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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 5 Mar 2026, 10:49 UTC
Duration 17.4s
Version v26.34.20
Integrity f0391ec85e3df067b6f1bef3e109a920c4ab3488a96d80001fe9a97a652fd39a233fa8e684c3fb748bb454b12464a5cf86ae58bc2e83102f8b8e4856e9f5dfc1
Subject Domain
ibm.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

ibm.com
5 Mar 2026, 10:49 UTC · 17.4s ·v26.34.20 · SHA-3-512: f039✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Proofpoint 10 SaaS Services
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
3 protocols configured, 5 not configured, 1 unavailable on provider Why we go beyond letter grades
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 67/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 66% Currency 67/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Adequate 67/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Good Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Degraded
DNS data shows some aging or gaps — consider re-scanning for critical decisions

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
AAAA 10s 1 hour (3600s) high AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 10s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
SOA 6 hours (21600s) 1 hour (3600s) high SOA TTL is above typical — observed 6 hours (21600s), typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Long TTLs reduce DNS query volume but slow propagation when records change. Consider 3600 seconds for a balance of performance and flexibility per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance.
MX 917s 1 hour (3600s) medium MX TTL is below typical — observed 917s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 328s 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 328s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
A 10s 1 hour (3600s) high A TTL is below typical — observed 10s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for ibm.com
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: NS1 (IBM) — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS dns1.p05.nsone.net
Serial 1729786389
Admin hostmaster.nsone.net
Provider NS1 (IBM)
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh43200s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry7200sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)3600s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 32.2s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Configured
SPF (hard fail), DMARC (reject), DKIM
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Unavailable on Provider
DANE
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Secure
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

BIMI displays your verified brand logo next to your emails in supporting mail clients.
TypeTXT
Hostdefault._bimi.ibm.com (BIMI default record)
Valuev=BIMI1; l=https://ibm.com/brand/logo.svg
RFC 9495
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostibm.com (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.ibm.com (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@ibm.com
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.ibm.com (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=ibm.com
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
CSC Corporate Domains, Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Proofpoint
Strongly Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
NS1 (IBM)
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No SPF and DMARC reject policy enforced

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success -all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:%{ir}.%{v}.%{d}.spf.has.pphosted.com -all
RFC 7489: -all may cause rejection before DMARC evaluation, preventing DKIM from being checked
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
SPF hard fail (-all): compliance-strong, but can short-circuit DMARC. RFC 7489 notes that -all can cause some receivers to reject mail during the SMTP transaction — before DKIM is checked and before DMARC can evaluate the result. A message that would pass DMARC via DKIM alignment may be rejected prematurely. For most domains, ~all + DMARC p=reject is the strongest compatible posture — it allows every authentication method (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to be fully evaluated before a decision is made.
DMARC is set to reject — enforcement is strong. However, some receivers may still reject messages on SPF hard fail before DKIM alignment is checked. Switching to ~all + p=reject would provide the same enforcement with full DMARC compatibility.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=none
Subdomains unprotected (sp=none while p=reject)
Forensic reporting (ruf) is configured, but most major providers do not send forensic reports. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification. Consider removing this tag to simplify your record. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 10 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

dkim._domainkey Proofpoint (inferred) 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1hkxOeNIFWSRQg0xN+fyzqrj45L9LVirEG4uRxE8uViGC8lBEKDivKGC0i8dptnTsUkzOY3Fbg4bF+EIObMESw0FLOkAqmlIp1v90QtIZDUuo/oRYEAV7lJrWk7WnlT2uXs6hR48Zbf8Lqd/aUygWyVTQqb4o9gNWuomQOvad2K94jfNWJeCNLW9gBU/YqnDkvf8S0rzEgeqFTrbIsD/KYTq3J4vu7vzSpuUjZNiD01OgVQoacnj6RZVnlGNrm1u6SvPTvGrnibH8q8XDiZQnhvF9ZWqfb388kC+S0mlJQJHGUBAcIGAuuoxxUPws5pX4mtb5w350xhF6DN4YQwZWQIDAQAB
email._domainkey Proofpoint (inferred) 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; t=s; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCIpUSWZda9nRCG1NdD9GebCbxVlDl+LKEPSVmM5piw57btzxVIFPjkPCccRMcJOrOXIoT/IFn/qVAoOt73s88YU156oExX0mU5RPXDccj6nIBAbSQUq/0jTBcRk/PMxTnj47j16FpMXNIvTuW1e5QeLGDCur4KaZPFaPE7ZfBvMQIDAQAB
k2._domainkey MailChimp 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv2aC2KjGKLOwTweBY5A9RpjsxaBXR9r7OAU6U8/zn92ivImI75naUujWbItRI/QmL1jy5PWGqLwoUA0b90ObWaLDc+i9MtTNmGeWO009hr20fIxhGg6XBT2kjZ1DTThopSe1nAndsupmcBwlQ5Q6LJ+ZAxLcujnPIxM0ZBLmgpkv8u6RfY4eFP8OLvdAW3oSuB0DyLDigQX4Sj8wBO4YIdQH6AAmBeOsidsKAFNFUCpc3vCxtBDR12U+cBg724l3sBkMQ8evnz6idnqxq9QAVYh8k4kJ+RP+6cqTdy7LjIm8xY/bQNpQIpGUAuDo2DjLcCDun9DAI4Q/3z+Q0o9QuQIDAQAB;
k3._domainkey MailChimp 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAsYGiMSn7fsUqSvfSX40x9R1OlRtbNiCY80lHRIlcKx3XDIR7257aUx+q9CSIARdfTL6KCuLGNFx5g9TgVr6png4ajcieSQGtOehBgxnkDN8aAA5TX0FmFrcefJU0JoxLOF09EKgXxhSSHCk/ekVb0PXSboHXoZ9+EI404F1qhcwXXIgHXTaUthHTut2P6BBZhIXIgvDe/w49GchR7MRJqjNb7neEBbYHbgWuBTvvHCg7Gy6m6n9krYK+ROWq3dVvXy9plAGK3ygM+HtjIiMt7arRGMOF0WgDTz7YdN9BGpt6BvXxLnjiQcgS5T9n+cIyPZgiWzDMXNlaEEdKTEKxrwIDAQAB;
s1._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAz6WjzCoCLUh8rUcvrCbKWy6pFU8RGru+kMogDQxXlYsHQe8L7K0VttWREzFtw1fmhHzkxVn2BpzBXU0e95MAxuam1mxBJdzVHwZxh2by17DCClxHcvgFDDYGX4bz0F1TWjVejPMKLjvLiT0fb9pM+xbChsV912LKzLIjYYIqGez6lwVCJKmy+CaaHJJ3nCJiVSpQlOf7VICmlX77gUXFiQRpfOyNZsUmJZohzJPQUMRtmBCvJn6i7y3f4OHZkURaGvjbm1ESK8IiT9U6mVUEd5dOqGXyNHz4TrmQ4p+5QlEeG2Eax3U+YC66YG86JvLCdH0t3AjnlZmXpadc+m8xTwIDAQAB
s2._domainkey SendGrid 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAviPehEhBIU1tMf4B5RXNxY7gKz6DPOMWSbAcH5+1ZlpmRjmobJdx3+7lYPMSMd28TaBfNKP+MSKm5Zt74vHzgu0Ejx8+0zHe0F6lKTFQl3RD2OLQLF3e4xSgBFibWu30fQg0Q476vCO3ZaNfEoguUnSqXlqf4Ld4jrHxlCBIkrkvFOhhJ8EPdJD+KBRHXzMOQAH2oPc5zYBdxBPUw9BKM3KVwg9sUkBx/WneWmKWLwtrLVJgBDYps6X52PMfNF2wr+RoOS9pAFxA3z7hWiwT/1X7l8nKE6Rv8xdEq/Gt9Atokfeh2RAfw3ijXyC++MS1TMblKM8/GbMkI87dgawrCwIDAQAB
s3._domainkey Proofpoint (inferred) 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA8ZaXCMPVLvNDs8sdKJE53lYRVbbJ879rZlM1qQvtKlCIjr4TqTc9gMcQ7k3pmQij1Lz1zNhFpCHP7ZdBhwa5JAzb2SdYhtLgxodECbQ2o+Jzg3CygcoxITdK7nn9xwKRT3sEGHzynsWkf8BU51wU3vxUNZ2V8xA5P2dFFfbrNvB1aLlvM/665GPhPRVfH5LQdUf6X9XCSEqeL1SJ0dYkf7xKyz/J4raEELfg44kTm9WUvq70TY8EziGAgghQqBz+HcI++1UjzhUrw47j5CuPTkDQe+KB/Qva2X03Y4Apt1fqk1Xjhza2lWChhS0vWlrmz3puh4VcAwgg8b5p1nsHpQIDAQAB
sf2._domainkey Salesforce 2048-bit Adequate
k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv9NIFZTwP/AH4LFYM8Qm1ll6YXckxqktPfNx21X8TvXrtufbNEHjgrcskBdjsbl84CZ6NawrcwWWQqFMT2EjEijxKksn4ZhNLzoqdN8tHXJ67Ryaz/3ezL1rfgONZrU+PH13GWacuqwR1TShJ1tYxjag8NaTpyRTz07Q3spDxQ7jFz1Pv1WeT5fYTyF29NpbcwTD/3NdqkMQqegJPPFWx7frGFMMVQ0DWYbIIjAepQ5XbDgT0E5H23UFf4Uk6leDWLVNbdQ6Vhqg8l7JkzgdwsD2xPLo7qLaML1/Y8mg79ea8aq3/GtDyXukvDoU4NKtyNohkFtHwOX1H38VlCAITQIDAQAB
zendesk1._domainkey Zendesk 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1;t=s;n=core;k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA9IqdLrO3Zr2/56MHt8oQVCQorP0Bl2Fz9sM2tFBnJCdB/HogQmuudEg2xAovCN2PYpw44UijIvPuBoT9vxiv6ZCBJTLJXa82r6ke5rE4tbe9NKFIrVIb9S306cJDrnKFMDb8p0dU/Su0+eUR5gVAOtCuz2L8HAzs5edvsEvD/Fb4ny1RLNSEPZkIQLfGhVxQeWANm3+1Jwb/OBVXV9k0nKpWrpgqcmO7NzroJirp014RQY7rGi60JLUubc6XhvoFQBQrtOAdVlZC5wvfS1bgpq5kQpdP7cajIqWCeqxPTeo0ZUpey2ZcaygEsZz0Z3Gs5wDzyuqd7/ADpr2jNF7ozwIDAQAB
zendesk2._domainkey Zendesk 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1; t=s; n=core; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAmiSFNkgXrO3I8aOaPONDZWHv027rkiGIwb838OyXPgvFDEkCV/qGcdXSjZnaVAadrTm/oKnL8WOltP9zB1FLEuKt0fTi5zRyKPE4oIYCnEzXwrGqzjUcCABQBawQVqvXjDOaYh9Lhp8W5PYOLo905vRW7ipyIMDhuzBOJls91/WWXnNK0OwP3RghiisZjA3K2KqtRwf7w6GjNeNuAMNhvcmgAN15d/mhK+dev/hcRbal66RoYyTD8c0F0isahWH0envEX8aj+SBhheNk0/U37dGE+4nFaY5yP9CUlYjFKDSIKZgHzG4Hci3t/RubU58pi6BCrQQdAFvIOeDFeCZ0ywIDAQAB
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No valid MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1

Are external report receivers authorized? Yes — all authorized
Success

All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized

External Domain Authorization Auth Record
emaildefense.proofpoint.com Authorized v=DMARC1;
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Proofpoint does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Proofpoint

Proofpoint is a security gateway with shared MX infrastructure. It does not publish per-customer TLSA records.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Since Proofpoint does not support inbound DANE, deploy MTA-STS (RFC 8461) to enforce TLS and protect against downgrade attacks.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No valid BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Yes RFC 9116

security.txt properly configured

Contact

https://www.ibm.com/trust/security-psirt
https://hackerone.com/ibm?type=team
mailto:psirt@us.ibm.com

Expires

2026-04-05 Valid

Encryption

https://ibm.ent.box.com/s/gxyniavjpmqj6bnn3gsssirzbp6bmn8p
Acknowledgments
Source: https://ibm.com/.well-known/security.txt
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on dns1.p05.nsone.net — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: dns1.p05.nsone.net, dns3.p05.nsone.net, dns4.p05.nsone.net, dns2.p05.nsone.net

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
dns1.p05.nsone.net No N/A N/A OK
dns2.p05.nsone.net No N/A N/A OK
dns3.p05.nsone.net No N/A N/A OK
dns4.p05.nsone.net No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 3600s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

dns1.p05.nsone.net: 1.729786389e+09
dns2.p05.nsone.net: 1.729786389e+09
dns3.p05.nsone.net: 1.729786389e+09
dns4.p05.nsone.net: 1.729786389e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for ibm.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
dns1.p05.nsone.net 198.51.44.5 2620:4d:4000:6259:7:5:0:1 AS62597 1729786389
dns4.p05.nsone.net 198.51.45.69 2a00:edc0:6259:7:5::4 AS62597 1729786389
dns3.p05.nsone.net 198.51.44.69 2620:4d:4000:6259:7:5:0:3 AS62597 1729786389
dns2.p05.nsone.net 198.51.45.5 2a00:edc0:6259:7:5::2 AS62597 1729786389
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
2
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 2 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

All 2 server(s) verified: encrypted transport confirmed via direct SMTP probe and DNS policy

Policy Assessment Primary
  • Proofpoint enforces TLS on managed mail transport
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
MX Host STARTTLS TLS Version Cipher Certificate
mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Valid
Expires: 2026-12-10 (280 days)
Issuer: Sectigo Limited
mx0a-001b2d05.pphosted.com TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Valid
Expires: 2026-12-10 (280 days)
Issuer: Sectigo Limited
Multi-Vantage Probe Results
Unanimous: TLS verified 2 probes, 1 responded
France - EU observed
All servers support TLS
US-East (Boston) skipped
4.02s
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Success

Resolved 2 unique ASN(s) across 3 IP address(es)

ASNNameCountry
AS16625 Akamai Technologies, Inc. US
AS20940 Akamai International B.V. US
IPv4 Mappings:
184.30.98.134 → AS16625 (184.30.96.0/20)
IPv6 Mappings:
2600:1405:7400:c82::3831 → AS20940 (2600:1405:7400::/48)
2600:1405:7400:c8c::3831 → AS20940 (2600:1405:7400::/48)

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success 10 services

10 SaaS services detected via DNS TXT verification records

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

ServiceVerification Record
Yandex yandex-verification: 5f458b477256c50c
Atlassian atlassian-domain-verification=a32Aj0uoXQRh6QseDFFrlufYlkbeSdok7az3sY0DQNVXpW1Iqj...
Apple apple-domain-verification=M3o953J0rN1B0P2a
MongoDB Atlas mongodb-site-verification=3d0wR0KvanH3yTbll0sXEJ0QGBQffOkv
GitHub _github-challenge-ibm.ibm.com=2613e984bc
Google Workspace google-site-verification=aH5jG_abrxRKeKZKOrX9CuXlXdFSCQxVkmAVoYwzNcc
Microsoft 365 MS=ms61389031
Facebook / Meta facebook-domain-verification=kyuxs3tdqtyh9rbqa3szkq3k9i2bbs
Amazon SES amazonses:79ShwQazteb+WkCt8e297sAC2mwZVRditsrzaoxiHjU=
Adobe adobe-idp-site-verification=5f8adca7-512f-44e1-a5b2-b62c5e3763f2
Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: dns1.p05.nsone.net dns2.p05.nsone.net dns3.p05.nsone.net dns4.p05.nsone.net
Managed DNS
All 4 nameservers hosted by NS1 (IBM). Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): NS1 (IBM)
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (3 differences found)
Resolver Differences:
TXT: OpenDNS returned different results: [00D3h000004YkeYEAS 00d00000000hedieay 00d50000000c9mweay 00df40000004784eaa 40a21f5affe343c6b37e0a5af80dcd93 MS=ms61389031 _github-challenge-ibm.ibm.com=2613e984bc apple-domain-verification=M3o953J0rN1B0P2a asv=e8bb80eeac60e62a4dd07f03d1d36829 jamf-site-verification=CN4bHigc1ZnD6ZQX_2c6XQ yandex-verification: 5f458b477256c50c]
A: Google returned different results: [184.30.98.134]
A: DNS4EU returned different results: [184.29.195.35]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

184.30.98.134
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2600:1405:7400:c82::3831
2600:1405:7400:c8c::3831
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

5 mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com.
5 mx0a-001b2d05.pphosted.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Proofpoint

SRVServices

_sipfederationtls._tcp: 0 20 5269 nxpfs.ucfederationcloud.com.
SIP, XMPP, or other service endpoints
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: 1 endpoint
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 27 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
CT logs unavailable 27 current 0 expired 12 CNAMEs Source: Certificate Transparency + DNS Intelligence
Subdomains discovered via CT logs (RFC 6962), DNS probing of common service names, and CNAME chain traversal.
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
api.ibm.com DNS Current prod-api.ibm.net — — —
app.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
apps.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
assets.ibm.com DNS Current assets.ibm.com.edgekey.net — — —
autodiscover.ibm.com DNS Current outlook.office.com — — —
build.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
careers.ibm.com DNS Current portals-ibmglobal.avature.net — — —
client.ibm.com DNS Current client.ibm.net — — —
cloud.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
cms.ibm.com DNS Current cms.ibm.net — — —
community.ibm.com DNS Current community.ibm.net — — —
db2.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
developer.ibm.com DNS Current developer.ibm.net — — —
github.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
inventory.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
learn.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
login.ibm.com DNS Current ibmlogin.ice.ibmcloud.com — — —
m.ibm.com DNS Current redirect.www.ibm.com — — —
mail.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
mobile.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
reporting.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
shop.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
sip.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
support.ibm.com DNS Current redirect.www.ibm.com — — —
training.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
video.ibm.com DNS Current — — — —
www.ibm.com DNS Current outer-global-dual.ibmcom-tls12.edgekey.net — — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
184.30.98.134
184.30.98.134
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2600:1405:7400:c82::3831
2600:1405:7400:c8c::3831
2600:1405:7400:c8c::3831
2600:1405:7400:c82::3831
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.ibm.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
5 mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com.
5 mx0a-001b2d05.pphosted.com.
5 mx0a-001b2d05.pphosted.com.
5 mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
dns2.p05.nsone.net.
dns1.p05.nsone.net.
dns3.p05.nsone.net.
dns2.p05.nsone.net.
dns4.p05.nsone.net.
dns3.p05.nsone.net.
dns1.p05.nsone.net.
dns4.p05.nsone.net.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
dns1.p05.nsone.net. hostmaster.nsone.net. 1729786389 43200 7200 604800 3600
dns1.p05.nsone.net. hostmaster.nsone.net. 1729786389 43200 7200 604800 3600
TXT RFC 7208 §4 42 / 0 records
yandex-verification: 5f458b477256c50c
—
atlassian-domain-verification=a32Aj0uoXQRh6QseDFFrlufYlkbeSdok7az3sY0DQNVXpW1Iqj8zlsuXFZgHMojH
—
apple-domain-verification=M3o953J0rN1B0P2a
—
docker-verification=7c4d4e40-e7ee-4183-94c2-db97d0873269
—
asv=e8bb80eeac60e62a4dd07f03d1d36829
—
mongodb-site-verification=3d0wR0KvanH3yTbll0sXEJ0QGBQffOkv
—
figma-domain-verification=6db9259c4472f3e5ba44c7ae284b4f4b8aa0268c0797659a5e1a28ccfe912ddf-1741206863
—
anthropic-domain-verification-ym2t7s=RPDdVAMpzgbooX0kxhqstuM2D
—
atlassian-domain-verification=79ZnqmRPyDwm6b99GAF3ymzBmjtRZU9oCfgMwVMAUGlrPPenDc6esgO62jafAXUI
—
_github-challenge-ibm.ibm.com=2613e984bc
—
v=spf1 include:%{ir}.%{v}.%{d}.spf.has.pphosted.com -all
—
_analyst_ng_validation=f6702989-83f3-42b8-be39-19cf8f1c33f5
—
00D3h000004YkeYEAS
—
smartsheet-site-validation=TaCpXPZ-qFfOgfHXuMrfF8_d6GZjICNl
—
atlassian-domain-verification=WAjTH82C5Zx475WLKAA2nrdlsoA/kN0ej9igrLrED4h15KMHPOm+A5H3GndKAxDC
—
docker-verification=846278f4-7e2c-4586-ae26-e1a9f0f0aecd
—
google-site-verification=aH5jG_abrxRKeKZKOrX9CuXlXdFSCQxVkmAVoYwzNcc
—
ms-domain-verification=bedcd06e-7e1c-4906-9b6a-b4a1095fa4ed
—
00d00000000hedieay
—
onetrust-domain-verification=e7e09cedfb9b4ff386f1274e4c214d55
—
00df40000004784eaa
—
40a21f5affe343c6b37e0a5af80dcd93
—
Dynatrace-site-verification=76b6b299-fe43-4f31-889b-a8a467193478__8q74sg9dg5udjppn95utrb8bct
—
h1-domain-verification=m9jGKLYa5hDdU5AHUfK9jrBmWVhx3h9t9ztfDFMaxZfgChvk
—
google-site-verification=I-empodMpM7n5Px1doUgIaOKHKeIMXXf6k8Ea5ENyO4
—
ms-domain-verification=1adbc779-89ce-47cf-8167-c4e4a3b4a6aa
—
MS=ms61389031
—
facebook-domain-verification=kyuxs3tdqtyh9rbqa3szkq3k9i2bbs
—
google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=42135076
—
google-site-verification=tzdngH5fWH-k8uQoDVovOFJQZTwaGtDOP6S2cQlOvCs
—
00d50000000c9mweay
—
jamf-site-verification=CN4bHigc1ZnD6ZQX_2c6XQ
—
mongodb-site-verification=Gcqpap80hVonXfV2VnYC6AlEr2Z9vvf3
—
google-site-verification=Jck8mLbYYfCnrmi_nRy4MG2fbUN3UGhC29KdspGLd9Y
—
smartsheet-site-validation=I-lI3gCPdvKbKQ6KTki96Ream6Yjs1gU
—
amazonses:79ShwQazteb+WkCt8e297sAC2mwZVRditsrzaoxiHjU=
—
adobe-idp-site-verification=5f8adca7-512f-44e1-a5b2-b62c5e3763f2
—
intersight=1439768961d2f6d736c38b947d235947681cd817abea13eab3daee9ecbdc6c3d
—
google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=48225137
—
DomainVerification=CYICZMSWT62KDTQWZ1YCKKU763NN36BQJ4TD5BV606K3FLDUR3UOJE58E30FTIVL
—
intersight=cfe6f48b59e7428442b9aab04765ca0953e01c480a685ca5cf6939ef9e505532
—
mongodb-site-verification=gEevYaKFpagtLmrYxomtpE2QmYwnd29i
—
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

f0391ec85e3df067b6f1bef3e109a920c4ab3488a96d80001fe9a97a652fd39a233fa8e684c3fb748bb454b12464a5cf86ae58bc2e83102f8b8e4856e9f5dfc1
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 5 Mar 2026, 10:49 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-ibm.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-ibm.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-ibm.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-ibm.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/5813/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for ibm.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short ibm.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' RFC 6376 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'email' RFC 6376 
dig +short email._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' RFC 6376 
dig +short k2._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' RFC 6376 
dig +short k3._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' RFC 6376 
dig +short s1._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' RFC 6376 
dig +short s2._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's3' RFC 6376 
dig +short s3._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sf2' RFC 6376 
dig +short sf2._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' RFC 6376 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.ibm.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer ibm.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd ibm.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx0a-001b2d05.pphosted.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx0a-001b2d05.pphosted.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com:25 -servername mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.ibm.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.ibm.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.ibm.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.ibm.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/ibm.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com:25 -servername mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.ibm.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://ibm.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://ibm.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://ibm.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 184.30.98.134 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 134.98.30.184.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4874 runs
DKIM
Verified 4692 runs
DMARC
Verified 4857 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4676 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4855 runs
BIMI
Verified 4691 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4694 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4696 runs
CAA
Verified 4688 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short ibm.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'dkim' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short dkim._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'email' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short email._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k2._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k3._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s1._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s2._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 's3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short s3._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'sf2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short sf2._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk1._domainkey.ibm.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'zendesk2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short zendesk2._domainkey.ibm.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer ibm.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd ibm.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for mx0a-001b2d05.pphosted.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mx0a-001b2d05.pphosted.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com:25 -servername mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.ibm.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.ibm.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.ibm.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.ibm.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer ibm.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/ibm.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com:25 -servername mx0b-001b2d05.pphosted.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.ibm.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://ibm.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://ibm.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://ibm.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 184.30.98.134 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 134.98.30.184.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

ibm.com

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.