Skip to main content
DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 10 Feb 2026, 22:28 UTC
Duration 1.9s
Integrity 739db2f56b93b82402ac0f9133e74911431e0f2c17a1636db55c9d30b2b8472f51d81f11d185277a21303b87a16c151605b139ee34c8827c28f0613e895fa453
Subject Domain
2911.us

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

2911.us
10 Feb 2026, 22:28 UTC · 1.9s · SHA-3-512: 739d✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Medium Risk
5 protocols configured, 2 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
1 action required 2 recommendations
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Protected
Certificate Control
Open
Action Required
No DKIM found
Recommended
SPF uses ~all (softfail) — consider -all (hardfail) for stricter enforcement per RFC 7208 §5, No CAA records
Configured
SPF (~all), DMARC (reject), MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, DNSSEC
Not Configured
DKIM, CAA
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
High Configure DKIM signing

DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) adds a cryptographic signature to outgoing emails, proving they haven't been tampered with. Enable DKIM in your email provider's settings.

selector1._domainkey.yourdomain.com TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=<public_key>"
RFC 6376 §3.6
Medium Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com).

yourdomain.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659 §4
Low Upgrade SPF to hard fail (-all)

Your SPF record uses ~all (softfail), which asks receivers to accept but flag unauthorized senders. Upgrading to -all (hardfail) instructs receivers to reject unauthorized senders outright. Verify all legitimate sending sources are included before switching. Note: if you later enable DMARC enforcement (p=reject or p=quarantine) with DKIM, ~all becomes acceptable because DMARC evaluates both SPF and DKIM alignment before making decisions (RFC 7489 §10.1).

yourdomain.com TXT "v=spf1 include:servers.mcsv.net include:_spf.google.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all"
RFC 7208 §5
Low Configure BIMI brand logo

Publish a BIMI DNS record pointing to your brand logo (SVG Tiny PS format). For full support in Gmail, you will also need a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC).

default._bimi.yourdomain.com TXT "v=BIMI1; l=https://yourdomain.com/logo.svg"
BIMI Spec
Registrar (WHOIS) LIVE
GoDaddy.com, LLC (Registrant: Jeremy Westby)
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Unknown
Email: Enabled
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
GoDaddy
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? Partially
Verdict: Partial email authentication configured — some spoofed messages may be delivered.

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 3/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 3/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:servers.mcsv.net include:_spf.google.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.
Upgrade SPF to hard fail (-all):
yourdomain.com TXT "v=spf1 include:servers.mcsv.net include:_spf.google.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all"

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400
Alignment: SPF relaxed DKIM relaxed sp=reject
Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these
Reported to Mailhardener
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Third-party only
Third-Party Only

Found DKIM for 2 selector(s) but none for primary mail platform (Microsoft 365)

DKIM verified for MailChimp only — no DKIM found for primary mail platform (Microsoft 365). The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
k1._domainkey MailChimp
k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i89sA2guU0ta4UX1Xzm06XIU6iBP41VwmPwBGRNofhBVR+e6WHUoNyIR4Bn84LVcfZE20rmDeXQblIupNWBqLXM1Q+VieI/eZu/7k9/vOkLSaQQdml4Cv8lb3PcnluMVIhQIDAQAB;
k2._domainkey MailChimp
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv2aC2KjGKLOwTweBY5A9RpjsxaBXR9r7OAU6U8/zn92ivImI75naUujWbItRI/QmL1jy5PWGqLwoUA0b90ObWaLDc+i9MtTNmGeWO009hr20fIxhGg6XBT2kjZ1DTThopSe1nAndsupmcBwlQ5Q6LJ+ZAxLcujnPIxM0ZBLmgpkv8u6RfY4eFP8OLvdAW3oSuB0DyLDigQX4Sj8wBO4YIdQH6AAmBeOsidsKAFNFUCpc3vCxtBDR12U+cBg724l3sBkMQ8evnz6idnqxq9QAVYh8k4kJ+RP+6cqTdy7LjIm8xY/bQNpQIpGUAuDo2DjLcCDun9DAI4Q/3z+Q0o9QuQIDAQAB;
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 2 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=20260209185352
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 14 days (1209600 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net, west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net
Hosted by Mailhardener

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com
Reported to Mailhardener

Email Security Management Actively Managed

Intelligence: This domain uses dedicated email security management — indicating continuous monitoring and professional oversight, not a "set and forget" configuration. Reporting destinations reveal the operational security partner network, and we extract that intelligence directly from DNS.
Mailhardener
DMARC TLS-RPT MTA-STS Dynamic services
DMARC aggregate (rua) and forensic (ruf) reports
TLS-RPT delivery reports
MTA-STS policy hosting
Dynamic services (Dynamic MTA-STS)
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Configured

No DANE/TLSA records found (checked 2 MX hosts)

DANE (RFC 7672) binds TLS certificates to DNSSEC-signed DNS records, protecting email transport against man-in-the-middle attacks and rogue CAs. It is the primary transport security standard — MTA-STS (RFC 8461) was created as the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC. Over 1 million domains use DANE globally, including Microsoft Exchange Online, Proton Mail, and Fastmail. Best practice: deploy both for defense in depth.
Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS without DANE. MTA-STS provides transport security through HTTPS-based policy (RFC 8461), but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use. Adding DANE (RFC 7672) would provide cryptographic certificate pinning independent of certificate authorities.

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: No brand protection configured. Any CA can issue certificates and no brand logo verification in place.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Signed ECDSA P-256/SHA-256

DNSSEC fully configured and validated — AD (Authenticated Data) flag set by resolver 8.8.8.8 confirming cryptographic chain of trust from root to zone (RFC 4035 §3.2.3)

Chain of trust: Root → TLD → Domain. DNS responses are authenticated and tamper-proof.
AD Flag: Validated - Resolver (8.8.8.8) confirmed cryptographic signatures
DS Record (at registrar):
40611 13 2 24284E985302282351AA791F81059E778C5B93ED4EA9536EB68832C9599CF6DB
17048 13 2 3FCCDEBAFA765AF4F6254CED78E58635944DC88C76A3E82FDDA2DF68A09ECF78

NS Delegation Verified

2 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: pdns01.domaincontrol.com pdns02.domaincontrol.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Consensus reached - 4 resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) agree on DNS records
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

23.185.0.3
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

2620:12a:8000::3
2620:12a:8001::3
IPv6 ready

MXMail Servers

10 west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net.
0 east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net.
Priority + mail server for email delivery

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (1 IPv4, 2 IPv6) Mail: 2 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 3 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup
CT logs unavailable current expired Source: Certificate Transparency Logs
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
CT Log Expired — 12 — —
CT Log Expired — 16 — —
CT Log Expired — 108 — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: MTA-STS Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 1 / 1 records
23.185.0.3
23.185.0.3
AAAA Synchronized 2 / 2 records
2620:12a:8000::3
2620:12a:8000::3
2620:12a:8001::3
2620:12a:8001::3
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.2911.us RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; sp=reject; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400
MTA-STS _mta-sts.2911.us RFC 8461 §3 Propagating 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1; id=20260209185352
2911.us._mta-sts.mailhardener.com.
MX RFC 5321 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
10 west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net.
0 east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net.
0 east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net.
10 west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 2 / 2 records
pdns02.domaincontrol.com.
pdns01.domaincontrol.com.
pdns01.domaincontrol.com.
pdns02.domaincontrol.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
pdns01.domaincontrol.com. dns.jomax.net. 2026021001 28800 7200 604800 600
pdns01.domaincontrol.com. dns.jomax.net. 2026021001 28800 7200 604800 600
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.2911.us RFC 8460 §3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:81a9c434@in.mailhardener.com
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 5 / 5 records
facebook-domain-verification=rtkwfzcjtrjgnz02y6nz0btld5a9q1
openai-domain-verification=dv-8fTZweKgrwn7udZbUlatxIuV
MS=ms63238513
google-site-verification=cnKBmgtuqnLMn2LbH_RbjL3OfRZMzVJgA8YiGZwauJo
openai-domain-verification=dv-8fTZweKgrwn7udZbUlatxIuV
v=spf1 include:servers.mcsv.net include:_spf.google.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all
v=spf1 include:servers.mcsv.net include:_spf.google.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all
facebook-domain-verification=rtkwfzcjtrjgnz02y6nz0btld5a9q1
google-site-verification=cnKBmgtuqnLMn2LbH_RbjL3OfRZMzVJgA8YiGZwauJo
MS=ms63238513
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

739db2f56b93b82402ac0f9133e74911431e0f2c17a1636db55c9d30b2b8472f51d81f11d185277a21303b87a16c151605b139ee34c8827c28f0613e895fa453
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 10 Feb 2026, 22:28 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-2911.us.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-2911.us.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-2911.us.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-2911.us.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/554/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for 2911.us. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short 2911.us TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' RFC 6376 
dig +short k1._domainkey.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' RFC 6376 
dig +short k2._domainkey.2911.us TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer 2911.us DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd 2911.us A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net TLSA
Check TLSA record for east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net:25 -servername west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.2911.us TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.2911.us/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.2911.us TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.2911.us TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/2911.us' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net:25 -servername west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.2911.us&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://2911.us/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://2911.us/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://2911.us/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.185.0.3 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 3.0.185.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4858 runs
DKIM
Verified 4677 runs
DMARC
Verified 4842 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4661 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4839 runs
BIMI
Verified 4676 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4679 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4681 runs
CAA
Verified 4673 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short 2911.us TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k1._domainkey.2911.us TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'k2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short k2._domainkey.2911.us TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer 2911.us DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd 2911.us A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net TLSA
Check TLSA record for east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.east.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net:25 -servername west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.2911.us TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.2911.us/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.2911.us TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.2911.us TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer 2911.us CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/2911.us' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net:25 -servername west.smtp.mx.o365.serverdata.net </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.2911.us&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://2911.us/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://2911.us/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://2911.us/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 23.185.0.3 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 3.0.185.23.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

2911.us

0s
DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.