Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
The following DNS record TTLs deviate from recommended values. Incorrect TTLs can cause caching issues, slow propagation, or unnecessary DNS traffic.
| Record Type | Observed TTL | Typical TTL | Severity | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | 1661s |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | A TTL is below typical — observed 1661s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| NS | 17571s |
1 day (86400s) |
medium | NS TTL is below typical — observed 17571s, typical value is 1 day (86400s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 86400 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| MX | 652s |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | MX TTL is below typical — observed 652s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
| TXT | 1249s |
1 hour (3600s) |
medium | TXT TTL is below typical — observed 1249s, typical value is 1 hour (3600s). Short TTLs increase DNS query volume but enable faster propagation. If you are preparing for a migration or need rapid failover, this may be intentional (RFC 1035 §3.2.1). For steady-state production, consider 3600 seconds per NIST SP 800-53 SI-18 relevance guidance. Use the TTL Tuner for profile-specific recommendations. |
Big Picture Questions
- How often do you actually change this record? If it hasn’t changed in months, a short TTL is generating unnecessary DNS queries without any benefit.
- Are you preparing for a migration or IP change? Short TTLs make sense temporarily — but should be raised back to 1 hour (3600s) once the change is complete.
- Every DNS lookup adds 20–150ms of latency. With a 60s TTL, returning visitors trigger a fresh lookup every minute. With 3600s, they get cached responses for an hour — faster page loads, no extra infrastructure needed.
- Google runs A records at ~30s because they operate a global anycast network and need to steer traffic dynamically. For a typical website without that infrastructure, copying those TTLs increases query volume with zero upside.
ns1-205.azure-dns.com
1
azuredns-hostmaster.microsoft.com
| Timer | Value | RFC 1912 Range |
|---|---|---|
| Refresh | 3600s | 1,200–43,200s (20 min – 12 hrs) |
| Retry | 300s | Fraction of Refresh |
| Expire | 2419200s | 1,209,600–2,419,200s (14–28 days) |
| Minimum (Neg. Cache) | 300s | 300–86,400s (5 min – 1 day) |
Your DMARC policy is monitor-only (p=none). Upgrade to p=quarantine or p=reject after reviewing reports to actively prevent spoofing.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Type | TXT |
| Host | _dmarc.hotmail.com (DMARC policy record) |
| Value | v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@hotmail.com |
DNSSEC is not enabled for this domain. DNSSEC provides cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, preventing cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks.
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Yes DMARC is monitor-only (p=none)
SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Consistent
SPF valid with strict enforcement (-all), 1/10 lookups
DMARC is monitoring only (p=none). -all provides some SPF-level protection, but DMARC isn't enforcing. Adding p=reject and considering ~all for compatibility would be far more effective.
DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Consistent
DMARC in monitoring mode (p=none) - spoofed mail still delivered, no enforcement
pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Consistent
Found DKIM for 1 selector(s) with strong keys (2048-bit)
l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail),
weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3),
DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)
MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Consistent
MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 1 mail server(s)
- Mode:
enforce - Max Age: 7 days (604800 seconds)
- MX Patterns: *.olc.protection.outlook.com
MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.
TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Consistent
TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports
DMARC External Reporting Authorization RFC 7489 §7.1
All 1 external reporting domains properly authorized
| External Domain | Authorization | Auth Record |
|---|---|---|
dmarc.microsoft |
Authorized |
v=DMARC1
|
DANE / TLSA Consistent Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
DANE not available — Microsoft 365 does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure
Microsoft 365 does not support DANE for inbound mail. Microsoft uses its own certificate pinning mechanism.
Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)
Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:
- DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
- MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).
Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked? Likely DMARC is monitor-only p=none (RFC 7489 §6.3) — spoofed mail is not blocked, brand faking is trivial
BIMI BIMI Spec Consistent Warning
No BIMI record found
CAA RFC 8659 §4 Consistent Success
CAA configured - only microsoft.com, GlobalSign, DigiCert can issue certificates
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (security.txt) Is there a verified way to report security issues? Partial RFC 9116
security.txt found but missing required fields
Contact
Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.3)Expires
Missing (required by RFC 9116 §2.5.5)AI Surface Scanner Beta Is this domain discoverable by AI — and protected from abuse? Yes
AI governance signals observed
llms.txt llmstxt.org
AI Crawler Governance (robots.txt) RFC 9309 IETF Draft
Content-Usage Directive IETF Draft
Content-Usage: directive for robots.txt that lets site owners declare whether their content may be used for AI training and inference. This is an active draft, not yet a ratified standard.
Content-Usage: ai=no to robots.txt to deny AI training, or Content-Usage: ai=allow to explicitly permit it.
Without this directive, AI crawler behavior depends on individual crawler policies and User-agent rules.
AI Recommendation Poisoning
Hidden Prompt Artifacts
Evidence Log (3 items)
| Type | Detail | Severity | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
llms_txt_found |
llms.txt file found providing structured LLM context | info | Observed |
llms_full_txt_found |
llms-full.txt also found (extended LLM context) | info | Observed |
robots_txt_no_ai_blocks |
robots.txt found but no AI-specific blocking directives | low | Observed |
Public Exposure Checks Are sensitive files or secrets exposed? No
No exposed secrets detected in public page source — same-origin, non-intrusive scan of publicly visible page source and scripts.
Sources scanned (1)
- https://hotmail.com/
What type of scan is this?
This is OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) collection — we check the same publicly accessible URLs that any web browser could visit. No authentication is bypassed, no ports are probed, no vulnerabilities are exploited.
Is this a PCI compliance scan? No. PCI DSS requires scans performed by an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) certified by the PCI Security Standards Council. DNS Tool is not an ASV. If you need PCI compliance scanning, engage a certified ASV such as Qualys, Tenable, or Trustwave.
Is this a penetration test? No. Penetration testing involves active exploitation attempts against systems with authorization. Our checks are passive observation of publicly accessible resources — the same methodology used by Shodan, Mozilla Observatory, and other OSINT platforms.
DNS Server Security Hardened
No DNS server misconfigurations found on ns1-205.azure-dns.com — Nmap NSE probes for zone transfer (AXFR), open recursion (RFC 5358), nameserver identity disclosure, and DNS cache snooping.
| Check | Result | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Zone Transfer (AXFR) | Denied | Test inconclusive |
| Open Recursion | Disabled | Test inconclusive |
| Nameserver Identity | Hidden | Test inconclusive |
| Cache Snooping | Protected | Test inconclusive |
Tested nameservers: ns1-205.azure-dns.com, ns2-205.azure-dns.net, ns4-205.azure-dns.info, ns3-205.azure-dns.org
Delegation Consistency 1 Issue
Delegation consistency: 1 issue(s) found — Parent/child NS delegation alignment: DS↔DNSKEY, glue records, TTL drift, SOA serial sync.
- Could not retrieve NS TTL from parent zone
DS ↔ DNSKEY Alignment Aligned
Glue Record Completeness Complete
| Nameserver | In-Bailiwick | IPv4 Glue | IPv6 Glue | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ns1-205.azure-dns.com |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
ns2-205.azure-dns.net |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
ns3-205.azure-dns.org |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
ns4-205.azure-dns.info |
No | N/A | N/A | OK |
NS TTL Comparison Drift
SOA Serial Consistency Consistent
ns1-205.azure-dns.com: 1ns2-205.azure-dns.net: 1ns3-205.azure-dns.org: 1ns4-205.azure-dns.info: 1Nameserver Fleet Matrix Healthy
Analyzed 4 nameserver(s) for hotmail.com — Per-nameserver reachability, ASN diversity, SOA serial sync, and lame delegation checks.
| Nameserver | IPv4 | IPv6 | ASN / Operator | UDP | TCP | AA | SOA Serial |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ns3-205.azure-dns.org |
204.14.183.205 | 2a01:111:4000:700::cd |
AS8075
Microsoft Corporation |
1 | |||
ns1-205.azure-dns.com |
13.107.236.205 | 2603:1061:0:700::cd |
AS8075
Microsoft Corporation |
1 | |||
ns4-205.azure-dns.info |
208.84.5.205 | 2620:1ec:bda:700::cd |
AS8075
Microsoft Corporation |
1 | |||
ns2-205.azure-dns.net |
150.171.21.205 | 2620:1ec:8ec:700::cd |
AS8075
Microsoft Corporation |
1 |