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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 5 Mar 2026, 10:41 UTC
Duration 16.4s
Version v26.34.20
Integrity ecbc190a86adb5bd73c8ea11cfba46ded854b65293130c2c4e393c16a76ef98489da9a919747a7587c6a8814c67c97ca03d3ab008201e8e872042be058ca1bee
Subject Domain
kokee.net

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

kokee.net
5 Mar 2026, 10:41 UTC · 16.4s ·v26.34.20 · SHA-3-512: ecbc✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk
4 protocols configured, 5 not configured Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled Why we go beyond letter grades
1 recommendation 1 monitoring
Analysis Confidence (ICD 203)
MODERATE 69/100
Resolver agreement is inconsistent for some protocols, limiting confidence. Data currency and system maturity are adequate.
Accuracy 63% Currency 75/100 Maturity verified
Limiting factor: Resolver agreement is low for this scan — some protocols returned inconsistent results across resolvers
Intelligence Currency
Data Currency: Good 75/100
ICuAE Details
Currentness Excellent TTL Compliance Excellent Completeness Degraded Source Credibility Excellent TTL Relevance Adequate
DNS data is mostly current with minor gaps — good intelligence currency

The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.

Record Type Observed TTL Typical TTL Severity Context
MX 1799s 1 hour (3600s) medium MX TTL is below typical — observed 1799s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
TXT 1799s 1 hour (3600s) medium TXT TTL is below typical — observed 1799s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.
NS 30 minutes (1800s) 1 day (86400s) high NS TTL is below typical — observed 30 minutes (1800s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations.

Big Picture Questions

  • How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
  • Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
  • Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
  • Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
Tune TTL for kokee.net
Reference: NIST SP 800-53 SI-7 (Information Integrity) · RFC 8767 (Serve Stale) · RFC 1035 §3.2.1 (TTL semantics) DNS provider detected: Namecheap — provider-specific RFC compliance notes are shown inline above where applicable.
Primary NS dns1.registrar-servers.com
Serial 1662543277
Admin hostmaster.registrar-servers.com
Provider Namecheap
Timer Value RFC 1912 Range
Refresh43200s1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs)
Retry3600sFraction of Refresh
Expire604800s1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days)
Minimum (Neg. Cache)3601s300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day)
Expire: SOA Expire is 7 days (604800s). RFC 1912 §2.2 recommends 1,209,600–2,419,200 seconds (14–28 days). If the primary nameserver becomes unreachable, secondary nameservers will stop serving this zone after only 7 days (604800s).
RFC 1912 §2.2
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
Move DMARC policy from 'none' to 'quarantine' or 'reject'
Monitoring
DMARC record has configuration warnings — review recommended
Configured
SPF, DMARC (with warnings), DKIM, DANE
Not Configured
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions 6 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High DANE Requires DNSSEC

DANE/TLSA records are present but DNSSEC is not enabled. DANE cannot function without DNSSEC validation.

RFC 7672 §2.1
High Upgrade DMARC from p=none

Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.

A quarantine or reject policy instructs receivers to take action on failing mail.
TypeTXT
Host_dmarc.kokee.net (DMARC policy record)
Valuev=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@kokee.net
RFC 7489 §6.3
Medium Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.

RFC 4035
Low Add CAA Records

CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.

CAA constrains which CAs can issue certificates for this domain.
TypeCAA
Hostkokee.net (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider)
Value0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659
Low Add TLS-RPT Reporting

Your domain has DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest email transport security available. TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.

TLS-RPT sends you reports about TLS connection failures to your mail servers.
TypeTXT
Host_smtp._tls.kokee.net (SMTP TLS reporting record)
Valuev=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@kokee.net
RFC 8460
Low Deploy MTA-STS

MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.

MTA-STS tells sending servers to require TLS when delivering mail to your domain.
TypeTXT
Host_mta-sts.kokee.net (MTA-STS policy record)
Valuev=STSv1; id=kokee.net
RFC 8461
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
NameCheap, Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider INFERRED
ProtonMail
Moderately Protected
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting OBSERVED
Namecheap
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 2/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 2/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf.protonmail.ch mx ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain has DMARC p=none (monitoring only). Enforcing quarantine or reject is recommended to gain real protection.

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Monitoring only
Warning p=none

DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@kokee.net
Policy p=none provides no protection - spoofed emails reach inboxes
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
Advanced cryptographic posture detected. Domain appears to be in deliberate DMARC monitoring phase with aggregate reporting enabled
RFC 7489 Present — DMARC record published per RFC 7489 §6.3.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Yes — verified
Found 2048-bit

Found DKIM for 2 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)

protonmail._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1;k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAnndCJh9Zfup6L51kw6f5eBVMYa1CGm5Lstu9XGKe1xEagKBUXhD6CuydTiUn3vF1zlRTjK2dJ4uCH1iMbLzIURDh6ho7lFegS43M1C00OzDtUZmkIDpS8EkZwxKP/tyayJIhKImZozGhoYM1emTksNMQAM4ENH3ccu5/CSYx99sKgq7tGQ5A0z6KReh5/X8tMaL9ktVe1S7j51zcZGOt9y37hPM/OGfBeLQmNzqtFBgk+9J6xQuxPAkJ9J6O7yzvpcqekMvb5Fz8ECJw2fO8sg0Th3cBcDRLpp9XGa9a8F1SGn2oME5y74h6RZHjVoeIqk0CVG/0y7B92qHwE9u6tQIDAQAB;
protonmail3._domainkey 2048-bit Adequate
v=DKIM1;k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAtFovf3dZVuCAdCKeh+qT1UX6TPSqICeVaFDlU6JHSQ5tH4zsT7LWzjS3orOYZs0W+lvD+27NpbOI3N3hRGC4H0z57Occc3/tB5OEGB+9gZ1UMfQcp0BJHHG2IOnEMG6GAS14sv4lEjhtfPapps2DxLZtXnHL94DSajSoxHip4O5ybSSCH7r8ew1J5hvM7vVXITS4C1Of3jbpgqGoIRQn2C9g1SuKuxWd4Qcidn58/hai90//JTAHts3fP/osLGCLpYIkb+6dlitp5L4mQbQYTgTxK+wVY02T6EL/7D78UkXQPncKXw99vfWZ/b/EhZbw84aXO2VvZNgcOzfl/dx0GwIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 Conformant — DKIM keys and signatures conform to RFC 6376 §3.6 (Internet Standard).
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? Yes
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 2/2 MX

DANE configured — TLSA records found for all 2 MX hosts

MX Host Usage Selector Match Certificate Data
mailsec.protonmail.ch 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 76bb66711da416433ca890a5b2e5a0533c6006478f7d10a4469a947acc8399e1
mailsec.protonmail.ch 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 6111a5698d23c89e09c36ff833c1487edc1b0c841f87c49dae8f7a09e11e979e
mail.protonmail.ch 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 6111a5698d23c89e09c36ff833c1487edc1b0c841f87c49dae8f7a09e11e979e
mail.protonmail.ch 3 DANE-EE (Domain-issued certificate) Public key only (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) SHA-256 76bb66711da416433ca890a5b2e5a0533c6006478f7d10a4469a947acc8399e1
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses DNSSEC + DANE — the strongest cryptographic transport security. DANE binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, creating a verifiable chain of trust from root to mail server (RFC 7672 §1.3). MTA-STS could complement this for senders that don't validate DNSSEC, but DANE alone provides the highest level of protection available.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

Could not fetch security.txt

Fetch error: Connection failed
A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No significant AI surface findings

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? No directives
No robots.txt found
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on dns2.registrar-servers.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Test inconclusive
Open Recursion Disabled Test inconclusive
Nameserver Identity Hidden Test inconclusive
Cache Snooping Protected Test inconclusive

Tested nameservers: dns2.registrar-servers.com, dns1.registrar-servers.com

Delegation Consistency 1 Issue

Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
dns1.registrar-servers.com No N/A N/A OK
dns2.registrar-servers.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Child TTL: 1800s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

dns1.registrar-servers.com: 1.662543277e+09
dns2.registrar-servers.com: 1.662543277e+09
Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy

Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for kokee.net — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial
dns1.registrar-servers.com 156.154.132.200 2610:a1:1024::200 AS12008 1662543277
dns2.registrar-servers.com 156.154.133.200 2610:a1:1025::200 AS12008 1662543277
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
2
Diversity Score
Fair

1 ASN(s), 2 /24 prefix(es) — consider adding diversity

Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? Yes DANE/TLSA provides cryptographic transport verification

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (2 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC (RFC 7672)
  • Proton Mail enforces TLS 1.2+ with DANE support
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
Infrastructure Intelligence Who hosts this domain and what services power it? Direct

ASN / Network Info

No IP addresses to look up

Edge / CDN Success

Domain appears to use direct origin hosting

SaaS TXT Footprint Success

No SaaS services detected

Detects SaaS services that leave DNS TXT verification records (e.g., domain ownership proofs). Does not detect all SaaS platforms — only those indicated by DNS.

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? Possible DNSSEC is not deployed, DNS responses are not cryptographically verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Enterprise DNS Context: DNSSEC is the only standardized, DNS-verifiable mechanism that cryptographically authenticates responses between authoritative servers and resolvers (RFC 4033 §2, RFC 4035). Without it, DNS responses are technically vulnerable to in-transit tampering. Enterprise operators may employ compensating controls (anycast, DDoS mitigation, private peering, TSIG) — however, these do not provide DNS-layer data authentication to third-party resolvers and are not verifiable via DNS alone.
Visibility: DNS-only — network-layer compensating controls cannot be observed or verified through DNS queries. This assessment reflects what is provable from the DNS evidence available.

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: dns1.registrar-servers.com dns2.registrar-servers.com
Managed DNS
All 2 nameservers hosted by Namecheap. Managed DNS provides reliable resolution with provider-maintained infrastructure.
DNS provider(s): Namecheap
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

No A records
Domain may use AAAA (IPv6) only or CNAME

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

20 mailsec.protonmail.ch.
10 mail.protonmail.ch.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
ProtonMail

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: No direct IP Mail: 2 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? None found
How did we find these?

No subdomains found via Certificate Transparency logs, DNS probing, or CNAME chain traversal for this domain. No TLS certificates have been issued and no common service names resolve for subdomains of kokee.net.

Δ No Propagation Issues: All DNS records are synchronized between resolver and authoritative nameserver.
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.kokee.net RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@kokee.net
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@kokee.net
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
20 mailsec.protonmail.ch.
10 mail.protonmail.ch.
10 mail.protonmail.ch.
20 mailsec.protonmail.ch.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
dns2.registrar-servers.com.
dns1.registrar-servers.com.
dns1.registrar-servers.com.
dns2.registrar-servers.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
dns1.registrar-servers.com. hostmaster.registrar-servers.com. 1662543277 43200 3600 604800 3601
dns1.registrar-servers.com. hostmaster.registrar-servers.com. 1662543277 43200 3600 604800 3601
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
protonmail-verification=eaa79cf54922b0c8de2d20d1fb57570ecf326659
v=spf1 include:_spf.protonmail.ch mx ~all
v=spf1 include:_spf.protonmail.ch mx ~all
protonmail-verification=eaa79cf54922b0c8de2d20d1fb57570ecf326659
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

ecbc190a86adb5bd73c8ea11cfba46ded854b65293130c2c4e393c16a76ef98489da9a919747a7587c6a8814c67c97ca03d3ab008201e8e872042be058ca1bee
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 5 Mar 2026, 10:41 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-kokee.net.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-kokee.net.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-kokee.net.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-kokee.net.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/5798/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for kokee.net. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short kokee.net TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.kokee.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail' RFC 6376 
dig +short protonmail._domainkey.kokee.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail3' RFC 6376 
dig +short protonmail3._domainkey.kokee.net TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer kokee.net DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd kokee.net A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mailsec.protonmail.ch RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mailsec.protonmail.ch TLSA
Check TLSA record for mail.protonmail.ch RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail.protonmail.ch TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mailsec.protonmail.ch) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mailsec.protonmail.ch:25 -servername mailsec.protonmail.ch 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.kokee.net TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.kokee.net/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.kokee.net TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.kokee.net TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/kokee.net' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mailsec.protonmail.ch) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mailsec.protonmail.ch:25 -servername mailsec.protonmail.ch </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.kokee.net&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://kokee.net/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://kokee.net/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://kokee.net/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 5026 runs
DKIM
Verified 4845 runs
DMARC
Verified 5010 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4827 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 5008 runs
BIMI
Verified 4841 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4844 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4848 runs
CAA
Verified 4841 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short kokee.net TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.kokee.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short protonmail._domainkey.kokee.net TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'protonmail3' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short protonmail3._domainkey.kokee.net TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer kokee.net DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd kokee.net A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for mailsec.protonmail.ch (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mailsec.protonmail.ch TLSA
Check TLSA record for mail.protonmail.ch (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.mail.protonmail.ch TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (mailsec.protonmail.ch) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mailsec.protonmail.ch:25 -servername mailsec.protonmail.ch 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.kokee.net TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.kokee.net/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.kokee.net TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.kokee.net TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer kokee.net CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/kokee.net' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (mailsec.protonmail.ch) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mailsec.protonmail.ch:25 -servername mailsec.protonmail.ch </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.kokee.net&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://kokee.net/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://kokee.net/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://kokee.net/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

kokee.net

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.