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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 5 Mar 2026, 10:52 UTC
Duration 15.3s
Version v26.34.20
Integrity 63694f587a2a12f07525ac936164fb175d4158aaba1f9cdbbff7cb0d7566042a028d4350693b70996e644838aa078773f1dd5e328993f981d0a3a80972e48015
Subject Domain
cnn.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

cnn.com
5 Mar 2026, 10:52 UTC · 15.3s ·v26.34.20 · SHA-3-512: 6369✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Microsoft 365 9 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
4 protocols configured, 4 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 66/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 63% Currency 68/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 68/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Stale
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions
Enterprise Traffic Engineering Detected DNS-based Global Server Load Balancing (GSLB)

This domain uses short TTLs across 4 record types (A record at 26s), consistent with DNS-based traffic management (GSLB). Enterprises operating large anycast networks intentionally use short TTLs to enable rapid failover, geographic steering, and load distribution. This is a deliberate infrastructure choice, not a misconfiguration. RFC 1035 §3.2.1 permits any TTL value the zone administrator selects. The findings below reflect deviation from typical values for reference, not necessarily actionable recommendations for this class of infrastructure.

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from typical values. For domains using DNS-based traffic management, short TTLs are expected and intentional.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
A 26s 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 26s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 230s 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 230s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
MX 239s 1 hour (3600s) high MX TTL is below typical — observed 239s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 239s 1 hour (3600s) high TXT TTL is below typical — observed 239s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 1469s 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 1469s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 15 minutes (900s) 1 hour (3600s) medium SOA TTL is below typical — observed 15 minutes (900s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • This domain runs short TTLs across multiple record types. Does it operate a global anycast network where DNS-based traffic steering justifies the query volume?
  • Are the short TTLs enabling active failover, geographic routing, or load distribution — or are they leftover from a migration that was never reverted?
  • Enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure (sub-5ms authoritative response times, globally distributed nameservers) absorbs short-TTL query volume. Would your authoritative DNS handle the same load?
Tune TTL for cnn.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: AWS Route 53 — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ns-1652.awsdns-14.co.uk
Serial 1
Admin awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com
Provider AWS Route 53
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh7200s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry900sFraction of Refresh
Expire1209600s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)86400s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
All SOA timer values are within RFC 1912 recommended ranges.

Independent RFC compliance assessment for AWS Route 53. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

Alias record TTLs fixed at 60s RFC 1035 §3.2.1

AWS Route 53 alias records pointing to AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3, API Gateway) have a fixed TTL of 60 seconds that cannot be modified. Route 53 alias records are an AWS-specific extension — not part of standard DNS RFCs. They solve the CNAME-at-apex problem (RFC prohibits CNAME at zone apex) by appearing as A/AAAA records to resolvers. The 60-second TTL ensures fast failover but removes administrator TTL control.

Proprietary extension — not covered by DNS RFCs
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Protected
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM, BIMI
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostcnn.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.cnn.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@cnn.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.cnn.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=cnn.com
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Nom-iq Ltd. dba COM LAUDE
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Microsoft 365
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Amazon Route 53
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 3/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 3/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:cnn.com._nspf.vali.email include:%{i}._ip.%{h}._ehlo.%{d}._spf.vali.email include:mail.zendesk.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email; ruf=mailto:Njk3@ruf.vali.email
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 9 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

DKIM key management delegated — _domainkey.cnn.com NS records point to an external service (ns.vali.email). DKIM selectors are dynamically managed and may include keys for services beyond what static scanning discovers.
cm._domainkey Campaign Monitor 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDJkTS3JcJ4hQRsv1cliVntd8zWldCF+myBiXRgwIdqdlbQ+s/yIsTBHd0gk+A+FpqNH+2BLeyqPEsgeaO4/o4YlwiN7OKP43+s01i/jLBHKDOI37XRz3muKZeAoYDXlXvOWo9FDnzvcQtbxI89qtBEwgtfSloQaIa+Vc+fny8m2wIDAQAB
k1._domainkey MailChimp 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i89sA2guU0ta4UX1Xzm06XIU6iBP41VwmPwBGRNofhBVR+e6WHUoNyIR4Bn84LVcfZE20rmDeXQblIupNWBqLXM1Q+VieI/eZu/7k9/vOkLSaQQdml4Cv8lb3PcnluMVIhQIDAQAB;
k2._domainkey MailChimp 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv2aC2KjGKLOwTweBY5A9RpjsxaBXR9r7OAU6U8/zn92ivImI75naUujWbItRI/QmL1jy5PWGqLwoUA0b90ObWaLDc+i9MtTNmGeWO009hr20fIxhGg6XBT2kjZ1DTThopSe1nAndsupmcBwlQ5Q6LJ+ZAxLcujnPIxM0ZBLmgpkv8u6RfY4eFP8OLvdAW3oSuB0DyLDigQX4Sj8wBO4YIdQH6AAmBeOsidsKAFNFUCpc3vCxtBDR12U+cBg724l3sBkMQ8evnz6idnqxq9QAVYh8k4kJ+RP+6cqTdy7LjIm8xY/bQNpQIpGUAuDo2DjLcCDun9DAI4Q/3z+Q0o9QuQIDAQAB;
k3._domainkey MailChimp 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAsYGiMSn7fsUqSvfSX40x9R1OlRtbNiCY80lHRIlcKx3XDIR7257aUx+q9CSIARdfTL6KCuLGNFx5g9TgVr6png4ajcieSQGtOehBgxnkDN8aAA5TX0FmFrcefJU0JoxLOF09EKgXxhSSHCk/ekVb0PXSboHXoZ9+EI404F1qhcwXXIgHXTaUthHTut2P6BBZhIXIgvDe/w49GchR7MRJqjNb7neEBbYHbgWuBTvvHCg7Gy6m6n9krYK+ROWq3dVvXy9plAGK3ygM+HtjIiMt7arRGMOF0WgDTz7YdN9BGpt6BvXxLnjiQcgS5T9n+cIyPZgiWzDMXNlaEEdKTEKxrwIDAQAB;
s1._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0XW3nsRfewzcUrDMHPktsRufYEXFQIceBFwah/2ofqL8d5FhWUxuEPhI2AuXNQ40GntSj0QMJpZKDd6gQBXAQfm35DwKtXOREVdAyS3VxkixC9k5Q1Dpm0Izo5XZ7bGbCxSZD2pnFOfDVkuTZ1pGVGOUWxF+OjHisDgOJzGF5Bx5/p1twXJEtXqhIWGvNE2HdCBaGhmutTvC/Bl8+uVjCQ02x65HA+U/4WcjXqI8HDiSt3/xA6XOYTJTV+Px/ktH0In7olUEZVQqI/pM9NIEpbr0NvEHBEddZjzNbhSEUTCk/n2aiyPv7KLVJecq2QE8jPrHXcgnB7r89bwAWlDp4QIDAQAB
s2._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv/LydSz5l39sYLpWSJsw8BZ8x0RdaBUc31QWlsia/V+E0ow0l9uo4bWaYC46ODGOlAVmZ6Q5jojNLWp6YU/lv9gjEomYdTqhPvq02LbEQTpkmSNX1QYtu/QCsOS2DffbnjRXuJnzJ21PHOMn6XR7eZlQTVR1kd8ilR632gwaPzwxWAqMn0UkxE/TjqqRNpqP5iDhJEbILKOoVoVQzenKoRMSC09Rhep3N3oMjzGjtL+uchdxJpXA/X4KMKAlt9HogXm8gQuwEdWhSwzVgayxn0BH5Hs6ylwa7hALnbG6rBN/tTNJ9+Uu0PmIrMdu1cUU3EPtyeXPWbwumOnCmnDyjwIDAQAB
selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAsZc1FOMkCaNoC09qvvioKK+kWxS6jryfj6cm9XM/tUOFLANNhYR/x+UegUkG9Dmnr50vQw51Pc+I6zYwfxMC/AAQNblgbLkRm6+hyowhrkF3YJUtCOK8Z1XFpqC3Ra86ajMiphbHGRlkJpvvPdqqYbHayfeMbWg0Hd3FsigRfGZKAllvVO3Y8IK5Ivi6PlNf7Yr66BVPEPB99gJXqnRH8+IWmOIOwIVwrYQcDAYxmhM1tp7ULCC+1d7a9IS9X+BzxExHINvJRU5p9RBArAZPrD8/tZ91jkOF+Rf65wsGs+nKtVr6HTtjizIH2YGRiBTzBhWKGMpAgge1Xue4VQoXCQIDAQAB;
zendesk1._domainkey Zendesk 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1;t=s;n=core;k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA9IqdLrO3Zr2/56MHt8oQVCQorP0Bl2Fz9sM2tFBnJCdB/HogQmuudEg2xAovCN2PYpw44UijIvPuBoT9vxiv6ZCBJTLJXa82r6ke5rE4tbe9NKFIrVIb9S306cJDrnKFMDb8p0dU/Su0+eUR5gVAOtCuz2L8HAzs5edvsEvD/Fb4ny1RLNSEPZkIQLfGhVxQeWANm3+1Jwb/OBVXV9k0nKpWrpgqcmO7NzroJirp014RQY7rGi60JLUubc6XhvoFQBQrtOAdVlZC5wvfS1bgpq5kQpdP7cajIqWCeqxPTeo0ZUpey2ZcaygEsZz0Z3Gs5wDzyuqd7/ADpr2jNF7ozwIDAQAB
zendesk2._domainkey Zendesk 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; t=s; n=core; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAmiSFNkgXrO3I8aOaPONDZWHv027rkiGIwb838OyXPgvFDEkCV/qGcdXSjZnaVAadrTm/oKnL8WOltP9zB1FLEuKt0fTi5zRyKPE4oIYCnEzXwrGqzjUcCABQBawQVqvXjDOaYh9Lhp8W5PYOLo905vRW7ipyIMDhuzBOJls91/WWXnNK0OwP3RghiisZjA3K2KqtRwf7w6GjNeNuAMNhvcmgAN15d/mhK+dev/hcRbal66RoYyTD8c0F0isahWH0envEX8aj+SBhheNk0/U37dGE+4nFaY5yP9CUlYjFKDSIKZgHzG4Hci3t/RubU58pi6BCrQQdAFvIOeDFeCZ0ywIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 2 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
vali.email Authorized v=DMARC1;
ruf.vali.email Authorized v=DMARC1;
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Unlikely DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and BIMI with VMC provides verified brand identity in inboxes — email-based brand faking is effectively blocked; adding CAA records (RFC 8659) would further restrict certificate issuance for lookalike domains

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success VMC SVG

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Yes

BIMI with VMC certificate (from Verified CA)

VMC certificate accessible (from Verified CA) - logo displays in Gmail, Apple Mail, and all major providers.
v=BIMI1; l=https://amplify.valimail.com/bimi/time-warner/vmNHnljIYyW-cable_news_network_inc_1325272691.svg; a=https://amplify.valimail.com/bimi/time-warner/vmNHnljIYyW-cable_news_network_inc_1325272691.pem
BIMI Logo
Logo validated (SVG) View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? Yes — 2 found

2 potential secret(s) found in publicly accessible source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

Action Required: The following secrets were observed in publicly accessible source code. These credentials should be rotated immediately and removed from public-facing code.
Severity Type Location Redacted Value Confidence
medium Stripe Publishable Key cnn.com/ pk_l********as8n high
medium Stripe Publishable Key cnn.com/ pk_l********qhGq high
Remediation: (1) Rotate all exposed credentials immediately at the provider's dashboard. (2) Remove secrets from public-facing source code. (3) Use environment variables or a secrets manager instead. (4) Review git history for previously committed secrets.
Sources scanned (1)
  • https://cnn.com/
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns-1652.awsdns-14.co.uk — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: ns-1652.awsdns-14.co.uk, ns-378.awsdns-47.com, ns-1242.awsdns-27.org, ns-587.awsdns-09.net

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ns-1242.awsdns-27.org No N/A N/A OK
ns-1652.awsdns-14.co.uk No N/A N/A OK
ns-378.awsdns-47.com No N/A N/A OK
ns-587.awsdns-09.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 172800s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ns-1242.awsdns-27.org: 1
ns-1652.awsdns-14.co.uk: 1
ns-378.awsdns-47.com: 1
ns-587.awsdns-09.net: 1
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for cnn.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
ns-1242.awsdns-27.org 205.251.196.218 2600:9000:5304:da00::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-1652.awsdns-14.co.uk 205.251.198.116 2600:9000:5306:7400::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-378.awsdns-47.com 205.251.193.122 2600:9000:5301:7a00::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
ns-587.awsdns-09.net 205.251.194.75 2600:9000:5302:4b00::1 AS16509
Amazon.com, Inc. 		1
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
4
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 4 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

All 1 server(s) verified: encrypted transport confirmed via direct SMTP probe and DNS policy

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Microsoft 365 enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE (GA Oct 2024) and valid certificates
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Certificate
cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Valid
Expires: 2026-08-26 (174 days)
Issuer: DigiCert Inc
Multi-Vantage Probe Results
Unanimous: TLS verified 2 probes, 1 responded
US-East (Boston) observed
All servers support TLS
France - EU skipped
9.003081751s
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 8 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS54113 Fastly, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
151.101.131.5 → AS54113 (151.101.128.0/22)
151.101.67.5 → AS54113 (151.101.64.0/22)
151.101.3.5 → AS54113 (151.101.0.0/22)
151.101.195.5 → AS54113 (151.101.192.0/22)
IPv6 Mappings:
2a04:4e42:400::773 → AS54113 (2a04:4e42:400::/48)
2a04:4e42:200::773 → AS54113 (2a04:4e42:200::/48)
2a04:4e42:600::773 → AS54113 (2a04:4e42:600::/48)
2a04:4e42::773 → AS54113 (2a04:4e42::/48)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 9 services

9 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
MongoDB Atlas mongodb-site-verification=mtrxHeW3jOzWtwEwnOLpeQo9NXh6Lqas
Cisco Umbrella cisco-ci-domain-verification=4a1c92ef69fe42f8125c3ca9ce0696dcf6cc16fa80243257de5...
Stripe stripe-verification=42CDB310484C1CAA878F12A73EB7505EA6E7F154731CD7E4F5ABB574DE5E...
Adobe adobe-idp-site-verification=279ead95-3581-42b7-82f4-73c97f8cebfa
Google Workspace google-site-verification=_QivaXNjhXy-V1y_YqrycXdAWZi2mVrcwbXerX6THeY
Facebook / Meta facebook-domain-verification=xszi21kow2trmw3xt3ph6s631zyu3i
Canva canva-site-verification=_RUUWoBDVpt0pfonUPWJgg
Microsoft 365 MS=ms66433104
Atlassian atlassian-domain-verification=joqe6L8dNi+aisGbB1XHQa0pDc53V2l0GQQRUtLEcr2997x0+r...
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns-1242.awsdns-27.org ns-1652.awsdns-14.co.uk ns-378.awsdns-47.com ns-587.awsdns-09.net
Managed DNS
All 4 nameservers hosted by Amazon Route 53. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Amazon Route 53
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [126953328-4422040 133461244-4422058 178953534-4422001 186844776-4422028 228426766-4422034 267933795-4422004 287893558-4422013 294913881-4422049 299762315-4422055 321159687-4422031 349997471-4422043 353665828-4422052 528183251-4422019 553992719-4400647 MS=ms66433104 ms=ms97284866]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

151.101.131.5
151.101.67.5
151.101.3.5
151.101.195.5
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2a04:4e42:400::773
2a04:4e42:200::773
2a04:4e42:600::773
2a04:4e42::773
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Microsoft 365

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 100 1 5061 sipfed.online.lync.com.
_autodiscover._tcp: 0 0 443 autodiscover.turner.com.
_sip._tls: 100 1 443 sipdir.online.lync.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (4 IPv4, 4 IPv6) Mail: 1 server Services: 3 endpoints
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 46 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 46 current 0 expired 30 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
academy.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
account.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
alerts.cnn.com DNS Current www.cnn.com — — —
api.cnn.com DNS Current api.cnn.com.vgtf.net — — —
archives.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
asia.cnn.com DNS Current asia.cnn.com.edgesuite.net — — —
cdn.cnn.com DNS Current ion-ma.turner.com.edgekey.net — — —
clients.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
cms.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
community.cnn.com DNS Current reflector.cnn.com — — —
content.cnn.com DNS Current cnn-content-api-prod.56m.vgtf.net — — —
data.cnn.com DNS Current cnn-tls.map.fastly.net — — —
developer.cnn.com
80/tcp Amazon S3 httpd
DNS Current developer.cnn.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com — — —
download.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
feeds.cnn.com DNS Current cnn-tls.map.fastly.net — — —
forums.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
go.cnn.com DNS Current cnn-tls.map.fastly.net — — —
help.cnn.com DNS Current eus-prod-cc-cnn-webapp-fd-gxfecygwgrcveaf7.a02.azurefd.net — — —
hub.cnn.com DNS Current moodle-alb-212803005.eu-west-2.elb.amazonaws.com — — —
links.cnn.com DNS Current sendgrid.net — — —
live.cnn.com DNS Current live.cnn.com.edgesuite.net — — —
m.cnn.com DNS Current lite.cnn.com — — —
mail.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
mail2.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
media.cnn.com DNS Current cnn-tls.map.fastly.net — — —
metrics.cnn.com DNS Current cnn.122.2o7.net — — —
mobile.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
my.cnn.com DNS Current reflector.cnn.com — — —
partner.cnn.com DNS Current partner-cnn-com-116399010.eu-west-1.elb.amazonaws.com — — —
partners.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
phone.cnn.com DNS Current phone.cnn.com.edgesuite.net — — —
proxy.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
rss.cnn.com DNS Current i0bub0.feedproxy.ghs.google.com — — —
sandbox.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
services.cnn.com DNS Current newsgraph.api.cnn.io — — —
stage.cnn.com DNS Current cnn-tls.map.fastly.net — — —
static.cnn.com DNS Current i.cnn.net — — —
store.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
training.cnn.com DNS Current cnn-tls.map.fastly.net — — —
us.cnn.com DNS Current cnn-tls.map.fastly.net — — —
video.cnn.com DNS Current vxtreme.cnn.com — — —
www.cnn.com DNS Current cnn-tls.map.fastly.net — — —
www1.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
www2.cnn.com DNS Current ion-ma.turner.com.edgekey.net — — —
www3.cnn.com DNS Current — — — —
xml.cnn.com DNS Current robots.cnn.com — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 4 / 4 records
151.101.131.5
151.101.67.5
151.101.67.5
151.101.131.5
151.101.3.5
151.101.195.5
151.101.195.5
151.101.3.5
AAAA Synchronized 4 / 4 records
2a04:4e42:400::773
2a04:4e42:400::773
2a04:4e42:200::773
2a04:4e42:600::773
2a04:4e42:600::773
2a04:4e42:200::773
2a04:4e42::773
2a04:4e42::773
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.cnn.com RFC 7489 §6.3 1 / 0 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email; ruf=mailto:Njk3@ruf.vali.email
—
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
10 cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
10 cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns-1652.awsdns-14.co.uk.
ns-1242.awsdns-27.org.
ns-1242.awsdns-27.org.
ns-1652.awsdns-14.co.uk.
ns-378.awsdns-47.com.
ns-378.awsdns-47.com.
ns-587.awsdns-09.net.
ns-587.awsdns-09.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns-1652.awsdns-14.co.uk. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
ns-1652.awsdns-14.co.uk. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
TXT RFC 7208 §4 60 / 0 records
186844776-4422028
—
528183251-4422019
—
mongodb-site-verification=mtrxHeW3jOzWtwEwnOLpeQo9NXh6Lqas
—
126953328-4422040
—
133461244-4422058
—
349997471-4422043
—
ms=ms97284866
—
667921863-4422007
—
782989862-4417942
—
353665828-4422052
—
cisco-ci-domain-verification=4a1c92ef69fe42f8125c3ca9ce0696dcf6cc16fa80243257de578af593d19548
—
_globalsign-domain-verification=-lBuNJDFRxDkLkNbYOLBU03PlWjnPqAzBPAVUokhAw
—
v=spf1 include:cnn.com._nspf.vali.email include:%{i}._ip.%{h}._ehlo.%{d}._spf.vali.email include:mail.zendesk.com ~all
—
178953534-4422001
—
688162515-4422037
—
598362927-4422061
—
299762315-4422055
—
stripe-verification=42CDB310484C1CAA878F12A73EB7505EA6E7F154731CD7E4F5ABB574DE5E7725
—
_globalsign-domain-verification=5ckEJ4VIhQ6weCdCfmfzQPVP6ED1LtCX9jw1OKX5Mv
—
_globalsign-domain-verification=S6DssfjyL_2kgK4I2Ae_1cdPfwqRRBfB9-3ZhRGMRj
—
adobe-idp-site-verification=279ead95-3581-42b7-82f4-73c97f8cebfa
—
826218936-4422046
—
_globalsign-domain-verification=yTw3T3KnyIyTB1xG2GvVhl1zWJlFp-WqmNskdVI_65
—
_globalsign-domain-verification=MK_ZKmss4D_DdzGOsssHxxBOK6hJc6LGycFvNOESdZ
—
stripe-verification=5535d8a3c7b3517ee3765df8bd66b8a5cf70a65c3437f5be5d3a8f0108b790ef
—
google-site-verification=_QivaXNjhXy-V1y_YqrycXdAWZi2mVrcwbXerX6THeY
—
882269757-4422010
—
714321471-4421998
—
553992719-4400647
—
facebook-domain-verification=xszi21kow2trmw3xt3ph6s631zyu3i
—
google-site-verification=cNhH3bbaizgJp34tQo2r1NgKE0YYLIPNOOvcBVTT5Pk
—
755973593-4422016
—
2baPGrmeo+RwsWdIdq/gIVSEWNb4tC9mLGQu0j4l/mduqhm06T+V9vNLXsauLyH9FwMZJSRHvj/YHGKOVWRylw==
—
_globalsign-domain-verification=9hlGg1_xFQ9m6kVqzsG0EO121UTChwQZQCgxCRvgyn
—
294913881-4422049
—
google-site-verification=R-Btow3Z8oU_9H1IWU4Gm4lvUQ_OVmsfxonIKhIaiPE
—
267933795-4422004
—
287893558-4422013
—
stripe-verification=1488a36c1dc125ea564dc5822d1414eeed68875825aaf90df27ac3131d053935
—
228426766-4422034
—
globalsign-domain-verification=-Q7umwx2mj164XwLa0PsoUaWe2HBhta50GjggsT98f
—
stripe-verification=e5dad290205182f6bdbd4e72697ce3cf9a965f35cb0349d538e09706345fb673
—
d1xTs9+kADZZSz3bPphLpkMXXxBGjqn5vsQHhi2M6lo0r8AdIbm6j8LfQXPujsywVgeGSP+AXWX0vO9Iep5cUg==
—
691244352-4422022
—
adobe-sign-verification=c3dc3217f76deddcb413a23e4e665fad
—
canva-site-verification=_RUUWoBDVpt0pfonUPWJgg
—
764482256-4422025
—
openai-domain-verification=dv-yGIc9wI1iK7uFqtmBqEp94Xk
—
tollbit-domain-verification=3b1766c3c41ef082750984a8a43089a81344c7af85005466c1a03c6ca1fb47dd
—
stripe-verification=094254c9a60a6dc0c1c2a62294b81c0c3b9363d044151a3e562ffeac0a7c4157
—
mixpanel-domain-verify=612e2914-a7fb-4965-95d5-19acc02797df
—
_globalsign-domain-verification=B57sRQpmte4G4w-gavZbVNmmNsMxGp5kcL19UP2599
—
MS=ms66433104
—
_globalsign-domain-verification=2lybn8Z2GKCTHNehPEREKdz_jh5SahShpwOeRqCWjl
—
321159687-4422031
—
_globalsign-domain-verification=1McxnrVkIU8RCVwwHslxDiq_r8hp3zjD_f29xgdWgF
—
globalsign-domain-verification=2lI5pahhCu_jg_2RC5GEdolQmAa4K7rhP7_OA-lZBK
—
lucidlink-verification=B9TYHWKAXAA93NQ61ST71E7NW8
—
754516718-4422064
—
atlassian-domain-verification=joqe6L8dNi+aisGbB1XHQa0pDc53V2l0GQQRUtLEcr2997x0+rtrAA5Zw+UgQw3u
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

63694f587a2a12f07525ac936164fb175d4158aaba1f9cdbbff7cb0d7566042a028d4350693b70996e644838aa078773f1dd5e328993f981d0a3a80972e48015
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 5 Mar 2026, 10:52 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-cnn.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-cnn.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-cnn.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-cnn.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/5832/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for cnn.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short cnn.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' RFC 6376 
dig +short cm._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' RFC 6376 
dig +short k1._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' RFC 6376 
dig +short k2._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' RFC 6376 
dig +short k3._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376 
dig +short s2._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.cnn.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cnn.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd cnn.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.cnn.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cnn.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cnn.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.cnn.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cnn.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cnn.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://cnn.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cnn.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cnn.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 151.101.131.5 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 5.131.101.151.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 151.101.67.5 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 5.67.101.151.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4858 runs
DKIM
Verified 4677 runs
DMARC
Verified 4842 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4661 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4839 runs
BIMI
Verified 4676 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4679 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4681 runs
CAA
Verified 4673 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short cnn.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'cm' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short cm._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k1._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k2._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k3._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s2._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.cnn.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.cnn.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer cnn.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd cnn.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.cnn.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.cnn.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.cnn.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.cnn.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer cnn.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/cnn.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com:25 -servername cnn-com.mail.protection.outlook.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.cnn.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://cnn.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://cnn.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://cnn.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 151.101.131.5 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 5.131.101.151.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 151.101.67.5 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 5.67.101.151.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

cnn.com

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DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.