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DNS Tool
Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report
Generated 10 Feb 2026, 19:47 UTC
Duration 20.6s
Integrity a702f27a1b84647a42bef63a0905a90504665312165d2542ca01a7b70f37909da7bc696b04f68de1cba341e51ea989c63099c8948cef2bbe0e035b72065e1902
Subject Domain
natashabedingfield.com

Engineer's DNS Intelligence Report

natashabedingfield.com
10 Feb 2026, 19:47 UTC · 20.6s · SHA-3-512: a702✱✱✱✱ Verify
Executive Methodology
Recon Mode Snapshot Re-analyze New Domain
Footprint Google Workspace
DNS Security & Trust Posture
Risk Level: Low Risk
5 protocols configured, 2 not configured Why we go beyond letter grades
2 recommendations
Suggested Scanner Configuration High Confidence
Based on 20 historical scans of this domain
Parameter Current Suggested Severity Rationale
timeout_seconds 5s 8s low Average scan duration is 30.6s, suggesting DNS responses are slow for this domain. Increasing timeout from 5s to 8s prevents premature resolution failures.
RFC 8767
Suggestions require explicit approval before applying. No automatic changes will be made.
Email Spoofing
Protected
Brand Impersonation
Not Setup
DNS Tampering
Unsigned
Certificate Control
Open
Recommended
SPF uses ~all (softfail) — consider -all (hardfail) for stricter enforcement per RFC 7208 §5, No CAA records
Configured
SPF (~all), DMARC (reject), DKIM (provider-verified), MTA-STS, TLS-RPT
Not Configured
CAA, DNSSEC
Priority Actions 4 total Achievable posture: Low Risk
Medium Add CAA records

Publish CAA DNS records to restrict which Certificate Authorities can issue TLS certificates for your domain. Specify your preferred CA (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com).

yourdomain.com CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
RFC 8659 §4
Low Upgrade SPF to hard fail (-all)

Your SPF record uses ~all (softfail), which asks receivers to accept but flag unauthorized senders. Upgrading to -all (hardfail) instructs receivers to reject unauthorized senders outright. Verify all legitimate sending sources are included before switching.

yourdomain.com TXT "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com -all"
RFC 7208 §5
Low Enable DNSSEC

DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) cryptographically signs DNS responses, preventing attackers from forging DNS answers. Contact your DNS hosting provider to enable DNSSEC signing.

RFC 4033 §2
Low Configure BIMI brand logo

Publish a BIMI DNS record pointing to your brand logo (SVG Tiny PS format). For full support in Gmail, you will also need a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC).

default._bimi.yourdomain.com TXT "v=BIMI1; l=https://yourdomain.com/logo.svg"
BIMI Spec
Registrar (RDAP) LIVE
DNC Holdings, Inc.
Where domain was purchased
Email Service Provider
Google Workspace
Email: Enforced
Web Hosting
Unknown
Where website is hosted
DNS Hosting
Unknown
Where DNS records are edited
Email Security Methodology Can this domain be impersonated by email? No
Verdict: DMARC policy is reject — spoofed messages will be blocked by receiving servers. DKIM keys verified (provider-verified for Google Workspace).

SPF Record RFC 7208 §4 Verified

Does this domain declare who may send email on its behalf? Yes
Success ~all 1/10 lookups

SPF valid with industry-standard soft fail (~all), 1/10 lookups

v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
RFC 7208 Conformant — This SPF record conforms to the syntax and semantics defined in RFC 7208 §4.
RFC Failure Mode: Unlike DMARC (where unknown tags are silently ignored per RFC 7489 §6.3), SPF with unrecognized mechanisms produces a PermError per RFC 7208 §4.6 — the record fails loudly rather than silently.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant domain spoofing), CVE-2024-7209 (shared SPF exploitation), CVE-2023-51764 (SMTP smuggling bypasses SPF)
~all is the industry standard. Google, Apple, and most providers default to soft fail. CISA (BOD 18-01) and RFC 7489 confirm that DMARC policy — not SPF alone — is the primary enforcement control. Using ~all allows DKIM to be evaluated before a DMARC decision is made. This domain uses ~all + DMARC reject: the strongest compatible security stance, aligned with CISA and RFC guidance.
Upgrade SPF to hard fail (-all):
yourdomain.com TXT "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com -all"

DMARC Policy RFC 7489 §6.3 Verified

Are spoofed emails rejected or quarantined? Yes — reject policy
Success p=reject

DMARC policy reject (100%) - excellent protection

v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s; pct=100; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400; rua=mailto:26f7866a@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:26f7866a@in.mailhardener.com
Alignment: SPF strict DKIM strict sp=reject
Forensic reports (ruf) configured - many providers ignore these
Reported to Mailhardener
RFC 7489 Conformant — DMARC record conforms to RFC 7489 §6.3 with full enforcement.
DMARCbis (Pending): draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis will elevate DMARC to Standards Track, obsolete RFC 7489, replace pct= with t= (testing flag), add np= (non-existent subdomain policy), and mandate DNS tree walk for policy discovery instead of the Public Suffix List.
Related CVEs: CVE-2024-49040 (Exchange sender spoofing), CVE-2024-7208 (multi-tenant DMARC bypass)

DKIM Records RFC 6376 §3.6 Verified

Are outbound emails cryptographically signed? Provider-managed
Provider Verified

DKIM not discoverable via common selectors (large providers use rotating selectors)

Google Workspace detected as primary mail platform — DKIM signing is managed by the provider. The primary provider may use custom selectors not discoverable through standard checks.
Know your DKIM selector? Re-scan with a custom selector to verify.
RFC 6376 (Provider-Managed) — DKIM signing managed by the detected mail provider per RFC 6376.
Known Vulnerabilities: DKIM l= tag body length vulnerability (attacker appends unsigned content to signed mail), weak key exploitation (keys below 1024-bit are cryptographically breakable per RFC 6376 §3.3.3), DKIM replay attacks (re-sending legitimately signed messages at scale)

MTA-STS RFC 8461 §3 Verified

Can attackers downgrade SMTP to intercept mail? No — TLS enforced
Success ENFORCE Policy Verified

MTA-STS enforced - TLS required for 6 mail server(s)

v=STSv1; id=20190601000000Z
Policy Details:
  • Mode: enforce
  • Max Age: 7 days (604800 seconds)
  • MX Patterns: aspmx.l.google.com, alt1.aspmx.l.google.com, alt2.aspmx.l.google.com, alt3.aspmx.l.google.com, alt4.aspmx.l.google.com, 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.google.com
Hosted by Mailhardener

MTA-STS policy enforcement is evaluated in Mail Transport Security below.

TLS-RPT RFC 8460 §3 Verified

Will failures in TLS delivery be reported? Yes — reports configured
Success

TLS-RPT configured - receiving TLS delivery reports

v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsrpt@in.mailhardener.com
Reported to Mailhardener

Email Security Management Actively Managed

Intelligence: This domain uses dedicated email security management — indicating continuous monitoring and professional oversight, not a "set and forget" configuration. Reporting destinations reveal the operational security partner network, and we extract that intelligence directly from DNS.
Mailhardener
DMARC TLS-RPT MTA-STS Dynamic services
DMARC aggregate (rua) and forensic (ruf) reports
TLS-RPT delivery reports
MTA-STS policy hosting
Dynamic services (Dynamic MTA-STS, Dynamic TLS-RPT)
DANE / TLSA Verified Recon Methodology Can mail servers establish identity without a public CA? via MTA-STS (CA)
RFC 7672 §3 RFC 6698 §2 Not Available

DANE not available — Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE/TLSA on its MX infrastructure

DANE not deployable on Google Workspace

Google Workspace supports DANE for outbound mail verification but does not publish TLSA records for its MX hosts.

Recommended alternative: MTA-STS (already configured)

Note: Google Workspace does validate DANE/TLSA when sending mail to DANE-enabled recipients (outbound DANE).

Email Transport Security

Two mechanisms protect email in transit. DANE is the primary standard; MTA-STS is the alternative for domains that cannot deploy DNSSEC:

  • DNSSEC + DANE (RFC 7672) — Cryptographic chain of trust from DNS root to mail server certificate. Eliminates reliance on certificate authorities. No trust-on-first-use weakness. Requires DNSSEC.
  • MTA-STS (RFC 8461) — HTTPS-based policy requiring TLS for mail delivery. Works without DNSSEC but relies on CA trust and is vulnerable on first use (§10). Created for domains where “deploying DNSSEC is undesirable or impractical” (§2).
This domain uses MTA-STS — the best available option for Google Workspace. Since Google Workspace does not support inbound DANE, MTA-STS is the strongest transport security this domain can deploy. MTA-STS enforces TLS via HTTPS-based policy, protecting against downgrade attacks (RFC 8461).

Industry trend: Microsoft Exchange Online enforces inbound DANE with DNSSEC (GA October 2024), and providers like Proton Mail and Fastmail also support DANE. Google Workspace does not support DANE and relies on MTA-STS. Both mechanisms coexist because DANE is backward-compatible — senders skip the check if the domain isn't DNSSEC-signed (RFC 7672 §1.3).

Brand Security Can this brand be convincingly faked?
Verdict: No brand protection configured. Any CA can issue certificates and no brand logo verification in place.

BIMI BIMI Spec Verified Warning

Is the brand identity verified and displayed in inboxes? No

No BIMI record found

CAA RFC 8659 §4 Verified Warning

Does this domain restrict who can issue TLS certificates? No

No CAA records found - any CA can issue certificates

Domain Security Methodology Can DNS responses be tampered with in transit?

DNSSEC RFC 4033 §2 Verified Unsigned

DNSSEC not configured - DNS responses are unsigned

Domain does not use DNSSEC. Enable in your registrar's DNS settings (look for "DNSSEC" or "DS records" section).

NS Delegation Verified

4 nameserver(s) configured

Nameservers: ns0.directnic.com ns1.directnic.com ns2.directnic.com ns3.directnic.com
Multi-Resolver Verification Recon: Discrepancy detected - Some resolvers returned different results (1 difference found)
Resolver Differences:
MX: OpenDNS returned different results: [1 aspmx.l.google.com. 10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com. 10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com. 15 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.google.com. 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com. 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com.]
This may indicate DNS propagation in progress or geo-based DNS routing.
Traffic & Routing Where does this domain's traffic actually terminate?

AIPv4 Address

198.185.159.145
198.49.23.144
198.185.159.144
198.49.23.145
Where the domain points for web traffic

AAAAIPv6 Address

No AAAA records
IPv6 not configured

MXMail Servers

15 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com.
1 ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
5 ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
10 ALT3.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
10 ALT4.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
5 ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
Priority + mail server for email delivery
Google Workspace

SRVServices

No SRV records
No service-specific routing configured
Web: Reachable (4 IPv4, 0 IPv6) Mail: 6 servers Services: None
Subdomain Discovery RFC 6962 Recon LIVE What subdomains and infrastructure are exposed in certificate logs? 2 subdomains discovered
How did we find these?
Certificate Transparency Logs Unavailable The results below are from DNS probing only and may be significantly incomplete. CT logs typically reveal hundreds or thousands of additional subdomains via certificate issuance history (RFC 6962).
Re-Analyze to Retry CT Lookup
269 certificates analyzed current expired Source: Certificate Transparency Logs
Subdomain Source Status Provider / CNAME Certificates First Seen Issuer(s)
CT Log Expired — 28 — —
CT Log Expired — 121 — —
Export Recon (CSV)
Δ Changes Detected: MTA-STS MX TLS-RPT Resolver ≠ Authoritative (TTL / CDN rotation / recent change)
Risk: Low - typically resolves within TTL
DNS Intelligence What does DNS look like right now — and what changed over time?
DNS Evidence Diff Side-by-side comparison
Resolver Records (Public DNS cache)
Authoritative Records (Source of truth)
A Synchronized 4 / 4 records
198.185.159.145
198.185.159.144
198.49.23.144
198.49.23.145
198.185.159.144
198.185.159.145
198.49.23.145
198.49.23.144
AAAA 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
CAA RFC 8659 §4 0 / 0 records
No records
No records
DMARC _dmarc.natashabedingfield.com RFC 7489 §6.3 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s; pct=100; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400; rua=mailto:26f7866a@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:26f7866a@in.mailhardener.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s; pct=100; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400; rua=mailto:26f7866a@in.mailhardener.com; ruf=mailto:26f7866a@in.mailhardener.com
MTA-STS _mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com RFC 8461 §3 Propagating 1 / 1 records
v=STSv1; id=20190601000000Z
natashabedingfield.com._mta-sts.mailhardener.com.
MX RFC 5321 Propagating 6 / 6 records
15 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com.
15 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.google.com.
1 ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
5 ALT2.ASPMX.L.google.com.
5 ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
5 ALT1.ASPMX.L.google.com.
10 ALT3.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
10 ALT3.ASPMX.L.google.com.
10 ALT4.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
1 ASPMX.L.google.com.
5 ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com.
10 ALT4.ASPMX.L.google.com.
NS RFC 1035 Synchronized 4 / 4 records
ns1.directnic.com.
ns3.directnic.com.
ns3.directnic.com.
ns2.directnic.com.
ns2.directnic.com.
ns0.directnic.com.
ns0.directnic.com.
ns1.directnic.com.
SOA RFC 1035 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
ns0.directnic.com. hostmaster.directnic.com. 2014011513 28800 14400 604800 600
ns0.directnic.com. hostmaster.directnic.com. 2014011513 28800 14400 604800 600
TLS-RPT _smtp._tls.natashabedingfield.com RFC 8460 §3 Propagating 1 / 1 records
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tlsrpt@in.mailhardener.com
natashabedingfield.com._smtp._tls.mailhardener.com.
TXT RFC 7208 §4 Synchronized 1 / 1 records
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
DNS History Timeline BETA
Your key is sent directly to SecurityTrails and is never stored on our servers. Get an API key
DNS History Timeline BETA

When was a record added, removed, or changed — and could that change be the problem?

Analyze Another Domain

Confirm Your Email Configuration

This tool analyzes DNS records, but to verify actual email delivery, send a test email to Red Sift Investigate. Their tool shows exactly how your emails arrive, including SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass/fail results in the headers.

DATA FRESHNESS & METHODOLOGY

All security-critical records (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA) are queried live from authoritative nameservers and cross-referenced against 5 independent public DNS resolvers (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU) at the time of each analysis. No security verdict uses cached data.

Registrar data (RDAP) is cached for up to 24 hours because domain ownership and registration details change infrequently. Certificate Transparency logs (subdomain discovery via RFC 6962) are cached for 1 hour because CT entries are append-only historical records. Sections using cached data are marked with a CACHED badge; live queries show LIVE.

Intelligence Sources

This analysis used 4 DNS resolvers (consensus), reverse DNS (PTR), Team Cymru (ASN attribution), IANA RDAP (registrar), crt.sh (CT logs), and SMTP probing (transport). All using open-standard protocols.

Full List
Verify Report Integrity SHA-3-512 Has this report been altered since generation? Verify below

This cryptographic hash seals the analysis data, domain, timestamp, and tool version into a tamper-evident fingerprint. Any modification to the report data will produce a different hash. This is distinct from the posture hash (used for drift detection) — the integrity hash uniquely identifies this specific report instance.

a702f27a1b84647a42bef63a0905a90504665312165d2542ca01a7b70f37909da7bc696b04f68de1cba341e51ea989c63099c8948cef2bbe0e035b72065e1902
Evaluations reference 12 RFCs. Methods are reproducible using the verification commands provided. Results reflect DNS state at 10 Feb 2026, 19:47 UTC.
Download Raw Intelligence Download Checksum (.sha3)

Download the intelligence dump and verify its integrity, like you would a Kali ISO or any critical artifact. The SHA-3-512 checksum covers every byte of the download — deterministic serialization ensures identical hashes across downloads.

After downloading, verify with any of these commands:

Tip: cd ~/Downloads first (or wherever you saved the files).

OpenSSL + Sidecar (macOS, Linux, WSL) 
cat dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.com.json.sha3 && echo '---' && openssl dgst -sha3-512 dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.com.json
Python 3 (cross-platform) 
python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha3_512(open('dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.com.json','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
sha3sum (coreutils 9+) 
sha3sum -a 512 dns-intelligence-natashabedingfield.com.json
Compare the output against the .sha3 file or the checksum API at /api/analysis/543/checksum. Hash algorithm: SHA-3-512 (Keccak, NIST FIPS 202).

Every finding in this report is backed by DNS queries you can run yourself. These vetted one-liners reproduce the exact checks used to build this report for natashabedingfield.com. Our analysis adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing — but the underlying data is always independently verifiable. We are intelligence analysts, not gatekeepers.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com NS
Query TXT records RFC 1035 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record RFC 7208 
dig +short natashabedingfield.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy RFC 7489 
dig +short _dmarc.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' RFC 6376 
dig +short default._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' RFC 6376 
dig +short google._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' RFC 6376 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records RFC 4035 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) RFC 4035 
dig +dnssec +cd natashabedingfield.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for ALT3.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT3.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for ALT4.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT4.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com RFC 7672 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com) RFC 6698 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com:25 -servername 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record RFC 8461 
dig +short _mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file RFC 8461 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record RFC 8460 
dig +short _smtp._tls.natashabedingfield.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record BIMI Draft 
dig +short default._bimi.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) RFC 8659 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records RFC 9460 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records RFC 7344 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup RFC 9083 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/natashabedingfield.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com) RFC 3207 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com:25 -servername 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs RFC 6962 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.natashabedingfield.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt RFC 9116 
curl -sL https://natashabedingfield.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://natashabedingfield.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://natashabedingfield.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 198.185.159.145 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 145.159.185.198.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 198.49.23.144 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 144.23.49.198.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Commands use dig, openssl, and curl — standard tools available on macOS, Linux, and WSL. Results may vary slightly due to DNS propagation timing and resolver caching.
Intelligence Confidence Audit Engine Verified · 9/9 Evaluated
How confident are these results? Each protocol is independently verified against RFC standards. No self-awarded badges.
SPF
Verified 4874 runs
DKIM
Verified 4692 runs
DMARC
Verified 4857 runs
DANE/TLSA
Verified 4676 runs
DNSSEC
Verified 4855 runs
BIMI
Verified 4691 runs
MTA-STS
Verified 4694 runs
TLS-RPT
Verified 4696 runs
CAA
Verified 4688 runs
Maturity: Development → Verified → Consistent → Gold → Gold Master

Appendix: Verification Commands

The core DNS queries behind this report can be independently verified using these standard terminal commands (dig, openssl, curl). DNS Tool adds multi-resolver consensus, RFC-based evaluation, and cross-referencing on top of the raw data shown here.

DNS Records

Query A records (IPv4) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com A
Query AAAA records (IPv6) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com AAAA
Query MX records (mail servers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com MX
Query NS records (nameservers) (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com NS
Query TXT records (RFC 1035) 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com TXT

Email Authentication

Check SPF record (RFC 7208) 
dig +short natashabedingfield.com TXT | grep -i spf
Check DMARC policy (RFC 7489) 
dig +short _dmarc.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'default' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short default._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'google' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short google._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector1' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector1._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Check DKIM key for selector 'selector2' (RFC 6376) 
dig +short selector2._domainkey.natashabedingfield.com TXT

Domain Security

Check DNSSEC DNSKEY records (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com DNSKEY
Check DNSSEC DS records (RFC 4035) 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com DS
Validate DNSSEC chain (requires DNSSEC-validating resolver) (RFC 4035) 
dig +dnssec +cd natashabedingfield.com A @1.1.1.1

Transport Security

Check TLSA record for 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for ALT3.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT3.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for ALT4.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT4.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Check TLSA record for ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com (RFC 7672) 
dig +noall +answer _25._tcp.ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com TLSA
Verify TLS certificate on primary MX (4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com) (RFC 6698) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com:25 -servername 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -subject -dates
Check MTA-STS DNS record (RFC 8461) 
dig +short _mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Fetch MTA-STS policy file (RFC 8461) 
curl -sL https://mta-sts.natashabedingfield.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
Check TLS-RPT record (RFC 8460) 
dig +short _smtp._tls.natashabedingfield.com TXT

Brand & Trust

Check BIMI record (BIMI Draft) 
dig +short default._bimi.natashabedingfield.com TXT
Check CAA records (certificate authority authorization) (RFC 8659) 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com CAA

DNS Records

Check HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com HTTPS

Domain Security

Check CDS/CDNSKEY automation records (RFC 7344) 
dig +noall +answer natashabedingfield.com CDS

Infrastructure Intelligence

RDAP domain registration lookup (RFC 9083) 
curl -sL 'https://rdap.org/domain/natashabedingfield.com' | python3 -m json.tool | head -50

Transport Security

Test STARTTLS on primary MX (4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com) (RFC 3207) 
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com:25 -servername 4ow6suswpj5k6rzd752lfuyt6qb7cfkxbdfacwuofbcc6zavzxxa.mx-verification.GOOGLE.com </dev/null 2>/dev/null | head -5

Infrastructure Intelligence

Search Certificate Transparency logs (RFC 6962) 
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.natashabedingfield.com&output=json' | python3 -c "import json,sys; [print(e['name_value']) for e in json.load(sys.stdin)]" | sort -u | head -20
Check security.txt (RFC 9116) 
curl -sL https://natashabedingfield.com/.well-known/security.txt | head -20

AI Surface

Check for llms.txt 
curl -sI https://natashabedingfield.com/llms.txt | head -5
Check robots.txt for AI crawler rules 
curl -s https://natashabedingfield.com/robots.txt | grep -i -E 'GPTBot|ChatGPT|Claude|Anthropic|Google-Extended|CCBot|PerplexityBot'

Infrastructure Intelligence

ASN lookup for 198.185.159.145 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 145.159.185.198.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
ASN lookup for 198.49.23.144 (Team Cymru) 
dig +short 144.23.49.198.origin.asn.cymru.com TXT
Running Multi-Source Intelligence Audit

natashabedingfield.com

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DNS records — Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, OpenDNS, DNS4EU
Email auth — SPF, DMARC, DKIM selectors
DNSSEC chain of trust & DANE/TLSA
Certificate Transparency & subdomain discovery
SMTP transport & STARTTLS verification
MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, CAA
Registrar & infrastructure analysis
Intelligence Classification & Interpretation

Every result includes terminal commands you can run to independently verify the underlying data. No proprietary magic.