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Email Security Scope: SPF: No Local Record DMARC: Local Record MX Records Present
DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 4 Mar 2026, 15:34 UTC
Duration 23.5s
Version v26.33.96
Integrity cafc19ab7a2640513aeabe56c0162f86c23cbcfaa703a108909e47232cea63622f623c8021d093cd6d19705337ebca2e677d60019fbaf6d02d65c4986fa3ef90
Subject Domain
screen.it-help.tech

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

screen.it-help.tech High Risk
4 Mar 2026, 15:34 UTC · 23.5s ·v26.33.96 · SHA-3-512: cafc✱✱✱✱ Verify ·Cross-Referenced
Executive Topology Replay
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Engineer workspace · evidence preserved

Read the verdict first. Descend only as far as the incident requires.

This report keeps the complete technical record while separating decision, interpretation, evidence, and raw reproduction into a stable disclosure gradient.

L0PostureL1InterpretationL2EvidenceL3Raw & reproduce
Hurry path
MX & Routing Subdomains DNSSEC What changed
KEYBOARD !1@2#3$4%5^6 jump to that section · esc back to the verdict
Sorted by severity — worst first
Email Spoofing
Partial
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Configured
Monitoring
Not Setup
DANE
Not Deployed
TRACE L0 · Email Spoofing — Partial L1 · 01 · Email Security · SPF/DMARC L3 · Reproduce commands
Not Configured
SPF, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE
Recommended
Publish an SPF record to authorize legitimate mail senders, Add DMARC aggregate reporting (rua) for visibility into email authentication
Monitoring
DKIM signing inferred from provider — could not directly verify selector
Configured
DMARC (reject), DKIM (inferred via Zoho Mail), DNSSEC, CAA
Priority Actions 5 total Achievable posture: Moderate Risk
Critical Publish SPF Record

Add an SPF record to authorize mail servers for this domain.

RFC 7208
Medium Add DMARC Aggregate Reporting

Add a rua= tag to receive aggregate DMARC reports. Without reporting, you cannot monitor authentication failures.

RFC 7489 §7.1
Low Add BIMI Record

Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).

RFC 9495
Open Remediation Workspace — Copy-Paste Ready Records
Registrar (RDAP) OBSERVED LIVE
Amazon Registrar, Inc.
Registrar for it-help.tech
Email Service Provider INFERRED
Zoho Mail
Limited Protection
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Footprint
01 Identity & policy · L1 Email Security Can this domain be impersonated by email? SPF DMARC DKIM MTA-STS TLS-RPT MX & Routing Partial
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Partially DMARC present but no SPF

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? No
Warning

No SPF record found

RFC Stance: RFC 7208 defines the SPF mechanism for domains that choose to publish sender authorization. The standard does not mandate SPF publication — it is a voluntary security control.
Operational Security: We flag its absence because any server on the internet can send email claiming to be this domain. Attackers send from a domain — they do not need the domain to have email infrastructure.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject Local

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed
No np= tag (DMARCbis) — non-existent subdomains inherit p= policy but adding np=reject provides explicit protection against subdomain spoofing
No aggregate reporting (rua) configured — you won't receive reports about authentication results and potential abuse
No forensic reporting (ruf) tag — this is correct. The absence of ruf= is not a gap. RFC 7489 §7.3 warns that forensic reports can expose PII (full message headers or bodies). Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo do not honour ruf= requests regardless. The DMARCbis draft (draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis) has formally removed ruf= from the specification, confirming its deprecation. Omitting ruf= is the recommended modern practice. RFC 7489 §7.3 — Forensic Reports
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Provider-managed
Provider Verified

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

Zoho Mail detected as primary mail platform — DKIM signing is managed by the provider. The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? Not prevented
Warning

No MTA-STS record found

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? No reporting
Warning

No TLS-RPT record found

02 Chain of authority · L1 Domain Security Can DNS answers and certificate issuance be trusted? DANE / TLSA CAA Delegation DNSSEC & NS Protected
DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 3 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain has neither DANE nor MTA-STS. Mail transport relies on opportunistic TLS without policy enforcement, leaving it vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Deploy DANE (RFC 7672) with DNSSEC for the strongest protection, or MTA-STS (RFC 8461) if DNSSEC is not feasible.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold Success

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? Yes

CAA configured - specific CAs authorized

12a3869a5f4bcc65ad1122480032ce15.assist.cs.zohohost.com.
assist.cs.zohohost.com.
zs-us4-elczhost.zohohost.com.
Since September 2025, all public CAs must verify domain control from multiple geographic locations (Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration, CA/B Forum Ballot SC-067). CAA records are now checked from multiple network perspectives before certificate issuance.
Delegation Consistency 2 Issues

Delegation consistency: 2 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.

Findings:
  • Could not retrieve NS TTL from child zone
  • Could not retrieve SOA serial from any nameserver

DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned

Glue Record Completeness Complete

NameserverIn-BailiwickIPv4 GlueIPv6 GlueStatus
12a3869a5f4bcc65ad1122480032ce15.assist.cs.zohohost.com No N/A N/A OK
assist.cs.zohohost.com No N/A N/A OK
zs-us4-elczhost.zohohost.com No N/A N/A OK

NS TTL Comparison Drift

Parent TTL: 3600s Drift: 0s

SOA Serial Consistency Consistent

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit? No DNSSEC signed and validated, cryptographic chain of trust verified

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Gold Signed

DNSSEC configured (DNSKEY + DS records present) but AD flag not set — resolver did not confirm chain of trust validation (RFC 4035 §3.2.3). This may indicate a broken chain or a non-validating resolver path.

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are cryptographically authenticated and tamper-evident.
AD Flag: Not Set - Records exist but resolver didn't confirm validation
DS Record (at registrar):
12a3869a5f4bcc65ad1122480032ce15.assist.cs.zohohost.com.
assist.cs.zohohost.com.
zs-us4-elczhost.zohohost.com.

NS Delegation Check Failed Mismatch

NS delegation mismatch - child and parent zone have different NS records

NS records at domain differ from parent zone delegation. May indicate recent DNS migration still propagating.
Nameservers: 12a3869a5f4bcc65ad1122480032ce15.assist.cs.zohohost.com assist.cs.zohohost.com zs-us4-elczhost.zohohost.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 5 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
03 Delivery path · L1 Transport Security Will mail transport resist downgrade and interception? STARTTLS MTA-STS policy TLS-RPT
Mail Transport Security Beta Is mail transport encrypted and verified? No No MTA-STS or DANE — mail transport encryption is opportunistic only

Transport encryption enforced via DNS policy (1 signal(s))

Policy Assessment Primary
  • DANE/TLSA records published — mail servers pin TLS certificates via DNSSEC (RFC 7672)
Telemetry
TLS-RPT not configured — domain has no visibility into TLS delivery failures from real senders
Live Probe Supplementary
Skipped — Remote probe failed (connection failed — probe may be offline) and local port 25 is blocked. Transport security is assessed via DNS policy records per NIST SP 800-177 Rev. 1.
What Is Measured: Our probe’s TLS 1.3 handshake offers the hybrid post-quantum group X25519MLKEM768 (X25519 combined with ML-KEM-768). The Key Exchange column reports the group each mail server actually negotiated — direct, observed evidence of its post-quantum readiness toward a hybrid-capable client.
Quantum-Safe Hybrid: The session key agreement combines classical X25519 with ML-KEM-768, standardized in FIPS 203 (final, August 2024). This protects the key exchange against “harvest now, decrypt later” collection by a future quantum adversary.
Classical: The server completed the handshake without selecting the offered hybrid group. This is not a deviation — no RFC currently requires post-quantum key exchange. The X25519MLKEM768 group is defined in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem (Standards Track draft, not yet an RFC); the hybrid approach is described in draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (IESG-approved Informational). Servers supporting only other hybrid groups also read as Classical here.
Transition Outlook: NIST’s draft transition guidance (NIST IR 8547) projects quantum-vulnerable algorithms being deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. Hybrid key exchange requires TLS 1.3. This finding is informational and does not affect this domain’s grade.
04 Human-visible identity · L1 Brand & Trust Can this brand be convincingly faked? BIMI & VMC CAA · see Domain Security Not Setup
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3) and CAA restricts certificate issuance (RFC 8659 §4), but no BIMI brand verification — lookalike domains display identically in inboxes without visual proof of authenticity

BIMI BIMI Spec Gold Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

05 Ownership & attack surface · L1 Infrastructure Intelligence Who operates this domain, and what is exposed? Registrar / RDAP security.txt AI Surface Subdomains
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116

No security.txt found

A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities. See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No

No AI governance measures detected

llms.txt llmstxt.org
Is this domain publishing AI-readable brand context? No
No llms.txt found
No llms-full.txt found
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Are AI crawlers explicitly allowed or blocked? Not blocked
No AI crawler blocking observed — no blocking directives found in robots.txt View robots.txt
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Does the site express AI content-usage preferences? Not Configured
No Content-Usage directive detected. The IETF AI Preferences working group is developing a Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Example: Add Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it. Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Is this site trying to manipulate AI recommendations? No
No AI recommendation poisoning indicators found
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Is hidden prompt-injection text present in the source? No
No hidden prompt-like artifacts detected
Evidence Log (1 item)
TypeDetailSeverityConfidence
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives low Observed
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No

No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.

No exposed secrets, API keys, or credentials were detected in publicly accessible page source or scripts.
Sources scanned (1)
  • https://screen.it-help.tech/
What type of scan is this?

This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.

Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.

Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.

DNS Server Security Hardened

No DNS server misconfigurations found on 12a3869a5f4bcc65ad1122480032ce15.assist.cs.zohohost.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.

Check Result Detail
Zone Transfer (AXFR) Denied Zone transfer denied (correct configuration)
Open Recursion Disabled Recursion disabled (correct configuration)
Nameserver Identity Hidden No nameserver identity information disclosed
Cache Snooping Protected Cache snooping not possible (correct configuration)

Tested nameservers: 12a3869a5f4bcc65ad1122480032ce15.assist.cs.zohohost.com, assist.cs.zohohost.com, zs-us4-elczhost.zohohost.com

Nameserver Fleet Matrix 1 Issue

Analyzed 3 nameserver(s) for screen.it-help.tech — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.

Findings:
  • Reachability probes skipped — all 3 resolved nameservers failed both UDP and TCP, indicating the scanning environment's network restricts outbound DNS on port 53
Nameserver IPv4 IPv6 ASN / Operator UDP TCP AA SOA Serial Anycast Node
12a3869a5f4bcc65ad1122480032ce15.assist.cs.zohohost.com assist.cs.zohohost.com.
zs-us4-elczhost.zohohost.com.
136.143.189.127 		assist.cs.zohohost.com.
zs-us4-elczhost.zohohost.com. 		N/A N/A
assist.cs.zohohost.com ZS-US4-ELCZHOST.zohohost.com.
136.143.189.127 		zs-us4-elczhost.zohohost.com. N/A N/A
zs-us4-elczhost.zohohost.com 136.143.189.127 None AS2639 N/A N/A
Unique ASNs
1
Unique Operators
0
Unique /24 Prefixes
3
Diversity Score