina.ro DNS Current — — — —
autodiscover.spjslatina.ro DNS Current — — — —
cpanel.spjslatina.ro DNS Current — — — —
feedback.spjslatina.ro DNS Current — — — —
ftp.spjslatina.ro DNS Current — — — —
mail.spjslatina.ro DNS Current spjslatina.ro — — —
mobile.spjslatina.ro DNS Current — — — —
portal.spjslatina.ro DNS Current — — — —
webmail.spjslatina.ro DNS Current — — — —
whm.spjslatina.ro
80/tcp LiteSpeed 443/tcp LiteSpeed
DNS Current — — — —
www.spjslatina.ro DNS Current spjslatina.ro — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
185.33.180.137
185.33.180.137
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.spjslatina.ro RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
0 spjslatina.ro.
0 spjslatina.ro.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
ns11.globehosting.net.
ns12.globehosting.net.
ns12.globehosting.net.
ns11.globehosting.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns11.globehosting.net. techteam.instra.com. 2026020701 3600 1800 1209600 86400
ns11.globehosting.net. techteam.instra.com. 2026020701 3600 1800 1209600 86400
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.spjslatina.ro RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsrpt@spjslatina.ro;
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsrpt@spjslatina.ro;
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
v=spf1 +mx +a +ip4:185.33.180.137 +include:mail.hostingww.com +include:_spf.globehosting.net +include:relay.mailchannels.net ~all
google-site-verification=oikbeJ7OfbFAT74VXrbU-UIGNdlWDN2UP-Sbj4rUe1c
google-site-verification=oikbeJ7OfbFAT74VXrbU-UIGNdlWDN2UP-Sbj4rUe1c
v=spf1 +mx +a +ip4:185.33.180.137 +include:mail.hostingww.com +include:_spf.globehosting.net +include:relay.mailchannels.net ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

be7620979c01a1043b00629f583572cfb6adf5bd892c4c8588f14048aeefdaae3e78d9e8aff354a7d8eb65e179af2b4086e20c19ed7ed127b50e7164869cf7c0
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 5 Mar 2026, 10:53 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-spjslatina.ro.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-spjslatina.ro.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-spjslatina.ro.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-spjslatina.ro.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/5843/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for spjslatina.ro. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short spjslatina.ro TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.spjslatina.ro TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.spjslatina.ro TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer spjslatina.ro DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd spjslatina.ro A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for spjslatina.ro RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.spjslatina.ro TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (spjslatina.ro) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect spjslatina.ro:25 -servername spjslatina.ro 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.spjslatina.ro TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.spjslatina.ro/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.spjslatina.ro TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.spjslatina.ro TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/spjslatina.ro' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (spjslatina.ro) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect spjslatina.ro:25 -servername spjslatina.ro </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.spjslatina.ro&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://spjslatina.ro/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://spjslatina.ro/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://spjslatina.ro/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 185.33.180.137 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 137.180.33.185.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4858 runs
DKIM
Verified 4677 runs
DMARC
Verified 4842 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4661 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4839 runs
BIMI
Verified 4676 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4679 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4681 runs
CAA
Verified 4673 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short spjslatina.ro TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.spjslatina.ro TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.spjslatina.ro TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer spjslatina.ro DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd spjslatina.ro A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for spjslatina.ro (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.spjslatina.ro TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (spjslatina.ro) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect spjslatina.ro:25 -servername spjslatina.ro 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.spjslatina.ro TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.spjslatina.ro/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.spjslatina.ro TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.spjslatina.ro TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer spjslatina.ro CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/spjslatina.ro' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (spjslatina.ro) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect spjslatina.ro:25 -servername spjslatina.ro </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.spjslatina.ro&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://spjslatina.ro/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://spjslatina.ro/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://spjslatina.ro/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 185.33.180.137 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 137.180.33.185.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

spjslatina.ro

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.