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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 5 Mar 2026, 10:50 UTC
Duration 1.8s
Version v26.34.20
Integrity 05fa5c5361bbec044e0dfd600916617e16e7a0fb157b40857d8a75a6dc8ddbb1d60280828bd69de10b4ce735ac38bd4485805594840bc81ada0f318450ae7df4
Subject Domain
whitehouse.gov

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

whitehouse.gov
5 Mar 2026, 10:50 UTC · 1.8s ·v26.34.20 · SHA-3-512: 05fa✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint 2 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
5 protocols configured, 4 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 68/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 60% Currency 76/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 76/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
A 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.
NS 6 hours (21600s) 1 day (86400s) medium NS TTL is below typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
AAAA 5 minutes (300s) 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 5 minutes (300s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
Provider Note: This TTL (5 minutes (300s)) matches Cloudflare's fixed proxied-record TTL. If this record is proxied (orange cloud), the TTL is enforced by Cloudflare and cannot be changed. Disable proxying (gray cloud) to regain TTL control, at the cost of losing Cloudflare's DDoS protection and CDN.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for whitehouse.gov
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Cloudflare — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS ernest.ns.cloudflare.com
Serial 2397694611
Admin dns.cloudflare.com
Provider Cloudflare
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh10000s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry2400sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)1800s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s). Cloudflare's anycast architecture reduces the practical risk, but this value departs from the RFC recommendation.
RFC 1912 §2.2

Independent RFC compliance assessment for Cloudflare. Each finding cites the specific RFC section and reports what the engineering community consensus is. We report honestly — if a provider deviates from standards, we explain what they did differently and what the RFCs actually say.

SOA Expire below RFC 1912 recommendation RFC 1912 §2.2

Cloudflare sets SOA Expire to 604,800 seconds (7 days). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). This means secondary nameservers stop serving the zone sooner if the primary becomes unreachable. Cloudflare's position is that their anycast architecture makes traditional zone transfer semantics less relevant. SOA timers are not editable on Free, Pro, or Business plans.

Below RFC recommendation
Proxied record TTLs fixed at 300s RFC 2181 §5.2

Cloudflare overrides the zone administrator's TTL to 300 seconds for all proxied (orange-cloud) records. RFC 2181 §5.2 requires TTL uniformity within an RRset but does not mandate a specific value. As the authoritative server, Cloudflare is technically within its rights, but the administrator loses TTL control. This can affect ACME DNS-01 challenges and automation workflows that depend on rapid propagation.

Technically compliant, but overrides administrator intent
Non-standard SOA serial format RFC 1912 §2.2

RFC 1912 recommends YYYYMMDDNN format for SOA serial numbers (e.g., 2026022501). Cloudflare uses a proprietary serial number format that does not encode the date. RFC 1035 only requires the serial to increment on changes, so this is compliant with the mandatory standard but breaks the convention relied on by monitoring tools.

Compliant with RFC 1035, deviates from RFC 1912 convention
Negative cache TTL delays new records RFC 2308 §5

Cloudflare's SOA MINIMUM (negative cache TTL) is 1,800–3,600 seconds (30–60 minutes). This controls how long resolvers cache NXDOMAIN responses. Newly created DNS records — including ACME DNS-01 challenge TXT records for Let's Encrypt — may be invisible for up to 1 hour even after creation. This causes certificate issuance failures for automation tools like cert-manager and Traefik. Workaround: pre-create placeholder records before they're needed. This is RFC-compliant but aggressive compared to the 300–900 seconds common at other providers.

RFC-compliant, but causes real-world automation failures
Historical RFC 2181 §5.2 violation: TTL mismatch in CNAME RRsets RFC 2181 §5.2

In February 2022, Cloudflare's resolver (1.1.1.1) returned CNAME responses with mismatched TTLs within the same RRset — including cases where one TTL was zero and another was non-zero. RFC 2181 §5.2 explicitly states: 'the TTLs of all RRs in an RRSet must be the same.' systemd-resolved (used by Arch Linux, Ubuntu, Fedora, and most modern Linux distributions) correctly rejected these responses per the RFC, causing widespread DNS resolution failures. Cloudflare acknowledged the issue and it appears to have been fixed, but it demonstrated that Cloudflare's DNS infrastructure can deviate from RFC requirements in ways that break compliant resolver implementations.

Was a documented RFC violation — appears resolved
This assessment is based on RFC specifications, provider documentation, and documented incidents from DNS engineering communities. DNS Tool does not have a commercial relationship with any provider listed.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Protected
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Configured
SPF, DMARC (reject), DKIM, BIMI, DNSSEC
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, DANE, CAA
Priority Actions Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Lock Down SPF for No-Mail Domain

This domain has no MX records and appears to be a website-only domain. Publishing a strict SPF record explicitly declares that no servers are authorized to send email, preventing attackers from spoofing your domain.

Explicitly declares no servers are authorized to send email from this domain.
TypeTXT
Hostwhitehouse.gov
Valuev=spf1 -all
RFC 7208
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostwhitehouse.gov (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
get.gov (Registrant: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Microsoft 365
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Cloudflare
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 3/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 3/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:spf.mail.dmz.pitc.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.mandrillapp.com ip4:214.3.115.10/32 ip4:214.3.115.12/32 ip4:214.3.115.14/32 ip4:214.3.115.225/32 ip4:214.3.140.16/32 ip4:214.3.140.22/32 ip4:214.3.140.255/32 ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:b1fabe8b7f3f41a181ecd1253a794edf@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 2 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

mandrill._domainkey MailChimp (Mandrill) 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCrLHiExVd55zd/IQ/J/mRwSRMAocV/hMB3jXwaHH36d9NaVynQFYV8NaWi69c1veUtRzGt7yAioXqLj7Z4TeEUoOLgrKsn8YnckGs9i3B3tVFB+Ch/4mPhXWiNfNdynHWBcPcbJ8kjEQ2U8y78dHZj1YeRXXVvWob2OaKynO8/lQIDAQAB;
selector1._domainkey Microsoft 365 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAp1ziKBtcYab3KdfsvO0BqkVLdLeezt+YxATDxubNLHd1moBUT0x3aNVIot3Dq/wbyxz+4uhQrHEsunkzDxtMgSUDmR62hHkJyjo58f5BSAk2WWD5TcrB0SRqVrtWwRklZT3URO+Dl1q/+pSfGLVylZ7sm71RSBAd4b8MmrB3+Izd/GLiozokw30S66a/Oc34cdNLTE4Kqwk66HkWNXRERBg4naZ/KWyLVC74Ut+f+h9vR8h/BmvMOjGCBf1dcNQ/jZwnE3Ye0o41ZqF8xIuipyYCRtHFT0GOJH7CtcCRo+NZux/rCzddpu6DaPkX5xe171F5rfx7vHmIFyaBw08JdQIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 2 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net Authorized v=DMARC1;
dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov Authorized v=DMARC1
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No MX records available — DANE check skipped

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Unlikely DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and BIMI with VMC provides verified brand identity in inboxes — email-based brand faking is effectively blocked; adding CAA records (RFC 8659) would further restrict certificate issuance for lookalike domains

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Success VMC SVG

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? Yes

BIMI with VMC certificate (from Verified CA)

VMC certificate accessible (from Verified CA) - logo displays in Gmail, Apple Mail, and all major providers.
v=BIMI1; l=https://whitehouse.gov/wp-content/themes/whitehouse/assets/svg/wh-bimi-avatar.svg; a=https://whitehouse.gov/.well-known/vmc/executive_office_of_the_president.pem
BIMI Logo
Logo validated (SVG) View full logo

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on wally.ns.cloudflare.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: wally.ns.cloudflare.com, ernest.ns.cloudflare.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

DS Key TagDS AlgorithmDNSKEY Key TagDNSKEY Algorithm
2371 13 2371 13

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
ernest.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK
wally.ns.cloudflare.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 86400s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

ernest.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.397694611e+09
wally.ns.cloudflare.com: 2.397694611e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for whitehouse.gov — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
wally.ns.cloudflare.com 173.245.58.239
108.162.192.239
172.64.32.239 		2803:f800:50::6ca2:c0ef
2606:4700:50::adf5:3aef
2a06:98c1:50::ac40:20ef 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2397694611
ernest.ns.cloudflare.com 172.64.33.164
173.245.59.164
108.162.193.164 		2a06:98c1:50::ac40:21a4
2606:4700:58::adf5:3ba4
2803:f800:50::6ca2:c1a4 		AS13335
Cloudflare, Inc. 		2397694611
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
1
Unique /24 Prefixes
6
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 6 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

DNSSEC Operations Deep Dive 1 Issue

DNSSEC operational notes: 1 item(s) to review — KSK/ZSK differentiation, RRSIG expiry windows, NSEC/NSEC3 analysis, and rollover readiness.

Findings:
  • CDS/CDNSKEY automation present but only single KSK — pre-publish second KSK before rollover

DNSKEY Inventory 2 Keys

RoleKey TagAlgorithmKey Size
ZSK 34505 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits
KSK 2371 ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 256 bits

RRSIG Signatures 0 Signatures

No RRSIG records found.

Denial of Existence NSEC

NSEC records expose zone contents via ordered names (zone walking). Consider NSEC3 for zone enumeration protection.

Rollover Readiness Partial

Multiple KSKs:
CDS Published:
CDNSKEY Published:
Automation: full
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

No MX records found

Policy Assessment Primary

No transport enforcement policies detected. Mail delivery relies on opportunistic STARTTLS, which is vulnerable to downgrade attacks (RFC 3207). Consider deploying MTA-STS (RFC 8461) or DANE (RFC 7672).

Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — No MX records found for this domain
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 1 unique ASN(s) across 2 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS2635 Automattic, Inc. US
IPv4 Mappings:
192.0.66.232 → AS2635 (192.0.66.0/24)
IPv6 Mappings:
2a04:fa87:fffd::c000:427d → AS2635 (2a04:fa87:fffd::/48)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 2 services

2 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Google Workspace google-site-verification=TfE8QdIcAwpNcoG9l9AxMIzz69S5PPd8peS-Pj1qtXk
Microsoft 365 MS=ms61205702
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 Modern

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Algorithm Observation: ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 — MUST implement, recommended default (RFC 8624 §3.1)
All current DNSSEC algorithms use classical cryptography. Post-quantum DNSSEC standards are in active IETF development (draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy) but no PQC algorithms have been standardized for DNSSEC yet.
Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
2371 13 2 BE4C7B11AD123596BA672B13FFDA04CA73C9FE0652E66542AEFADAF206B381AE

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ernest.ns.cloudflare.com wally.ns.cloudflare.com
Managed DNS
All 2 nameservers hosted by Cloudflare. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Cloudflare
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (3 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
A: Quad9 returned different results: [192.0.66.180]
A: Cloudflare returned different results: [192.0.66.212]
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [192.0.66.148]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.

CDS / CDNSKEY (DNSSEC Automation) RFC 7344 Success CDS CDNSKEY

Full RFC 8078 automated DNSSEC key rollover signaling detected (CDS + CDNSKEY)

Key TagAlgorithmDigest TypeDigest
2371 ECDSAP256SHA256 2
CDNSKEY Records:
FlagsProtocolAlgorithmPublic Key
257 3 ECDSAP256SHA256
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

192.0.66.232
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2a04:fa87:fffd::c000:427d
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

No MX records
Domain cannot receive email

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 1 IPv6) Mail: Not configured Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 7 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 7 current 0 expired 7 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
apply.whitehouse.gov CT Log Current apply.whitehouse.gov.00dsj000001dif72ai.live.siteforce.com 1 2025-12-02T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
events.whitehouse.gov CT Log Current events.whitehouse.gov.00dsj000001dhcc2ai.live.siteforce.com 1 2025-12-02T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
fellows.whitehouse.gov CT Log Current prodsan.usajobs.gov.edgekey.net 2 2026-02-13T00:00:00 DigiCert Inc
joinus.whitehouse.gov CT Log Current joinus.whitehouse.gov.00dsj000000merb2aq.live.siteforce.com 2 2026-01-01T15:49:00 Let's Encrypt
tours.whitehouse.gov CT Log Current wh47.go-vip.net 3 2026-01-26T11:37:57 Let's Encrypt, DigiCert Inc
visit.whitehouse.gov CT Log Current visit.whitehouse.gov.00d820000008fgaeaq.live.siteforce.com 2 2026-01-15T17:50:28 Let's Encrypt
www.whitehouse.gov CT Log Current wh47.go-vip.net 2 2026-01-27T10:14:00 Let's Encrypt
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: A AAAA Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Propagating 1 / 1 records
192.0.66.232
192.0.66.51
AAAA Propagating 1 / 1 records
2a04:fa87:fffd::c000:427d
2a04:fa87:fffd::c000:429f
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.whitehouse.gov RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:b1fabe8b7f3f41a181ecd1253a794edf@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:b1fabe8b7f3f41a181ecd1253a794edf@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net,mailto:reports@dmarc.cyber.dhs.gov
MX RFC 5321 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
ernest.ns.cloudflare.com.
ernest.ns.cloudflare.com.
wally.ns.cloudflare.com.
wally.ns.cloudflare.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ernest.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2397694611 10000 2400 604800 1800
ernest.ns.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2397694611 10000 2400 604800 1800
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
google-site-verification=TfE8QdIcAwpNcoG9l9AxMIzz69S5PPd8peS-Pj1qtXk
MS=ms61205702
MS=ms61205702
_ag15rep8dkdk6c65mcqgkcmtszqxbqt
v=spf1 include:spf.mail.dmz.pitc.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.mandrillapp.com ip4:214.3.115.10/32 ip4:214.3.115.12/32 ip4:214.3.115.14/32 ip4:214.3.115.225/32 ip4:214.3.140.16/32 ip4:214.3.140.22/32 ip4:214.3.140.255/32 ~all
google-site-verification=TfE8QdIcAwpNcoG9l9AxMIzz69S5PPd8peS-Pj1qtXk
_ag15rep8dkdk6c65mcqgkcmtszqxbqt
v=spf1 include:spf.mail.dmz.pitc.gov include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.mandrillapp.com ip4:214.3.115.10/32 ip4:214.3.115.12/32 ip4:214.3.115.14/32 ip4:214.3.115.225/32 ip4:214.3.140.16/32 ip4:214.3.140.22/32 ip4:214.3.140.255/32 ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
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DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

05fa5c5361bbec044e0dfd600916617e16e7a0fb157b40857d8a75a6dc8ddbb1d60280828bd69de10b4ce735ac38bd4485805594840bc81ada0f318450ae7df4
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 5 Mar 2026, 10:50 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-whitehouse.gov.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-whitehouse.gov.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-whitehouse.gov.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-whitehouse.gov.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/5821/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for whitehouse.gov. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short whitehouse.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.whitehouse.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill' RFC 6376 
dig +short mandrill._domainkey.whitehouse.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.whitehouse.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer whitehouse.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd whitehouse.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.whitehouse.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.whitehouse.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.whitehouse.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.whitehouse.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/whitehouse.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.whitehouse.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://whitehouse.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://whitehouse.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://whitehouse.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 192.0.66.232 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 232.66.0.192.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4845 runs
DKIM
Verified 4664 runs
DMARC
Verified 4829 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4648 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4826 runs
BIMI
Verified 4663 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4666 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4668 runs
CAA
Verified 4660 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short whitehouse.gov TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.whitehouse.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'mandrill' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short mandrill._domainkey.whitehouse.gov TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.whitehouse.gov TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer whitehouse.gov DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd whitehouse.gov A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record (replace MX_HOST with actual MX) (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.MX_HOST TLSA
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.whitehouse.gov TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.whitehouse.gov/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.whitehouse.gov TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.whitehouse.gov TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer whitehouse.gov CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/whitehouse.gov' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50
Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.whitehouse.gov&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://whitehouse.gov/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://whitehouse.gov/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://whitehouse.gov/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 192.0.66.232 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 232.66.0.192.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

whitehouse.gov

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.