Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Add an SPF record to authorize mail servers for this domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | ohg-nagold.de (root of domain) |
| Value | v=spf1 ~all |
Add a rua= tag to receive aggregate DMARC reports. Without reporting, you cannot monitor authentication failures.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _dmarc.ohg-nagold.de (add to existing DMARC record) |
| Value | rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@ohg-nagold.de |
DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.
Your domain has DMARC reject — you qualify for BIMI, which displays your brand logo in receiving email clients that support it (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo).
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | default._bimi.ohg-nagold.de (BIMI default record) |
| Value | v=BIMI1; l=https://ohg-nagold.de/brand/logo.svg |
CAA records specify which Certificate Authorities may issue certificates for your domain, reducing the risk of unauthorized certificate issuance.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | CAA |
| Host | ohg-nagold.de (root of domain — adjust CA to match your provider) |
| Value | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
TLS-RPT (TLS Reporting) sends you reports about TLS connection failures when other servers try to deliver mail to your domain.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _smtp._tls.ohg-nagold.de (SMTP TLS reporting record) |
| Value | v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@ohg-nagold.de |
MTA-STS enforces TLS encryption for inbound mail delivery, preventing downgrade attacks on your mail transport.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _mta-sts.ohg-nagold.de (MTA-STS policy record) |
| Value | v=STSv1; id=ohg-nagold.de |
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Partially DMARC present but no SPF
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Gold
No SPF record found
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Gold
DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Gold
DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Gold
No MTA-STS record found
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Gold
No TLS-RPT record found
This domain uses short TTLs across 4 record types (A record at 119s), consistent with DNS-based traffic management (GSLB). Enterprises operating large anycast networks intentionally use short TTLs to enable rapid failover, geographic steering, and load distribution. This is a deliberate infrastructure choice, not a misconfiguration. RFC 1035 §3.2.1 permits any TTL value the zone administrator selects. The findings below reflect deviation from typical values for reference, not necessarily actionable recommendations for this class of infrastructure.
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from typical values. For domains using DNS-based traffic management, short TTLs are expected and intentional.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 119s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | A TTL is below typical — observed 119s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| MX | 119s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | MX TTL is below typical — observed 119s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| NS | 2 minutes (120s) |
1 day (86400s) |
high | NS TTL is below typical — observed 2 minutes (120s), typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| AAAA | 150s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | AAAA TTL is below typical — observed 150s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| SOA | 150s |
1 hour (3600s) |
high | SOA TTL is below typical — observed 150s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- This domain runs short TTLs across multiple record types. Does it operate a global anycast network where DNS-based traffic steering justifies the query volume?
- Are the short TTLs enabling active failover, geographic routing, or load distribution — or are they leftover from a migration that was never reverted?
- Enterprise-grade DNS infrastructure (sub-5ms authoritative response times, globally distributed nameservers) absorbs short-TTL query volume. Would your authoritative DNS handle the same load?
docks12.rzone.de
2020050719
hostmaster.strato-rz.de
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 86400s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 7200s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 604800s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 300s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
DANE / TLSA Gold Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? No
No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 1 MX host)
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Possible DMARC reject policy blocks email spoofing (RFC 7489 §6.3), but no BIMI brand verification and no CAA certificate restriction (RFC 8659) — visual impersonation via lookalike domains and unrestricted certificate issuance remain open vectors
No BIMI record found
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Gold wrrning
No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? No RFC 9116
No security.txt found
/.well-known/security.txt provides security researchers with a standardized way to report vulnerabilities.
See securitytxt.org for a generator.
AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? No
No AI governance measures detected
llms.txt llmstxt.org
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it.
Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Evidence Log (1 item)
| Type | Detail | Severity | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks |
robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives | low | Observed |
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No
No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.
Sources scanned (9)
- https://ohg-nagold.de/
- https://ohg-nagold.de/wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery.min.js?ver=3.7.1
- https://ohg-nagold.de/wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery-migrate.min.js?ver=3.4.1
- https://ohg-nagold.de/wp-content/cache/borlabs-cookie/1/borlabs-cookie-config-de.json.js?ver=3.4-55
- https://ohg-nagold.de/wp-content/plugins/borlabs-cookie/assets/javascript/borlabs-cookie.min.js?ver=3.4
- https://ohg-nagold.de/wp-includes/js/dist/hooks.min.js?ver=4d63a3d491d11ffd8ac6
- https://ohg-nagold.de/wp-includes/js/dist/i18n.min.js?ver=5e580eb46a90c2b997e6
- https://ohg-nagold.de/wp-content/plugins/contact-form-7/includes/swv/js/index.js?ver=6.1
- https://ohg-nagold.de/wp-content/plugins/contact-form-7/includes/js/index.js?ver=6.1
What type of scan is this?
This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.
Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.
Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.
DNS Server Security Hardened
No DNS server misconfigurations found on docks12.rzone.de — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.
| Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | Denied | Test inconclusive |
| Open Recursion | Disabled | Test inconclusive |
| Nameserver Identity | Hidden | Test inconclusive |
| Cache Snooping | Protected | Test inconclusive |
Tested nameservers: docks12.rzone.de, shades20.rzone.de
Delegation Consistency 1 Issue
Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.
- Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned
Glue Record Completeness Complete
| Nameserver | In-Bailiwick | IPv4 Glue | IPv6 Glue | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
docks12.rzone.de |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
shades20.rzone.de |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
NS TTL Comparison Drift
SOA Serial Consistency Consistent
docks12.rzone.de: 2.020050719e+09shades20.rzone.de: 2.020050719e+09Nameserver Fleet Matrix 1 Issue
Analyzed 2 nameserver(s) for ohg-nagold.de — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.
- shades20.rzone.de: TCP unreachable on port 53
| Nameserver | IPv4 | IPv6 | ASN / Operator | UDP | TCP | AA | SOA Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
docks12.rzone.de |
217.160.80.139 | 2001:8d8:fe:53:5747:2a74:d:12 | AS8560 | 2020050719 | |||
shades20.rzone.de |
185.132.34.147 | 2607:f1c0:fe:53:185:132:34:147 | AS15418 | 2020050719 |